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Chapter 5. LANCHESTER ATTRITION-RATE COEFFICIENTS
5.1. General Considerations.
For applying any kind of LANCHESTER-type combat model to study a
particular hypothesized combat engagement in a defense-planning study, one
must be able to predict the rates at which weapon systems would inflict and
sustain casualties. In other words, one must be able to compute a reliable
numerical value for the loss rate of each and every weapon-system type on
the battlefield. This capability is essential for utilizing LANCHESTER-
type models of warfare in combat analyses. Thus, in this chapter we will
consider methods for predicting LANCHESTER attrition rates and, in par-
ticular, the coefficients that portray these rates.
Two approaches that have been developed and used to predict loss
rates for LANCHESTER-type combat models are based on using
(Al) an analytical submodel of the attrition process for the
particular target type1
and (A2) a statistical estimate based on "combat" data generated by
a detailed Monte Carlo combat simulation2
Ja this chapter we will examine each of these approaches in detail. For
now, however, let us say a few general words about each of them.
S. BONDER (15] has called the first approach (Al) the use of a
freestanding or independent analytical model, since this type of analytical
model can be run independently of any detailed Monte Carlo simulation of
the same combat process. The basic conceptual idea is to develop an
analytical expression for every required kill rate by considering a single
firer engaging a "passive" target (i.e. one that doesn't fire back) and
then to "tie all the attrition rates together" with a LANCHESTER-type
model. One designs such a model to use the same types of inputs as used
1
by Monte Carlo simulations of the the same combat process. Hopefully, the
freestanding analytical model will predict similar outputs in an efficient
and easily interpretable manner. An example of such an independent analyti-
cal model is the BONDER/IUA differential model, which was first used in
the United States in 1969 (15], and the many subsequently enrichL|. versions
of it (see Section 1.3 above). BONDER and FARRELL [17] have reported ex-
cellent agreement between outputs from the BONDER/IUA model and a cor-
responding Monte Carlo simulation.
The second approach (A2) has been called by BONDER [15] the use of
a fitted-parameter analytical model. The basic idea here for predicting
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients is to statistically estimate the
parameters of the loss rate for each type of weapon system from the output
of a high-resolution Monte Carlo combat simulation. This idea is ap-
parently due to G. CLARK (24] and is schematically shown in Figure 5.1.
Thus, the fitted parameter analytical model must be used in conjunction
with a Monte Carlo simulation (or appropriate data from the actual process .
The data or outputs of the simulaticn are used to fit one or more free
parameters in the analytical model so that the analytical model will (at
least) duplicate and (hopefully) predict results comparable to those ob-
tainable from the simulation model. The COMAN model [24] is an example
of such a fitted parameter model. Encouraging results have been reported
[36]. Such a model is built on a physical basis with only a minimum num-
ber of parameters to be estimated (in contrast to statistical regression
functions).
Both the above general approaches (Al) and (A2) for predicting LAN-
CHESTER attrition-rate coefficients, however, in some sense make use of








the expected time for a target to be killed. The details of both approaches
should be more readily comprehended if we will keep this principle in mind.
Let us therefore provide a motivation for this principle. We start by
considering combat between two homogenous forces. Assuming that the loss
rates only depend on the numbers of combatants and not time explicitly,
we may model the attrition process with the following deterministic LAN-
CHESTER-type equations of warfare
dx
t -A(x,y) with x(O) - x,
(5.1.1)
I ýy -B(x,y) with y(O) - yo,dt
where x(t) and y(t) dentze, respectively, the X and Y force levels
at time t. Here we find it convenient to represent, for example, the
actual number of X combatants, which is a nonnegative integer, with the
real number x(t). Let us assume that there are no replacements and
withdrawals, and then A and B are the attrition rates of the X and
Y forces, respectively.
If we want to statistically estimate the loss rates in the model
(5.1.1) from Monte Carlo simulation output data (i.e. casualty data generated
by a (pseudo-) random process), we must consider a stochastic version of
(5.1.1) in which casualties occur randomly over time. It is now con-
venient to consider the restriction that the force levels are really non-
negative integers and to model the combat attrition process as a continuous-
parameter MARKOV chain. Letting M(t), a random variable 4, denote the in-
tegral number of X combatants alive at time t (with corresponding
realization denoted as m) and similarly for the Y force, we then have
the following so-.called forward KOLMDGOROV equations (see Chapter 4) for
the evolution of the state probablities for 0 < m < m0 and 0 < n < no
e.
- -
dP_ (t,m,n) = P(t,•+l) A(m+l,n) + P(t,m,n+l) B(m,n+l)dt
{A(m,n) + B(m,n)} P(t,m,n), (5.1.2)
where P(t,m,n) - P[M(t) - m, N(t) - nIM(O) - m0, N(O) - no] and we have
adopted the convention that, for example, A(m,n) - 0 for m > m0  or
n > n0 . From this stochastic model, we find that (see Chapter 4 above)
1
EXY]T A(m,n) (5.1.3)
where TXy, a random variable, denotes the time required for the Y force
to kill an X combatant (i.e. the time between two successive X casualties)
and E[T] denotes the expected value of T. For the case o0 equal casualty
rates that are independent of the numbers of combatants (i.e. A(m,n) - B(m,n)
- X - constant), (5.1.3) becomes the well-known result for casualties oc-
curring to a Poisson stream
E(I 1E[T],
or
. _ 1 (5.1.4)
where T denotes the time between the occurrences of successive casualty
events and i - E[T].
The reader may be familiar with this well-known result (5.1.4), and,
in any case, the more general version (5.1.3) should provide a heuristic
motivation for cartain subsequent results in predicting attrition-rate
coefficients. Thus, in statistically estimating loss rates from simulation
output data, we should expect to use statistics about the times between
casualties. Furthermore, BONDER's freestanding analytical model approach
5
5
is also conceptually based on (5.1.3): one develops a model for T...
analytically computes E[Txy], and takes A(x,y) I/E [TKy]. Therefore,
(5.1.3) should in some sense be taken as a general principle that is es-
sential for understanding subsequent developments in this chapter.
6
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5.2. Attrition-Rate Coefficients for LANCHESTER's Equations of Modern Warfare.
Let us now consider the determination of numerical values for the attzi-
tion-rate coefficients in a particular combat model. We accordingly con-
aider "al*d-fire" combat betweetx two homogeneous forces and assume that
target-acquisition timna are constant (independent of the number of enemy
targets). tis combat situation may be modelled with the following IAN-
CHESTER-type equations for modern warfare5 (see Section 2.11 for a further
discusrion of the military circumstances hypothesized to yield them)
dx ay with x(O) -Xo,
dt
{-in-ay(5.2.1)
A - -bx with y(O) - yo,
dt
where for a particular battle a and b are positive constants called
LAUMHESTER attrition-rate coefficients (see Figure 5.2). Edch of these
attrition-rate coefficients in such a combat model rep- sents the f re
effectiveness of one side's weapon system against enemy targets, For
example, a is the rate at which one Y firer kills X targets. The
dimensions of a are (number of X casualties)/(time x number of Y
firers). Thus, a is indeed a rate and has the dimensions of reciprocal
time.
Before discussing a simple analytical model for determining numerical
values for the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient in particular mili-
tary engagements, let us point out a very important relation between the
daily casualty rate (expressed as a fraction of the side's current strength)
of a homogeneous force and such a LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient.




Figure 5.2. LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficiemts a and b
(here assumed to be constant) for LANCHESTER-type
equations of modern warfare. The coefficient a
represents the fire effectiveness of the weapon-
system type used by the Y force in the operational
circumstances of the battle under consideration.
More precisely, a is the rate at which one Y
firer kills X targets.
8
attrition-rate coefficient a is the slope of the plot of fractional casual-
k ties per unit time versus a certain force ratio. Let us acccrdingly con-
sider, for example, X's fractional casualties per unit time. From the
first of equations (5.2.1), we obtain
'' fractional casualties~ a - v, (5.2.2)
"x d• per unit time
where u denotes the force ratio of X to Y, i.e. u - x/y, and v
denotes its reciprocal, i.e. v - y/x.
In Figure 5.3 we have plotted X's fractional casualties per unit time
as a function'of a certain force ratio. The force ratio that we have used
is the quotient of the attacker's strength (here, force level) divided by
that of the defender and have denoted it as A/D, since most combat analyies
use this ratio A/D and consequently we will be able to more easily relate
the simple LANCHESTER-type model (5.2.1) to them. The solid line in
Figure 5.3 represents X's fractional casualties per unit time as a function
of the force ratio A/D when X defends and Y attacks. It is a straight
line through the origin with a slope equal to the value of the LANCHESTER
attrition rate coefficient a as the reader can see by referring back to
(5.2.2). Thus, we have developed an important relation between fractional
casualty rate and the LANCRESTER attrition-rate coefficient. Finally, the
dashed line (which is a hyperbola) in Figure 5.3 represents X's fractional
caaualties per unit time as a function of the force ratio A/D in the other
case in which X attacks and Y defends. Similar curves for daily
casualty rates are commonly used to assess casualties in currently opera-
tional large-scale ground-combat models (see Section 7.13).
Let us now return to our discussion of numerically determining the
9
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FORCE RATIO, A /D
Figure 5.3. Relation between X's casualty rate (expressed as a
fraction of his current force level x(t)) and the
force ratio (expressed as the ratio of the attacker's
force level to that of the defender) for LANCHESTER's
equations of modern warfare (5.2.1). (NOTE: In the
bottom legend of the above figure, A denotes the
attacker's force level, and D denotes that of the
defender. ]
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LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients a and b for the model (5.2.1).
In general, we may think of, for example, the LANCHESTER attrition-rate
coefficient a as being given by (cf. (5.1.3) above)
a (5.2.3)
where TXY again is a random variable (frequently abbreviated r.v.) and
denotes the time for an individual Y firer to kill a single X target.
Justification for using (5.2.3) is given in the next section (Section 5.3).
As we discussed in general terms in Section 5.1 above, such a LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficient may be predicted for particular military
engagements by using
(W1) an analytical submodel Involving physically measurable
weapon-system characteristics of the attrition process
for an individual friendly firer engaging a single enemy
target,
or
(W2) a statistical estimate based on "combat" data generated
by a detailed Monte Carlo combat simulation.
In the remainder of this section we will discuss the first way (W1),
while the second way (W2) is discussed in Section 5.15 below.
In the simplest case (a more complicated one is considered below),
the LANCHESTER actrition-rate coefficient is simply given by, for example,
a - vY P , (5.2.4)
where v denotes Y's firing rate, and P SSKx denotes Y's single shot
kill probability against X. This simple expression (5.2.4) is usually





(Cl) negligible target-acquisition time,
(C2) statistical independence among firing outcomes,
and (C3) uniform rate of fire.
The reader can probably best appreciate the intuitive plausibility of the
expression (5.2.4) by noting that a represents the average number of
kills per unit time by a single Y firer, \y denotes his rate of fire,
and (on the average) he kills a given fraction of an X target with each
round fired denoted by PSSKXY'
As we see from (5.2.3), the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient
is the reciprocal of the average time for an individual firer to kill
an enemy target. Let us therefore consider a simple model for the time
to kill a target. If we let T, a r.v., denote this time for a firer to
kill an enemy target, then T is given by
T - Ta + Tk~a (5.2.5)
where Ta denotes the time to acquire a target, and Tkja denotes the
time to kill an acquired target.
Again, in the simplest case (as above, assuming: (A!) a uniform rate
of fire, and (A2) statistical independence among firing outcomes) we have
E[fkT i " tkl 1 (5.2.6)
SSKwhere v denotes the firing rate, and P SSK denotes the single-shot kill
probability. The reader may find the following intuitive justification
for the average time to kill an acquired target (5.2.6) to be helpful:
6"I/SK represents the average number of rounds to kill6, while 1/v
12
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represents the average time between rounds, and consequently their product
is the average time to kill an acquired target E[Tka].
Thus, if we let
E[T ] - t , (5.2.7)
a a
then our simple model for the time to kill a target yields
1
E[T] - t + (5.2.8)a ) P SSK '
and consequently, for example,
a- y (5.2.9)
E[Tkyl
where E[1 I Y taxY + l/(vYPSSK xy). Thus, we see that (5.2.4) is just
the special case of (5.2.9) in which t - 0.ay
Let us finally note that, strictly speaking, (5.2.8) holds only when
(Al) and (A2) are satisfied [i.e. there is (Al) a uniform rate of fire,
and (A2) statistical independence among firing outcomes]. There are,
however, many weapon systems and engagement circumstances under which
these asstmptions are not at all appropriate. Consequently, S. BONDER
has developed an expression more complicated than (5.2.8) for target en-
gagement ,delled by MARKOV-dependent fire. He developed this expression
for the i.iw.ysis of tank operations in which it is very important to con-
sider MARKOV dependence. We will examine BONDER's work in the section
following the next one.
(1
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5.3. Justification of General Expression for Attrition-Rate Coefficients
for LANCHESTER's Equations of Modern Warfare.
In this section we present Justification for taking an attrition-
rate coefficient for LANCHESTER's equations of modern warfare (5.2.1)




where T is a random variable (abbreviated r.v.) denoting the time for
an individual Y firer to kill an X target and E[T] denotes the
expected value of T. BONDER and FARRELL (17] (see also [28; 88; 89])
have based their approach for determining attrition-rate coefficients
for a wide spectrum of weapon-system types on this definition (5.3.1).
It is therefore of considerable interest to inquire as to what Justification
there is for basing the calculation of LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients
on (5.3.1). We have already provided heuristic Justification of (5.3.1)
in Section 5.1 above, and here we will consider several more rigorous
justifications.,
All justifications of (5.3.1) known to this author are ultimately
based on the following basic hypothesis.
BASIC HYPOTHESIS: Combat is a complex random process, and
the LANCHESTER-type equations (5.2.1) are an approximation
to the mean course of combat.
14
If we assume that real-world combat attrition may be modelled
as a continuous-parameter MARKOV chain corresponding to (5.2.1), then
the probability distribution for the numbers of combatants satisfies
(5.1.2) with, for example, A(m,n) - an. Here, m is the realization of
an integer-valued r.v. M(t) denoting the number of X combatants
at time t, and similarly for n and N(t).* In this case, the times
between casualties for each side are exponentially distributed, and (5.3.1)
holds exactly. In other words, (5.3.1) holds exactly for exponentially-
distributed times between casualties. Let us finally observe that as
long as there is "negligible" probability that either side is annihilated,
then the mean course of combat may be taken to be given by (see Section 4.1?
above)
dm -
dt an with ;(0) - mo
(5.3.2)
dun -bi with n(0 - nodt0
where m(t) denotes the average X force level at time t, i.e.
m(t) - E[M(t)], and ;(t) denotes the average Y force level at time t.
Both BONDER (11] and BARFOOT [3] base their determinations of
an expression for the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient on consider-





dt an with mr(O) m0 ,
(5.3.3)
dt
where a denotes the expected value of the rate at which an individual Y
firer kills X targets and similarly for i. This definition of the
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient as [cf. (5.3.2)], for example,
- rate at which a single Y1
a - a - E Lfirer kills X targets (5.3.4)
implies an underlying distribution for the attrition-rate coefficient (as
stressed by BONDER [14; 15]). No particular distribution for the times
between casualties has been assumed here, though. In his original paper
[i1 BONDER took the LANCHESTER attrtion-rate coefficient to be given by
a - E[l/TIY] but could not obtain explicit results for it. BARFOOT [3]
then pointed out that there are two possibilities for computing a, the
average rate at which a single Y firer ills X targets: namely,
(P1) arithmetic mean, a - E [ j;
and (P2) harmonic mean, a - 1
E[TXy]
Furthermore, BARFOOT has argued that the harmonic mean is more appropriate,
since we should think of the probability distribution function for an
15
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attrition-rate coefficient as representirg the fraction of targets
killed at each rate. Thus, BARFOOT (3] has justified (5.3.1) for
any distribution of the times between casualties.
Following BONDER and FARRELL7 [17], let us now give a more
rigorous justification8 of (5.3.1). As above, we consider combat in
which the initial numbers of X and Y combatants, denoted as m0 and
nos are sufficiently large to insure that there is a "negligible" prob-
ability that their side will be annihilated during our examination of
the battlefield. Let us now focus on a single Y weapon system. We
will make no assumption about the distribution of timj' between kills,
but we will assume that each individual Y weapon system kills enemy
targets according to an attrition process in which the times between kills
are independent and identically distributed random variables (so-called
i.i.d. random variables). In the parlance of the theory of stochastic
processes, such an attrition process is called a renewal process (e.g.
see PARZEN [58, Chapter 5] for further details). Let OW(t) be a r.v.
denoting the number of X casualties produced by a single Y weapon
system, and let n (t) denote its expected value, i.e.
nX(t) - E[NX(t)] , (5.3.5)
the expected number of X casualties produced by a single Y weapon
system in (0,T]. Let us now introduce AnX(At,t) defined by
c
An(tt) n (t + At) n W7 (5.3.6)C c c
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which is the expected number of X casualties produced by a single Y
weapon system in the time interval9 (t, t + At). For exponentially
distributed times between kills, we have that (e.g. see PARZEN [58, p. 177])
AnX(At,t) At (5.3.7)c UT
where UT denotes the average time for a single Y firer to kill an X
target, i.e. UT " E(Txy]. For any other distribution for the times
between kills, (5.3.7) holds only asymptotically in the sense that
-X At
l An (At,t) - t . (5.3.8)t -. - c UT
The above result (5.3.8) is usually known as BLACKWELL's theorem (see
PARZEN [58, p. 183]). Assuming now that each Y firer acts independently
and identically, we find that for the entire Y force
[ number of kills by Y a (.t
E force in (t, t + At) U T (5.3.9)
which holds exactly for exponentially distributed times between kills and
only asymptotically in the same sense as (5.3.8) for any other distribution.
LANCHESTER's equations for modern warfare (5.2.1) with "large enough"
numbers of combatants suggest that [cf. (5.3.2)]
-Am- E rnumber of kills by Y 1. anAt . (5.3.10)
Lforce in (t,t+At) J
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Comparison of (5.3.9) and (5.3.10) suggests taking the LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficient to be the reciprocal of the average time for
an individual firer to kill an enemy target, i.e. (5.3.1) has been
Justified.
More generally, BONDER and FARRELL [17] take an attrition-rate
coefficient for a specific range r in heterogeneous-force combat to
be given by, for example,
a ij(r) - E[Txijr]
where E[TxiY Irn denotes the expected time for a single Y firer
of type j to kill an enemy target of type i, given that the range between
the firer-target pair is r. Again, this definition of an attrition-rate
coefficient for heterogenous-force combat is equivalent to the harmonic
mean for the attrition rate of a single combat system when this single-
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5.4. BONDER's Model for MARKOV-Dependent Fire.
For many weapon systems and engagement circumstances modelled
by (5.2.1), the extremely simple analytical model (5.2.4) for prediction
of numerical values for the LANC{ESTER attrition-rate coefficient is
totally inadequate. Ideally one should analyze the engagement process
for each particular target type by each particular weapon-system type to
predict such attrition-rate coefficients. BONDER and FARRELL (17] have
developed general methodology for predicting attrition-rate coefficients
for a wide spectrum of weapon-system types. Basically, their approach is
founded upon calculation of the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient as
the reciprocal of the expected time to kill a single target, e.g. (5.3.1)
above. Hence, central to their developments is the analysis and modelling
of the time to kill a target.
To facilitate such analysis BONDER and FARRELL [17] have classified
the engagement of particular target types by different weapon-system types
10
according to the taxonomy shown in Table 5.1. Weapon-system types are
first classified according to the mechanism by which they kill particular
target types (i.e. their lethality characteristics) as being either impact-
11to-kill systems or area-.lethality systems . Within each of these two
categories BONDER and FARRELL further classify weapon-system types accord-
ing to how they use firing information to control the system's aim point
and their delivery characteristics, i.e. the firing doctrine employed.
Expressions have been developed for LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients
corresponding to the weapon-system classifications tagged with asterisks *
in Table 5.1.
20
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TABLE 5.1. Classification of Weapon-System Types for the Development






(1) Repeated Single Shot
(a)* Without Feedback Control of Aim Point
(b)* With Feedback on Immediately Preceding Round
(MARKOV-Dependent Fire)
(c) With Complex Feedback
(2) Burst Fire
(a)* Without Aim Change or Drift in or Between Bursts
(b)* With Aim Drift in Bursts, Aim Refixed to Original
Aim Point for Each Burst
(c) With Aim Drift, Re-aim Between Bursts
(3) Multiple Tube Firing: Feedback Situations (la), (lb), (1c)
(a)* Salvo or Volley
(4) Mixed-Mode Firing
(a) Adjustment Followed by Multiple Tube Fire
(b)* Adjustment Followed by Burst Fire
Indicates that analysis of this category has been performed by BONDER
and FARRELL [17).
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A large class of weapon systems (e.g. tanks firing at tanks,
anti-tank weapon systems firing at tanks, etc.) may be classified as
MARKOV-dependent-fire weapons, i.e. the outcome of the firing of a round
by the weapon system depends on only the outcome of the immediately pre-
ceding round. For such weapon systems and an impact-to-kill lethality
mechanism 12, BONDER [11; 14] has developed a general expression for the
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient1. His expression applies when the
following assumptions hold:
(Al) MARKOV-dependent fire with parameters p,, P(hlh), and
P(hjm)
(A2) geometric distribution for the number of hits required
for a kill with parameter P(KIH).
Here p1 denotes Prob[hit on first round], P(hlh) denotes the conditional
hit probability Prob[hitlprevious round hit], P(hjm) denotes the con-
ditional hit probability Prob[hitlprevious round miss], and P(KIH)
denotes the conditional kill probability Prob[kill targerlhit target].
It is well known (e.g. see PARZEN [57, pp. 129-132]) that the three hit
probabilities pl, P(hlh), and P(hjm) completely describe MARKOV-dependent
fire in contrast to the situation with statistical independence between
the outcomes of any two rounds fired in which case only a single hit prob-
abiltty, denoted simply as p, completely describes the process.
As above let us denote the time for the firer to kill a target as T
(a r.v.). Then, BONDER [11; 14] has developed that
22
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TABLE 5.11. Factors Included in Expression for LANCRESTER Attrition-Rate
Coefficient for Single-Shot MARKOV-Dependent-Fire Weapon
Systems with a Geometric Distribution for the Number of Hits
Required for a Kill.
Time to acquire a target, ta
Time to fire first round after target acquired, t 1
Time to fire a round following a hit, th
Time to fire a round following a miss, t M
Time of flight of the projectile, tf
Probability of a hit on first round, p1
Probability of a hit on a round following a hit, P(hlh)
Probability of a hit on a round following a miss, P(hlm)




E[T] - t + ti - th +
(t +t f) m +-tf [1 P(hlh)J + P(h jh) - pl , (5.4.1)+ 'P(hTm) P(KIH) +
where all the variables are defined in Table 5.11. The corresponding
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient (see Section 5.3 above) is then
the reciprocal of (5.4.1)13, i.e. for the nomogeneous-force model (5.2.1)
we have, for example,
a 1TX (5.4.2)
where T (a r.v.) denotes the time for an individual Y firer to kill
a single X target. (5.4.1) is the general expression15 for the expected
time to kill a target with MARKOV-dependent fire and a geometric distri-
bution for the number of hits required for a kill. It may be developed
(see the next section) by considering the time required for an individual
firer to engage and kill a single enemy target. We will see in Section 5.10
below how this complex expression reduces to very simple ones in special
cases, e.g. E[T] - 1/(VPsSK) for a uniform rate of fire, statistical
independence between rounds, and negligible time of flight and targat-
acquisition time.
Together (5.4.1) and (5.4.2) allow us to estimate attrition-rate
coefficients for a homogeneous-force FIF LANCHESTER-type attrition process
[i.e. force-on-force combat attrition modelled by equations (5.2.1) above],
and consequently one may consider using such a model to operationally
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analayze combat between two homogeneous forces. In such an operational
model or its extension to heterogeneous forces (see Section 7.7), we would
want to consider variable attrition-rate coefficients to model temporal
variations in fire effectiveness when, for example, the range between
firers and targets changes appreciably during battle. We will discuss
below in Section 5.11 the variables upon which such attricion-rate
coefficients (indirectly) depend, with some typical range dependencies
being given in Section 5.12. Moreover, this attrition-rate-coefficient
model given by (5.4.1) and (5.4.2) is a general one in the sense that it
allows a uniform treatment of both area-fire as well as direct-fire weapons
(see Section 5.13 below and also BONDER [11, p. 231] for further details).
Furthermore, we note that the MARKOV-dependent-fire assumption has been
naturally motivated, since BONDER's model for MARKOV-dependent fire arose
in the analysis of armored operations (e.g. see BONDER [9; 11], BONDER
and FARRELL [17], or KIMBLETON [49] for further details). For example,
in the analysis of tank main guns it is usually assumed (e.g. see BONDER
[12, p. II-11]) that the result of the previous round is observed before
the next one is fired. If the round fired misses the target, the tank
gunner will make an appropriate adjustment; if a hit is obtained, the
same gun setting will be used again.
Finally, let us briefly discuss data sources for BONDER's model
(5.4.1). All the input data for this model is shown in Table 5.11.
Data is available for all these inputs from a variety of sources:
ballistics-laboratory tests, military field experiments, troop exercises,
further submodels, etc. A detailed discussion of such data sources is
is given in, for example, (54, pp. 16741681 and [28, pp. 173-174]. We
25
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should add, however, that all such experimental data is for systems
under simulated combat conditions and not for actual combat.
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5.5. Derivation of BONDER's Result for the Expected Time te Kill a
Target (Approach Based on the Exact Distribution of Time to Kill).
In this section we will derive BONDER's expression (5.4.1) for
the expected time to kill a target, which applies under the following
conditions:
(Cl) MARKOV-dependent fire,
(C2) geometric distribution for the number of hits to kill,
(C3) deterministic event times (i.e. ta, ti, th, tm, and tf
are all assumed to be deterministic quantities 16 ).
BONDER's result (5.4.1) is particularly significant because it is the
basis for estimating weapon-system kill rates in a variety of operational
models that are fairly widely used in defense planning today (see
Section 7.9 for further details). The combat-modelling approach of
S. BONDER and his associates at VECTOR RESEARCH, INC. basically de-
composes the battlefield into unit and subunit engagements, which are
essentially further decomposed into a series of one-on-one duels between
opposing weapon-system types. For each type of firer-target pair, one
must perform a detailed analysis of a single firer engaging a passive
(i.e. one that does not return fire) target and compute the weapon-
system type's kill rate according to (5.4.1) and (5.4.2), e.g. see
BONDER and FARRELL [17], TAYLOR [80, Section 5.5; 81, Section 6.6],
Section 7.9 of the book at hand, or [28; 88; 89]. Thus, (5.4.1) is
a key result in the force-on-force combat-modelling business (see
also [84; p. 16-2]).
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Before we derive (5.4.1), though, let us briefly examine the
shortcomings (i.e. limitations) of BONDER's approach to estimating
weapon-system kill rates based on the logical analysis of a single
firer engaging a single passive target. Besides assuming that the
above stated conditions (Cl) through (C3) hold, BONDER's approach
possesses the following limitations:
(l) no consideration of interactions between firer and
target,
(L2) cumulative damage assumed to be negligible,
(L3) precludes situations of both group firers and group
targets.
The first limitation (Ll) is a direct consequence of BONDER's general
approach of considering a firer engaging a passive target. In reality,
there are interactions between firer and target, e.g. the firer may
"duck" and degrade his firing effectiveness when the target returns
fire. The second limitation (L2) is due to the assumption of a geo-
metric distribution of hits to kill. In reality, a target may be
partially killed by the first hit and "finished off" by a second one.
However, BARFOOT [3, pp. 890-892] (see also KIMBLETON [49, pp. 704-705])
has indicated how to overcome this shortcoming. The last limitation (L3)
may in some sense be considered to be an elaboration and extension
of the first limitation. In particular, the infantry fire fight,
for example, has been characterized as being a group-target/group-firer
environment (_ee STOCKFISCH [72; pp. 72-73]; also (83; p. 2-42]),
28
_ 4- f 4_
and it is extremely questionable whether the attendant combat inter-
actions can be captured by any methodology based on consideration of
"a single firer engaging a passive target.
Thus, we will now derive (5.4.1) by analyzing the process of
"a single firer engaging a single passive target and following S. BONDER's
18(11] original analysis path , which included determining the probability
distribution for the number of rounds necessary to achieve z hits,
PNIZ(n~z), where N (a r.v. with realization n) is the number of rounds
fired, Z (a r.v. with realization z) is the number of hits achieved,
and PNIZ(nlz) denotes a conditional probability mass function. In
some sense, this approach might be called a "brute force" approach,
due to the laborious direct computation of the conditional expectation
E[NIZ - z] by means of its definition as In-i npNIZ(nlz). We will
later (see Section 5.6 below) present a much simpler and more general
approach for developing not only E[NIZ - z] but also E[T] (see
Section 5.8). Our review here of BONDER's original approach for deter-
mining E[T] will let the reader appreciate the simplicity of our aew
approach. Finally, BONDER's original approach is limited to consider-
ation of only deterministic event times (i.e. ta, ti, tho tn,, and tf
are all assumed to be deterministic quantities), but our new approach
will be able to handle stochastic ones (see Section 5.8 below).
Accordingly (following BONDER (111), we consider the process
by which a single firer engages and kills a siiigle passive enemy target.
We conceptualize this process as consisting of the following sequence
of events from target acquisition to destruction:
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(El) The sequence begins with target acquisition which takes
t minutes to occur.
a
(E2) The first round is then fired and arrives in the target
area (tI + tf) minutes later.
(E3) If the fi-st round misses, the next round will arrive
(t + tf) minutes after the first.
(E4) If the first round hits the target and more than one hit
is required (i.e. z > 1), the next round will arrive
(t'h + tf) minutes later.
(E5) The above sequence of firing after hits and misses is
continued until the final hit, which destroys the target,
is obtained.
The above conceptual target-destruction-process model is consistent
with the assumption of MARKOV-dependent fire in which the outcome of
the previous round is observed before the next one is fired.
For the above conceptual model of a single firer engaging a
single passive target, we will now compute the average time for the
firer to kill a target, E[T]. This important result will be obtained
by accomplishing the following steps:
(Sl) development of mathematical model for the time to obtain
z hits T (a r.v.),
z
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(S2) computation of the expected value for T , i.e.
zzE[T z I= E[TjZ =z] which is the expected time to kill the
target given that z hits are required for a kill,
(S3) computation of the unconditional expectation E[T] from the
conditional expectation obtained in step (S2), i.e.
E[T] p : (z) E[TIZ - z] . (5.5.1)
z1l
Here, pZ(z) denotes the probability mass function for the number of hits
to kill (assumed to follow a geometric distribution in BONDER's develop-
ments). The reader should note that the conceptual approach taken here
for determining the time to kill a target is to decompose the killing
process into a hitting process and a process of killing the target
19with hits . For a geometric distribution of the number of hits to kill,
we have
PZ(z) -{1 - P(KIH) z-1 P(KIH)}. (5.5.2)
Let us now carry out the above three computational steps (Sl)
through (S3) for obtaining E[T]. We will see that this computation
will require us to use the expected number of rounds to obtain z hits,
E[NIZ - z], which will be subsequently derived below. Turning to the
first computational step (Sl), we consider the above sequence of events
(El) through (ES) to kill a target and focus on the time to obtain z
hits, T , which is a r.v. In this case, the number of hits z is
considered to be a parameter (realization of the r.v. Z). Observing
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that there are (z-l) rounds fired after immediately preceding hits
and (Nz - z) rounds fired after immediately preceding misses because
the target is assumed to be destroyed by the rz-h hit, we may mathematically
express our model as
Tz - ta + (t1 + tf) + (th + tf)(z-l) + (tm + tf)(Nz - z) (5.5.3)
where the first term on the left t corresponds to (El), the seconda
(t1 + tf) corresponds to (E2), the th-rd (th + tf)(z-1) to (E3),
and the fourth to (E4). Thus, we have completed step (Sl).
Turning now to step (S2), we write (5.5.3) in the more con-
venient form
Tz - ta + t1 - th + (th - tm)z + (t + t f)Nz , (5.5.4)
and take its expected value to obtain
E[T] n t5 + t1 - th + (th - tm)z + (tim + tf) E(Nz], (5.5.5)
or
E[TIZ z] - ta + t1 - th + (th - tm)z + (t + t f) E[NIZ-z], (5.5.6)
It should be noted that (5.5.6) has been obtained without our making
any assumption about the r.v. N, i.e. (5.5.6) holds in general. We
could at this point uacondition the conditional expectation (5.5.6)
and obtain
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a t + tI - h + (th t E[Z] + (tm + tf) E[N] (5.5.7)
but we will not follow this course of development any further here,
since we wish to follow BONDER's original analysis path. Here E[N]
denotes the average number of rounds required to kill the target. Thus,
(5.5.7) is an important result that relates the expected time to kill a
target to the expected number of rounds required to kill the target
and the expected number of hits required to kill. Only deterministic
event times, cf. condition (C3) above, are required for it to hold.
Again, it should be noted that (5.5.7) has been obtained without our
making any assumptions about the random variables N and Z. Return-
ing now to BONDER's original development path, we again consider (5.5.6)
and substitute for E[NIZ - z]. It will be shown below that for MARKOV-
dependent fire
E[NIZ(-P .1- P(hzh)i (z-l) (5.5.8)
z + p(hlm)+ P(h m)
Substituting (5.5.8) into (5.5.6), we obtain
E[TTZ-z- t + t - th + (t 
+ tf) P(hIh)-p"
S[1 - P(hlh)) (559
+ (th + tf) + (tm + tf) P(hjm) Z (559)
We are now ready to execute step (S3). Assuming a geometric
distribution for the number of hits to kill [i.e. (5.5.2) holds], we may
uncondition (5.5.9) by multiplying both sides of it by pZ(z) and
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and summing over z from 1 to -, whence follows (5.4.1), since
cc 00
7 pZW I and I zpz(z) - K . (5.5.10)
z-1 z=l
The reader should observe how the conditions (Cl) through (C3) have
entered into the above development of (5.4.1).
It remains for us to derivL the result (5.5.8) for the conditional
expectation E[NIZ - z]. To derive this key intermediate expression,
we assume MARKOV-dependent fire and execute the following two tasks20
(Ti) develop expression for the distribution of the number
of rounds to obtain z hits pNIZ (nlz)
(T2) compute the desired conditional expectation E[NIZ - z]
by "brute force," i.e.,
*0
E[NIz-z] zI nPNIZ (nlz) (5.5.11)
n-i
To develop the distribution for the number of rounds to obtain
z hits (with the sequence of firings ending in a hit), it is convenient
to split the probability that N rounds are required to obtain z
hits into two parts as follows
PNIz(nlz) - P[N - nIZ - z]
- P[N - nIZ - z with bit on first roundi
+ P[N - n1Z - z with miss on first round] , (5.5.12)
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which holds because the outcome of the first firing is either a hit
or a miss. This split will be seen to he convenient in light of sub-
sequent combinatorial arguments. For convenience we will also write
(5.5.12) as
PNIZ(niz) - pz(nI-) + pz(nIM) , (5.5.13)
where pz(nIH) denotes the first of the two probabilities on the
right-hand side of '.5.5.12) and pz(nIM) denotes the second.
We will now focus on the development of the probability pz(nIH).
To develop this probability, we consider the sequence of evwnts, denoted
as SH# in which the following occurs:
Irk the first r, firings, the event hit occurs everytime;
In the next 81 f~rings, the event miss occurs everytime;
In the next r2  firings, the event hit occurs everytime;
In the next r2 firings, the event miss occurs everytime;
In the next ak_ firings, the event miss occurs everytime;
In the last rk firiags, the event hit occurs everytime.
We observe that for the joint occurrence of the above events
k k-I
ri - z and 9 s- - n - z (5.5.14)
i-i i-i
where ri and si are positive integers for all i > 1. The prob-
ability of the joint occurrence of the above events, denoted as
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P(SH occurs], is obtained according to the MARKOV-dependence assumption
by multiplying together the probabilities of all the individual firing-
outcome events. Hence
rl-1 sl-i r2-1 s2-1 rk-1
P[SH occurs] -plu (i-u)(l-v) vu (l-u)(l-v) vu (5.5.15)
or
rl+r2+'2 +rk-k k-i S1+s 2+" +sk-l-(K-l) k-i
P[SH occurs] -plu (i-u) (l-v) v , (5.5.16)
where for convenience te have introduced
u - P(hlh) and v - P(htm) . (5.5.17)
Using (5.5.14), we may write this latter probability as
z-k k-l n-z-k+i k-I
P[SH occurs] upu (1-u) ( n-v) v . (5.5.18)
Now the above probability holds for any particular sequence of events SH
in which there are z hits and (n-z) misses. Furthermore, the z hits
occur in k strings of one or more hits between which there are sandwiched
(k-i) strings of one or more misses. Thus, to compute the probability
P (nid) we must consider the number of ways in which such an SH can
occur with z hits and (n-z) misses. Now
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number of ways|in which such
\an SH can occtur
/ number of ways in number of ways in whichjwhich k strings | (k-i) strings of one
of one or more hits X or more misses can . (5.5.19)
can contain exactly contain exactly (n-z)
z hits / misses /
Also (cf. Lemma 5.5.2 below)
/numbe of ways in ~
which k strings (z-1
of one or more hi - (5.5.20)
can contain exactly k-lz hits/
where (z) denotes the binomial coefficient z:/{(z-k)! k! } and k!
k
denotes "k factorial" - I i for k > 1. Similarly
i-i
number of ways inwhich (k-1) strings n-z-i
of one or more misses - (5.5.21)
can contain exactly (k-2
(n-z) misses
Hence
(number of ways in z-1 n-z-i





P[N - nIZ - z with hit on first round]
( P(SH occurs] , 
(5.5.23)k-l/ k-2
or
PIN nIZ - z with hit on first round]
""i-k-i \+k-2
Such an outcome can occur for all values of k such that 1 < k < z. It
follows that
pluZ- 1 for n - z
PZ (ni) p z ( z-1) (n-z) uz-k(l_u)k-lvk- (l_v)n-z-k+1
I k-2 k-l\ k-2/
for n > z , (5.5.25)
since (n-z1) .0 for k - 1 and n > z (i.e. it is impossible to have
(k-1) strings of one or more misses sandwiched between k strings of one
or more hits when n > z and k - 1). In a similar fashion it may be
shown that
S(n IM) lP l )()•l uz-k(((u)lk-lvk(1v)n-z-k (5.5.26)
k-i k-l ~-1
Substituting (5.!.20) aad (5.5.26) into (5.5.13), we obtain the
desired distribution PNIZ(nlz) for the number of rounds to obtain z hits
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0 for n < z,
SZ-1 for n - zpl
PNIz(n1z) " l 2 1 zk-2 u-k(l-u)k-ii (lV)nzk+i (5.5.27)
PNIZ(njz ki 2 \k-1/\k-2/
+ (l-P z /z-i\n-z-l\ uz-k(l-u)k-v k (-v)n-z-k
1k-i k-I/\ k-i
for n > z
where the reader should recall that u and v are conditional hit prob-
abilities defined by (5.5.17). Thus, we have completed the first task
(TI) for deriving E[NIZ - z].
For accomplishing the second task (T2), it is more convenient
to consider the characteristic function for' pNIZ(niz), denoted as
ONIz(S), i.e.
- ns 0 eisn PNjZ(nlz) (5.5.28)
where i - v-E, than it is to compute E[NIZ - z] directly by (5.5.11).
The desired conditional expectation E[NIZ - z] is then given by
1 d__~ZO
E[NIZ - z] - ( (0) • (5.5.29)
to compute 0N4z(s) we begin by splitting it into two summations E
and Z Pi.e.








k2 - / ( : n:I) eis uz-k(l-u)k-lvk(1-v)n-z-k (5.5.32)
21nnz+l kl-A k-i / k-I
We will now concentrate on simplifying the expression (5.5.31)
for E1 . Interchanging the order of summation in (5.5.31), we obtain
I isz z-1£I "p1  e u
+ uZ-k vl~)k-i n - elSnl vn-k+l .
+ 7 uzv(l.-u)kl e71-
k-2 (k-l1 n-z+l / k-2
(5.5.33)
lie will now concentrate on evaluating the last summation in (5.5.33). To
this end, let us denote this summation as Sk, i.e. for k - 2, 3, ...
Sk - ( eisn (l-v)n-z-k+l . (5.5.34)
n-z+l \ k-2
For subsequent manipulations, it is convenient to introduce
m - n - z - 1 and j - k - 2 , (5.5.35)
and then write (5.5.34) as
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S k "T1  , (m) eis(m+z+1)(l-v)m-J (5.5 .36)
or, simplifying, for j - 0,1,2...
T = e us(zk-) [e is(1-v)m-] , (5.5.37)
since (m) - 0 when m < J. It is then convenient to further introduce
2 m-J and rearrange (5.5.37) into
eis(z+k- J is 
T ae [e (1-v) . (5.5.38)
=-0
Let us now recall that the-binomial theorem says that for lxi < 1
(l-x)-n I + nx + n(n+1) X2 + x ,"2
or
00 'n-1+k k
(l-x)-n - xn (5.5.39)
-0i n-1
Let us now temporarily assume that P(hlm) > 0. It follows that leiS(l-v)( < 1,
and consequently (5.5.38) may be written as
is (z+k-l)




Sk - - (5.5.41)
S{1 -es (1-v) k-l
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Using (5.5.34), we may write (5.5.33) as
z1 pl u 1 eJsz + k(-1 _u ]k Skj,
whereupon substitution of (5.5.41), for Sk yields
El = PIe u 1 + [ k]I k-2 (- u1-eSlv}
which by introduction of z - k-i may be more conveniently written as
Zi = pie u() e~~lu
E-0 \Z/ Lu{l - eis -(1)-) (5.5.42)
Again recalling the binomial theorem, i.e. for integer n we have
(i x) •n n k
"(1 + x)n _ n x , we may rewrite (5.5.42) to obtain Z in its final
form
=p eisz U + e isv(l-u) z-1 (5.5.43)
1 (1- eis (l-v)}
It may be similarly shown that
(l-p,) is(z+l)v eis v(lu) -
E (2 . . . v __ u + is (5.5.44)
{1 - e (l-v)} {i - es(l-v)}
Substituting (5.5.43) and (5.5.44) into (5.5.30), we obtain




isz pl-e (pl-v) u eis (U-v) z-ONZ()= eus-i (5.5.45)
l - e (1-v) l-e (l-v)
Let us observe that (as it should) *NIz(0) - 1, since pNIZ(nIz) is a
probability mass function and consequently C=0 PNIZ(nlz) - 1.
For the computation of the conditional expectation E[NIZ - z] by
(5.5.29), it is convenient to split ONIz(S) into three multiplicative
iszfactors ei, F1 (s), and F2 (s) as follows
oNIz(s) - eisz F1 (s) F2 (s) (5.5.46)
where sp-eis(pl-v)
1 - eis (-v)
and
F2 (s) = u - e is(u-v) z-(5.5.48)1 - eiS (l-v) 
5
For future purposes, we observe that
NIZ (0) - F1 (0) - F2 (0) = 1 . (5.5.49)
Because of the multiplicative representation of *Ngz(a) (5.5.46), it is
convenient to obtain doNIz/ds from its logarithmic derivative
d{In *NIz(S)l/ds, which is given by
d 1 dFl 1 dF 2
ds f *NIZ(S) - iz + F1 (s) ds (s) + F2 (s)ds (5.5.50)
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Consequently, we find that
(s) dF (s) dF
( iz z(8) + F1 (s) 1 (s) + F2 s 2 (s)N-- INZ~s " NIZ FI1(S) ds- F 2(s) ds
where
dF (S) e is 2P) (5.5.52)
{l - is (1-v))
and
dF- - (z-1) I i is V(L u - e.s(u-v) z-2
s [l-e is (- 2 - eS(l-v) (5553)
It follows from (5.5.49) that
d -N Z( z (z-l)(l-u)
d (a N iz +v) -u (5.5.54)
since
d__ Fl(0) - i (5.5.55)
and
d F (0) - i (z-l)(l-U) (5.5.56)
ds 2 v
Recalling (5.5.29), we see that
(l-p 1) ___
E[NIZ-z] - z + V + (z-l) (1-u) (5.5.57)
and thus by (5.5.17) we have proved (5.5.8) for P(hjm) > 0. It should be




Finally, it remains to justify (5.5.20). Thus, we consider the
number of ways in which k strings of one or more hits can contain exactly z
hits. It is obvious that this number is the same as the number of ways to
obtain z hits on k targets with each target being hit at least once.
Moreover, the problem of determining this number has exactly the same
mathematical structure as the classic occupany problem of probability theory
(see FELLER [35, pp. 36-371), when we agree to treat the hits as indistinguish-
able. To set the stage for proving (5.5.20), let us consider the somewhat
simpler problem of determining the number of ways to obtain z hits on k
targets without requiring that each target be hit at least once. To this
end, we state and prove the following lemma.
LEMMA 5.5.1: The number of ways to obtain z hits on k
targets (without requiring that each target be hit at least
once) is given by z+k-1
PROOF. Consider z hits distributed among k targets. Use the symbol *
(star) to represent a hit and the symbol I (bar) to represent a target's
boundary. Any stars contained within two bars between which no further
bars lie represent the hits on a target. Thus, !**ii***I*I would repre-
sent 6 hits on 4 targets with the first target having 2 hits, the second 0
hits, the third 3 hits, and the fourth 1 hit. In general, (k+l) bars are
required to represent k targets. The desired number of ways for obtaining
hits is determined by considering the number of possible arrangements for
the above symbols. In all such arrangements, however, the first and last
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symbols must be bars, and accordingly there are z stars and (k-i) bars
remaining to be arranged. Thus, the desired number of arrangements is
determined by considering the number of ways to select (k-i) places out
of (z+k-l), which is well known (e.g. see FELLER [35, pp. 32-35]) to be
given by the binomial coefficient
nk-I) nIl Q.E.D.
We are now ready to prove (5.5.20) in the following equivalent form.
LEMMA 5.5.2: The number of ways to obtain z hits on k
targets with each target being hit at least once is given by
PROOF. Introducing the star and bar symbols as used above in the proof of
Lemma 5.5.1, we consider the number of possible arrangements for these
symbols. Again, the first and last symbols must always be bars, and
consequently there are z star3 and (k-l) bars remaining to be arranged.
However, this time the requirement that each target must receive at least
one hit imposes the additional condition that no two bars can ever be
adjacent to each other in such arrangements. We may conceptualize this
situation by moving and placing each of the (k-I) arrangeable bars above
the star to its left. In other words, we would consider I****** as
46
S. . . .. . . . . . _-- - • -- . _ - - , -__ -_ . . . . .. . .. . . .. .
II I
*******. Since the last star receives no bar [recall that the first and
last of the original (k+l) bars have been omitted from further consideration
because they are fixed and consequently not arrangeable], there will be
(k-i) stars with bars over them out of a total of (z-l) stars available
for such arrangements. Thus, the desired number of arrangements is determined
by considering the number of ways to select (k-i) places out of (z-l),
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5.6. A Simple Derivation of the Expected Number of Rounds Necessary to
Obtain z Hits.
In this section we will present.a vty simple derivation of a general
expression for the expected number of rounds to obtain z hits, denoted
above as the conditional expectation EENIZ - z]. In the special case of
MARKOV-dependent fire, our general expression reduces to BONDER's result
(5.5.8), which was a key result in the development of the expected time
tc kill a target with MARKOV-dependent fire in Section 5.5 above. The
approach that we will use here is particularly significant, since it readily
leads to other important more general results [e.g. see (5.8.1) b~low].
Let N1 (a r.v.) denote the number of rounds fired to obtain the
first hit, and let Ni (a r.v.) for i > 2 denote the number of rounds
st th
fired after the (i-l)-t hit to obtain the i- hit. We then have the follow-
ing very simple model for the number of rounds to obtain z hits N (alsoz
a r.v.)
z
Nz N1 + 1 Ni . (5.6.1)
"i"z




E[N] - E(N1] + 2 E[N . (5.6.2)
1-2
*"Let uu again denote E[N ] as E(N!Z - z] and assume that the randoma
"variables Ni, i - 2,3,...,z, are identically distributed. Let us also
introduce N as a random variable having the same distribution as thes
random variables Ni for i > 2. It follows then that
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E(NIZ - zI - E[N1 ] + (z-l) E[N s (5.6.3)
We have therefore proved the following important lemma.
LEMMA 5.6.1: Let the random variables Ni, i - 2,3,...,z,
be identically distributed. The conditional expectation for
the number of rounds to achieve z hits, E[NIZ - z], is then
given by (5.6.3), where N denotes a random variable having5
the same distribution as the random variables Ni for i > 2.
It should be noted that there is no assumption about MARKOV dependence
for (5.6.3) to hold, only that the random variables Ni, i - 2,3,.. .,z,
be identically distributed.
For t__e case of MARKOV-dependent fire, it may be shown (and we will
do so below) that
(l-p 1)
E[NI] 1 + P 1 (5.6.4)
and
E[N l + 1  P(hlh) (5.6.5)
Substituting (5.6.4) and (5.6.5) into (5.6.3), we obtain BONDER's expression
for MARKOV-dependent fire (5.5.8).
It remains for us to develop the expressions (5.6.4) and (5.6.5).
We begin by observing that the rar.Jom variable N has the distribution
SPl for n- 1 ,
PN I (n) - (5.6.7)
(l-Pl)(4-P(h9m)}n-2 P(hIm) for n > 2
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and similarly the random variable N has the distributions
{P(hjh) for n- 1,
N a (n) {l-P(hjh)}{l-P(hjm))n-2 P(hjm) for n > 2. (5.6.8)
Direct computation now yields
1(-Pl) P(hjm) )"E[N] 1 P 1+ 11 - P(hlm)- a .2n{1 - P(hlm}- (5.6.9)
Let us now observe that for 0 < lxi differentiation of the geometric series
(=0 x)n M 1 (5.6.10)
yielda
Sn(l-x) n-1 1 (..1
nnl x




It follows that for 0 < lxi





Let us now temporarily assume that P(hjm) > 0. Our desired result (5.6.4)
for E[NI] now follows by using (5.6.13) to simplify (5.6.9). It should
be clear that (5.6.4) holds for P(hlm) > 0. The expression (5.6.5) for
E[N ] follows similarly.
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5.7. The Number of Rounds Necessary to Kill a Target (General Derivation).
It in of considerable interest to also compute the expected number
of rounds necessary to kill a target E[N]. Our development here is
particularly significant because it suggests a way tc compute both the mean
and the variance of the time to kill a target under '-ery general conditions.
These important new results are given in the next section.
Assuming that the random variable Z is Independent of Ni for all
i > 1 and then taking the expected value of (5.6.3), we accordingly obtain
E[N] - F[N11 + {E[Z] - 1} E[N s (5.7.1)
where Z denotes the random variable that the z-h hit kills the taiget.
We have therefore proved the following important lema.
LEM?4 5.7.1: Let the random variables Ni, i - 2,3,...
be identically distrib'uted and assume that the number
of hits required to kill the target, a random varioble
denoted as Z, Is independent of the random variables
Ni for all i > 1. The expected number of rounds to
kill a target, E[N], is then given by (5.7.1), where Z
denotes the random variable that the zth hit kills the
target and N denotes a random variable having the sames
distribution as the random variables Ni for i > 2.
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£t should be noted here that no assumption has been made about the specific
nature of the distribution of the number of hits to kill a target. In other
words, (5.7.1) applies under much more general circumstances than just for a
geometric distributiou of the number of hits to kill a target. However, if
we do assume YAPMOV-dependent fire and a geometric distribution for the number
of nits to kill, then we may substitute (5.6.4) and (5.6.5) into (5.7.1)
to obtain
1 1 + P(him) - P(h1h)"E[N] - m) 1 + P(K H) (5.7.2)
since we have for a geometric distribution of the number of hits to kill
1
E[Z] - P(-- (5.7.3)
Finally, it should be noted that (5.7.2) and (5.7.3) may be substituted into
(5.5.7) to yield 1ONDER's result for the expected ýime to kill a target.
Ihe above approach of considering N as a sum of random variablesz
(5.6.1) is particularly significant, since it allows us to also compute
higher moment& for N (and consequently also for N). We will accordinglyz
now compute the variance oZ the number of rounds to kill a target, denoted
as var[N], which gives us some idea of the variability in the average number
of rounds to kill a target E[N]. We will begin by computing the conditional
variance var[NI Z- z]. Here we will assume
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(AI) the random variables Ni, i - 1,2,3,..., are not
only independent of one another, but they are also
independent of the random variable Z representing
the number of hits required to kill the target,
and
(All) the random variables Ni, i - 2,3,4,... , are
identically distributed.
It then follows from (5.6.1) (e.g. see PARZEN (57, pp. 405-407]) that
var[NIZ-z] - var(NI] + (z-l) var[N ] . (5.7.4)
We have therefore proved the following companion result to Lemma 5.6.1
LEMMA 5.7.2: Assume that (AI) and (AII) hold. The cond'.tional
variance for the number of rounds to achieve z hits,
var[NIZ-zI, is then given by (5.7.4), where N is as defineds
in Lenma 5.6.1.
For the case of lYRKOV-dependeut fire, it may be shown (and we will
do so below) that
{1-p 1}{1 + Pl - F(him)}
var[N1 ] - 2 (hm) (5.7.5)
and




It should be noted that for independent fire, i.e. p1  F(hlh) = P(hlm),
(5.7.5) and (5.7.6) both reduce to the well-known result for the geometric
distribution, namely var[number of rounds for first hit] - (l-pl)/p.2
Substituting (5.7.5) and (5.7.6) into (5.7.4), we find that for MARIOV-
dependent fire the conditional variance for the number of rounds to achieve
z hits is given by
(P(hlh) - pI)(P(hlh) + p1 - P(him)}
vatr[NIZ-z] -
p2(him)
+ z{l - P(hlh)}{l + P(hlh) - P(hlm)} (577)
P 2(hlm)
which for independent fire reduces to var[NIZ-z] - z(l-p1 )/p2
It remains for us to develop the expressions (5.7.5) and (5.7.6).
We begin by computing EN2 1.Direct computation yields EN2 1- nl 2PN (n),W[e] [PN1
or by (5.6.7)
E(N!] 2 1P  + (l-pl)P(hlm) [. n(n-1) {l - P(hx1m)}n-21 In-2
+ -1 7 n{l - P(hlm)}n-], (5.7.8)+l P(hi'm)} -
n-2 
whence substitution of (5.6.12) and (5.6.13) into (5.7.8) and some algebraic
manipulation yields
E[N2 P 2 (hlm) + {l-pj1 {2 + P(hlm))
p[2(h - . (5.7.9)
CP 2(hjm)
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Substituting (5.6.4) and (5.7.9) into var[N1 ] - E[N2] E2[N we easily
obtain our desired result (5.7.5). The expression (5.7.6) for var[N may
be developed in a similar way.
To compute the unconditional variance var(N] from (5.7.4), we
observe that there is an important formula (e.g. see PARZEN [58, p. 55])
expressing the imconditional variance in terms of the conditional variance,
namely
var[N] - EZ[var[NIZ]] + var z[E[gz]] (5.7.10)
where E z[-I] explicitly denotes that the expected value is being computed
with respect to the r.v. Z and similarly for var,[.]. Again we will
assume that assumptions (AI) and (AII) hold. From (5.7.4), we see that the
expected value of the conditional variance EZ[var[NIZ]] is given by
Ez[var[NIZ]] = var[NI] + {E[ Z]-l} var[N s] . (5.7.11)
From (5.6.3), we see that the variance of the conditional expectation
vart[E[NIZI] is given by
varz[E[NIZ]] - var[Z] E 2[N . (5.7.12)
Substituting (5.7.11) and (5.7.12) into (5.7.10), we obtain the following
expression for the variance of the number of rounds to kill a target
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var[N] - var[NI] + {E[ZI-1} var[N s] + var[Z] E2 [N s (5.7.13)
We have therefore proved the following important lemma.
LEMIIA 5.7.3: Assume that (AI) and (AII) hold. The variance
of the number of rounds to kill a target, var(N], is then
given by (5.7.13), where Z and N are as defined inS
Lemma 5.7.1.
For the special case of MARIDV-dependent fire and a geometric distribution
for the number of hits to kill, (5.7.13) becomes




{ (l-u+v) + 2w(u-v) (l-u+v/2) - wv} (5.7.14)
(Wv)
2
where u - P(hjh), v - P(hlm), and w - P(KIH). This important result (5.7.14)




5.8. General Results for Time to Kill a Target.
In this section we will extend the approach used in the previous section
(for developing the mean and the variance for the number of rounds to kill a
target) to develop new important results for the time for a single firer to kill
a single passive enemy target. Specifically, we will use a very transparent,
simple model to obtain very general expressions for the mean and variance of the
time to kill a target. As the reader undoubtedly knows by now, such results are
very significant because they provide a basis for estimating weapon-system kill
rates in detailed operational LANCHESTER-type models of combat attrition, and
our new results allow such kill rates to be estimated under more general conditions
than before. Additionally, the simple direct approach used to obtain these new
important results is significant in its own right, since it appears to be
applicable in other related cases of interest.
Thus, the main result of the section at hand is to show that under fairly
general circumstances the expected time to kill a target, E[T], is given by
E[T] - E[Ta] + E[Tfr] - E[T h] + {E[Th] + E[Tf]} E[Z]
+ {E[Tm] + E[Tf]} (E[Z] {E[Ns - 11 + E[N1 ] - E[Ns) , (5.8.1)
where
T (a r.v.) denotes the time to acquire a target.a
Tfr (a r.v.) denotes the time to fire the first round after the
target has been acquired,
Th (a r.v.) denotes the time to fire a round following a hit,
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T (a r.v.) denotes the time to fire a roun, following a miss,
m
Tf (a r.v.) denotes the time of flight of the projectile,
N1  (a r.v.) denotes the number of rounds f:red to obtain the first hit,
N (a r.v.) denotes the number of rounds fired to obtain any hitS
subsequent to the first one (and measured from the
occurrence of the last hit),
and
Z (a r.v.) denotes the number of hits required to kill the target.
Also, a somewhat less explicit and more complicated result for the variance of
the time to kill a target is given by (5.8.11), (5.8.20), and (5.8.28) below.
For the special case of MARKOV-dependent fire and a geometric distribution
of the number of hits to kill, the above general result for the expected time
to kill a target reduces to
2 1
{E[ThI + E[Tf]}E[t] - E[Ta] + E[ Tfr] - E[Th] + P(KIH)
S+ Tf] i - P(hJh)] + P(hlh) - pj (5.8.2)+ P(hlm) P(KIH)
which the reader will easily recognize as (5.4.1) with the deterministic event
times ta, t1, th, tM, and tf replaced by the expected values of the corre-
sponding randota variables.
Let us now turn to the development of (5.8.1) for the expected value
of the time for a single firer to kill a single passive enemy target and
the variance of this tima. We will again covsider the conceptual model (given




single passive enemy target. It consists of the sequence of events (El)
through (E5) given above in Section 5.5. For this model we will compute the
average time for the firer to kill a target, E[T], by executing the two
following steps:
(Sl) relate expected time to kill a target to the expected times to
obtain the first and subsequent hits and to the expected number
of hits to kill (see (5.8.6) below],
(S2) develop submodel for the expected times to obtain the first and
subsequent hits [see (5.8.15) and (5.8.23) below].
The variance of the time to kill, var[T], will be obtained in a similar (but
much less explicit and more complicated) manner. The basic idea behind
developi-g these results is to decompose an event time of interest into the
sum of a random number of component event times and to compute the appropriate
momeuts along the lines as done in Section 5.7 above. For the development of
these results, we will let T1 (a r.v.) denote the length of the time interval
from the time at which the last target was killed until the first hit is
obtained on the 'target at hand, and Ti (a r.v. for i - 2, 3, 4, ... ) denote
h. length of the time interval from the time at which the (i-l)st hit was
thachieved until the i-t hit is obtained on the target. We will then assume
that
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(Al) the random variables Ti, i - 1,2,3, , are all independent
of the random variable Z representing the number of hits
required to kill the target,
(A2) the random variables Ti, i M 2,3,4, ... , are all identically
distributed,
and (A3) the random variables Ti, i - 1,2,3, ... , are all independent
of one another.
Let us now carry out the above two computational steps (Si) and (52)
for obtaining E[T] and vart[T]. Accordingly, we turn to the first computa-
tional step (Si) and consider [cf. (5.6.1) above] the following model for the
time to obtain z hits, T (a r.v.),
z
Tz - T1 + I Ti , (5.8.3)i-2
where z denotes a previously-specified positive-integer number (i.e. it is
a positive-integer-valued deterministic parameter upon which the rev. is con-
ditioned). Here (as elsewhere) we have adopted the convention that 1z2
for z < 2. The above result (5.8.3) is a particularly transparent model
for T . It follows that
z
z
ET = zI - E(T] + I E[T i , (5.8.4)
i-2
Denoting E[T z as E[TIZ - z] and recalling assumption (A2) above, we may
f" then write
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E[TIZ - z] - E[TI] + (z-l) ET s] , (5.8.5)
where T denotes a r.v. having the same distribution as the random variabless
Ti for i > 2. Recalling assumption (Al), we multiply both sides of (5.8.5)
by pz(z) and sum from I to o to obtain the expected value for the time to
kill a target
E(T] E(TI] + fE[Z] - 11 E[T s] . (5.8.6)
To compute var(T], we observe that (cf. Section 5.7 above or
PARZEN (58, p. 55])
var(T] - Ez(var[TIZI] + varz[E[TIZ]] (5.8.7)
Now it follows by arguments similar to those used for the development of
(5.7.4) above that
var(TIZ] - var[T1 ] + (z-l) var[T s] , (5.8.8)
whence
Ez[var[TIZ]] -var[TI] + {E(ZI - 11 var[Ts] . (5.8.9)
Here, assumption (A3) is needed for (5.8.8) to hold. We also observe that
(5.8.5) yields [cf. the development of (5.7.12) above]
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vaz[ (E[TIZ]] - var[Z] E 2[T s . (5.8.10)
Substituting (5.8.9) and (5.8.10) into (5.8.7), we obtain the following expres-
sion for the variance of the time to kill a target in terms of the variance
for the time to obtain the firsZ hit T1 and that for the time to obtain any
subsequent hit T
5
var[T] - var[TI] + (E[Z] - 1} var[T s] + var[Z] E 2 [T . (5.8.11)
We have therefore proved the following important lemma.
LEMMA 5.8.1: Assume that (Al) and (A2) hold. The eipected time
to kill a target, E[T], is then given by (5.8.6), where T (a r.v.)
denotes the time to obtain the first hit, T (a r.v.) denotes the
time between any two subsequent consecutive hits, and Z (a r.v.)
denotes the number of hits required to kill the target. If we
additionally assume that (A3) holds, then the variance of the time
to ktll a target, var[T], is given by (5.8.11).
The reader should note that the above results for the time to kill
a target are expressed in terms of the moments for the time to obtain the first
hit and the time between any two subsequent consecutive hits, and not in
terms of the basic event times for the sequence of events (El) through (E5)
in the conceputal model of Section 5.5 (i.e. the r&aidom variables Ta, Tfr,
Th, Tm, and Tf). Accordingly, we now turn to the second computational step
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(S2) mentioned above and consider the following model for the time to obtain
the first hit, Tit
T1 a + (T fr + Tf) + (N1 -1)(Tm + Tf) , (5.8.12)
where N1  (a r.v.) denotes the number of rounds fired to obtain the first hit.
We will now assume that
(AI) the random variables Ta' Tf, Tfr, and Tm are all independent
of the random variable N1 representing the number of rounds
fired to obtain the first hit,
and (A2) the random variables Ta, Tf Tfr, and T are all independent
of one another.
To compute the expected value of Ti, we consider the time required
to fire n rounds T n (here n may be considered to be a realization of
H1 ) and obtain from (5.8.12)
T1n T + (Tf + Tf) + (n-l)(Tm + T•) , (5.8.13)
and hence
E[T 1 IN1 - n] - E[Ta] + E[Tfr] + E[Tf] + (n-l) {E[TmI + E[T f1 , (5.8.14)
where E['r•] has bee•. denoted as E[TI1N1 - n]. Using argument~s similar to
those use-1 above, we may uncondition E[T IN - n] to obtain
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E[T] E[T a] + E[T fr + E[Tf + {E[NI -1 } {E[T] + E[Tf] . (5.8.15)
To compute var[Tl], we first observe that
var[TI -NE (var[T IN I] + varN [E[T INI] , (5.8.16)1 N1  11N1 1 1
From (5.8.13) and assumption (A2) it follows that
var[Tl1N1 a n] - var(Ta] + var[Tfr I + var[TfI + (n-i) (var[Tm I + var(Tf]}, (5.8.17)
whence
EN [var[T1 IN 1] var[T a + var(T frI + var(Tf] + {E[N 1.-l}{var(T I+var[T f]} (5.8.18)
Here, assumption (A) is needed to Justify obtaining (5.8.18) from (5.8.17).
Also, (5.8.14) yields
var N (E[T 1 IN - var[N1 ] (E[Tm] + E[Tf]} 2 . (5.8.19)
Substituting (5.8.18) and (5.8.19) into (5.8.16), we obtain the following
expression for the variance of the time to obtain the first hit
var[TI] - var[Ta + var(Tfr] + var[Tf] + {E[N] - 1l}{var(T m + var[Tfif
+ var[NI] (EtTm] + E[Tf] 2  (5.8.20)
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We have therefore proved the following important lerina.
LEMIA 5.8.2: Assume that (Al) holds. The expected time to
obtain the first hit on a target, E[TI], ie then given by (5.8.15).
If we additionally assume that (12) holds, then the variance of
the time to obtain the first hit on ut target, var[T1 ], is given by
(5.8.20).
We have now completed the first half of step (S2). This computational
step is completed by repeating the above calculation procedure for the time
between any two subsequent consecutive hits on the target Ta, which has
the same distribution as Ti for i > 2. Here we will merely sketch develop-
ments, since the details are completely analogous to thosE given above for
T1 . We will now assume that
(Al) the random variables TfV Th, and Tm are ill independeut
of the random variable Ni (for i > 2) tepresenting the
number of rounds fired after the (i-l)-hit to obtain
ththe i- hit,
and (12) the random variables TfV Th, and T are all independent
of one another,
Simiiar to the above, it may be shown that the following model (for i > 2)
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1 Ti Th Tf + (N.-l)(T + Tf) (5..21)
leads to
E[TiINi - nj - E[ThI + E[Tf] + (n-.l) fE[Tm] + E[Tf]}, (5.8.22)
and consequently
E[Ts] - E[Th] + E[TfI + (EINs - l}{E[Tm I + E[Tf]}, (5.8.23)
where we have taken the liberty of replacing Ti and Ni by their equivalents
T and N . We now turn to the variance. In general, we have for i > 2S S
var[T ] - EN [var[T3. INi]] + var11 [E[Ti N i]] . (5.8.24)
It is easily shown that
var[T iIN, n] - var[ThI + var[Tf] + (2-l) fvar[Tm I + var[Tf]1, (5.8.25)
EN [varfT IN I var[Th] + var[Tf] + {E[E[Ni]-l}{var[T m] + var[Tf]} , (5.8.26)
and
varN [E[T iNI]N var[Ni {E[T] + E[Tf]2 2 (5.8.27)
whence (again, replacing Ti by Ts and Ni by N) follows
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var[Ts] - var[Th] + var[Tf] + {E[N] - lW{var[T m] + var[Tf]}
+ var[N] {E[T + E[T fi2 (5.8.28)
and the following important lemma.
LEMMA 5.8.3: Assume that (Al) holds. The expected time to obtain
any subsequent hit on a target (where this time interval is measured
from the occurrence of the last previous hit), E[T s, is then given
by (5.8.23). If we additionally assume that (A2) holds, then the
variance of the time to obtain any subsequent hit on a target,
var[T s], is given by (5.8.28).
We are now ready to develop our final results for E[T] and var(T].
Substituting (5.8.15) and (5.8.23) into (5.8.6), we obtain the desired final
result (5.8.1) for the expected time to kill a target. Because of the com-
plexity of corresponding terms for the variance of the time to kill a target,
we will not present here one final expression for var[T] in terms of the
fundamental operational variables appearing in (5.8.1), but we will let
var[T] be given by (5.8.11) in terms of var[T1 1 and var[T s, which in
turn are expressed in terms of the fundamental operational variables by
(5.8.20) and (5.8.28). Thus, to compute var[T] one must first use (5.8.20)
to compute var[T1] and (5.8.28) to compute var[Ts] and then use (5.8.11)
to combine these intermediate results into the final desired result for
var[T]. It remains for us to reconcile the three different sets of assumptions
used to develop Lemmas 5.8.1, 5.8.2, and 5.8.3, upon which the final results
for E[T] and var(T] are based. In particular, if we assume that the random
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variables Ni for i - 1,2,3,.. are independent of one another, then assump-
tion (11), (X2), (XI), and (X2) imply that assumption (A3) holds (i.e. the
random variables Ti for i - 1,2,3,... are independent of one another).
Thus, all these above assumptions may be merged into the following consolidated
set:
(Al) the random variables Ta, Tf, Tfr, and Tm are all independent
of the random variable N1 representing the number of rounds
fired to obtain the first hit,
(i2) the random variables Tf, Th, and Tm are all independent of
the random variable Ni (for i > 2) representing the number
st thof rounds fired after the (i-l)- hit to obtain the i-= hit,
(A3) the random variables Ni for i - 1,2,3,... are all independent
of the random variable Z representing the number of hits re-
quired to kill the target,
(A4) the random variables Ni for i - 2,3,4,... are all identically
distributed (let N denote a random variable having the same
distribution as these random variables),
(A5) the random variables Ni for i - 1,2,3,... are all independent
of one another,




We are now ready to summarize the final results of this section for the mean
E[T] and the variance var[T] of the time to kill a target. We do this with
the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.8.1: Assume that (Al) through (A4) hold. The expected
time to kill a target, E[T], is then given by (5.8.1). If we
additionally assume that (ý5) and (A6) hold, then the variance of
the time to kill a target, var[T], is given by (5.8.11), with (in turn)
var[TI] given by (5.8.20) and var[T I given by (5.8.28).
The above result (5.8.1) for the expected time to kill a target holds
under the very general conditions described by assumptions (Al) through (A4).
Moreover, there are some special cases of particular interest to the combat
modeller. In particular, for MARKOV-dependent fire (with stationary transition
probabilities), we have shown that (see Section 5.7)
{E[N1 ] - 11 = •Ph ' (5.8.29)
and
EN 1 - P(hh) (5.8.30)E[s]-1- P(hlm) "
For a geometric distribution of the number of hits to kill, we have
E[Z] - 1 . (5.8.31)
Thus, for MARKOV-dependent fire and a geometric distribution of the number of
hits to kill, (5.8.2) then follows from (5.8.1). We leave it as an exercise
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for the reader to verify that assumptions (AIl) through (A6) are satisfied
in this case. Finally, we could also use in this special case (5.7.5) and
(5.7.6) to compute var(T] by means of (5.8.11), (5.8.20), and (5.8.28).
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5.9. Development '3f Expected Time to Kill a Targft as Mean State-Recurrence
Time in Continuous-Time Semi-FARKOV Process.
In this section we present a third approach for developing the
expected time to kill a target. It is based on conceputalizing the process
by which a single firer engages a single passive target as a so-called
continuous-time semi-MARKOV (or MARKOV-renewal) process and invoking a
result by BARLOW [4, p. 53] for the mean recurrence time for a state in
such a stochastic process with an imbedded ergodic MARKOV chain (i.e. the
system can be in any one of a finite number of states after a sufficiently
long lapse of time). Although our approach based on considering the
expected value of the sum of a random number of random variables is undoubtedly
the simplest and most transparent one for deriving attrition-rate-coefficient
results for homogeneous-force combat, the state-recurret.ce-time approach
may have greater applicability for heterogeneous-force combat, and it
does form the basis for determining numerical values for attrition-rate
coefficients in the VECTOR series of combat models22 of VECTOR RESEARCH,
INC. 128; 54; 89; 90] (see also Section 5.16 below).
The state-recuirence-time approach may be considered to have
received its ini etus from BARFOOT [3], who in 1969 (besides first proposing
that an attrition-rate coefficient be defined as the reciprocal of the
expected time to Kill a target) presented aa alternative (to BONDER's
[11]) method for deriving an expression for the expected time for a single
firer to kill a target. BARFOOT considered that the target could be in
one of, in general, m states (to obtain a result like BONDER's [11] for
the time to kill a target, one of three states: killed, hit (but not killed),
and missed (and not killed)], transitions between these states would
72
i mm m mi i mm [] i i •! i i l!• l • -I p -I -.I -]! ! !! ! ! • !
occur from the impacts of rounds in the target area, and this target-
destruction process formed a MARKOV chain. FARRELL [17, pp. 136-137] then
observed that if the target-destruction process could be conceputalized
in such a way that every state has some probability of eventually occurring,
then one can invoke a known result on mean state-recurrence time from the
theory of semi-MARKOV processes to determine the expected time to kill
a target.
Loosely speaking, a semi-MARKOV process (SMP) is completely described
by a matrix of transition probabilities for an imbedded MARKOV chain (MC)
and a matrix of distribution functions for the "wait" in a state before going
to another state. For a continuous-time MC, the "wait" in a state is
exponentially distributed, while the SMP considers more general distri-
butions for waiting times (e.g. see BARLOW [4], SINLAR [22], COX and MILLER
[30, p. 352], or ROSS [59; 69]). For such a SMP, BARLOW [4, p. 53] (see
also ýINLAR [22, Theorem 6.12] or ROSS [59, Theorem 5.16]) proved the
following important result.
THEOREM 3.9.1 (BARLOW [4]): Consider a semi-MARKOV process
(with J states SI, $2P ' , S) in which all states
communicate. The mean recurrence time for state Si, denoted
as I i, is then given by
1 (5.9.1)
where 1i denotes the unconditional mean wait in state S
and w is an element (corresponding to state S ) of the
stationary distribution of the imbedded MARKOV chain. It follows
that
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and
U- k- 1 Pjkjk (5.9.3)
where Pij is the transition probability that the system goes
from state Si to state S when such a change does occur, and
1 k denotes the mean time that the system remains in state S
before it transitions to state Sk.
It should be noted that no assumption at all is made here about the distri-
bution of waiting time in state S before the system transitions to
state Sk.
Let us now show how BARLOW's result (Theorem 5.9.1) may be used to
develop the general result (5.8.2) for the expected time for an individual
firer to kill a single passive enemy-target type with MARKOV-dependent
fire [a special case of which is 3ONDER's result (5.4.1)]. After developing
results for this Important special case, we will outline how this approach
may be used to determine the expected time to kill a target under more
general circumstances (e.g. under conditions of several target types with
different priorities for their engagement).
To develop (5.8.2), we consider a single firer trying to engage and
kill a single type of target. We assume that all the assumptions required








When a target has been killed, search immediately begins for a new target.
We now seek to define the system states so that the conditions requisite
for invoking BARLOW's theorem (i.e. Theorem (5.9.1) are met (in
particular, given any starting state, after sufficient lapse of time the
system could be in any state). Thus, the "killed" state cannot be absorbing.
To accomplish such a defining of system states, we observe that the follow-
ing two situations are mathematically treated the same: (I) a new target
immediately appearing upon the destruction of the currently engaged target,
and (II) the same target being repeatedly killed. Thus, we will. define
the following three system states:
S1 - killed state (which lasts from the destruction of the
previous target until the first round has been fired at
a new target),
S2 - hit state (in which the target has been hit but not killed
by the last round fired),
and S3 - missed state (in which the target has been missed and not
killed by the last round fired).
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These states and the corresponding transition probabilities for changes
in system state are shown in Figure 5.4. The transition probabilities for
the imbedded MARKOV chain are given by
Pl1  p lP(KIH), P2 1 - P(hlh) P(KIH), P3 1 - P(hlm) P(KIH),
P1 2 " plfl-P(KIH)I, P22 ' P(h!h){I-P(KIH)}, P3 2 - P(hlm){I-P(KIH)}, (5.9.4)
P13 ' p1 , P23 ' l-P(hlh), P3 3 - l-P(hlm),
Furthermore, the expected wait in each state is independent of the next
state visited and given by
I = E[Ta] + E[Tfr] + E(Tf]
U2 " E[Th] + E[Tf] , (5.9.5)
and P3 " E(TmI + E[Tff]I
where all the subscripted T's are as defined in Section 5.8.
With the above definitions, all states communicate, and the expected
time to kill a target is Just the expected time between visits to state Si,
i.e. the mean recurrence time 1 of state S . Hence, the expected time
to kill a target E[T] is given by
E[T]-L - 3 1 W (5.9.6)
11 ff1r 1
E[T =gll=• J1 "j-i
where the stationary probabilities are given by the ayetem of equations
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pI P(KIH)
s1 (Look for New Target)
S2h P.m {P(mrn) m1- PINt)
{~~)I-P(KIH)} P (MIh) (i)I-PM)
HIT II MISSED
(but Not Killed) 1-P(hlh) (and Not Killed)
Figure 5.4. System states ard transition probabilities used in
alternate derivation of expected time to kill a
target by invoking BARLOW's [4] result for mean
recurrence time of semi-MARKOV process with
imbedded ergodic MARKOV chain.
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it - Wipij for j - 1,2,3. (5.9.7)
i-I
From (5.9.6) we see that what we need for computing the mean recurrence
time for a target being killed 11 is not the stationary probabilities
Wi for j - 1,2,3 themselves but the ratios n h/W for j - 1,2,3.
Accordingly, let us define
r •(5.9.8)
j Wi
We may then write
E[T] - L11 " 41 + r 2 u 2 + r 3 it3 , (5.9.9)
where r 2 and r 3 are determined by the linear system of equations
(P22 - l)r 2 + P3 2 r 3 - -P12
1 (5.9.10)
P2 3 r 2 + (P 3 3 -1)' 3 " -P 1 3
The reader should recall here that only two of the three equations (5.9.7)
are linearly independent, since 73. 1. Solving (5.9.10), we
find that
P12(1 - P3 3 ) - P12P32
2- (_P22) (1-P 3 3 )-p 2 3 p 3 2
and (5.9.11)
P13(1 - P22) + P12P23
'3 (l-P 2 2 )(l-p 3 3 ) - P23P32
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Substituting (5.9.4) into (5.9.11), we find that
{1 - P(KIH))'2 " P(KJH) '
and
1 P[i - P(hTh)] + P(hlh) - p1
r3 =P(h•m- P(KIH)
whence follows (5.8.2) from substitution of (5.9.5) and (5.9.12) into (5.9.6).
In general, the above approach may be used to develop an expression
for the expected time to kill a target E[T] in any firing process with
a set of J distinguishable states Si, S2P ... P S* as long as the
following assumptions hold:
(Al) the process makes transitions at distinct points in time,
(A2) given that one is in state Si. the probability of transition
to state S does not depend on any history of the process;
we let p1J denote the probability of transition to state
S from state Si. i.e.
- system in state system in state 1j S after transitionISi before transition]
(A3) given that one Ls in state Si, the mean wait before a
transition to state S depends only on the specification
Sof these two states; we let Uij denote the mean wait in
state Si before a transition to state Si.
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(A4) no matter where the system starts, every state has some
probability of eventually occurring,
and (AS) the states are so defined that the expected time interval
between successive entries into state S1 corresponds to
the expected time between casualties.
In essence, this approach may be applied to any target-destruction process
23that can be modelled as a semi-MARKOV process . Let us now introduce
the ratio r - WJ/Wl" The expected time to kill a target E(T] is
then simply the expected time between the occurrences of two successive
casualties Zi1 and is given by
J
E[T] - + • r4i (5.9.13)J=2 J'J
where r 2, ... , r3  are determined by the linear system of equations
J
2 (PJ - i1j)ri " -Plj for j -
2,...,J, (5.9.14)
and 85j denotes the KRONECKER delta defined as - 1 for i - j and
- 0 otherwise. Here we should recall that assumption (A4) guarantees that
we can always solve the linear system of eqtuations (5.9.14) (e.g. see
FELLER [35, pp. 356-362] or PAAZEN [57, p. 265)). If the vj are not
directly available, they may be obtained from the v by using (5.9.3).
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5.10. Special Cases of BONDER's General Expression for the LANCHESTER-
Attrition-Rate Coefficient.
We began our examination of the analytical modelling of a LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficient (i.e. approach (Al) of Section 5.1] by consider-
ing in Section 5.2 some very simple models for such coefficients in the
case of aimed fire and an impact lethality mechanism, and then we progressed
to much more complicated models for the time to kill a target [namely,
BONDER's result (5.4.1) for MARKOV-dependent fire and our more general
ones (5.8.1) and (5.8.2)]. Thus, we started by presenting without justifi-
cation results for a couple of very simple analytical submodels for a
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coeffinient under conditions of "aimed" fire,
and we subsequently developed a fairly general model for the expected
time to kill a target and obtained a general result for this model.
At this juncture it now seems appropriate for us to show how the earlier-
obtained simple results may be viewed as special cases of these later-
obtained, more general results. In particular, we will show how BONDER's
result for the expected time to kill a target with HARKOV-dependent fire
(5.4.1) simplifies and yields (under the appropriate circumstances) a
simple result like (5.2.4) for the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient.
We will also examine an analogous simplification that yields that "aimed"
24
fire can lead to an FT target-type-attrition process when a model
proposed for target-acquisition times by H. BRACKNEY (20] is considered.
In preparation for developing these results, though, let us briefly review
how the different results that we have developed for varying degrees of
generality are related to one another.
The most general result that we have developed to the expected
time for an individual firer to kitl a single enemy passive target is
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given by (5.8.1), which holds for assumptions (Al) through (A6) of Section 5.8.
The operational conditions corresponding to these assumptions are more general
than MARKOV-dependent fire and a geometric distribution of the number of hits
required for a kill with random event times. When we do assume MARKOV-
dependent fire and a geometric distribution for the number of hits to kill,
however, our most general result (5.8.1) simplifies and we obtain (5.8.2),
which still contains random event times. BONDER's result (5.4.1) is a
special case of (5.8.2), i.e. it is the special case in which all event times
are deterministic. In turn, (5.2.8) is a special case of BONDER's result
(5.4.1), and (5.2.4) corresponds to a special case of (5.2.8), i.e. the
special case in which the time to acquire a target is negligible with
respect to the time required to destroy an acquired target and is taken to
be equal to zero.
Let us now consider more systematically the simplification of
BONDER's general result (5.4.1) in some special cases of tactical interest.
Other such special cases (and ones that we will not examine here) are to
be found in BONDER and FARRELL [17, pp. 106-107] and also [88, p. 28].
We begin by listing assumptions that are more restrictive than those used
to develop (5.4.1) but are yet of tactical interest (see [88, p. 28] for
a further discussion):
(Al) statistical independence among firing outcomes, i.e.
P1 "P(hlh) - P(him) - PSSH;
(AW) "uniform" rate of fire, i.e. t 1  th - tm - t v
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(A3) negligible time of flight for projectile, i.e. assume that
tf - 0;
/
and (A4) target-acquisition time negligible, i.e. assume that t - 0.
a
If we take assumption (Al) to hold, i.e. independent fire instead of MARKOV-
dependent fire, then BONDER's general expression reduces to
(t + tf) (th-.tm)
E[T] t +PS-K +(HK) tI th  f+ h (5.10.1)
where PSSK PSSH P(KIH) denotes the single-shot kill probability. If
we additionally take assumption (A2) to hold, i.e. uniform firing rate,
then this lasý result further reduces to
E[TI-t + (tt + tf) (5.10.2)a PSSK
which may also be written as
(1 + •tf)
E(T] - t + ( (5.10.3)a vp SSK
where v denotes the firing rate (assumed uniform). If we additionally
take assumption (A3) to hold, i.e. negligible projectile flight time, then
this last result further reduves to
SE[T] =t + 1 (5.10.4)
a vPSSK
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which is the same as (5.2.8) above. If we additionally take assumption
(A4) to hold, i.e. negligible target-acquisition time, then we finally
obtain
1
E[T] - , (5.10.5)
SSK
which is equvalent to the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient being given
by, for exmnple, (5.2.4), i.e. the kill rate of a single weapon system is
equal to the product of its firing rate times the (single-shot) kill prob-
ability of each round. We stumarize the above results with the following
lemma.
:.QMMA 5.10.1: Assume that assumptions (Al) through (A2) above hold.
BONDER's general expression for the expected time to kill. a target
(5.4.1) then reduces to (5.10.4), with the LANCHESTER attrition-
rate coefficient being given by, for example, (5.3.1) [i.e.
a - 1/ftay + 1/(vYPSSKXY)M. If we additionally take assumption
(A4) to hold, i.e. t a 0, then (5.10.4) reduces to (5.3.0.5) and
the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient is given, for example,
by (5.2.4).
Thus, we have shown that the simple models that we initially considered
may be viewed as special cases of much more general ones.
Along the same lines, let us now consider a target-acquisition-
time model proposed by H. BRACKNEY [20] and see V ,i "aimed" fire can lead
to an FT target-type-attrition process when target-acquisiLi'n times are
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target-type-force-level dependent and are the constraining factor in the
attrition process. Following BRACKNEY [20, p. 32], let us accordingly
replace assumption (A4) above by (X4).
(A4) the mean time to acquire a target is inversely proportional
(let k denote the constant of proportionality) to the
target density, i.e. t - k/p where p denotes the densitya
of targets in the target area A that is searched.
In analytical terms, assumption (A4) yields that, for example,
E[T x. (5.10.6)
where T (a r.v.) denotes the time required for a Y firer Zo acquireaxy
an X target, AX denotes the area occupied by X targets (and searched
by Y firers), x denotes the X force level within this region, and
denotes a constant of proportionality for this model of the time for a
Y firer to acquire an X target. The above considerations lead to the
following interesting result.
LDIMA 5.10.2: Assume that assumptions (Al) through (A3) and (A4)
hold. The expected tLme for a, for example, Y firer to kill an
X target is then given by




This last lemma haa the following important consequence: if the
time to acquire targets is the constraining factor in the target-attrition
process, then one has approximately, for example,
E[Cx ] -_ >> ,(5.10.8)k~x _ _ssx
XY X V Y PSSKXy
which yields that the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient may be taken
under such circumstances to be given by
a- = , (5.1o.9)
where a - l/(kYAX). Consequently, the rate of change of the X force
level under these circumstances would be given by
dx . -jxy (5.10.10)
dt
Thus, we have shown that when BRACKNEY's target-acquisition-time model is
used and target acquisition is the constraining factor on the rate of
attrition, "aimed" fire yields an FT target-type-attrition process. Thus,
both "area" fire against a target type and also the above situation for
"aimed" fire may be hypothesized to yield the same target-type-attrition-
rate equation, and this situation was the reason why we introduced in
Section 2.12 our classification scheme for homogeneous-force LANCHESTER-




One can use BRACKNEY's above target-acquisition-time model (5.10.6)
with the general expression for the expected time to kill a target (5.8.1)
and its various derivatives which we have discussed above to develop some
interesting consequences. In particular, the assault of an X force
against a Y force's defensive position may be hypothesized to yield FIFT
LANCHESTER-type attrition equations. A convenient place to begin this
development is to observe that the conditions of Lemma 5.10.2 (i.e. assump-
tions (Al) through (A3) and (A4) being satisfied] yield the following
LANCHESTER-type equations
Idt - - l (vyPSSxxT with x(0) - x0S+(5.10.11)
x with y(O) - 0y
Limiting cases of these equations provide some important insights into the
dynamics of combat. Such limiting cases may be generated by considering
the relative size of the time to acquire a target in relation to the
time required to kill an acquired target. BRACKNEY (20, pp. 32-331 con-
sidered the two limiting caces of (I) when the tire to acquire is
negligible, and (II) when it is the dominating term. He further reasoned
that a combatant's search time (i.e. the time to acquire an enemy target)
is negligible when the enemy rushes through an open area and assaults his
position. Furthermore, he postulated thac a combatant's search time
is the dominating term in the expression for the time to kill an enemy
target when the enemy remains under cover in their defensive positions.
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Consequently, BIACKNEY (20, p. 33] argued that force-on-force attrition
for the assault of an X force against a Y force's defensive position
could be modelled by
dx
dt- _ -YYPSSK y with x(O) - x0 9
(5.10.12)1 y =_--•Z- with y(O) - yo 5dt kXAy
which are readily recognized by the reader as the equations for an FIFT
LANCHESTER-type attrition process. This model (5.10.12) was proposed by
BRACKENY [20, pp. 32-33] and used, for example, by SCHAFFER [65, p. 4881
to study sieges in guerrilla-warfare operations (see Section 7.6 below).
Furthermore, when both sides remain in their (covered) defensive positions
(a situation that BRACKNEY [20, p. 361 termed a fire duel), BRACKNEY
argued that force-on-force attrition could then be modelled by
L dx 
with x(o) = x0
(5.10.13)
- _ with y(O) - y
dt kx%8
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5.11. Variables Upon Which Attrition-Rate Coefficients Depend.
It is intuitively obvious (and born out by empirical evidence)
that, in general terms, the fire effectiveness of a weapon system depends
on the target type engaged and the environmental circumstances of the
engagement 25. Thus, a numerical value for a LANCHESTER attrition-rate
coefficient depends on both the characteristics of the firer's weapon
system and also those of the target. However, this dependence of a
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient on firer-weapon-system-type and
target characteristics is not direct but indirect through the operational
variables (e.g. time to acquire a target, hit probabilities, etc.)
upon which such an attrition-rate coefficient directly depends. Conse-
quently, it seems appropriate for us to consider that an attrition-rate
coefficient depends on two types of factors:
(TI) direct factors,
and (T2) indirect factors.
Let us now examine more closely this distinction between direct and
indirect factors by considering the special case of the LANCHESTER attrition-
rate coefficient for an impact-to-kill system under conditions of MARKOV-
dependent fire and a geometric distribution for the number of hits required
for a kill. Similar remarks will, of course, apply to a LANCHESTER attrition-
rate coefficient corresponding to other circumstances. To return to the
case at hand, we again focus on an impact-to-kill system with MARKOV-
dependent fire and a geometric distribution for the number of hits to kill.
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As we have seen above in Section 5.4, the direct factors upon which the
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient depends correspond to the variables
appearing in (5.4.1) (see also Table 5.11). Howevcr, each of these vari-
ables, e.g. p or P(hjh), themselves in turn depend on other operational
factors in the tactical environment. For example, the hit probabilities
depend on such variables as range (i.e. distance) between target and firer,
tactical posture of the target and/or firer, etc. We will refer to such
variables as the indirect factors upon which a LANCHESTER attrition-rate
coefficient depends. Table 5.111 lists some indirect factors upon which
the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient may depend. This list is not
meant to be exhaustive, but it should be considered to be suggestive of
functional dependencies that should be considered in modelling force-on-
force combat interactions.
For many weapon systems, the range (i.e. distance) between firer
and target has a very significant effect on weapon-system fire effectiveness.
In such cases (as stressed by BONDER [9-11; 13]), if the range between
firers and targets changes appreciahly during the course of an engagement,
then use of constant attrition-rate coefficients in a LANCHESTER-type
model can yield quite misleading results (see Section 6.2 for further details).
BONDER has consequently emphasized the importance of explicitly considering
in LANCHESTER-type combat analyses such range dependence of weapon-system
fire effectiveness, especially for mobile weapon-system types. Thus, in
many tactical situations of interest we should consider, for example,
that for the model (5.2.1) the LANCHESTER attrtion-rate coefficients a and
26
b explicitly depend on range , i.e
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TABLE 5.111. Indirect Factors Upon Which LANCHESTER Attrition-Rate
Coefficients Depend.
1. Range Between Firer and Target











a a W(r) and b 0 8(r) (5.11.1)
where r denotes the range (i.e. distance) between firers and targets.
Thus, we should consider LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients to be at





5.12. Some Typical Range Dependencies for the LANCHESTER Attrition-Rate
Coefficient.
As we have Just discussed above, the range (i.e. distance) between
firers and targets is one of the principal indirect factors upon which a
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient depends. It is intuitively obvious
(and born out by empirical evidence) that the fire effectiveness of a
weapon system is strongly dependent on the range between firer and target.
Based on their examining predicted numerical values of the LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficient for specific weapon systems with widely differ-
ing characteristics and how these values varied with range, BONDER and
FARRELL [17, pp. 196-2001 have considered a number of functional forms for
range-dependent attrition-rate coefficients in "aimed-fire" combat, e.g.
for combat modelled by (5.2.1). The functional forms considered by BONDER
and FARRELL may be classified as:
(Fl) power dependence
(F2) exponential dependence upon range,
(F3) cosine dependence upon range,
(F4) piecewise-constant dependence upon range.
We will accordingly call such attrition-rate coefficients as follows:
f93
(Cl) power attrition-rate coefficient
e
Sp (r) -I (5.12.1)
0 for r < re -
(C2) exponential attrition-rate coefficient
r) - for 0 <r < r e
aE(r) - (5.12.2)
0 for re < r
(C3) cosine attrition-rate coefficient
0-- + cos(re/ for 0 < r < r
a c(r) M -- -- (5.12.3)
0 for re<r,
(C4) piecewise-constant attrition-rate coefficient
a 0 for 0 < r < r
a (r) - (5.12.4)
0 for r < r
e -
Here re denotes the maximum effective range of the firer's weapon sys-
term, a0 and I are positive constants, and v is a nonnegative con-
stant.
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The first two above functional forms for range-dependent attrition-
rate coefficients are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. In Figure 5.5 we have
plotted the value of the power attrition-rate coefficient ap(r) given by
(5.12.1) versus the range between firers and targets. As we can see from
Figure 5.5, the constant p is used to model the range dependence of the
attrition-rate coefficient ap (r). For values of V > 1, the attrition-
rate coefficient ap (r) is a convex function of r on [O,r e,
i.e. the plot of ap(r) versus r "flexes downward." We have accordingly
chosen to call P the "shape" parameter, since it controls the shape of
the plot of ap(r). In Figure 5.6 we have similarly plotted the exponential
attrition-rate coefficient aE(r) given by (5.12.2) versus range. In this
case, the constant a1  is used to model the range dependence of a E(r).
However, this attrition-rate coefficient a E(r) is a concave function of
r on [O,r e, i.e., the plot of a E(r) versus r "flexes upward." Also,
we observe that a E(r) - linear dependence on r as a1 - 0, and we have
similarly chosen to call a1  the "shape" parameter.
Still another model for range dependence of such an attrition-rate
coefficient is an exponential fall off in fire effectiveness of the form
aED(r) - a0e (5.12.5)
where a1 > 0. We call call the attrition-rate coefficient aED(r) given
by (5.12.5) the exponentially-decaying attrition-rate coefficient. It is
plotted versus range in Figure 5.7. As Figure 5.7 shows, it has a range
dependence somewhat similar to the attrition-rate coefficient a (r).p









0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Ronge r (meters
Figure 5.5. Variation in fire effectiveness (measured in kills/minute
per firer) with range for the power attrition-rate
coefficient ap(r), which is analytically given by (5.12.1),
for several different values of the "shape" parameter p.
The maximum effective range of the weapon-system type is
denoted as re and for this example re = 2000 meters.
Also, in this example the weapon-system kill rate at zero
force separation (range) ap (O) - a0 . 0.6 X casualties/(unit
time x number of Y firers) has been held constant, and the
"shape" parameter v has been varied (i.e. curves plotted
for i - 1/2, 1, 2, 3, and 4).
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Figure 5.6. Similar to Figure 5.5, variation in fire effectivenss with
range for the exponential attrition-rate coefficient a E(r),
which is analytically given by (5.12.2), for several differ-
ent values of the "shape" parameter a . Again, the maximum
effective range of the weapon system is given by r - 2000e
meters. Also, the weapon-system kill rate at zero force
separation (range) aE(O) - a0 has again been held constant,
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P > 1. Although (5.12.5) implies that the wapon system theoretically
has an infinite maximum effective range, for all practical purposes the
weapon system becomes "ineffective" (i.e. it ceases to kill) when
a 1r > 12, since then ED(r) is less than 10-5 times its value at
r - 0 (cf. the curve labeled a, - 0.004 in Figure 4.7 for ranges




5.13. Attition-Rate Coefficients for Area-Fire Weapons.
The above attrition-rate-coefficient results [in particular, (5.4.1)
and its generalizations (5.8.1) and (5.8.2)] apply to weapon-system types
that direct their fire at individual targets that are vulnerable to only
27the impact of a projectile fired by the weapon system . Let us refer to
this nituation as "aimed" fire against an impact-sensitive target. Many
times, however, a weapon system will engage a target or complex of targets
not by aiming its fire at an individual target but by directing its fire
into only the general area thought to be occupied by the target or targets.
Let us refer to this latter situation as "area" fire (cf. Section 2.11 above).
It is for this type of firing mode that we will now consider the determina-
tion of LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients. Furthermore, such "area"
fire may be directed at both fragment-sensitive and also impact-sensitive
28targets . As far as combat modelling is concerned, the former is far more
the important case, since it may be considered to conceptually model
artillery engaging enemy dismounted-infantry troops (i.e. those not in
protective vehicles) dispersed in tactical formations. An example of the
second case (i.e. "area" fire against impact-sensitive targets) would be
small-arms fire against poorly located enemy dismounted-infantry troops.
This latter tactical situation has been considered in guerrilla-warfare
settings by DEITCHMAN [31] and SCHAFFER [65] (see Chapter 7 for further
details). Thus, a number of important tactical situations may be modelled
by area fire.
Let us accordingly consider combat between two homogeneous forces
(denoted as X and Y) in which force-on-force attrition occurs at a




it appears to do so) but in which each side uses "area" fire. For the
sake of placing something concrete before the eyes of the reader, we will
focus on the attrition of the X force caused by the Y firers. According
to the assumptions just made, we may write




a- E[T xy 1 (5.13.2)
where T (a r.v.) denotes the time required for a Y firer to kill an
X target. For "area" fire, however, the expression for the expected time
to kill a target takes a different form than that for "aimed" fire, i.e.
E[T] is no longer given by (5.4.1).
The simplest model for E[TI in the case of "area" fire involves
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adapting (5.4.1) to this case . This adaptation may be accompllshed by
conceptualizing the target-destruction process in the following manner:
an "area" target is acquired, and "area" fire is directed at it; if a round
lands in the target area, the target may be killed; otherwise it is not
damaged. Thus, t would represent the time to acquire the "area" target,a
and other quantities in (5.4.)) would be analogously redefined. However,
since an area target is usually not reacquired after every kill of one of
its elements, we should replace ta by ta/N, where nK denotes the




t (• + tj
"E[T] -A+t -+h 4. h
n K 1 h Z:iare
(tm + tf) [1 - Pa+e1 
(5.13.3)Pae(him) P(,- Haa "area "areal'
area arararaa
where
t denotes the time to acquire an area target,
a
aK denotes the number of kills per acquisiticn,
t tf, th, and tm are defined similarly as for "aimed" fire
in Section 5.4,
parea, P area(hlh), and P (him) denote MARKOV-dependent prob-
abilities for hitting the area target,
and P(KIH area) denotes the probabilLt;, that we kill a target element
given that we "hit" the area targer.
Here, P(KIH area) depends on the lethal area (see [84, Chapter 15]) of the
30
weapon system's projectile
Moreover, there is a special case of the model discussed in the
previous paragraph that merits further examination and discussion. To this
end, let us make the following assumptions (cf. those made in Section 5.10)
concerning the above adaptation of (5.4.1), namely (5.13.3):
(Al) statistical independence among firing outcomes, i.e.
pares = Parea(hlh) a Parea (him) SSarea
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(A2) "uniform" rate of fire, i.e. tI M th W tm and we will
denote this common value as t - l/v;
and (A3) ne• igible time of flight for projectile, i.e. assume that
t f 0.
In this case, (5.13.3) reduces to
t
E[T] - a + a (5.13.4)n K varea
K SSK
where v - 1/tv denotes the operational firing rate of the weapon syst-am
and P area - P area P(KI1H ) denotes the single-shot-kill probability for
SSK SSH area
destroying a target element with one round. It is implicitly assumed here
that multiple kills are impossible (i.e. at most only one target element
can be killed with any one round). Furthermore, when ta/nK is negligible
area y
compared to I/(vPssK ), then Y's attrition-rate coefficient in (5.1.3.1)
may be approximated by [cf. (5.2.4) above]
a area (5.13.5)
Y SSKXY
where Parea denotes the single-3hot-kill probability for a Y firerSSKXy
engaging an X area target.
Moreover, there are a couple of special cases for the LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficient (5.13.5) that we should consider. When a weapon
system emplom__"area" fire and emy argets defend a constant area (see
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Table 2.XIX for a more precise list of the associated assumptions), the
expression for the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient may be given in an
even more explicit form (i.e. one depending on more basic measurable
operational quantities) and depends (among other things) on the vulnerable
area of the target (denoted as aV) and the lethal area of the projectile
fired by the firer's weapon system (denoted as aL). In general, a
rather complicated expression is obtained for such an attrition-rate coefficien.
(e.g. see BONDER and FARRELL (17, pp. 141-162]), but this expression may be
stated in a particularly simple form in special cases under the appropriate
simplifying assumptions, e.g. for "small-arms fire" when aV >> a and for
"fire from a weapon of great lethality" when aL >> av. Thus, two cases
in which a simple expression is obtained for an attrition-rate coefficient
for "area" fire and a constant-area defense are as follows:
(Cl) small-arms fire (i.e. aV >> aL),
and (C2) fire from weapons of large lethality (i.e. aL >> av).
A more precise description of the operational conditions that we have
in mind is given in the first five assumptions listed in Table 2.XIX.
Assuming that ta/ilK is negligible, we may take, for example, the
attrition-rate coefficient a to be given by (5.13.5) if we assume that
the attrition-rate of the X force is given by (5.13.1).
_area
For small-arms fire (i.e. a. >> aL), we may calculate P areaSSKXY
for use in (5.13.5) by considering a "lethal dot" being randomly placed
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into a large region (of area A.) that contains x "vulnerable circles"
(each of area avx). Under these circumstances and the assumptions31 that
a Y firer directs his fire into the region actually occupied by the X
targets and that his fire is uniformly distributed over the region into
which it is directed, the probability that a target is hit, denoted as
parea is given by the ratio of the total vulnerable area of all the targetsSSH 9









where P(KIH) denotes the probability that an X target is killed by a
Y projectile when it is hit. Thus, when P(KIH) - 1.0, the attrition
rate of the X force is given by
d..x . aX
dt Ax vy xy, (5.13.8)
which is the result [with P(KIH) included] given in Table 2.XIX.
For fire from weapons of large lethality (i.e. aL >>av), a slightly
_area b
different analysis is required. In this case, we may calculate P aa by
SSKXy
considering a "lethal circle" being randomly placed into a region that contains
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Figure 5.8. Conceputalization of target-destruction process for
"area fire" by small arms. In this case a » > a L2
i.e. the vulnerable area of a target is much larger
than the lethal'area of a round. The above diagram
considers X to be the target and Y the firer.
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3. randomly placed "vulnerable dots." We assume that these dots are so
placed that the "lethal circle" covers at most one of them per throw.
Furthermore, the probability of covering one of these x "vulnerable dots"
in the region of area AX is the same as the probability of covering one
such dot randomly placed in a region of area AX/x. This latter prob-
ability is simply given by the ratio of the total lethal area to the
total area of this equivalent region (see Figure 5.9), and hence
parea xa•
SSSK = " (5.13.9)
In the above formula, It is assumed that a "hit" on a target will kill the
target. The fcrmula is easily modified to model the case in which each
such "hit" (i.e. the covering of a "vulnerable dot" by a "lethal circle")
has a probability less than one of killing such a target. Finally, for
the above case of fire from weapons of large lethality, the attrition rate
of the X force is given by
dx a__
dt AX y Vxy, (5.13.10)
which is a result first apparently given by WEISS [91, p. 83] and later
used by both DEITCIHMAN [31, pp. 821-8221 and SCHAFFER [65, p. 470] in
the modelling of guerrilla warfare (see Chapter 7). The small-arms-fire
result (5.13.8) may be considered to be a particularization of (5.13.10)
in which the lethal area of a Y round is taken to be the vulnerable






Figure 5.9. Conceptualization of target-destruction process for
"area fire" by weapons of large lethality. In this
case aL >> aV, i.e. the lethal area of a round is
much larger than the vulnerable area of a target,
and the target density is reflected by considering
an equivalent process taking place in a region of
area AX/x. The above diagram considers X to
be the target and Y the firer.
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There is, however, another (more general) approach for developing
the above kill-rate result for "area" fire (5.13.10). This other approach
is based on the equivalence of expected target coverage to kill prob-
ability, and it considers the expected number of survivors by conceptually
replacing all the targets by a single equivalent target and computing the
probability of destroying this equivalent target (i.e. see (5.13.14)
below]. This approach is particularly significant, since it is essentially
the one used by BONDER and FARRELL [17, pp. 141-162] to develop attrition
rates for multiple-tube-firing cases (for both volley and salvo fire).
We will now present this important alternate development of attrition
rates for area-fire weapon systems.
A fundamental precept upon which target-coverage analysis (i.e.
the theoretical analysis of damage to targets by indirect-fire weapons
[e.g. see HESS [4311) is based on the equivalence of expected target coverage
to kill probability 32. It is simply stated as follows.
FUDAMENTAL PRECEPT OF TARGET COVERAGE: The probability
of killing a randomly located point target is equal to the
expected coverage of a population of objects when the popu-
lation density is distributed in the same manner as the
point target.
If we let F denote the average fraction of targets killed and PK denote
the probability of killing the point target, then the fundamental precept




F PK ( 5.13.11)
This result may be considered to be equivalent to thinking of the status of
the point target as a BERNOULLI random variable and scaling up the expected-
fraction-killed result for this single target to that for the entire target
population. Implicit in this fundamental premise is the assumption that
the exact locations of individual targets in the target area are not known.
In this sense, we may take (5.13.11) to be a static mathematical statement
of "area" fire which we will now convert into the dynamic result (5.13.10)
by a series of logical arguments.
We begin by considering a homogeneous X force receiving area fire
from a homogeneous Y force and computing the expected number of survivors.
By the fundamental precept of target coverage, this number is given by
x(t) - {l - P Ct)1xo (5.13.12)
where P (t) denotes the cumulative kill probability of the entire Y
K
force engaging a single randomly placed X target for a period of time t.
Taking the logarithmic derivative of (5.13.12), we find that
dx d Xd- " x d Zn{l - P (0). (5.13.13)
dt dt K1 t)1
Assuming independence between the outcomes of any two rounds (recall
Assumption (A3) of Table 2.XIX], we also have that
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P YW - (l- P XSK) , y (5.13.14)
where v denotes the firing rate of a single Y firer and P denotes
Y SSK
the single-shot kill probability for a single Y firer engaging a single
X point target. From (5.13.14), we readily deduce that
d_ ZnI-PXYt) nl xdt Zn(1 - P y(01 - yn(1 - PSK) (5.13.15)
TtK Y ~ SSK~
whence follows
dx y {Zn(l - PrK )}xy (5.13.16)
dt Y SSK
by substitution of (5.13,15) into (5.13.13). The reader should regard
(5.13.16) as the fundamental attrition-rate equation for area fire. Com-
parison of (5.13.16) with, for example, (5.13.1) reveals that we may consider
the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient for such area-fire weapons to
be given by
KY
aa-v {In(l - P SS)}x, (5.13.16)
Y SSK
which should be compared with BONDER and FARRELL's [17, pp. 150-154] result
for area-fire weapons (see also [54, p. 170] or [28, p. 1761). Furthermore,
KY is a good approximation 3 3 to In(l -XY when PY E [0, 0.2],
SSK -SSK SSK
and in this case we approximately have
a Vy PSSK x. (5.13.17)
YSSK
(2• 11i
Returning to our criginal problem of modelling the force-on-force attrition
of a homogeneous X force receiving "area" fire from an opposing homogeneous
Y force, we observe that the probability that a single Y firer kills
a single randomly-placed target is equal to the probability that a "lethal
circle" of area aLY covets a "vulnerable dot" randomly placed within
the region of area AX (under, of course, the assumption that a »>> aV X
Hence
S .am - (5.13.18)
Xxy
PSSK AX
and (5.13.10) follows from (5.13.16) whenPsXY P < 0.2.SSK -
BONDER and FARRELL (17, pp. 141-162] have used the basic idea of the
above approach34 based on the fundamental precept of target coverage to
develop an expression for the attrition-rate coefficient corresponding to
firer by indirect, area-fire weapons. Their expression includes all the
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factors shown in Table 5.IV. It holds under the following set of assumptions
(Al) no delivery bias exists--no aiming error, target-
location error, or intentional offset,
(A2) centers of impact (p,q) of the damage patterns are
distributed about a mean center of impact (p,q)
according to a circular-normal distribution; for con-
venience, let (p,q) - (0,0) and the standard deviation
be norrualized to unity; the probability density function
for the delivery error is then
b(pq) T exp{-(p2 + q2)12},
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TABLE 5.IV. Factors Considered in Attrition-Rate Coefficients for
Indirect, Area-Fire Weapons by BONDER and FARRELL [17].











(A3) the target is a circle of radius Rt centered at the
origin; two mathematically equivalent types of targets
are considered:
(Ti) a circular, homogeneous, area target centered
at (0,0) with radius Rt,
(T2) a point target (,n) of uniformly uncertain
location in the area of radius Rt; the target
density function W(Q,n) is then I/(wR )
t
over the target area and zero elsewhere,
(A4) the damage pattern is a circular cookie-cutter of radius
R p; let d(Q,n;p,q) denote the damage function, which is
then given by
IX for (p-0)2 + (q-n)2 < R2
d(Q,n;p,q) -
0 elsewhere,
where d(Q,n;p,q) is the probability that a point target
at (Q,n) will be killed by a damage pattern with center
of impact at (p,q); damage is either all or nothing (killed
or not killed)--no cumulative damage is considered,
and (A5) the weapon system employs a constant firing rate v.
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BONDER and FARRELL [17] (see also [54, p. 1701 or [28, p. 176]) have stated
that when the above assumptions hold, an approximation to the attrition-
rate coefficient for a, for example, Y firer engaging an opposing X
force with such an area-fire-weapon-system type is given by
a n vy{2fn(l - XS1)}x , (5.13.19)
where R
1
Si - f P(R ,r)r dr (5.13.20)
Rt
P(Rr 2-exp -1 dp dq , (5.13.21)
(p-0) 2+(q-n) 2 <R2  "
-- p
and r denotes the distance from the point target located at (E,n) to
the mean center of impact at (0,0), i.e. r2 . E2 + n 2. The function
P(R ,r) is called the circular coverage function and plays a prominent
role in target-coverage analysis (e.g. see SNOW [70], HESS [43], ECKLER
[33], or ECKLER and BURR [34]). It is well-known to be also given by
P(R ,r) - er /2 fRp xex /2 10 (xr)dx , (5.13.22)0
where 1o(X) denotes the modified BESSEL function of the first kind of
zero order (see HESS [43] or ECKLER and BURR [34] for further details).
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BONDER and FARRELL (e.g. [28, p. 176]) have stated that in general
the expression (5.13.18) is a good approximation to the attrition rate
of a single weapon system "if Rp >> Rt, or when Rt is less than the
standard deviation of the center of impact of the damage pattern, or
when the number of volleys is small." Further details are to be found
in [28; 54].
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5.14. Results for Other Related Weapon-System Types.
We have developed abuve expressions for the LANCIESTER attrition-rate
coefficient under the following two different sets of circumstances:
(51) MARKOV-dependent fire with an impact-lethality mechanism,
and (02) an area-lethality mechanism.
In the first case we have developed our results under fairly general circum-
stances [see (5.8.1) and assumptions (Al) through (A6) in Section 5.8 above].
There are, however, a number of additional operational circumstances and weapon-
system types for which it is convenient to have other LANCHESTER-attrition-
rate-coefficient results available, especially for building and exercising
a complex operational combat model in which a wide spectrum of weapon-system
types is to be played. For example, three different types of weapon-syEtem
fire (cf. BONDER and FARRELL's taxonomy of weapon-system types reproduced
here as Table 5.1) are permitted in VECTOR-2 [28, p. 170] (see also [86; 87])
(1) MARKOV-dependent fire at a specific target,
(2) repeated-burst fire at a specific target,
and (3) area fire (not directed at any specific target).
Consequently, we will present in this section LANCHESTER-attritAion-rate-
coefficient results for some other related weapon-system types of tactical
interest. Complete derivations of these results will not be given, however,
( since results previously derived above may be Invoked for their develcpment.
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Thus, we will give results for the following additional weapon-system
types/operational circumstances of tactical interest:
(Ti) MARKOV-dependent fire with chance of killing target on a miss,
(T2) burst fire-
(a) one long burst,
(b) mixed-mode firing doctrine [repeated-single-shot-MARKOV-
dependent fire until first hit obtained after which there
is an immediate switch to burst fire (one long burst)],
(c) repeated-burst fire [multiple (short) bursts independently
fired].
In each of the above cases, we will give the appropriate expression for the
expected time to kill a target, with the LANCHES1ER attrition-rate coefficient
(as usual) being obtained as the reciprocal of this quantity (recall Section
5.3 above). The first type of weapon-system fire (Ti), i.e. MARKOV-dependent
fire with kills on misses, applies to weapon-system types that fire rounds
with fragmentation effects at targets with exposed personnel. In such cases
it is quite possible to achieve a system kill when a projectile misses the
target weapon system but detonates and kills the personnel by fragmentation
effects. Thus, a miss may cause a kill, and the usual expression for
MARKOV--dependent fire (5.8.2) (which only allows a target to be killed by
being hit) must be modified to accommodate this fact. The second type of
wsapon-system fire (T2), i.e. burst fire, is characteristic of automatic
weapons used by Infantry and sometimes mounted on armored-personnel carriers
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or other vehicles [e.g. the vehicle rapid-fire weapon system (VRFWS) or the
secondary armament on a tank]. In particular, infantry doctrine calls for
automatic weapons to be fired in repeated short bursts, and the LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficient must again be modified for automatic weapons to
accommodate this fact.
We will first consider the case of MARKOV-dependent fire with chance
of killing on a miss, which is a further generalization of MARKOV-dependent
fire considered above in Section 5.8. Let x assume that assumptions (Al)
through (A6) of Se(.cio:t 5.8 hold, and we will additionally assume that there
is a coltstant probability, denoted as P(KIM), that a miss kills the target.
Then the expected time to kill a target is given by
3 6
EfT] - E[Ta ] + E[Tfr ] + E[Tf]
{E[Th] + E[Tf]}{I-P(KIH)}{[1-P(KIM)][P(hjm)-pl] + pl
+ P(hlm) P(KIH){-P(KiMi)-+P(KIM) {1-P(hlh)[1-P(KIH)]}
{E[TmI+E[Tf1){l-P(KIM)}{l-P(hjh)+[P(hlh)-P 1 ] P(KIH)}
+ P(him) P(KIH) {I-P(KIM)}+P(KIM){I -P(hlh)[I-P(KIH)I}' (5.14.1)
which is a generalization of (5.8.2) given above and consequently is the most
general result given in this monograph for MARFOV-dependent fire. The above
expression (5.14.1) is readily developed by invoking Section 5.9's approach
of considering the mean first-passage time for the killed state in a con-
tinuous-time semi-MARKOV process: one simply replaces the transition prob-




P1 3 " PxP(KIH),
P12 PIl - P(KIH)},
P1 3 ' (1-p 1 ) (1 - P(KIM)},
P21 " P(hlh) P(KIH)
P22 m F(hlh) {1 - P(KIH)I,
P23 " {1 - P(hlh)}{l - P(KIM)I,
P3 1 - P(hjm) P(KIH)
P32 ' P(hlm) (1 - P(KIH),
P3 3 ' {l - P(hlm)1{l - P(KIM)}, (5.14.2)
and substitute (5.9.5), (5.9.11), and (5.14.2) into (5.9.9) to obtain the
desired result for the expected time to kill a target.
Let us now turn to the case of burst fire. We will consider weapon-
system types that employ impact-lethality projectiles and have the capability
of burst fire. BONDER and FARRELL [17, pp. 107-108] have pointed out that
such weapon-system types can fire in a number of modes37
(Ml) repeated-single-shot-independevt fire,
(M2) repeated-single-shot-MARKOV-dependent fire,
(M3) burst fire (one long burst),
(M4) mixed-mode fire (repeated-single-shot-MARKOV-dependent fire until
first hit after which there is an immediate switch to burst fire
(one long burst)],
120
and (M5) repeated-burst fire [multiple (short) bursts independently
fired].
Modes (Ml) and (M2) arc special cases of BONDER's model of MARKOV-dependent
fire discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 above, while mode (M5) is conceputally
the same as mode (Ml), and consequently results for the expected time to kill
a target may be obtained for them by involing, for example 38 , (5.4.1).
In particular, VECTOR-2 (28, pp. 174-175] uses the following result for
repeated-burst fire [multiple (short) bursts independently fired]
E[T] - t + tB + PSBK (5.14.3)a 1 a P Js
where
t is as previously defined,a
B denotes the time to fire the first burst after the decision
to engage the target has been made,
t denotes the time between the firings of any two successive bursts,s
p1
SBK denotes the probability of killing the target with the first burst,
and Ps denotes the probability of killing the target with any sub-SEBK
sequent burst.
The simplest model for PSBK is to assume that all rounds within the burst
are independently fired, and then
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B nPSBK -1- (- SSK) , (5.14.4)
where n denotes the number of rounds in the burst and PB denotes the
3SK
single-shot hit probability for imy round in the burst (and is assumed to be
the same whether the round follows a hit or a miss).
For the mixed-firing mode (M4), using arguments similar to those
employed in Section 5.5, BONDER and FARRELL [17, pp. 108-113] have derived
the following expression for the expected time to kill a target
E[]-t+ tI + tf + (tm + t) !Pl
a~~ ~ 1 fPSfSK(jT
+ 1 - P(KIH) [th + tf + tb B , (5.14.5)
PSSK
where
tat tip tf, th, tm, Pi, and P(KIH) are all as previously defined
in Table 5.11,
P(h 1 1m) denotes the conditional probability of a hit following a
miss before the first hit has been obtained,
tb denotes the time between the firings of any two successive rounds
in the burst-fire model,
and B - B P(YIH) denotes the probability of killing the target
d SSK SSH




Here BONDER and FARRELL [17, p. 109] have assumed that the hit probability
for any round in the burst is the same whether it follows a hit or a miss.
Mode (M3), firing one long burst, may be obtained as a special case of mode
(M4) by assuming
(Al) the time to fire every round except the first is tb, i.e.
th = tm = tb;
(A2) after the first round, the hit probability is constant, i.e.
P(h Im) - SB1PSSH;
and (A3) only the time of flight for one round need be considered.
It follows that under these conditions the expected time to kill a target
with one long burst is given by, i.e. (5.14.5) reduces to
1 - p1 P(KIH)1
E[T] - t + t1 + tf + tb (5.14.6)EIT ta B P(KIH)
which, if the first-round hit probability is the same as that for any sub-
sequent round, further reduces to
E[T] - t + t1 + t +t (5.14.7)
where PSSK " P P(KIH) and P P- = BSK SH SSH SSH*
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Let us finally note here that data sources for not only all the
attrition-rate-coefficient expressions given in this section but also all
those given elsewhere in this chapter have to be discussed in the docu-
mentation on, for example, VECTOR-2 [28, pp. 173-175]. The interested
reader is directed to such places for further information about data sources
for computing numerical values for LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients.
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5.15. Maximum-Likelihood Estimation of Attrition-Rate Coefficients.
In the introductory section of this chapter we saw that there are two
general approaches for determining numerical values for LANCHESTER attrition-
rate coefficients:
(Al) use an analytical submodel of the attrition process to compute
the desirod numerical value,
and (A2) use "combat" data to compute a statistical estimate of it.
In the previous sections of this chapter we have considered in detail the
former approach based on using an analytical submodel, and in this section
we will briefly consider the statistical-estimation approach, which pre-
supposes the availability of (either actual39 or simulated) combat data
(recall Figure 5.1). In actual applications some type of "simulated-combat"
data (generated, for example, by a high-resolution Monte Carlo combat simu-
lation) is invariably used.
In this latter quasi-empirical approach, one uses the "combat" data
to compute statistical estimates of the attrition-rate coefficients (and
sometimes parameters contained in the coefficients). In general, there are
four principal statistical methods for computing such point estimates
(e.g. see BHAT (7, pp. 370-3711 for further details): (a) maximum-likelihood
estimation, (b) method of moments, (c) BAYES estimation, and (d) method
of least squares. Of these four methods, however, only the first one has
had any significant application in combat analysis (e.g. seee CLARK [24],
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(36, pp. 3-1 thrc dh 3-10], ANDRIGHETTI [2], STOCKTON [73], or GRAHAM [39]).
AccordLngly, we will consider only the maximum-likelihood-estimation approach,
which determines attriticn-rate-coefficient parameters from an appropriate
set of "combat" data by selecting their values to maximize the so-called
likelihood function corresponding to this data. Out approach here will be
to consider a simple example first, before examining more general (and com-
plicated) cases.
Consider now that we have run a Monte Carlo combat simulation and
have recorded the times at which casualties have occurred (and also the type
of each casualty). Let us run this stochastic simulation until a total of
K casualties have occurred. The total time that the simulation will have
been run is a random ,variable that we will denote as TK (with realization
t K). Let us also denote (for k - 1,2,...,K) the time (a r.v.) at which
ththe k:- casualty occurs as Tk (with realization t k). We will start the
battle at t - 0 by setting t 0 - 0. Our main assumption is that we will
consider that our "battle" data represents a sample from the MARKOV-chain
analogue of the deterministic LANCHESTER-type equations
d a with x(0) - x0
(5.15.1)
j - -b with y(0) - y( 1
dt
i.e. in the corresponding continuous-parameter MARKOV chai-L the transition
(casualty) probabilities are given by Prob[X casualty in small interval
of length At] - aAt and Prob[Y casualty in At] - bAt.
Let M(t) (a r.v. with realization m) denote the number of X
combatants at time t in the above stochastic combat model, and let N(t)
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(a r.v. with realization n) denote the number of Y combatants at time t
(see Figure 5.10). Furthermore, let us introduce the r.v.'s CX and
(with realizations c and cY) defined by








X Y x YFocussing now on the realizations ck and Ck, we have ck ck 0 with
cX + c - 1. For future purposes, we will let cTX denote the total numberck k Tk
of X casualties, i.e.
x K
" T Y . k (5.15.2)k-1
and, similarly,
KY MK Y
"CT I • c , (5.15.3)
k=l
with (of course)
K YC + cT = K (5.15.4)CT T
Eurthermore, although we will not need them right now, let us denote m(tk)
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m n
Figure 5.10. Schematic of combat interactions for stochastic
battle corresponding to the deterministic LANCHESTER-
type equations (5.15.1) for CIC attrition process.
Here a denotes the casualty rate of the X force
caused by the entire Y force.
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as mk (i.e. mk is the realization of the number of X combatants just
after the occurrence of the k!•casualty) and n(tk) as nk. In other words,
there are mk X combatants and nk Y combatants "alive" during the interval
[tk, tk+I) for k - 0,1,..., K-i.
X X Y YUsing the data t1, ... 1t, c 1, ... , cK, C1, ... , CK, we will now
develop statistical estimates, denoted as a and b, for the continuous-time
MARKOV-chain analogue of the LANCHESTER-type model (5.15.1) by the so-called
method of maximum-likelihood estimation. The observant reader will notice
that in this case the casualty streams are nothing more than two superimposed
POISSON processes, and consequently a and b will turn out to be given by
expressions equivalent to well-known results for the maximum-likelihood
estimator of a POISSON parameter. In very general terms, the maximum-likelihood-
estimation approach choses (based on the available data) the formulas for
the computation of a and t so that they give the greatest probability to
the observed combat outcome (see KENDALL [48, p. 178]). This maximization
is effected by considering the so-called likelihood function, which (in simple
terms) gives the probability of the observed realization of the stochastic
attrition process. The likelihood function, in turn, is constructed out of
the density functions for the times between casualties, since we should con-
sider the above combat data to be a random sample from these times. For
our stochastic attrition process, we may summarize the above maximum-likelihood
method as follows:
(SI) determine the probability density function (p.d.f.) for the
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(S2) construct the likelihood function (i.e. the density
function for the observed sequence of events),
(S3) determine the values of the parameters a and b that
maximize the likelihood function (denote these maximizing
values as a and b).
We will ncw carry out the above three steps (Si) through (S3) to
determine maximum-likelihood estimators a and 6 for the LANCHESTER attrition-
rate coefficients for the continuous-time MARKOV-chain analogue of (5.15.1).
For step (SI), we consider the time to an X casualty from the occurrence
of the last casualty and develcp its p.d.f. For our constant-attrition-rate
coefficient continuous-time MARKOV-chain attrition model, the times between
casualties are exponentially distributed (see Section 4.7 above). Thus, if
we let S denote the time between any two consecutive casualties, then the
p.d.f. for this nonnegative random variable is given by
f s(s) - (a + b) e(a+b)s (5.15.5)
We now need to convert this p.d.f. for S into one for the time to the
occurrence of an X casualty from the occurrence of the last casualty (a r.v.
denoted as S X). This may be accomplished by multiplying (5.15.5) by




which is just the probability that an X casualty occurs before a Y
one (see Section 4.7 above). Thus





We now turn to step ($2). To construct the likelihood function,
we observe that casualties have occurred at times tI, t,2  tK'
x y
there being a total of c x X casualties and cT Y casualties withT
X Y thcT + c - K. Consider now the occurrence of the k: casualty, which repre-
sents a transition from battle state (mk_], nk-l) to (mk,nk). If it
is an X casualty, there would be a contribution to the likelihood
thfunction of (i.e. the p.d.f. of the population from which the k- sample
of the time between casualties is drawn would be)
a exp[-(a-'b) {tk - tk-l}] ; (5.15.9)
while if it is a Y casualty, there would be a contribution to the
likelihood function of
b exp[-(a+b) {tk - tkll] . (5.15.10)
x x
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contribution from the occurrence of the k-t casualty to the likelihood
function in both the above cases simply as
X Y
aCk bck exp[-(a+b) (tk - tk-l}] (5.15.11)
X
since (5.15.11) reduces to (5.15.9) when ck 1 and to (5.15.10) when
xV
ck f 0 (i.e. when c - 1). By the memoryless property of our continuous-k k
time MARKOV-chain attrition model, the times between casualties are indep-
pendent random variables, and hence the likelihood function for the observed




L(a,b) H 1 a b exp[-(a+b) {tk - tk 1l]
k-1
or (from (5.15.2), (5.15.3), and a little manipulation]
X YcT c
L(a,b) - a b cT exp[-(a+b)tk] , (5.15.12)
where L(a,b) denotes the likelihood function depending on the parameters
a and b.
Finally, we reach step (S3), the determination of the estimates
a and b from maximization of the likelihood function (5.15.12). However,
instead of maximizing the likelihood function L(a,b) itself, one usually
maximizes its logarithm, since both maximum values occur at the same point




In L(a,b) - cTX In a + c Y In b - (a+b)tK (5.15.13)
The maximum-likelihood estimates a and b are then the values of a and
b that solve the problems
maximize in L(a,b) , (5.15.14)
a,b
where
CT + c Y- K.
TT
From (5.15.13) we see that the two-dimensional maximization problem (5.15.14)
[with (5.15.13)] factors into two one-dimensional maximization problems. Let
us now focus on determining the maximizing value for a. Computing
Xa T
aL --- tK , (5.15.15)
we find from aL/at - 0 that
X
cT
-a_ t K -0 , (5.15.16)
yielding
x
A C Ta - - (5.15.17)
tK
22
which is the desired maximizing value for a, since a In L/aa (a) < 0.






The estimates given by (5.15.17) and (5.15.18) are the maximum-
likelihood estimates for the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients a and
b in the continuous-time MARKOV-chain analogue of (5.15.1). They are also
intuitively appealing, since the casualty process can be considered as being
composed of two POISSON processes, the X-force casualty process and the
Y-force casualty process. The equations (5.15.17) and (5.15.18) then give
the estimates of the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients a and b
x Y
from CT occurrences of an X casualty and cT occurrences of a Y
casualty in time tK9 which is the time for K total casualties to occur.
Let us now consider the same maximum-likelihood-estimation problem
for the MARKOV-chain analogue of deterministic FIF LANCHESTER-type
equations, i.e.
dx
d--r -ay with x(O) -x 0 ,
(5.15.19)
j . -bx with y(O) - yodt
Here the transition probabilities for the continuous-time MARKOV-chain
attrition process are given by PCX casualty in At] - anAt and
P[Y casualty in At] - bmAt, where m and n denote realizations of the
random variables M(t) and N(t), the numbers of X and Y combatants
at time t. In this case, for step (SI) we find that




f S(s) - bme(an+bm)s (5.15.21)
Step (S2) then yields that the occurrence of the kth casualty at tk makes
a contribution to the likelihood function of
X Y
Ck k
(ankI) (bmkl) - exp4-(an,_1 + bmkl) {tk - tkl}l]
whence the likelihood function itself is given by
X YK ck ck
L(a,b)- TI (ank_I) (bmk_I) exp[-(amk_,. +bmk_l) {tk- tkl}-] (5.15.22)
k-I
Computing the natural logarithm of the likelihood function
K K~
Xnm I1)
Xn L(a,b) - I Ck kn(an.kl) + c Xn[b
k-i k-i
K
- 1 (ank_l + bmk_I) {tk - tkk , (5.15.23)
k-l
we find in step (S3) that
XLn L CT K
9a a L T - nk-ltk - tk1}1 (5.15.24)
k-i
whence, setting the above derivative equal to zero, we obtain the maximum
likelihood estimate
Xc T
a - f (5.15.25)





",k-l 'k-l{tk - tk-l1
The above results for maximum-likelihood estimates of attrition-
rate coefficients are characterized by their simplicity, i.e. explicit
results are easily written down. Let us now show that for nonautonomous
LANCHESTER-type combat, thist will always be true when the attrition-rate
parameters appear linearly. To see this, let us consider the continuous-
time MARKOV-chain analogue o:! the nonautonomous LANCHESTER-type equations
fdx_
dt A(xy) with x(O) - x0 ,j (5.15.27)
.dt - -B(x,y) 
with y(O) -
yo "
In this case, the forward KOLMOGOROV equations for the stochastic evolution
of combat are given by (5.1.2), and the infinitesimal transition prob-
abilities are given by P[X casualty in At] - A(m,n)At and P[Y casualty in At]
- B(m,n)At. As usual, ta and n are realizations of M(t) and N(t), the
numbers of X and Y at time t in the stochastic battle (see Figure 5.11).
We will now consider the special case in which the attrition-rate parameters
appear linearly in A(m,n) and B(m,n). When the attrition-rate coefficients
a and b appear linearly in the attrition rates A and B, we may write
A(m,n) - aga(mn), and B(m,n) - bgb(mn) . (5.15.28)






MMt) _ _ _ N(t)
B8(m, n)
Figure 5.11. Schematic of combat interactions for stochastic
battle corresponding to the deterministic
nonautonomous LANCHESTER-type equations (5.15.27).
Here A(m,n) denotes the. casualty rate of the
entire X force with m combatants caused by
the entire Y force with n combatants.
137
!M! ... .. no .
x
CTi = T (5.15.29)




k-.1 gb(mN-l' nk_1) ltk'tkI}
Thus, when the parameters to be estimated appear linearly in the attrition
rates, very simple estimates result. Furthermore, all our previous results
are just special cases of this one. We have presented these special cases
first, however, in order to show the reader the basic idea of the maximum-
likelihood method without his being overencumbered with notation the
first time.
In all the above developments, we have had the same stopping rule
th
for collecting our combat data: data was collected until the K- casualty
occurred. Let us now suppose, however, that we collect data (or run our
"combat experiment") for a specified length of time tf or until one side
or the other has been annihilated. Again, let us say that K casualties
have been observed at times ti, t 2 , ... , tK. We have then that
tK tf , (5.15.31)
K K-
KC no (5.15.32)
1 k -<mO k
k-l k-l
and (5.15.2) through (5.15.4) again hold. Here mo and no denote the
initial numbers of X and Y combatants. Furthermore, we will now con-
sider the general continuous-time MARKOV-chain attrition-process model
(5.1.2) (again, see Figure 5.11), with infinitesimal transition probabilities
P[X casualty in At] - A(m,n)At and P[Y casualty in At] - B(m,n)At.
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In this case, there will be an additional contribution to the likelihood
function of
exp(-{A(mK,nK) + B(mK,nK)){tf- tKY] , (5.15.33)
when t f > tK, i.e. when neither side is annihilated before tf, Accord-
ingly, the likelihood function for the observed sequence of casualties
is given by
.[ x yKck ckL = K {A(mklak_ 1)} {B(mk_,a-l'n  )
k-l
x exp[-{A(mkl,nkl) + B(mk.l'nk-l)}{tk-tk-11
x exp[-{A(mK,nK) + B(mK'nK)}{tf-tK}] , (5.15.34)
where (5.15.2) through (5.15.4), (5.15.31), and (5.15.32) hold. The
nataral logarithm of the likelihood function is then given by
K K
In L - [ ck In A(mk l,n1 + c kZnB(mkl,nkl)
k-i k-I
K
- [ {A(n._2,nk_) + B(mk l )}{tk - tkl}
k-l
- {A(mK.nK) + B(mK,nK)I{tf - ti , (5.15.35)
and hence when (5.15.28) holds we find tnat
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- gmk-l '_,nk-l){ tk-tk-11
where tK+l - tf. We also have that tK - tf if and only if either
or Ck a no, i.e. if and only if either side is
annihilated before tf* Thus, we see that the maximum-likelihood estimate
of a LANCHESTER attriton-rate coefficient depends (slightly) on the circum-
stances under which the combat data has been collected, although for the
stochastic analogue of (5.15.1) we have that, for example,
a - (total number of X casualties)/(total length of time that battle has
been observed).
If we had J replications of the "combat experiment," we would
redefine our notation as follows:
tj- time of occurrence of ! casualty in J- replication,
k caubr fXcobtn s dualyin -replicationl
k - number of X combatants "alive" during the interval
ti, .k+l)




and K - total number of casualties on both sides for the I_
replication of the battle.




with (5.15.28)] that, for example,
(CT)all replications
a-J-l~k 21. ga(k nk _) {tw; t 0-l (5.15.38)
where (Ca denotes the total number of X casualties
whee (T) all replications
for all replications of the "combat experiment."
We will wrap up this section by briefly sketching historical develop-
ments and possible future trends in the use of maximum-likelihood estimation
of attrition-rate coefficients in combat analysis. This approach has been
intimately related with the idea of hierarchy of models (see Section 7.20)
in which the output data from, for example, a high-resolution combat model
of small-unit operations is used as input data to a low-resolution combat
model of large-unit operations (again, refer to Figure 5.1).
Although the concept of a hierarchy of combat models has apparently
been on the minds of a number of military OR workers in the United States
since at least about the mid-1950's, recent interest in the United States
and an accompanying analytical framework apparently dates from the Ph.D.
thesis of G. Clark (24] in 1969 (see also [25]). He developed a satellite
model [called the COMAN (CObat ANalysis) model] that must be used40 in
conjunction with a high-resolution combat-simulation model (usually Monte
Carlo type) in order to interpolate/extrapolate the results of the higher-
resolution model (in terms of numbers and types of casualties for a
given force mix or mixes) to other force mixes not explicitly evaluated
by the high-resolution model. The COMAN model was a stochastic LANCHESTER-
C. type heterogeneous-force combat model (i.e. the continuous-time
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MARKOV-chain analogue of certain de.-erministic heterogeneous-force
LANCHESTER-type equations) and involved the following two modifications
of the then existing LANCHESTER combat theory (see CLARK [24, pp. 139-1641
for further details):
(Ml) incorporation of weapon-system target-acquisition
capability into the model through introduction of the
probabilities that a target is unacquired by an enemy firer,
and (M2) introduction of target priorities.
The former modification (MI) was implemented through the introduction of
target-acquisition probabilities, which then were used to modify (i.e.
degrade) the inherent kill capabilities of weapon-system types, while
the latter modification (M2) was implemented through the input of two
target-priority lists (every weapon-system type on a particular side had
the same target-priority list) and the modelling of the engagement of
41target tyres with priorities . Let us now examine in greater detail how
this former aspect [i.e. modification (Ml)] was handled. For siuplicity,
we will consider a constant-parameter homogeneous-force version of
CLARK's COMAN model.
CLARK's (24, pp. 157-158] basic idea for incorporating weapon-system
target-acquisition capabilities into the LANCHESTER paradigm42 may be
seen by considering the MARKOV-chain model (5.1.2) (see Figure 5.11 again)
with total-force kill rates given by
142
A(m,n) = a{l - (pxy)m}n , B(m,n) - b{l - (p.x)n}m (5.15.39)
where
a denotes the kill rate for a single Y weapon system having
acquired targets at which to fire,
a specific X target is unacquired
PXY " P [by an individual Y firer
and b and pYX are similarly defined for the X force.
Here, for example, a denotes an acquisition-independent attrition-rate
coefficient and represents the "inherent" kill capability of a single Y
firer in the sense that it is his kill rate when one or more enemy targets
are available for him to fire at (i.e. there are acquired targets at which
he can fire).
The total-force kill rates (5.15.;)) may be developed in the follow-
ing manner. One assumes that the total-force attrition rate for each side
is equal to the sum of the individual firing-weapon kill rates for the
opposing force. Interactions due to multiple firers attacking a single
target are neglected by this assumption. Consider now, for example, a
single Y firer engaging X targets of which there are a total of n
at time t. The probability that this firer has one or more X targets
at which to fire is given by 1 - (pxy)m, whence it follows by the above
additivity assumption that the Y-force kill rate A(m,n) is given by
(5.15.39). Furthermore, it is readily shown that when targets are easy




an (i.e. the X-force attrition rate is proportional to only zhe number of
enemy firers as in LANCHESTER's equations for modern warfare). Also, when
targets are difficuit to acquire (e.g. pXY is near 1), then A(m,n) is
very nearly given by amn (i.e. the X-force attrition rate is proportional
to the product of the numbers of firers and targets as in LANCHESTER's
equations for area fire). Thus, we should think of (5.15.39) as a general
attrition-rate model that incorporates weapon-system target-acquisition
capabilities into the model and reduces to those corresponding to LANCHESTER's
classic formulations in the above two important limiting cases. From an
examination of DYNTACS43 data CLARK [26] fou.'d that the probability of a
target being unacquired is quite sensitive to the nature of the terrain
profile between the opposing forces. This terrain profile can change abruptly
and cause the target-acquisition probabilities to appear as almost discon-
tinuous functions of battle time.
CLARK's idea of the COMAN model was adopted by the Research
Analysis Corporation (RAC), which later became part of General Research
Corporation (GRC), and evolved44 into COMANEX (COMAN EXtended), which (like
COMAN itself) was composed of two basic sub-programs: the pre-processor
and the simulator (see CLARK [24] or [36] for further details). Figure
5.12 shows how these programs were used, with CARMONETTE serving as the
high-resolution model.
Data for weapons characteristics, combat environment, mission,
etc. for a particular mix of opposing forces were input into CARMONETTE.
CARMONETTE was then run for a specified number of replications of the
battle. The computer program then output (for each replication) a
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MIXES OFSIMULATORN WTAPONS TO
KILLER /CASUALTY MATRICES BY TIME PERIOD
Figure 5.12. Implementation of the COMANEX model (from [36]), which
ias an example (apparently the first to be developed in
the United States) of the fitted-parameter analytical
model (see Figure 5.1). The COMANEX model was composed
of two basic sub-programs: the pre-processor and
the simulator, with CARMONETTE serving as the high-




time-sequenced casualty history, with the time at which each casualty
occurred (as well as the casualty type and the killer type) being given.
This output was, in turn, input into the COMANEX pre-processor. This
pre-processor massaged the data and output a set of values for LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficients, which represent the kill rates fcr each
firer/target combination on the battlefield. The values for these
attrition-rate coefficients were then stored in the COMANEX simulator
to be subsequently used in predicting the outcomes of battles involving
force mixes "close" to the original mix (i.e. mixes involving the same
types but different numbers of weapons).
The force mixes to be analyzed were then specified and input into
the simulator. In practice, for test purposes, the first such mix was
usually the original one from which the values for the LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficients were determined. The simulator was exercised
for up to 100 replications of the battle. It output the expected results
of the battle in the form of killer/casualty matrices which listed the
number of casualties (averaged over all replications) by time period,
for each of the target types, and for each of the killer types. After
it was verified that the simulator indeed reproduced the results of the
original CARMONETTE run, the remaining force mixes were processed, and
their expected outcomes were listed (again in the form of killer/casualty
matrices). COMANEX was used in this fashion in a number of analyses for
the U. S. Army (e.g. see (32]).
Later the same general idea was used by a U. S. Army systems-
analysis agency called TRASANA (TRADOC Systems ANalysis Activity) with a
few further modifications in the form of COMANEW [COMAN (N)EW].
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Target priorities and target-acquisition probabilities were eliminated
and replaced by heterogeneous-force allocation factors (see Section 7.7),
and also ammunition expenditure was explicitly considered (see GRAHAM
(39] for further details). Quite encouraging results have been reported.
Future trends would appear to be centered around the use of
further additional functional forms for attrition-rates in this satellite-
model approach. The theory of this approach has now been rather fully
developed, and the author anticipates that future activities will be
centered around computational work and that further computational results
will be reported, especially as to which functional forms for LANCHESTER-
type attritiun rates give the "best" results. It is surprising, however,
that there have been so few resultn reported so far about which forms
for LANCHESTER-type equations are at least not inconsistent with simulated
combat results generated by high-resolution Monte Carla simulations.
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5.16. Attrition-Rate Coefficients for Heterogeneous-Force Combat.
The modern battlefiald contains many different weapon-system types
that operate together with complementary capabilities as "combined-arms
teams." For example, there might be both mounted and dismounted infantry,
infantry with rifles, infantry with machine guns, tanks, different types of
anti-tank weapon systems, artillery, mortars, other types of fire-support
systems, etc. Since each of these various different weapon-system types would
generally inflict and sustain casualties at different rates, when one wants
to model the attrition process for combat between such combined-arms teams,
one is obliged to keep track of the number of each type of casualty and
consider combat between heterogeneous forces.
For such heterogeneous-force combat, the natural generalization of the
homogeneous-force FIF deterministic LANCHESTER-type attrition process may
be written as (see Section 7.7 for further details)
dxi n 0
d-- -l Ajyj with xi(O) - xi
(5.16.1)
dy m0
dt I B with yx(0) ( Y0
i-wh
where xi(t) (for i - 1,2,...,m) denotes the number of the i17 weapon-system
type of the X force at time t, B denotes the rate at which one Xi firer
kills Y targets45, and the quantities y (t) (for j - 1,2,...,n) and
Aij are similarly defined for the Y force (see Figure 7.11). Here (as
in Section 7.7) we will always let the subscript i refer to the X force
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(and take on the Jntegez values 1 through m) and the subscript j refer to
the Y force (and take on the integer values 1 through n). We will call
a nonnegative quantity such ds, for example, Aij d heterogeneous-force
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient. It represents the fire effectiveness
of a Y firer againar Xi targets and denotes the rate at which a typical
Y firer kills Xi targets in the opposing heterogeneous enemy force (see
Figure 5.13). BONDER and FARRELL (17] (see also Section 5.3 above) have
argued that one should take such a heterogeneous-force LANCHESTER attrition-
rate coefficient to be given, for example, by
Aij - ] , (5.16.2)ij [Tx yj
ii
where E[TX y ] denotes the expected time for a single Y firer to kill
ii
an Xi target. As we have stressed above, the development of credible
methodology for computing numerical values for such LANCHESTER attrition-rate
coefficients has greatly facilitated the use of LANCHESTER-type combat models
as viable defense-planning tools.
Heterogeneous-force attrition-.rate coefficients such as Aij and
B j in the model (5.16.1) reflect a much greater complexity in the attrition
process than do homogeneous-force attrition-rate coefficients such as a and
b in the model (5.2.1): besides being complex functions of weapon-system-
type capabilities and target-type characteristics, the attrition-rate
coefficients Aij and Bj, also depend on additional operational factors
such as the distribution of target types, relative rates of target-type
acquisition for the various different types of firer-target pairs, procedures
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Figure 5.13. Schematic showing notation con~Tention for subscripts
on attrition-rate coefficients in heterogeneous-force
combat. Our convention is that the first subscript
denotes the target type and thu second subscript
denotes fiter type, e.g. Ai denotes the rate at
A ii
which a typical Yj firer kills Xitar gets in
the opposing enemy force.
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and priorities for assigning weapon-system types to target types, etc. In
other words, not only must one consider how a given weapon-system type causes
attrition to a particular engaged-enemy-weapon-system type (as one does in
modelling homogeneous-force-on-force combat attrition), but also one must
account for different such pairings occurring at different times and places
on the battlefield and also possible changes in these pairings over time.
Thus, attrition-rate coefficients for heterogeneous-force combat must reflect
much greater complexities of the attrition process than those for homo-
geneous-force combat. It is of fundamental importance, though, that all
approaches known to this author for modelling heterogeneous-force attrition-
rate coefficients take homogeneous-force results [e.g. (5.4.1)] as key
"building blocks" for constructing their heterogeneous-force results. Thus,
although there will occasionally be some minor modifications, we will use
(in the appropriate way) all the above homogeneous-force-attrition-rate-
coefficient results for developing heterogeneous-force attrition-rate
coefficients.
It is convenient for modellins attrition-rate coefficients (e.g. see
BONDER and FARRELL [17, pp. 15-16] or CHERRY [21, pp. 6-7]) to reflect such
complexities of heterogeneous-force combat as discussed above by partitioning
46
the attritionprocess into four distinct subprocesses 4
(SPl) the fire effectiveness of weapon-system types firing at
live targets,
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(SP3) the inefficiency of fire when weapon-system types engage
other than live targers,
and (SP4) the effects of terrain on limiting firing activities of
weapon-system types and on the mobility of the systems.
Two general ways in which these effects have been included in LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficients are as follows: to model such a coefficient as,
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for example,
(WI) Ai - 0ijfljaij , (5.16.3)
or (W2) A M F~ ( all other variables describing the (5.16.4)or (W2) ij i= F j i' acquisition and engagement of targets)' (.64
where
*ij denotes the allocation factor (the fraction of Y assigned
to engage Xi)
aij denotes the "inherent" single-firer weapon-system kill rate
(the rate at which one Y firer type kills Xi target types
when it is engaging only them),
fY denotes a factor aggregating the effects of all other variables
that are not included in the "inherent" single-firer kill rate
aiJ and modifying the effectiveness of an individual Y
firer type against Xi target types,
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FY denotes a function that yields the attrition-rate coefficient for a Y
firer type engaging Xi target types (with arguments as indicated),
and CLj denotes the conditional single-firer weapon-system kill r&tE
(the rate at which one Yj firer type kills acquired X
target types when it is engaging them).
The reader should note the distinction between the "inherent" single-firer
kill rate a j (the rate at which one Yj firer type kills Xi target types
when it is engaging only them) and the single-firer kill rate against acquired
targets aej (the rate at which one Yj firer type kills acquired Xi
t-arget types when it is engaging only them). In other words, aij -, ij when
the time to acquire a target is equal to zero. The "inherent" single-firer
kill rate for a particular firer-type/target-type pair ajj may be calculated
by using data for the pair together with the appropriate attrition-rate-
coefficient formula given above. For the reader's convenience, we have
summarized in Table 5.V the conditions under which such formulas have been
developed and have also cited the equation number for each such formula given
above. The conditional single-firer kill rate (i.e. the single-firer kill
rate against acquired targets) for a particular firer-type/target type pair
OiJ may then be calculated by setting the time to acquire a target equal to
zero in the appropriate expression for aij. For example, the conditional
single-firer kill rate for a weapon-system type using MARKOV-dependent fire
and an impact-lethality mechanism is given by
1 {E[Th] + E[Tf]}
a i- E[T fr] [Th' +i P(KIH)
+ {E[TJm + E[Tf]} D (1 - P(hlh)] + P(hth) -p (5.16.5)
POWlm P(KIH)p 1 (165
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TABLE 5.V. Summary of Conditions Uuder Which Expressions for LANCHESTER
Attrition-Rate Coefficients Have Been Developed, With Equation
Number of Each Expression Given.
(Cl) MARKOV-dependent fire and impact-lethality mechanism (5.8.2)
(C2) MARKOV-dependent fire and lethality mechanism by which a target
can be killed not only by a hit but also by a miss (5.14.1)
(C3) burst fire and impact-lethality mechanism (5.14.2) or (5.14.3)




where all symbols are as defined in Section 5.8.
Before providing a few selective detailed results on the modelling
of heterogeneous-force-attrition-rate coefficients Aij in the two general
forms (5.16.3) anid (5.16.4), we will present a brief overview of this entire
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field4. The model (5.16.3) and the corresponding form of (5.16.4) [namely,
Au - f•iYfiji] have received by far the widest use. Let us note here
that the heterogeneous-force model presented in Section 7.7, i.e. (7.7.3),
corresponds to (5.16.3) with f Y - 1. In other words, in Section 7.7 weij
have developed a heterogeneous-force model with50
Aij - *ijaij . (5.16.6)
The modelling of attrition-rate coefficients Aij by the expression (5.16.3)
has been used in operational models such as (at the battalion level of combat)
BONDER/IUA [18] and its many derivatives (e.g. AIRCAV [85], BLDM[5], AMSWAG [41],
FAST [19]) and (at the theater level of combat) IDAGAM [1; 67] (see also
TAYLOR [74-78; 79, pp. 797-800]). The modelling of attrition-rate coefficients
Aij by the expression (5.16.4) and its special form
Au = gcii (5.16.7)
has been used in operational models such as (at the battalion level of combat)
COMAN [24; 25] and its derivatives COMANEX [36; 73] and COMANEW [39] (see
also R. M. THRALL et al. [82]) and (at the theater level of combat) the
Y
VECTOR series of models [28; 54; 86; 87]. Here giJ denotes a factor
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(similar to f in (5.16.4)] aggregating the effects of all other variables
that are not included in the conditional single-firer kill rate a J and
modifying the effectiveness of an individual Y firer type against XI
target types. COMAN and its derivatives have used (5.16.7), while VECTOR has
used the nonlinear form (5.16.4).
We will now provide a few selective detailed results pertaining to the
above brief overview. In the BONDER/IUA [18] and its many derivatives such
as AIRCAV [85], BLDM [5], AMSWAG [41], and FAST [19], the first three sub-
processes (SPI) through (SP3) given above are incorporated into an attrition-
rate coefficient such as Aij as follows (see also Section 7.7):
Aij - iijaij (5.16.8)
where •'j and aij are as defined after equation (5.16.3) and (5.16.4),
and I denotes the intelligence factor (the fraction of those Y*ij
allocated against Xi who are actually engaging live Xi target types). This
intelligence factor, however, has not been considered in any applications at
least through 1975 (see CHERRY [21, p. 7]), i.e. IY - 1.0 for all i and j
and hence (5.16.8) reduces to (5.16.6). A submodel based on target-acquisition
considerations is used to calculate the allocation factors *iJ. The pro-
cedure used in the original version of BONDER/IUA is similar to that used
51in AMSWAG and discussed below . In the AIRCAV and BLDM models the factors
were calculated based on parallel acquisition of targets52 and a target-prioity
list (inwhich more than one type of target was allowed to be tied at the
same level of priority to a firing weapon-system type). In actual computation,
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an algorithm based on a simplifying approximation was used to compute
numerical values for such allocation factors (see [85, pp. 29-32] or [5,
pp. 111-6 through 111-81).
In the AMSWAG [41] model attrition-rate coefficients are modelled as
Aij - *iPjUjaij (5.16.9)
where U denotes the fraction of the firer-type Y that are unsuppressed.
Submodels are used for
(a) the suppression factor U [41, pp. 15-17],
and (b) the fire-allocation factor * [41, pp. 18-21].
We will now discuss in detail the fire-allocation submodel used in AMSWAG.
The following factors influence which target types will be engaged by




(F2) range to target,
(F3) intervisibility,
(F4) round choice,
and (F5) target-type acquisition.
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In AMSWAG each firing weapon-system type has its own target priority scheme
which allows different target types to have the highest priority at various
ranges. An example of one such firer-type target-priority scheme is shown in
Figure 5.14. It is assumed that a firer type will attempt to allocate its fire-
power against the enemy target type currently having the higher priority, with
the closest target not necessarily having the highest priority (see Figure 5.14).
However, if two potential targets are of the same type, the one at the shortest
range always has the higher priority. Besides being an important factor in
target priority, the range (distance) between firer and target also determines
firing feasibility, i.e. no firing event can take place beyond the specified
maximum effective range of the firing weapon-system type. Moreover, no target
(regardless of priority or proximity) can receive any fire allocation if line
of sight from the firer to that particular target (i.e. intervisibility) does
not exist. However, if line of sight does exist, the fact that a target is
seen either partially exposed or fully exposed does not affect either the
target's priority or its allocation.
The availability of ammunition of the appropriate type also influences
the allocation of fire in AMSWAG: a proper round choice must exist before a
firer type can allocate its fire against a particular target types. Round
choice is modelled for each firer-type--target-type combination by a table
of first and second choices of rounds at both short and long ranges, plus a
threshold range used to determine whether the current firer-target range
will be classified as either short or long (see Table 5.VI). If for some
reason the first choice of roumd type cannot be fired, the model tries to
carry out the firing event with the second-choice round type. If neither
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Figure 5.14. Typical target-type priorities used in AMSWAG





- -- - - _ -• - - - -"= = _; ._.. . . . . .
during this time interval. [Here the term time interval refers to the fact
that the battle has been segmented into a large number of small time steps
(i.e. intervals) for computational reasons as per the numerical inte-
grat:Lon of the LANCHESTER-type attrition equation" (see Appendix E, especially
Figure E.1).] Currently in AMSWAG, there are two reasons why a particular
round type might not be used: (1) the particular firer type does not have
available that type of round, and (2) the firer is moving and that type of
round cannot be fired from a moving platform. Thus, a target type will
receive an allocation of fire only when all the following conditions have
been met:
(Cl) the firer type has not allocated more thau ninety-eight
percent of its firepower;
(C2) the target type is the highest priority target type that has
not already received an allocation;
(C3) the target type is within the maximum effective range of the
firer type;
(C4) line of sight exists;
and (C5) a proper choice of round type exists.
Finally, targtt-acquisition probabilities determine ia the following way
exactly what the allocation by a firer type against a particular target
type will be when all the above conditions have been met. The cumulative
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thdetection probability for each firer type (say the it-) against each target type
(say the j--.) is computed at each time step since the existence of intervisibility.
If we let Pij denote this cumulative detection probability, then in such an
"expected-value" model as AMSWAG p is interpreted as representing the
th tfraction of the i-ýh firer type that has detected the j-tl__ target type. Then
th ththe fraction of fire allocated by the i-! firer type against the J- target
type cannot exceed Pij times the unallocated portion of the firer type's fire.
A firer type continues to allocate its fire until it runs out of target types
or has allocated more than ninety-eight percent of its firepower (see HAWKINS
[41, p. 21] for further details).
In IDAGAM (1; 67] attrition-rate coefficients are also modelled by
(5.16.6), but completely different submodels are used to compute the "inherent"
single-firer kill rate a j and the allocation factor *iJ than are used
in BONDER/IUA. The "inherent" single-firex kill rates are computed according
to the heterogeneous-force version of (5.2.4) (but at a much lower level of
resolution than that of a fire fight considered in BONDER/IUA), while a sub-
model based on the concept of a "standard force" (see SHUPACK [67, pp. 45-491
for further details) is used to determine the allocation factors. Tlese are
computed, for example, for the Y force by
SF I atl_
*ij " m S (5.16.10)SF JXL(t)
) SP
i-l
where xSF denotes the ntimber of Xi weapons in a standard force, SF
denotes the fraction of Y weapons that would fire at Xi targets if X
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were the standard force, xi(t) denotes the number of Xi weapons in the
sector (or geographical region of interest), and the 6ummation extends over
all weapon-system types iu the sector. Thus, the allocation factors used in
IDAGAM are internally computed based on what the allocation of fire by each
weapon-system type in the given force would be against each opposing weapon-
system type in a standard force and corrected by the relative force compositions.
SF SF
Both xSF and 1i are externally determined and are inputs into IDAGAM.
Thus, the fraction of fire allocated by a weapon-system type against an enemy
weapon-system type in an opposing force is roughly proportional to what would
be allocated against the standard force but modified by the relative force
composition of the actual opposing force. The denominator of (5.16.10)
insures that I i 1.0.
As noted above, both the COMAN model [24; 25] (and its derivatives
COMANEX (36] and COMANEW [39]) and the VECTOR series of models (28; 54; 86; 87]
(in particular, VECTOR-2) use the conditional single-firer kill rate aij
to calculate the attrition-rate coefficient A ij. COMANEX [73] considers
target priorities and computes attrition-rate coefficients according to
H
Au - (px) 11 - (px) aij (5.16.11)
where
S[ a specific X target is unacquired 1
Px L by an individual Y firer J
x denotes the number of X1  targets, and xi denotes the number of
surviving X weapon-system types of higher priority than X Let us now
introduce Si denoting the set of Indices of all target types having a
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higher priority than Xi. It follows that x• -0k E Si xk" The parameters
PX and aij are calculated as maximum-likelihood estimates from simulated
combat data gemerated by a high-resolution Monte Carlo simulation such as
CARMONETTE [36] (see Section 5.15 for further details). For a closely related
alternative approach, see THRALL et al. [82, pp. 99-104]. COMANEW computes
attrition-rate coefficients according to [cf. (5.16.6) above]
Aij - ,ij aij 9 (5.16.12)
where both factors (i.e. *P and a ) are estimated from simulated combat
ii ii
data by the maximum-likelihood method (see [39] for further details).
VECTOR-2 [28; 54] also considers the conditional single-firer kill
rates axj and uses different formulas to compute the attrition-rate coeffic-
ients Aij according to whether the target-acquisition process is done in
series with or in parallel with the killing of acquired targets 54. Thus, the
two major factors determining the numerical value of an attrition-rate
coefficient in VECTOR-2 are
(Fl) the acquisition and selection of targets,
and (F2) the conditional single-firer kill rate against acquired
target types, aij1
The acquisition and selection of targets in VECTOR-2 is conceptualized as
consisting of the following three processes:
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(P1) the line-of-sight process, which determines whether a given
target type is visible or not to a particular firer type,
(P2) the target-acquisition process, which determines the time for
a firer type to acquire a particular target type,
and (P3) the target-section process, which represents how a particular
target type is selected for engagement from among those
acquired.
The interaction of these three processes depends on whether target acquisition
is done in series or in parallel. In both cases each firer type orders all
opposing enemy target types into a priority list, which the model uses to
determine which target types are to be engaged first.
In serial acquisition in VECTOR-2 the acquired target type of highest
priority is engaged by a particular firer type until it has been destroyed
or until line of sight has been lost. At this time the serial acquirer
must acquire a new target. Moreover, past acquisitions are not remembered
by the serial acquirer. Also, in searching for a new target, the timeliness
of acquisition is given consideration through a series of search-cutoff
times. When there are m target types, the selection of the next target
thtype involves a sequence of (m-1) search-cutoff times. Prior to the k-
cutoff time (where k < m), the observer looks for only target types of
priorities 1 through k and ignores any lower priority targets. If the
observer has not acquired a target by the (m-l)st cutoff time, he will
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then engage the first target acquired (regardless of its priority). Once a
target is acquired in serial acquisition, it cannot be preempted by a higher
priority target, and only its destruction or loss of line of sight can cause
fire to be shifted away from it. In parallel. acquisition search for new
targets continues even during the engagement of acquired targets. When the
target has been destroyed, a higher priority target type has been acquired,
or line of sight has been lost; fire is instantaneously shifted to the
highest priority acquired enemy target type. A parallel acquirer does
remember all past target-type acquisitions. It should be noted here that these
two different conceptual models of target acquisition lead to two completely
different expressions for the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient: the
attrition-rate coefficient for serial acquisition may be developed using the
mean-first-passage-time result given in Section 5.9 for a continuous-time-
semi-MARKOV process, while that for parallel acquisition may be developed by
straightforward probability arguments.
The following is a summary of the assumptions made in VECTOR-2 con-
cerning target-type acquisition and selection in maneuver-unit combat (28;
pp. 53-54]:
(Al) the time to acquire a target, given that it is continuously
visible, is an exponentially distributed random variable with
parameter XijV where i is an index denoting the weapon-
system type of the target and j is an index denoting the
weapon-system type of the firer;
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(A2) the line-of-sight process between a pair of opposing weapon-
system types is an alternating MARKOV process with two states
-- visible and invisbile;
(A3) the line-of-sight process for an observer-target pair is inde-
pendent of that for all other pairs;
(A4) there are two modes of acquiring targets; an observer using
the parallel mode acquires targets continuously, even while
engaging other targets; an observer using serial acquisition
can acquire only between engagements of targets;
(A5) when an observer in the parallel mode acquires a target of
higher priority than the one being engaged, he shifts his fire
instantanteously to the target of higher priority;
and (A6) an observer in the serial mode selects a new target whenever he
loses line of sight to the previous target or the previous
target is killed (the model assumes that the firer can perfectly
distinguish between active and killed weapon systems and never
engages killed systems); there is a sequence of cutoff times
to limit the time spent searching for certain target types,
thsuch that prior to the n-- cutoff time only weapon-system
types of priorities 1 through n are eligible as targets.
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Thus, the target-acquisition-and-selection process transforms a Y
thweapon-system type's (say the j-h) kill rates against acquired X target types
(a j for i - 1,2,...,m) into an achieved kill rate against a particular enemy
target type (say the i-=-) Aiu that accounts for target priorities and the
various competing activities in which a single firer may be engaged over time.
Moreover, the amount of attrition actually assessed against a force is limited
by a tactically acceptable maximum attrition rate (see [28, pp. 54-55] for
further details). We will now give attrition-rate-coefficient results for
the two cases
(CAI) serial acquisition of targets,
and (CA2) parallel acquisition of targets.
For the former case (CAl), it is additionally assumed for the derivation of
an expression for Aii that the time to kill an acquired target is exponentially
distributed (with parameter aij, where i is an index denoting the weapon-
system type of the target (here X i) and j is an index denoting the reapon-
system type of the firer (here Y )]. Also, in VECTOR-2 the ma•ii£um number of
weapon-system types in a maneuver element is currently 11, i.e. within a homo-
geneous portion of the battlefield m - n - 11 where m and a are X-
and Y-force integer index limits appearing in (for example) summations below.
For serial acquisition of targets in VECTOR-2, the heterogeneous-force
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient Aij is taken to be given by
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A - ij 11 (5.16.13)Aij m s 1 1
E[TkiI+ 1
k-l j + 1ij A kj
where
Fa group-i target (here X i) being fired upon a acquired
hi W p by a group-j firer (here Y ) will be destroyed by that
firer before either line of sight is lost or the target
is destroyed by another firer.
P p r a group-J weapon which employs serial acquisition acquires ]L and selects a group-i target type when it selects a target
E[Tia] - expected time on a given acquisition that a group-J weapon spends
ij asacquiring and selecting a group-i target [here Tij - 0 if the
acquisition is of a non-group-i target; also if Tas > 0 for
some i, then T a 0 
for all other i],
ii
1
expected time that a group-j weapon firing at a group-i target
a iJ requires to achieve a kill, i.e. the single-firer weapon-system
kill rate against an acquire target [it should be recalled that
the corresponding time to achieve a kill (a r.v.) has been assumed
to be exponentially distributed with parameter aij],
- expected time that a weapon system in group i spends in the visible
state (for a weapon in a group J) each time that it enters that
that state [it is assumed that the corresponding time (a r.v.)
is exponentially distributed with parameter uij],




and - expected time for any firer other than the single group-j firer
A ij in question to kill a particular target in group i.
In somewhat simpler words, Pij denotes the selection probability of an X i-type
target by a YJ-type firer, and h ij denotes the corresponding destruction
probability. The above expression (5,16.13) was developed by taking the
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficieat to be the reciprocal of the expected time
to kill a target and then by involing BARLOW's [4] mean-first-passage-time
result for a continuous-time semi-MARKOV process [e.g. see (5.9.13)], and
consequently in VECTOR-2 the target-destruction process has been conceputalized
in such a way that this latter result could be invoked (see [28, pp. 55-67]
for further details). We will now give expressions for all the remaining
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Z-I-I k-l k-0
x --I ([exp(-Zjt2 )] -[exp(-Z jt+ , 1 j)]} (5.16.15)
where
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I [ observer in group J (here Yj has a target in group I
(here X) under surveillance at time t after initial of search
D~jt= - (t) ,
CO
t - cut-off time for an observer in group J searching for targets to
exclusively engage acquired targets of priority classes 1 through I
(i.e. a target of priority class I + 1 will not be engaged in
acquired before tCO < CO (see Table 5.VII; also KARR [47,
IJ I+l,J
pp. 32-331),
N1j - expected number of currently surviving group-I targets within range
of a group-J firer,
R in (5.16,16)
IJ n ii + U
S expected time for a weapon in group J (here Yj) to detect a visible
target in group I (here X1 ) [it should be recalled that the corres-
ponding time to detect (a r.v.) has been taken by assumption (Al)
to be exponentially distributed with parameter XlIj]
and
Z Ii RkjNk. (5.16.17)
k-l
Here the two conventions have been followed that (1) a summation over an
empty index set is always taken to be equal to zero, and (2) a product taken
over an empty index set is always taken to be equal to one, e.g. 10 Tk -k-l 
f and 11-0I Tk 1 . Also, the complement of a cumulative distribution function
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TABLE 5.VII. Rules for Target Selection by Serial Acquirer
in VECTOR-2.
Priorities of Targets Priorities of Targets
to be Engaged to be Engaged if
Immediately Upon Previously Acquired





lJ' 23 , __
CO 3
2J
CO CO(tl2 J t 3 J) 1, 2, 3.o . o 1 2.. , .. , ,
COCO CO
(t M-2,J' tm-l,J) 1 , 2, . . ,m-1
t Co
m-l,J
(tCO 1, 2, ... , r-i,
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like (for example) D W(t) has been denoted as DI (t), and we then (of
course) have D5j(t) 1 -- D ICt). Let us observe that 0 < N i( x1,
The target types have been indexed in such a way that XI denotes the
highest priority target, X2 denotes the next highest, etc. It remains for
us to give an expression for DI (t) in order that PIi as given by
(5.16.15) may be computed: the following expression has been developed for
D i(t) (see (28, pp. 62-63] for further details)
DIJW
D1j (t)
1 - i- R1j Rexp(-Rjt) - exp[-(PI, +  Aij)t]I ] . (5.16.18)
IJ IJ
Returning no-; to the computation of the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient
A i by (5.16.13), we see that it remains for us to Si, e expressions for the
asexpected time to acquire and select a target E[TIj] and the single-firer
kill rate of Xi-type targets by other than YJ-type firers A ij. The follow-





CO CO - CO CO COt D (t a 5 iDT(t'_ilj) exl,{ R ij~iu tr1 1  tj4J]
Bl (tC exp{
L-I-i k-O k-0O
X (z CO + 1) (Z "CO (Z tCO + 1) CO (5.16.19)2 t+ exp(-ZL.1tt+l }.( .
zWJ
Finally, the following approximation has been developed for A and is used
in VECTOR-2
n




fz(t) - yL(t)/{ k Yk(t)} - fraction of tctal Y weapons exclusive of group j
k•J that Y weapon" of group L comprise.
Here, the fact that the differential-equation force-on-force attrition model is
numerically integrated by discretizing time into time steps (see Appendix E)
has been used to develop this approximation, -ith the riah:-nand side of
(5.16.20) being evaluated at the old time step and the left-hand side being
taken ac the new one. In way of suary, the computation of Aij for weapons
that employ serial acquisition requires the following inputs: aiJ, IAJi' nij'
Si J ' N 1j ' y J ' a n d t C ,
The interested reader can find the derivaticn of the above serial-
acquisition attrition-rate-coefficiant results skeeched in (28, pp. 55-68j
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(see also KARR [47, pp. 38-44]). It will be instructive, however, for us to
briefly consider the development of the expression (5.16.15) for P i, the
probability of selecting a target from target-type group I. This probability
is given by
CO (- CO CO - lCO
PT D1 (tI_1,J i F a (t I-, -t (t
iIi
CO
-i z+lj 4 -CO - ( t - O )
+ n f kfl 5 ((t k) a (t t M
-I-I O k-I k lJkJ Ta
1-2 -O Ci CO (t CO
IT T (t - t•) Dk+l,j( t }pij(ti 0 ,J dFa (t- ti...), (5.16.21)
k-0 Tk+l,J Ti
where
T a - the time (a r.v.) for in observer in group i to acquire a
ij
target in group J, with cumulative distribution function
F (t) - P[T a < tj.
Tij
The fiLst term on the right-hand side of (5.16.21) represents the probability
CO
that a target in group I (here XI) is tnder surveillance at 
time t C ,
and tnat no higher priority target was ever under surveillance at a time
CO
before tI 13 at which time it would have been engaged, while the second term
represents the probability that a target in group I was acquired at some time t
after t Co and that neither a higher priority target nor a lower priority
one was ever under surveillance at a time before t at which time it would
f have been engaged.. It follows from assumptions (Al) through (A3) above
that
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F (t) - i exp(-RijNijt) , (5.16.22)Tij
whence substitution of (5.16.22) into (5.16.21) yields (5.16.15). The
as
expression (5.16.19) for E[TsI] may be developed in a similar fashion.
Finally, it is worthwhile to observe here that n j/((n + ij) gives the
probability that a target of type i is visible. Recalling that Xij denotes
the rate of acquisition of a group-i target by a group-j observer, we then
immediately see the just:ification of (5.16.22).
For parallel acquisition of targets in VECTOR-2, the heterogeneous-
force LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient Aij is taken to be gi-ien by
AJ Q- , ' (5.16.23)
where
rat a random poir.t in time a given group-j (here Y ) weapon
Quj - P employing parallel acquisition ir firing at a group-i (hereJ
L i ) target.
We further have that Q - S and
XY X i_ IiYi-i
Q .S TI, U1  S Y for 2(<i <m, (5.16.24)
k-
writh ijl
w it 1 1 (5.16.25)
S•( + -i. ) (ij y + Xij)
where
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[at a random point in time a group-i (here Xi target is
S k•, P p available to a group-j (here Y ) firer, i.e. a target 
is
ij available and has been detected.
The above expression for SiK has been by considering the alternating-renewalii
visibility process for a Xi-type target (see [28, pp. 68-70] for further
details).
Finally, let us give a brief overview of the data-base requirements
for computation of attrition-rate coefficients in E•CTOR-2. Current values of
the following parameters are required for the calculation of attrition-rate
coefficients at each time step:
(P1) number of survivors in each weapon-system-type group;
(P2) conditional single-firer kill rate, a or 8ji;
(P3) acquisition rate for each weapon-system type in each observing
55 KY Y
and observed group , 55 or X .'ii or i'J
(PQ) rates for the alternating-MARKOV-renewal line-of-sight process,
1iJ and n
IPM) fraction of targets within range for every pair of firer
type and target type;
and (P6) rate of fire for each weapon-system type.
( 2.77
The parameters (P1) are obtained from other parts of VECTOR-2, while (P6) is
an external-user input. Parameters (P2) through (PS) are internally computed
in the model. These computations involve more detailed input data from the
following four classes (see [28, pp. 70-71] for further details):
(DCl) scenario data expressing differences in force employment
(e.g. between armored, mechanized, and dismounted infantry
units); such data reflect the initial geometry and maneuver
patterns of forces and the making of such tactical decisions
as, for example, when to mount and dismount infantry into APCs,
(DC2) movement data consisting of the speed of each weapon-system
type (indexed on terrain trafficability),
(DC3) line-of-sight data consisting of the rates of entering and
leaving the visible state in each of the terrain visibility
classes,
(DC4) weapon-system-performance data (including the firing rate for
each weapon-system type) used to compute the conditional single-
firer kill rate, acquisition rate, and the fraction of the
target group within range for each firer-type/target-type pair.
From the above brief sketch, the reader undoubtedly senses that the data-base
requirements for VECTOR-2 are rather demanding. In fact, upwards of 350,000
pieces of input data are required for its running (see BONDER [16, p. 36]),
178
S
and many man-months of effort are involved in the use of this much data in
such a complex operational model, e.g. the time required to acquire the
input data, the time required to structure this data into the model's input
format, the time required to run the model, and the time required to analyze
and evaluate the model's results (see [6] for further details).
17
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FOOTNOTES for Chapter 5
1. Methodology for the prediction of LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients
from weapon-system performance characteristics has been developed by
S. BONDER (11; 14] and others (namely, BARFOOT (3], BONDER and FARRELL
[17], and KIMBLETON [49]). In particular, BONDER [11; 14] has given
an analytical expression involving various weapon-system performance
parameters for the so-called LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient,
i.e. coefficient of the attrition rate for a FIF process. This ap-
proach (in contrast to that of G. CLARK discussed in Footnote 2) does
not -nvolve the complimentary use of a high-resolution Monte Carlo
combat simulation. Thus, we may say that we have a "freestanding"
analytical model in the sense that it is complete in itself and does
not require the complimentary use of a Monte Carlo simulation.
Furthermore, RUSTAGI and SRIVASTAVA [62] have given results con-
cerning the maximum-likelihood estimation of the MARKOV-dependent-
fire parameters in BONDER's [11; 14] attrition-rate expression. Thus,
experimental firing data can be used to generate maximum-likelihood
estimates of the parameters in LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients
and consequently of the coefficients themselves. However, these
maximum-likelihood estimates require information about the outcome
of each and every round in a sequence of firing trials. Consequently,
RUSTAGI and LAITINEN [61] have given results for the moment estimation
of the parameters, which is applicable when only partial information
is available on the observed firing sequences.
2. Methodology for the maximum-likelihood estimation of LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficients from Monte Carlo simulation output data
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has been developed by G. CLARK (24]. His basic idea is to use a com-
bat analysis model (COMAN Model) in conjunction with a high-resolution
Monte Carlo combat simulation.
3. Unfortunately, the historical combat data base does not contain informa-
tion about the times between casualties, which is needed for the basic
estimation procedure (cf. Figure 5.1). Furthermore, it is unlikely
that it ever will although such experimental data is recorded under
simulated combat conditions by the U.S. Army Combat Developments
Experimentation Command (CDEC) at Fort Ord, California. We must bear
in mind, however, that CDEC data is not real combat data.
4. As usual, random variables are denoted by, capital letters, while
their realizations are denoted by the corresponding lower-case letters.
5. The reader should recall that these equations were also called in
Section 2.12 Lanchester-type equations for a FIF attrition process.
6. If N, a r.v., denotes the number of rounds required to kill a tar-




when there is statistical independence between the outcomes of any
two rounds fired, since the N obeys a geometric probability law, i.e.
Prob (N -n] - PSSK (1 -P )n
( which is well known to yield an expected value of 1/P SSK for N.
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7. Although our basic idea for this justification is taken from BONDER
and FARRELL (17], our development here differs from theirs in several
essential aspects. For example, BONDER and FARRELL did not point out
that (5.3.1) holds exactly for exponentially-distributed times between
kills.
8. As pointed out previously by the author (see TAYLOR [81, p. 47]),
this justification is not universally accepted and is apparently some-
what controversial. Moreover, there apparently has been some computa-
tional evidence against the appropriateness of (5.3.1).
9. Since we asnume that limAt- 0 P[X casualty in (t, t + At)] - 0,
it follows that the expected number of X casualties in (t, t + At]
is the same as in (t, t + At).
10. A more appropriate taxonomy than that shown in Table 5.1 would appear






where aiming doctrine would refer to how aim points ara selected,
firing doctrine would refer to how consecutive rounds are related to
one another (i.e. how they are correlated), and lethality mechanism
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would be as defined by BONDER and FARRELL [17, pp. 86-87] (see main
text above). Under aiming doctrine, "aimed fire" would refer to the
situation in which fire is aimed at particular targeta, while "area
fire" would refer to the situation in which fire is directed into
only the general area thought to contain targets (see Section 5.13
for further discussion). BONDER and FARRELL's classification of
firing doctrine would be retained, except that the term firing doctrine
would now refer to how consecutive rounds are related to one another.
As a colleague (LTC Richard S. Miller, USA, of the Naval Postgraduate
School) has pointed out, weapon systems with an area-lethality
mechanism (see main text) almost always engage their *argets with
"area fire." Thus, for weapon systems with an impact-lethality
mechanism (again, see main text), one might be tempted to omit the
aiming-doctrine portion of the above proposed alternate taxonomy.
However, weapon systems with an impact-lethality mechanism frequently
are fired in the "area-fire" mode, for example, when engaging very
poorly located targets (cf. VON NEUMANN [88] or WEISS 190]).
11. Strictly speaking, the lethality mechanism of a weapon system's
projective also depends on the target's vulnerability, and consequently
we should speak of the weapon-target damage mechanism (L.e SNOW and
RYAN [71, p. 5] or WEISS (89, p. 7] for a further discussion). It
is convenient, however, to simply refer to this as the weapon's
damage (or lethality) mechanism. Furthermore, terminology Is far
from uniform in this field, and different authors frequently use
the same word with quite different meanings. For example, the
U. S. Army's Engineering Design Handbook (84, p. 15-9] says that
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"vulnerability is ordinarily a term used for the case where actual
hits are obtained on targets such as tanks and aircraft. Lethality,
on the other hand, refers primarily to the case where lethal or
incapacitating fragments, for example, are projected over an area
on the battlefield to incapacitate personnel." This terminology
should be compared with that used by BONDER and FARRELL [17, pp.
86-87] and also with that used by us above. Mo eover, SNOW and RYAN
[71, p. 2] classify targets as being either (1) impact sensitive,
or (2) fragment sensitive; and projectiles are usually classified
as being either (1) nonfragmenting, or (2) fragmenting. The
weapon/target-damage-characteristics taxonomy outlined in the pre-
ceding sentence would yield a four-fold classification scheme for
weapon/target-damage mechanisms (e.g. a fragmenting projectile fired
against an impact-sensitive target [an example of which would be an
artillery shell fired against tanks]).
12. Other categories of weapon-system types have been analyzed and other
expressions for the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient developed
by BONDER and FARRELL [17] (see also Table 5.0).
13. However, we give below in Section 5.8 an expression that applies
under even more general conditions: namely, (Cl) identical probability
thdistributions for the number of rounds to achieve the i- hit for
i > 2, and (C2) any arbitrary distribution for the number of hits
to kill.
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14. As noted above in Section 5.3, BONDER [11] originally took the
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient to be given by E[l/T], e.g.
a - E[l/Txy]. Subsequently, BARFOOT [31 has suggested that a more
appropriate expression for the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient
under constant battle conditions (e.g. at a constant range) is the
so-called harmonic mean of the rate at which a single firer kills
enemy targets, i.e. l/E[T]. This latter definition is ii better
consonance with our introductory comments made in Section 5.1
(cf. (5.1.3)). BARPOOT based his arguments for the use of I/E[T]
on the fact that the harmonic mean of a set of rates yields a more
appropriate estimate of the average rate than does the arithmetic
mean (see Section 5.3 above and [3, p. 894]). It should also be
pointed out that the definition of, for example, a as E[l/TXY] is
not analytically tractable (i.e. explicit analytical results apparently
are not obtainable and numerical methods must be employed) whereas
the definition of a as l/E[TXY] does yield explicit analytical
results. Thus, the harmonious mean of the rate of target attrition
is superior on both theoretical and also computational grounds to
the arithmetic-mean attrition rate in LANCHESTER combat theory.
15. In (5.4.1) all the subscripted event times, e.g. ta, are taken to
ia
be fixed deterministic quantities. We show below in Section 5.8 that
(5.4.1) also holds for the average values of these times taken to
be random variables. Although this result is intuitively obvious,
its proof has not apparently heretofore appeared anywhere, and we
have used a simple new approach to prove this important result.
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16. We will show in Section 5.8 below that (5.4.1) also holds for the
average values of these times taken to be random variables (see also
Footnote 15 above).
17. By saying logical analysis, we are emphasizing here that there has
not been any empirical verification of BONDER's model for the LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficient. Furthermore, considering the nature and
quality of available historical combat data (see McQUIE [51], McQUIE
et al. [52], or HUBER, LOW, and TAYLOR [45]; also see Section 7.21
below), such empirical verification against real combat data does not
seem to be possible.
18. Originally BONDER [11] tried to compute E[l/T] (see Footnote 14 above).
Here we have taken the liberty of integrating together the ideas of
BONDER [11] and BARFOOT [31 (e.g. see BONDER [14] or BONDER and
FARRELL (171).
19. The readec should recognize this decomposition a6 an application of
the general modelling principle of factoring a complex syster.i problem
into simpler problems (see MORRIS [55, p. B-711] for a further
discussion).
20. Here we are again following BONDER's [11) (see also BONDER (12, Vp.
111-4 through III-111) development based on determination of the
distribution of the number of rounds required to obtain z hits
PNIZ(nIz). A more general result that reduces to the distribution
of the number of rounds to obtain z hits (5.5.21) was developed
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earlier by GNEDENKO (38, pp. 138-139] (see also RUSTAGI and
SRIVASTAVA (62, p. 1223] and RUSTAGI and LAITINEN (61, pp. 918-919]).
In Section 5.6 below we present a simpler, more general approach
that does not involve determination of this complicated distribution.
21. Although justification of this important result, which is a special
case of our more general result (5.8.1), apparently appears here for
the first time, the statement of an equivalent result does appear
elsewhere (e.g. see (28, p. 171] or [54, p. 1651). However, no
proof of this result is given in (28] or (54], but in such places
the reader is referred to BONDER and FARRELL [17] for its development.
The author, however, could not find any such development in [17],
only a development for deterministic event times (cf. Section 5.5
above) and an accompanying statement that when the event times are
random variables, "expressions for the LAPLACE-STIELTJES transform
of the time to kill may be obtained" [17, p. 132] (see also KIMBLETON
(49, p. 704]).
22. For a critique of the determination of attrition-rate coefficients
in VECTOR-2 (which is essentially the same as that in VECTOR-O and
VECTOR-l), see KARR [47, pp. 31-47j, who has discussed their develop-
ment in terms of "an important limit theorem for semi-MARKOV processes
(cf. SINLAR [23, Theorems (10.4.3) and (10.5.22])." KARR (47, p. 39]
has pointed out that except for this limit theorem, none of the
results given in SINLAR [22; 50] are required for such developments.
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23. So far our discussion has more or less parelleled that given by
FARRELL [17, pp. 136-137]. We now will depart from FARRELL's develop-
ment by expressing results in terms of the ratios of stationary
probabilities r -Mj/ l"
24. Here we mean that target-type attrition occurs at a rate proportional
to the product of the numbers of firers and targets (cf. the convention
adopted in Section 2.12 for two-sided LANCHESTER-type attrition
processes).
25. See WEISS [89, pp. 708]. See also HAYWARD [42] for a very closely
related discussion in a slightly different context. HAYWARD has pro-
posed the organization of variables upon which combat effectiveness
depends into three categories: those that relate to (Cl) capabilities,
(C2) environment, and (C3) mission.
26. An early discussion of such a model with range-dependent attrition-
rate coefficients appears in WEISS [91, p. 88]. WEISS's model was
apparently later elaborated upon by BONDER [9].
27. See Footnote 11 above.
28. Strictly speaking, the vulnerability of a target also depends on the
nature of the attacking weapon system's projectile (for further
details, see [84, p. 15-2] and also Footnote 11 above).
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g 29. The explicit statement of this approach apparently first api.eared in
BONDER [11, p. 231], although it had appeared implicitly in earlier
work by WEISS [89; 911.
30. In actuality (as discussed in Footnote 11 above), the lethal area
also depends on the target's vulnerability and this may change over
time. Consider, for example, artillery being fired at dismounted-
infantry troops. For modelling purposes, the lethal area of an
artillery round is usually taken to depend on the posture (e.g.
standing, kneeling, prone, or in foxholes) of the infantry soliders,
and this may change over time (see [84, pp. 15-9 through 15-13] for
further details; also BONDER and FARRELL (17, pp. 154-155]).
31. The formula (5.13.6) given in the main text is readily modified if
the region occupied by the X targets does not coincide with the
region perceived by the Y firers to contain them and into which
their fire is directed. Furthermore, one must then consider the
probability that a round fired at the perceived region lands in
the region actually containing the X targets.
32. This concept goes back at least to WEISS [90, p. 6]. It underlies
essentially all analytical computations of the expected number of
kills for indirect-fire weapons (e.g. artillery), although it is
usually not explicitly stated (e.g. see GRUBBS [40, p. 1022]).
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33. By considering TAYLOR's formula with LAGRANGE's form of the remainder
(e.g. see COURANT and JOHN [29, pp. 446-449]), one can readily show
that for x E [0, a] with 0 < a < 1
-n(l - x) - -x - R,
where 0 5 R : (1/2) {a/(l-a)) 2. It follows that -x is a good
approximation to Zn(l-x) when x E [0, 0.2], with a maximum error
not greater than 1/32 at x - 0.2. However, by considering the
geometric series 1 1 n , one can show that R(x) . fx udu
which yields the better error bound 0 5 R 5 (1/2)a 2/(1-a). Hence,
for x E [0, 0.2] the maximum error occurs at x - 0.2 and is
actually not greater than 1/40.
34. However, BONDER and FARRELL's [17, pp. 141-162] development is quite
different than that given here. The use of the fundamental precept
of target coverage and how it is related to "area" fire is never
explicitly mentioned by them.
35. These assumptions are taken from BONDER and FARRELL [17, pp. 143-144
and p. 149] (see also [54, pp. 169-170] or [28, pp. 175-176]).
36. The corresponding expression used in models built by VECTOR RESEARCH,
INC. such as, for example, VECTOR-2 apparently contains an algebraic
error, since it does not simplify to the known result (5.4.1) for
MARKOV-dependent fire when there is zero probability of a kill by a
miss. Moreover, slightly different assumptions were taken to hold
for this expression's development: namely, the time to fire being
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the same on all subsequent rounds, and the probability of a kill
given a miss on the first round taken to be not necessarily the
same as the probability of a kill given a miss on any subsequent
round (e.g. see [28, pp. 172-173] for further details). The latter
assumption may be readily incorporated into our expression for the
expected time to kill a target and (5.14.1) accordingly modified,
but we have not presented these results here because they are so
complex.
37. The first four modes (Ml) through (M4) were explicitly given by
BONDER and FARRELL [17, pp. 107-108], while the last is implicit in,
for example, VECTOR-2 [28, pp. 174-175].
38. For simplicity, we have chosen to invoke the result for the expected
time to kill a target for the case in which all the subscripted
event times are deterministic (cf. Footnote 15 above). We could have,
of course, chosen to particularize more general results, e.g., (5.8.2)
which has random event times.
39. In reality, actual historical combat does not (and probably cannot)
supply the required data inputs. Therefore, in practice one must
use data generated either by combat field experimentation or by a
high-resolution Monte Carlo combat simulation. Moreover, one must
always bear in mind that such data is not real combat data and of
unsubstantiated validity. However, in the combat-modelling business
there unfortunately is no better data available than such simulated




40. Usually the cost of such use is only a very small fraction of that
for the detailed (i.e. high-resolution) model. For example, COMANEX
has been reported (73] to take only about 0.003 of the computer time
required by CARMONETTE.
41. A simple model of target-type engagement based on the assumption that
there is a constant probability that a specific enemy target is un-
acquired by an individual firer in a specific time interval was used
by CLARK [24, pp. 156-158]. This assumption simplified considerably
the expression obtained for the probability of engaging a particular
enemy target type. Otherwise, concepts used in the analysis and
modelling of priority queues (see, for example, MORSE [56, pp. 121-137]
or SAATY [63, pp. 348-352; 64, pp. 231-242]), e.g. whether service for
high-priority units is preemptive or nonpreemptive,. must be used (as
they are in, for example, VECTOR-2 [28]).
42. Here we mean a lucid simple example of the approach of using differ-
ential equations to model the force-on-force combat-attrition process.
43. Here we mean output data from DYNTACS (e.g. see [81 or [27]), which
is a high-resolution Monte Carlo simulation of armored combat at
battalion level.
44. The main changes were that the COMANEX model was deterministic and
a matrix of target priorities (i.e. each weapon-system type had its
own target-priority list) were used (see STOCKTON [73] for further
details).
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45. It is not assumed here that Bji is constant. In fact, for present
purposes one need not make any assumption about the variables upon
which Bji depends, i.e. no particular functional dependence is
assume here.
46. Our list here follows the discussion of BONDER and FARRELL [17,
pp. 15-16].
47. Throughout the rest of this section we will always focus on Aij,
with B being symmetrically determined.
48. Since equation (5.13.18) does not contain a time for target acquisition
(i.e. it is implicitly assumed that the time to acquire a target is
equal to zero), it applies to both aij and also uij"
49. At least to the extent that available literature and model documenta-
tion permit. As we have discussed in Chapter 1, documentation of any
combat model (particularly its underlying methodology) is generally
quite bad, and much work that is done is never documented for
"1exterul consumption" [44; 66] (see Footnotes 17 and 23 of Chapter 1
for 'Lurther details). Furthermore, essentially all of the major
developments reported in this section have never been published in
the open literature.
50. The first place where such a fire-distribution model appears [although
not explicitly in the form of (5.16.6)] is the remarkable RAND
research memorandum by GIAMBONI, MENGEL, and DISHINGTON [37, pp. 3-4]
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(s__e also MENGEL [53]). The first place where allocation factors
explicitly in the form given by (5.16.6) have appeared is (to the
best of this author's knowledge) in SISKA, GIAMBONI, and LIND [68,
p. 12] and in the open literature in ISBELL and MARLOW [46, p. 76]
(see also WEISS [91, pp. 94-95]).
51. SMOLER [69, pp. 10-111 has pointed out that both the detection and
fire-allocation submodels in AMSWAG contain several features that
are at variance with military experience and judgment. He has con-
sequently proposed an alternative fire-allocation procedure [69,
pp. 31-36].
52. For a detailed discussion of parallel acquisition, see the below
discussion on VECTOR-2.
53. Our discussion here is drawn from HAWKINS [41]. Also, see Footnote 51
above.
54. See KARR [47, pp. 31-47] for a critique of the determination of
attrition-rate coefficients in VECTOR-2, which in this respect is
essentially the same as VECTOR-O and VECTOR-l. See also Footnote 22
above.
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55. Here X denotes the acquisition rate of a Y -type observer against
ij ~ YX J
Xi-type targets, while X denotes that ,of an X -type observer againstii
Yi-type targets. In our previous discussion of heterogeneous-force
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients above, e.g. 3ee (5.16.16), it
was not considered necessary to be absolutely precise, and for
co
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Chapter 6. HOMOGENEOUS-FORCE MODELS
6.1. Introduction
The classic LANCHESTER theory of combat assumed constant attrition-
rate coefficients for its combat models . A so-called attrition-rate co-
efficient (see Chapter 5) in such a model represents the fire effectiveness
of a weapon-system type against a particular target type, i.e. its effective
firepower. All the models that we have considered previously in this book
have had constant attrition-rate coefficients. Time-dependent attrition-
rate coefficients are used to model temporal variations in firepower on
the battlefield. This chapter considers LANCHESTER-type combat between
two homogeneous forces with temporal variations in each combatant's fire
effectiveneso.
In general, we may model such combat with the following LANCHESTER-
type equations for x, y > 0 [the first equation, for example, becomes
dx/dt = 0 for x- 0]
dx = - G(t,x,y) with x(O) - xO,
dt (6.1.1l)
dy = - H(t,x,y) with y(O) - yo,dt
where x(t) and y(t) denote, resepctively, the X and Y force levels
at time t. For cases of no replacements and withdrawals such as we will
consider here, G and H are the attrition rates of the X and Y fqrces,
respectively. As we have seen in Section 2.12 for constant attrition-
rate coefficients, various different military situations have been hypo-
thesized to yield different functional forms for the attrition rates
G - A(x,y) and H - B(x,y). We will consider time-dependent versions of such
4'• attrition rates A(x.y) and B(x,y) in this chapter.
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We emphasize analytical results2 for obtaining insights into the dy-
namics of combat for the following three types of time-dependent attrition




Let us recall that, for example, an attrition-rate coefficient in a FIF
LANCHESTER-type model is different from and related to different physical
quantities than one in an FTIFT model. Moreover, the analytical results
that we present here allow one to study these particular variable-coefficient
models almost as easily and thoroughly as LANCHESTER's classic constant-
coefficient ones.
S. BONDER's (4; 5; 7; 10] pioneering work on methodology for the
evaluaticn of military systems (particularly mobile systems such as tanks,
mechanized infantry combat vehicles, etc.) provides a motivation for in-
terest in variable-coefficient, deterministic, LANCHESTER-type combat
models such as we consider in this chapter. BONDER [61 has pointed out
that in many cases (for example, in the case of mobile weapon systems)
the validity of the assumption of constant attrition-rate coefficients
is seriously open to question (see also BONDER [4; 5; 7]). Two signi-
ficant LANCHESTER-theory developments of the 1960's that have generated
interest in time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients have been the de-
velopment of methodology for
(Dl) the prediction of LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients
from weapon-system-performance data by S. BONDER [6; 8]
and others3 V
(D2) the (maximum-likelihood) estimation of such coefficients
from Monte Carlo simulation output by G. CLARK [13].
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Both these developments and others4 have generated interest in variable-
0 coefficient homogeneous-force models of the general form (6.1.1) and have
facilitated their use (and that of corresponding heterogeneous-force models)
in defense-planning studies.
How do temporal variations in each combatant's fire effectiveness af-
fect the outcome of battle? When is the outcome significantly influenced
(or even changed) by such temporal variations? These are important ques-
tions for the military operations research worker to answer. We will try
to answer them (at least in a few specific cases) by considering several
specific instances of a LANCHESTER-type combat model with time-dependent
attrition-rate coefficients. Thus, we begin with a specific example of
such a model, S. BONDER's model of a constant-speed attack on a static
defensive position in which the fire effectiveness of each side's weapons
is range dependent (i.e. it depends on the range between firer and target).
In this model, we will assume that both sides use "aimed" fire and
target acquisition times are negligible. Consequently, we will model
attrition as a variable-coefficient FIF LANCHESTER-type process (i.e.
use variable-coefficient LANCHESTER-type equations of modern warfare).
Consideration of this model will (1) suggest several classes of time-
dependent attrition-rate coefficients that are of tactical interest, and
(2) show that temporal variations in such coefficients may have a really
big impact on battle outcome.
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6.2. BONDER's Constant-Speed-Attack Model.
In this section we will consider S. BONDER's (4; 5; 7] model of a
constant-speed attack on a static defensive position in which the fire
effectiveness of each side's weapon system is range dependent (i.e. it
depends on the range between firers and targets). This model will moti-
vate our interest in certain functional forms for time-dependent attrition-
rate coefficients that we will consider subsequently in this chapter.
Let us accordingly consider "aimed-fire" combat between two homo-
geneous forces and assume that target-acquisition times do not depend on
the number of targets. We further assume that one force attacks at con-
stant speed the other force's static defensive position. Assuming that
the fire effectiveness of each side's weapon system is range dependent,
BONDER hypothesized (see Section 2.12 for a further discussion on physical
assumptions) that such an engagement could be modelled by the following
LANCHESTER-type equations for x and y > 0 [the first equation, for
example, becomes dx/dt - 0 for x - 0]
S- -(r)y with x(t-O) - x0,
(6.2.1)
-- (r)x with y(t-O) - yo,
dt
where x(t) and y(t) denote, respectively, the X and Y force levels
at time t, r denotes the range between the opposing forces, and a(r)
and 8(r) denote range-dependent attrition-rate coefficients (see Section
5.12).
Range is related to time by
r(t) - r 0 - vt, (6.2.2)
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3where r0 denotes the opening range of battle and v > 0 denotes the con-
stant attack speed. For example, let us consider the constant-speed attack
of a mobile homogeneous Y force against the static defensive position of a
homogeneous X force (see Figure 6.1). The basic idea emphasized in BONDER's
model (6.2.1) is that force separation, i.e. range between the opposing
forces, changes over time, and the fire effectiveness of, for example, a
single Y firer, denoted as a(r), depends on this force separation (see
also WEISS [61, pp. 87-88]).
For the combat situation modelled by (6.2.1) we can take either time
t or range r as the independent variable in our differential combat model.
In our work we have found it to be more convenient to take time as the inde-
pendent variable. In other words, observing that r - r(t), we see that we
may eliminate range r from the attrition-rate coefficients a and 8,
i.e.
a(r(t)) - a(t) and 8(r(t)) - b(t), (6.2.3)
to obtain time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients, and thus the model
(6.2.1) may be converted into
dxd-" - a(t)y with x(0) -
(6.2.4)
d _ b(t)x with y(O) - y0.dt
Thus, any model such as (6.2.1) with range-dependent attrition-rate coef-
ficients can always be converted into one with tii~e-dependent ones.
As we have seen in Section 5.6 above, in many cases of tactical in-
( terest we may model the fire effectiveness of Y's weapon system as a
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for r < r,
where r denotes the maximum effective range of Y's weapon system and
P > 0. Here u is used to model the range dependence of Y's power
attrition-rate coefficient and is called the "shape" parameter (see
Figure 6.2). We may similarly model the fire effectiveness of X's
weapon system as a function of range with the power attrition-rate
coefficient
for 0< r <r
8(r) - (6.2.6)
0 for r8 r,
where r 8  denotes the maximum effective range of X's weapon system and
V > 0. As we have discussed in Chapter 5, the parameter values chosen for
the models (6.2.5) and (6.2.6) depend on both the kill capabilities of the
weapon system (as functions of range) and also the vulnerabilities of the
two target types.
Let us also consider another range-capability model that will turn out
to be in some sense equivalent to the above model, although this equivalence
will certainly not be obvious at this moment. Thus, another relevant model
for the fire effectiveness of Y's weapon system as a function of range
is given by the exponential attrition-rate coefficient
-ul
a(r) - a 0 e 1 (6.2.7)
where a0 denotes the kill rate of a single Y system at zero force separa-
tion and a1  is a positive constant that is used to model the decline in
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weapon systems (as functions of range) and also the vulnerabilities of the
two target types.
Let us also consider another range-capability model that will turn
out to be in some sense equivalent to the above model, although this equiva-
lence will certainly not be obvious at this moment. Thus, another relevant
model for the fire effectiveness of Y's weapon system as a function of
range is given by the exponential attrition-rate coefficient
-•ir
a(r) - 0 e 1 (6.2.7)
where a denotes the kill rate of a single Y system at zero force
separation and al is a positive constant that is used to model the
decline in kill rate with increasing range and is called the "shape"
parameter (see Figure 6.3). Although the Y weapon-system type
theoretically has an infinite maximum effective range according to
(6.2.7), its fire effectiveness is essentially equal to zero for large
values of force separation. Similarly, we have for the X weapon-system
type -Blr
8(r) - 80 e • (6.2.8)
In any case, irrespective of such a theoretical property for the maximum
effective ranges of the wvapon systems, the range-dependent attrition-rate
coefficients (6.2.7) and (6.2.8) will in many instances give a good fit
to each weapon system's kill rate between the opening range of battle and
the final one.
As we have discussed in general terms above, we may use (6.2.2) to
eliminate range r from the range-dependent attrition-rate coefficients
in the model (6.2.1). Doing this for the range-dependent attrition-rate
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Figure 6.3. Dependence of Y's exponential attrition-rate coefficient
a(r) - a0 exp{-c1 r} on range and the "shape" parameter
aI with the kill rate at zero force separation (range)
a(O) - a0 held constant. Although the Y weapon-system
type theoretically has an infinite maximum effective
range according to this model, its fire effectiveness
is readily seen to be essentially equal to zero for
large enough values of force separation.
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coefficients (6.2.5) and (6.2.6), we obtain the time-dependent-coefficient
model (6.2.4) with general power attrition-rate coefficients.
a(t) - k a(t+C) , and b(t) - k.(t+C+D)v, (6.2.9)
where
ka a r a and kb - '0 (6.2.11)
We will call C the starting parameter, since it allows us to model (with
P and v > 0) battles that begin within the maximum effective range of
the Y weapon system (see Figure 6.2). We will call D the offset para-
meter, since it allows us to model (again, with p and v > 0) battles
between opposing weapon systems with different maximum effective ranges,
i.e. opposing weapon systems whose maximum effective ranges are "offset"
(see Figure 6.4). We observe that C and D > 0 if and only if
r, L r > rO. C - 0 me.ns that the battle begins within the maximum
effective range of the Y weapon system, while D > 0 means that the
maximum effective range of the X weapon system is greater than that of
the Y system.
In a similar fashion, we may use (6.2.2) to eliminate range r from
the range-dependent attrition-rate coefficients (6.2.7) and (6.2.8) in the
model (6.2.1) and obtain the time-dependent-coefficient model (6.2.5) with
exponential attrition-rate coefficients
( at Xbt
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ka O k b0 ,• B 1 re 0 (6.2.13)
S- a1v, and X b a 81 v " (6.2.14)
We close this section with some illustrative numerical results from
BONDER's constant-speed-attack model. Let us therefore examine the contant-
speed-attack model. We will consider the constant-speed attack of
a mobile homogeneous Y force against the static defensive position of a
homogeneous X force (see Figure 6.1). We assume that combat attrition
can be modelled by (6.2.1) with range-dependent attrition-ra4e coefficients
(6.2.5) and (6.2.6). The dependence upon range of the attrition-rate coef-
ficient c(r) (which represents the fire effectiveness of the Y weapon
system) is shown in Figure 6.2. Let us assume that the attacking 'Y force
initially numbers 30 and attacks at a constant speed of 5 miles per hour.
We assume that the defending X force initially numbers 10. We will see
that exactly what will happen in such a battle is quite sensitive to the
variations in the kill rates of the opposing weapon systems with range.
In Figure 6.5 we have plotted force-level trajectories for three dif-
ferent battles, denoted as battles (A), (B), and (C). These force-level
curves have been developed from analytical results to be discussed subsequently
in this chapter, but at this point in time we are not quite ready to discuss
how we have developed them. In these battles both types of opposing weapon
systems have the same maximum effective range, i.e. r. - r 8 - res and the
battle begins at this range, i.e. r0 . re . For these battles
we have held constant the kill rates at zero force separation, i.e.
a- a(O) and Bog and have varied in these three battles the manner in
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Figure 6.5. Force-level trajectories of X and Y forces
for three different battles [denoted in the
figure as (A), (B), and (C) and explained in
the main text] with each side's fire effective-
ness modelled by the power attrition-rate
coefficients for r 0 - r - r, - re - 2000 meters,
0 0 a e
CO - 0.06 X (casualties/minute) per Y firer,
8o - 0.6 Y (casualties/minute) per X firer,
v - 5 mph, x0 - 10, and yo - 30. The symbol x
denotes the end of a force-level trajectory due
to annihilation of the enemy force. i
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attrition-rate coefficients are given by the following expressions in each
of the three battles:
(A) constant-constant: a(r) - a0 and 8(r) - 0,
(B) linear-linear a(r) - a 0 (1-r/r) and 8(r) - %0(l-r/re),
2(C) linear-quadratic: a(r) - a 0 (l-r/re) and 8(r) - 80 (l-r/r e)
In other words, in battle (C) (the linear-quadratic case) the term "linear"
denotes that c(r) (the fire effectiveness of the Y weapon system type)
varies linearly with range, while the term "quadratic" denotes that 8(r)
varies quadratically with range. In battle (A) both attrition-rate coef-
ficients are constant, and thus in this case we have assumed no variation
in fire effectiveness with range for either weapon-system type.
We see from Figure 6.5 that battle outcome is quite sensitive to
the variation in weapon-system kill rate with range: in battle (A) the
attacking Y force is annihilated at a range of about 750 meters, while in
battle (C) the defending X force is annihilated before the attackers have
approached within 100 meters of the defender's position. Figure 6.5 shows
us the inadequacy of using constant attrition-rate coefficients in battles
with appreciable variations in force separation to model the kill rates of
weapon-system types whose true capabilities actually vary appreciably with
range. The ccnstant-coefficient results can be quite misleading for such
battles. We also see from Figure 6.5 that we can use the initial trend of
battle to forecast battle outcome only when we know how the fire effective-
ness of each weapon-system type depends on range. If the reader will com-
pare results for the three battles, the truth of this statement should be
clear. We finally note the "compounding" effect of casualties over time:
a small advantage in range capability rapidly "grows in its effect on
force-level trajectories," and such a small difference can have a large ef-
fect on battle outcome.
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Figure 6.6 shows similar force-level curves for the same battle-parameter
values except that the battle begins at an opening range of 1250 meters, i.e.
r0 a 1250 meters, instead of 2000 meters as it did for Figure 6.5. The force-
level curves corresponding to the constant-coefficient case, i.e. battle (A)
in Figure 6.6 with r 0 - 1250 meters are exactly the same for the same time
intervals (but not range intervals) as those shown in Figure 6.5 with
r 0 2000 meters. Other force-level trajectories decay faster in Figure
6.6 than they do in Figure 6.5 because the "intensity" of combat is greater,
i.e. as a function of time the attrition-rate coefficients are larger here
than for Figure 6.5. Again we see that batUle outcome is sensitive to the
range dependence of the attrition-rate coefficients. From comparing the
force-level curves shown in Figure 6.5 with those in Figure 6.6, we see that
the differences between battles (A), (B), and (C) are smaller when the open-
ing range of battle r 0  is much less than the maximum effective range of
the two opposing weapon-system types. In fact, when re - +-, the force-
level trajectories converge to the classic constant-coefficient ones (see
BONDER [7, p. IV-33] for a further discussion).
Thus, we see that the range dependence of weapon-system kill rates
has a very significant impact on battle outcome for BONDER's constant-speed-
attack model. We have reached this conclusion after examining three specific
battles, denoted as (A), (B), and (C) in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 and classified
according to the combination of two attrition-rate-coefficient range de-
pendencies (e.g. linear-quadratic). In these figures each different battle
is represented by a separate force-level curve. Moreover, it will be in-
structive for us to examine further parametric variations in attrition-rate-
coefficient range dependencies. It will be convenient, however, to identify
battles in a slightly different manner: we will denote exponent combinations
for the attrition-rate coefficients (6.25) and (6.26) as P:v, where P
218
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Figure 6.6. Force-level trajectories of X and Y forces for
an additional three different battles modelled
with the power attrition-rate coefficients for the
same parameter values chosen for Figure 6.5 except
that the opening range of battle r 0  is given by
r0- 1250 meters (still with r - r 8 - re -2000 meters).
The symbol conventions are also the same as in Figure 6.5.
(1
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denotes the exponent for the Y weapon-system-type kill rate a(r) and
v denotes the exponent for the X weapon-system-type kill rate 8(r).
Accordingly, further battle results for a wider variety of exponent
combinations in BONDER's constant-speed attack modelled with (6.2.1) and
the attrition-rate coefficients (6.2.5) and (6.2.6) are shown in Figures
6.7, 6.8, and 6.9. In Figure 6.7 we have expanded the range of exponent
combinations from those for the battles shown in Figure 6.5. Furthermore,
battles are identified differently in these figures (i.e. Figures 6.7, 6.8,
and 6.9) than they wiere in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. For example, battle (C)
with the linear-quadratic range-dependent attrition-rate coefficients is
now denoted simply as 1:2, i.e. M - 1 and v - 2 for the coefficients
(6.2.5) and (6.2.6). As in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, we have held a 0 -(O)
and B0 constant for these computations, i.e. the kill rates at zero force
separation are the same for all these battles.
Figure 6.7 further shows us that the nature of a force-level trajectory
is quite sensitive to the particular combination of exponent values P and
v and that these exponents are additional parameters that help determine
who wins and who loses. Returning to the constant-speed attack of a mobile
Y force against the static defensive position of a defending X force,
we see that, for example, for u - 1 (i.e. the kill rate c(r) of the
attacker's weapon system varying linearly with range) a battle may have
quite different outcomes depending on the value of v: the reader should
contrast the force-level trajectories denoted as 1:0, 1:1, 1:2, and 1:3 in
Figure 6.7. We also see that we can use the initial trend of battle to
predict battle outcome only when we know the nature of the dependency of
each weapon-system type's kill capability on range; the results shown in
Figure 6.7 should make this clear. For example, compare the outcomes for
the curves denoted as 1:2, 2:2, and 3:2. We also note the "compounding"
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Figure 6.7. Results for BONDER's constant-speed-attack model when
both sides' weapon-system types have the same maximum
effective range: force-level trajectories of X and Y
forces for different battles corresponding to different
combinations of the exponents p and v in the power
attrition-rate coefficients for r 0 - r r - W- re -2000 meters,
a0 " 0.06 X (casualties/minute) per Y firer, 80 - 0.6 Y
(casualties/minute) per X firer, v - 5 mph, x0 - 10, and
YO - 30. Each exponent combination is expressed as
u:v in the figure, and the symbol x denotes the end of
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Figure 6.8. Further results for BONDER's constant-speed-attack
model when both sides' weapon-system types have the
same maximum effective range: force-level trajectories
of X and Y forces for different battles corresponding
to different combinations of the exponents p and v
in the power attrition-rate coefficients for the same
parameter values chosen for Figure 6.7 except that
r0 - 1250 meters. The symbol conventions are also the
same as in Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.9. Further results for BONDER's constant-speed-attack model
when both sides' weapon-system types have the same
maximum effective range: force-level trajectories of
X and Y forces for different battles corresponding
to different combinations of the exponents p and v
in the power attrition-rate coefficients for the same
parameter values chosen for Figure 6.7 except that
r- 1250 meters and r - r8 - r - 1500 meters.
Again, the symbol conventions are also the same as in
Figure 6.7.
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effect over time: a small advantage in range capability can eventually
materially affect battle outcome.
In Figure 6.8 we have similarly expanded the range of exponent combi-
nations for the battles shown in Figure 6.6, i.e. all battle parameters are
the same as for Figure 6.7 except that r 0 - 1250 meters instead of 2000
meters. Similar to the case shown in Figure 6.6, the force-level curves
shown in Figure 6.8 with r 0 - 1250 meters are similar to those shown in
Figure 6.7 with r 0 - 2000 meters except that as a function of time they
decrease faster in Figure 6.8 for V and v > 0 because the "intensity"
of combat is greater, i.e. as a function of time both attrition-rate coef-
ficients are larger here than in Figure'6.7. Figure 6.9 shows similar
force-level curves for the same parameter values except that r - ra -
r 1500 meters. Observing that for p > 1 we have a(r;r a) < a(r;r )
if and only if ra < rC, we may consider that the "intensity" of combat is
less intense for the engagements depicted in Figure 6.9 than for those
shown in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.10 shows the effect of increasing maximum effective range of
the defender's weapons, i.e. that of the X force (cf. Figure 6.1), when
each weapon-system type's kill rate is assumed to vary linearly with range
(see Figure 6.4). For the family of battles depicted in Figure 6.10, we
have held the opening range of battle constant at r 0 - 1250 meters and the
maximum effective range of the attacking Y weapon system constant at
r M 1500 meters. Both attrition-rate coefficients vary linearly with range
(i.e. V - v 1 in (6.2.5) and (6.2.6)], a0 and B0 have been held con-
stant, and r has been varied. The force-level curves in Figure 6.10
quantitatively show the benefit from increasing the long-range kill capability
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Figure 6.10. Results for BONDER's constant-speed-attack model when
opposing weapon-system tynes have different maximum
effective ranges: force-level trajectories of X
and Y forces for various different maximum effective
ranges of the X-force-weapon-system type for linear
attrition-rate coefficients with r0 - 1250 meters,
r - 1500 meters, and the same values of the other parameters
(i.e. mo, B0, and v) listed in the legend of Figure 6.7.
The symbol x has the same meaning as in that figure.
225
__ . ..
in the battle, and these are then magnified over time by Lhe "compounding
nature" of the LANCHESTER-type equations (6.2.1). Again, these numerical
results nave been generated from analytical results that are given later
in this chapter. However, using an analogue computer, BONDER and FARRELL
[10, pp. 296-367] have developed extentive parametric results for this model.
The important thing to glean from all these battle examples is that
variations in weapon-system kill rates with range in mobile operations
(equivalently, temporal variations in fire effectiveness over the course of
a battle) have a significant impact on the battle's outcome. Consequently,
we should use time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients to model temporal
variations in fire effectiveness when, for example, the range between firers
and targets changes appreciably during battle.
As noted above, we have generated all the force-level curves shown in
Figures 6.5 through 6.10 from analytical results, i.e. infinite-series
solutions, to be subsequently developed in this chapter. However, we could
have equally well generated them by a step-by-step niumerical integra-
tion of a finite-difference approximAtion to our differential-equation combat
model. We can, of course, always numerically do this for a specific set of
battle-parameter values. However, the structure of combat results is not
at all evident from such specific numerical evaluations, but it may be de-
duced from further analysis of the analytical results. Of course, before
we embark on an analytical examination of force-level trajectories for the




6.3. Information to be Obtained from the Model.
As we have discussed many times above, our goal in this book is to
help the reader to obtain insights into the dynamics of combat from rela-
tively simple combat models rather than enriching such models in details
(see W. T. MORRIS (291 for a lucid discussion of the process of such en-
richment). Consequently, both our research and also the developments of
this chapter have been guided by this goal of obtaining insights into the
dynamics of combat.
We will emphasize extracting as much operational information as pos-
sible from the model with a minimum of effort. What information should we
seek to obtain? Although the specific information to extract from any com-
bat model depends, of course, on the purpose of the OR study, we have used
the questions shown in Table 6.1 to guide our efforts. We have tried to
make the extraction of such information from variable-coefficient homogeneous-
force models almost as easy as obtaining it from LANCHESTER's classic c on-
stant-coefficient models. As we have just seen in the previous section, such
variable-coefficient combat models are required when there are appreciable
temporal variations in fire effectiveness during a battle.
In the rest of this chapter we will present analytical results for
time-dependent FIF, FTJFT, and (F+T)I(F+T) attrition processes. S. BONDER
(10, pp. 30-31] has stressed the importance of analytical solutions to such
models for developing insights into the dynamics of combat by explicitly
portraying the relation between various factors in the combat attrition pro-
cess and the surviving numbers of forces and also for facilitating sensitivity
and other parametric anrlyse" (see BONDER [9]). Consequently, we will con-
sider developing and analyzing solutions to variable-coefficient differential




Table 6.1. Information to Extract from Combat Model.
(QI) Who will "win"*the engagement? Be annihilated?
(Q2) How do the force levels change over time in the battle?
(Q3) How many survivors will the winner have?
(Q4) What force ratio is required to guarantee victory!
(Q5) How long will the battle last?
(Q6) How do changes in the initial force levels and weapon-system
parameters affect the battle's outcome?
(Q7) What will be the casualty-exchange ratio?
(Q8) Is concentration of forces a good tactic?
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Most of these developments for analytically investigating variable-
coefficient LANCIIESTER-type combat have only recently appeared in the litera-
ture. In particular, the theory of variable-coefficient FIF combat is now
essentially almost as complete as that for LANCHESTER's classic constant-
coefficient equations for modern warfare. In other words, it is now almost
as easy to extract information (recall Table 6.1) from these variable-






6.4. The Special Case of Quasi-Autonomous Equations.
Before elaborating upon general results concerning analytical solutions
of LANCHESTER-type equations with time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients,
let us consider a very important special case that bridges the gap between
constant-coefficient and variable-coefficient models. As stressed by S.
BONDER [10, pp. 30-31], analytical solutions to LANCHESTER-type equations
are important for developing insights into the dynamics of combat by ex-
plicityly portraying the relation between the parameters of the attrition
process and the numbers of survivors. Unfortunately, it is generally im-
possible to express the solution to such a system of equations with time-
dependent attrition-rate coefficients in terms of any of the classic "ele-
mentary" functions of mathematics 5, e.g. exponential functions, hyperbolic
functions, etc. Thus, we are grateful when constant-coefficient results
may be used in some sense for analyzing combat modelled with time-dependent
coefficients.
Let us therefore note that any homogeneous-force model of the form
dX - -h(t) A(x,y) with x(O) - x0,
(6.4.1)
-h(t) B(x,y) with y(O) - Y0'
dt
may be transformed into the autonomous system of differential equations
(i.e. the right-hand sides of the differential equations do not contain the
time parameter)
dd - -A(x,y) with x(T-0) - x0,
(6.4.2)
dy -B(x,y) with y(r-O) - yo,
dT
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e by the substitution
t
T f h(s)ds, (6.4.3)
0
where we assume that the integral exists. Thus, the model (6.4.1) with time-
dependent attrition-rate coefficients may be transformed into a constant-
coefficient one by a transformation of the battle's time scale. We will say
that such LANCHESTER-type equations are quasi-autonomous.
We have already encountered in Section 3.6 an important example of
such quasi-autonomous equations for an FIF attrition process, namely
dx - -a(t)y and dy - -b(t)x, (6.4.4)
dt dt
where
a(t) ka h(t), b(t) - kbh(t), (6.4.5)
h(t) > 0 for all t >_ 0, and ka and kb are positive constants. The
substitution
t
T - /kakb f h(s)ds, (6.4.6)aD0
then transforms (6.4.4) with (6.4.5) into
dT La Y and 5 x, (6.4.7)
dD a
whence , for example,
k a




which may be written as
x(t) x cosh (Va(t)b(t) t) - yo /a(t) sinh (/-a(t)b(t) t), (6.4.9)0 btt
where va(t)b(t) denotes the average intensity of combat, i.e.
it/a(t)b(t) . f Va(s)b(s) ds. (6.4.10)
0
Finally, we note that for combat modelled with the quasi-autonomous equations
(6.4.4) and (6.4.5) a "square law" still holds
7




6.5. General Force-Level Results for Variable-Coefficient LANCHESTER-
Yn Equations of Modern Warfare.
Let us consider the following LANCHESTER-type equations for a
FIF attrition process with time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients
dx = -a(t)y with x(O) w xo,
(6.5 .1)
-( w -b(x)x with y(O) - yo
These equations may be hypothesized to model combat under either of the
following two sets of circumstances (cf. Sections 2.2 and 2.11 above):
either (Sl) beth sides use "aimed" fire and target-acquisition times
do not depend on the number of targets [611,
or (S2) both sides use "area" fire and a constant-density defense
[12 1.
Mathematically, we assume that the attrition-rate coefficients
a(t) and b(t) are defined, positive, and continuous for t0 < t < +
with t0 < 0. For convenience, we introduce the notation that
a(t) E L(toT) means fT a(t)dt exists (and is given by a finite
t0
quantity). From our assumptions about a(t) it follows that a(t)
T
L(toT) implies that ft a(t)dt - + -V and similarly for b(t). We
0
also assume that both a(t) and b(t) E L(toT) for any finite T.
It follows that, for example, a(t) A L(to,+ -) implies that
iT a(t)dt - + •. We will further take a(t) and b(t)
limT 41 + - St0
(..• to be given in the form
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a(t) = ka g(t) , and b(t) k  h(t) , (6.5.2)
where k and kb are positive constants chosen so that a(t)/b(t)
k a/kb when g(t) a h(t). In other words, ka and kb are basically
"."scale factors," which are useful for the parametric study of battle
outcomes as related to various system parameters.
We will now introduce some useful notation for two important
parameters of such "aimed-fire" battles with time-dependent attrition-
rate coefficients (6.5.1). In Chapter 2, we considered the FIF
attriton process with constant attrition-rate coefficients and found
out that the force-level trajectories depended on the following three
quantities: (1) the initial force ratio u0 - x0 /y 0 , (2) the intensity
of combat I - / , and (3) the relative fire effectiveness R - a/b,
where a and b denote constant attrition-rate coefficients. With
these constant-coefficient results in mind, we introduce for the model
(6.5.1) the intensity of combat I(t) and the relative fire effective-
ness R(t) defined by
I(t) - Va(t) b(t) and R(t) - a(t)/b(t) . (6.5.3)
We similarly introduce the combat-intensity parameter A I and the
relative-fire-effectiveness parameter A R defined by
A /=ka , and xR = k/kb" (6.5.4)
Before considering the representation of solutions to (6.5.1),
let us establish an important mathematical property of such solutions:
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all solutions to (6.5.1) with both a(t) and b(t) > 0 for all t > 0
and also with both x 0 and yo > 0 are nonoscillatory in the sense
that x(t) and y(t) can have at most one zero for t > 0. To see
this, we multiply the first equation of (6.5.1) by y, the second by
x, add, and integrate to obtain
x(t) y(t) - x0 y0 - f {a(s) y 2(s) + b(s) x2 ()}ds , (6.5.5)
0
whence follows the assertion by recalling that on physical grounds we
must have (and therefore we will assume that) both a(t) and b(t) > 0
for all t > 0 and also that both x 0  and yo > O.
THEOREM 6.5.1: All solutions to (6.5.1) are non.-
oscillatory in the sense that at most one of the
force levels x(t) and y(t) can ever vanish in
finite time.
As we have discussed in Section 2.2 above, we should "turn off" the
combat model (6.5.1) when either side is annihilated [cf. (2.2.2)1.
For many purposes, however, it is convenient to "let the equations run
for all t > 0." Theorem 6.5.1 then tells us that if, for example, the
xX force is ever annihilated (i.e. there is a finite t such chat
X(ta) - 01, then y(t) > 0 for all t > 0. This property is usefula -
for developing force-annihilation-prediction conditions for the model
(6.5.1). Furthermore, it does not hold for all differential combat
models.
( We will now show how the well-known constant-coefficient results
(2.2.11) for the force levels as functions of time, i.e. x(t) and
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y(t), may be generalized to the model (6.5.1) for battles with time-
dependent attrition-rate coefficients. The basic idea is to construct
the solution out of certain generalizations of the classic hyperbolic
functions. Thus, the X force level as a function of time, x(t), may
be represented as (see TAYLOR and BROWN (53])
x(t) - xo{Cy(o) Cx(t) - sy(o) Sx(t)}
- V'7__ (Cx(0) Sx(t) - Sx(0) Cx(t)} (6.5.6)
where the hyperbolic-like g~neral LANCHESTER functions (GLF) Cx(t)
and S x(t) are linearly independent solutions to the X force-level
equation
d2x 1 da dx a(t) b(t)x 0 (6.5.7)
dt2 7a6t) t FdtF
with initial conditions
Cx(to) 0 l , sx(to) - 0
(6.5.8)
{l/a(to)}dCx/dt(tO) - 0 , {i/a(to)}dSx/dt(to) -1// .
Here to0  0 denotes the largest finite time at which a(t) or b(t)
ceases to be defined, positive, or continuous. We will set to - 0
if no such finite time exists.
In a similar fashion, the Y force level as a function of
time, y(t), may be represented as
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y(t) - yo{Cx(0) Cy(t) - Sx (0) S y(t)
x0
- . {(c(0) Sy( ) - Sy(O) c¢( M , (6.5.9)
R
where the hyperbolic-like GLF C (t) aqd S (t) are linearly inde-
y y
pendent solutions to the Y force-level equation
-2 ___ db l - a(t) b(t)y - 0 (6.5.10)
with initial conditions
CY(t 0 ) = 1 , Sy (t) 0 (6.5.11)
{I/b(t 0 )}dCy/dt(t 0 ) - 0 , (i/b(t )}dSy/dt(t /'x-
0 Y 00 Y 0 R
It may be shown (and we will do so below) that
C X(t) C (t) - SX(t) Sy(W ) - 1 , (6.5.12)
whence (6.5.6) and (6.5.9) are readily seen to satisfy the initial
conditions to (6.5.1).
It is often convenient to view the above GLF as solutions to the
following two systems
dCX a(t)( z with C (to) i
dt -Y x 0
SdR (6.5.13)
d-T- b(t) C with S(t)-0
( dt R XY y0 0
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and the dual system obtained by making the substitutions X ÷ Y, Y -0X,
a(t) ÷ b(t), b(t) 0 a(t), and XR * l/XR in (6.5.13)
dCy
S/ R b(t) S with Cy(t) -0
(6.5.14)
dSdSX a(t)
dt V7- with S X(t)0-0
R
Equation (6.5.12) is now a trivial consequence of (6.5.13) and (6.5.14).
Thus, the X and Y force levels may be constructed from the
GLF, which we may consider to be the basic "building blocks" of all
analytical results for the differential combat model (6.5.1). In other
words, once we have determined the GLF defined by (6.5.7), (6.5.8),
(6.5.10), and (6.5.11) (or, equivalently, by the two systems (6.5.13)
and (6.5.14)), we can, for example, construct the X force level x(t)
by means of (6.5.7).
Thus, it remains to discuss the calculation of the hyperbolic-
like GLF. Two approaches that may be used to calculate the hyperbolic-
like GLF from their definitions are as follows:
(Al) method of succesive approximations,
and (A2) infinite-series methods.
The infinite-series methods essentially consist of assuming an infinite
series of a given form with undetermined coefficients and then deter-
mining these coefficients (see, for example, INCE [23], KAMKE (24 ],
MURPHY (32], or RAINVILLE [35]). We have primarily used, however,
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f successive approximations in our work (see, for example, TAYLOR [431),
and we will now further discuss this approach.
We will now illustrate the method of successive approximations
by developing an expression for the hyperbolic-like GLF C Xt). From
(6.5.13) we find that C X(t) satisfies the following VOLTERRA integral
equation
t Sl1
C x(t) - 1 + f a(s 1 )ds, f b(s 2 ) Cx(s 2 )ds 2  (6.5.15)t 0  to
We may also write that
2 s3
Cx(S 2 ) ( 1 + f a(s 3 )ds 3  5 b(s 4 ) Cx (s 4 )ds 4
to to
which we may then substitute into the right-hand side of (6.5.15) and
recursively continue. Doing this, we find that we may write
00
C X(t) - Fn (t), (6.5.16)
n-O
where F0 (t) - 1 and for n > 0
t s
Fn (t) - f a(s)ds f b(r) Fn-l(r) dr . (6.5.17)
to to
It may be shown that F (t) < (i/n.)f{f a(s) B(s)ds}n , whence the
a t 0
infinite series (6.5.16) converges uniformly and absolutely on S
for S - [O,T] with T finite. In a similar fashion we may show
that
t00
S -W f a(s){ I Gn(s)}ds , (6.5.18)
R to n-0
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where GO(t) -1 and for n > 0
t s
Gn(t)- f b(s)ds f a(r) Gn-l (r)dr . (6.5.19)
t0 t0
Example 6.5.1. If a(t) - k ah(t) and b(t) - kbh(t) with h(t) > 0
for all t > -, then CX(t) - cosh r and SX(t) - sinh r, where
T(t) -/7 ft h(s)ds.
Example 6.5.2. If a(t) ka (t + C)P and b(t) = k b(t + C)' with
C > 0 and both p and v > -1, then
C tL( )2k (t + C) k(p+v+2)
Cx(t) =r(q) +_ _722/ k' .~ )
k-0 t + "q)7
and
S I 2k+lk(+v+2)++l
Sx(t) =r(p) + 21 (t + C
k=0 + V + 2/ k! r(k +1 + p)T
where p - (?. + 1)/(u + v + 2) and q - l-p.
Before leaving the topic of time solutions to (6.5.1), let us
record here some further important properties of such solutions. First
of all, if the reader compares, for example, the X force level
(6.5.6) with the corresponding constant-coefficient result (2.2.9), he
will see that it is more complex. TAYLOR and BROWN (53] have shown
that (6.5.6) only simplifies for t0 < 0 when
a(t)/b(t) klaki - CONSTANT * (6.5.20)
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since only then does a so-called algebraic addition theorem (see below)
hold between the hyperbolic-like GLF.
THEOREM 6.5.2 (TAYLOR and BROWN [53]): For t0 < 0,
one can further simplify (6.5.6) if and only if
a(t)/b(t) - ka/kb  CONSTANT (constant ratio of
attrition-rate coefficients).
Let us now give an example of how such an algebraic addition theorem
helps us to simplify (6.5.6). Consider a constant-coefficient battle
that begins at t - t . Equation (6.5.6) then yields
I t
x(t) - x/ic t1 cosh Vi- t - sin /a t1 sinh "a tj
- Y0vb cosh t1 n t - sinh/F t cosh t l,
(6.5.21)
which simplifies to
c(t) - x cosh /a (t-t) - sinh /a (t-tI) , (6.5.22)
due to the well-known algebraic addition theorems for the ordinary
hyperbolic functions, e.g. cosh(u-v) - cosh u ccosh v - sinh u sinh v.
As we have seen above in Section 6.4, when the ratio of
attrition-rate coefficients is constant, i.e. (6.5.20) holds, we can
transform the X force-level equation into one with constant
coefficients by a transformation of the independent variable t. As
we have seen, this situation leads to particularly convenient results.
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In this respect, TAYLOR and BROWN have proved the following result.
THEOREM 6.5.3 (TAYLOR and BROWN [531): A necessary and
sufficient condition to be able to transform the X force-
level equation (6.5.7) by a transformation of the inde-
pendent variable t into a linear second-order ordinary
differential equation with constant coefficients is that
1 d1 d £n R(t) - CONSTANT (6.5.23)
In this case the desired substitution is given by
t
T - K f /a(s) bTiT ds , (6.5.24)
t
where f ... ds denotes an indefinite integral and K is
an arbitrary constant conveniently chosen.
Finally, the reader may be interested in the author's assess-
ment as to just how difficult it is to develop analytical solutions
to such LANCHESTER-type equations for modern warfare when there are
temporal variations in fire effectiveness. Figure 6.11 shows the


















it is important for the military operations analyst to have a
clear understanding of how the initial force ratio and weapon-system-
performance parameters interact to determine a battle's outcome. For any
particular battle, we can always, of course, determine its outcome by
explicitly computing the force-level trajectories and plotting them over
time: the loser is simply the side that first reaches its battle-termi-
nation condition (see Section 3.3). The force-level trajectories may be
generated either from the analytical results discussed in the previous
section or more simply by numerical integration of the differential
equations. This approach, however, is time consuming and by itself
provides no understanding about the parametric dependence of battle out-
come on the initial force levels and weapon-system-performance parameters.
Moreover, as work by BONDER and FARRELL (10 and TAYLOR [43; 53] unfortu-
nately shows, even the analytical (i.e. infinite-series) solution to
variable-coefficient equations generally provides by itself (i.e. without
explicitly computing force-level trajectories) little information about
battle outcome because of its complexity.
Moreover, fraquently the military operations analyst may only
want to determine who is going to "win" a battle without having to spend
the time and effort of explicitly computing the force-level trajectories.
It is therefore of interest to develop battle-outcome-prediction (or
victory-prediction) conditions that help one obtain insights into the
dynamics of combat by explicitly portraying the relation between the
various factors in the combat-attrition process and battle outcome.
Specifically, one would like to have a (hopefully) simple expression that
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relates battle outcome to the model's parameters. Thus, the military OR
analyst is interested in developing battle-outcome-prediction conditions.
Battle outcome, however, depends on the battle-termination model chosen,
and modelling battle termination is a somewhat controversial topic as
we saw in Chapter ?.
Although we are well aware that engagement termination is a
complex random process for which it is by no means certain that force
levels are the significant variables (.see Chapter 3), we will consider
two types of battle-termination conditions in this section:
(Tl) battle terminated by one side's force level reaching
its "breakpoint" value while the other side's force
level has always been above its breakpoint value
(force-level-breakpoint battle),
and (T2) battle terminated by the force ratio first reaching
either of two given "breakpoint" force ratio values
(force-ratio-breakpoint battle).
Moreover, in both cases we will only consider deterministic breakpoints
here (see Section 3.4 for a further discussion), and we will accordingly







The first type of battle-termination condition (Ti) and the
corresponding engagement with deterministic breakpoints (El) have been
discussed in Section 2.8 and Chapter 3 above, and thus it remains to
discuss battle-termination-condition type (T2) and the corresponding
engagement model with deterministic breakpoints (E2). Let us as usual
denote the force ratio x/y as u. Then for a fixed-force-ratio-
X
breakpoint battle, we denote the "breakpoint" force ratio as UBp when
X terminates the battle (i.e. tries to "break off" the engagement),
Y
and as uBp when Y terminates the battle. The idea here is that,
for example, X will decide to "break off" the engagement when he
perceives a certain very unfavorable force ratio against him. These
"breakpoint" force ratios then satisfy 0 < u X < u0 < uY < +uBP 0 Bp --
Corresponding to a fight until the annihilation of one side or the
x Y
other is the case in which uBp - 0 and uBP = + -. Such a "fight-to-the-
finish" may consequently be examined under either of the above two battle-
termination conditions (Ti) and (T2). BONDER and HONIG [11] have pointed
out, however, that force annihilation may not always be the best criterion
for evaluating the outcomes of simulated military operations. See BONDER
and FARRELL [10, pp. 192-242] for a detailed LANCHESTER-type analysis of
an attack scenario for with other "end of battle conditions" play the
principal role. Nevertheless, it is of considerable interest (especially
for developing insights into the dynamics of combat) to be able to easily
predict the occurrence of force annihilation.
Thus, as we have discussed in Section 2.8 above, battle outcome
depends on not only the dynamics of combat but also the battle-termination
model considered. Consequently, we will generally obtain different
victory-prediction conditions for the above two types of engagements:
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(El) fixed-force-level-breakpoint battle, and (E2) fixed-force-ratio-
breakpoint battle. Moreover, it turns out that there are two different
kinds of battle-outcome-prediction conditions that have been developed
for the model (6.5.1):
(A) exact force-annihilation-prediction conditions
(necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of
force annihilation),
and
(B) simple approximate battle-outcome-prediction conditions
(sufficient, but not necessary, for the occurrence of a
particular type of outcome).
The first type of condition is essentially developed from results on
the representation of solutions to (6.5.1), see equations (6.5.6) and
(6.5.9) above. In retrospect, the author feels that the main value of
(6.5.6) is that it may be used to develop these force-annihilation-
prediction conditions. The second type of battle-outcome-prediction
condition may be developed from considering the equation satisfied by
the force ratio.
We will see that so-called higher transcendental functions, unfortu-
nately, are usually involved (i.e. for t 0 < 0 and a(t)/b(t) 0 CONSTANT)
in the "exact" force-annihilation-prediction conditions. On the other
hand, no higher transcendental functions are usually involved in the
"simple approximate" battle-outcome-prediction conditions for a fixed-
force-ratio-breakpoint battle, but many times one is unable to predict the
outcome, i.e. there is a "gap" in this type of condition.
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Concerning exact force-annihilation-prediction conditions, the
author (52] (extending earlier results by TAYLOR and COMSTOCK (58]) has
developed the following general result.
THEOREM 6.6.1 (TAYLOR [521): The X force will be
annihilated in finite time in LANCHESTER-type combat
modelled with (6.5.1) if and only if
YO R ma
where F(Q) is given by
Cx(O) - QSx(O)
F(Q) - .Cy(0) - Sy(0) (6.6.2)
QCYTO-) - SY (0)
Neither side will be annihilated in finite time if and only
if
* x.•
IrV F(Q < YO < V<- F (QmOn) (6.6.3)R max -yo-- R 'mn
where
Sx(t) 1 1 ______
llim . .I - a(s)ds (6.6.4)t -.+00 . 7 7 * 2664Xa Q I-- tO {Cx(S)}2
t++o ~ max R t0  (C(s1
and
s_(t) , rt bs
lim - Qmix R f 2 (6.6.5)




We always have Qmin Qmax with Qmin < Qmax' with
0* < if and only if both a(t) + b(t) E L(t 0 ,+-o).'miri % ax
The deterministic inequality (6.6.1) is the generalization of
the well-known constant-coefficient force-annihilation-prediction condition
given in Section 2.2 above (recall Proposition 2.2.1). We will call the
parameters %a and Qmin defined by (6.6.4) and (6.6.5) in Theorem
6.6.1 the parity-condition parameters, since parity between the two forces
(i.e. neither force annihilated in finite time) may be associated with them
[see (6.6.3) above]. As (6.6.1) shows us, force-annihilation prediction
may be expressed in terms of the following three parameters:
(PI) the initial force ratio, u0 = Xo/yo,
(P2) the relative-fire-effectiveness parameter, X R = k a/kb
and (P3) the partity-condition parameter, Q * or Rnin"
As Theorem 6.6.1 tells us, different parity-condition parameters are in-
volved in the prediction of annihilation of the X force and in that of
the Y force. These two parity-condition parameters are functionals depend-
ing on only the attrition-rate-coefficient functions a(t) and b(t)
[see, (6.6.4) and (6.6.5) above]. Depending on the boundedness of the
total cumulative fire effectiveness of both sides (i.e. the integrability
of the attrition-rate coefficients over the interval [top+-)), however,
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the values of these two parameters Q and Q may not be the same
min max
[i.e. Qmin < max with min < max if and only if both a(t) and
b(t) E L(t 0 ,+o-)]. Thus, unless both a(t) and b(t) E L(t 0 ,oe), only a
single parameter, denoted simply as Q , is actually involved in force-
annihilation prediction.
Let us now give a physical interpretation for the parity-condition
parameter. TAYLOR and COMSTOCK [58, p. 355] have pointed out that we may
consider Q to be the initial Y force level that leads to a draw8
in the following fight-to-the finish (i.e. parity exists between the two
forces) against an X force of "unit strength"
dEx a(t) Ey with EX(to;Q) - 1
R (6.6.6)
dE- - R b(t) EX with Ey-O;Q) = Q 9
where Ex(t;Q) and Ey(t;Q) are so-called subdominant solutions which
play the role of decreasing exponentials for the X and Y force-level
equations. Let us denote any Q E [Q as Q . It follows from
(6.6.3) and (6.6.6) that
EX(t;Q*) and Eý(t;Q*) > 0 for all finite t > to. (6.6.7)
*
Considering (6.6.6) and (6.6.7), we may think of Q as "the Y-force
equivalent of an X force of unit strength," since neither force is annihilated
in finite time.
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Let us now consider two examples of LANCHESTER-type battles for
which the parity-condition parameter may be explicitly analytically
determined. The first example shows the possibility of the existence of
a finite range of values for the initial force ratio x 0 /y 0  such that
neither side is ever annihilated in battle, while the second analytically
determines the parity-condition parameter for a very important specific
case of attrition-rate coefficients (namely, power attrition-rate coefficients
with "no offset" modelling, for example, combat between two opposing
weapon-system types with the same maximum effective range). Further examples
and use of such results in tactical analysis is given in Section 6.9 below.
Example 6.6.1. Consider combat modelled by (6.5.1) with the following
attrition-rate coefficients
4.
a(t) - k ah(t) , and b(t) - kh(t) . (6.6.8)
We assume that h(t) > 0 for all t > -•, and then to - 0. It follows
(see Sections 6.4 and 6.5) that C -(t) Ct) - cosh T and S X() - S yt)
- sinh r, where T(t) - TI f h(s)ds. Denote lim r(t) as M. It
0 t=
follows that
1 - "e2n < (6.6.9)Qn 1 + e-2n Qi
~max
Thus,Qmin x if and only if M < +- if and only if h(t) E L(O,+o-).




Furthermore, neither X nor Y will be annihilated in finite time for
-- Y x0 < + e-2
*"XR (1- e 2 n Y R 1-e2n
Example 6.6.2. Consider combat modelled by (6.5.1) with the following
power attrition-rate coefficients with no offset
a(t) - k a(t + C)P, and b(t) - k (t + C)", (6.6.10)a a
where C > 0. It follows that t 0 - -C. As we saw in Section 6.2 above,
these coefficients may be taken to model, for example, the constant-speed
attack of a mobile force against the static defensive position of an enemy
force in which each side's fire effectiveness varies as a power of the
range between the two opposing forces. These particular coefficients
(6.6.10) model combat between two opposing forces armed with weapon systems
with the same maximum effective range, i.e. set D - 0 in (6.2.9). The
assumption that both a(t) and b(t) E L(t 0 ,T) for any finite T > to
yields that we must have V and v > -1, and consequently both a(t)
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and b(t) f L(t 0 ,+oo) so that Q - %a " Considering (6.5.7),
(6.5.8), (6.5.10), and (6.5.11), one may show that (see [53, p. 521)
Gx(t) - r(q)( + )P (t + C) I(T) , (6.6.11)
Sx(t) - r(p) +• + 2) (t +C) (T) ,(6.6.12)
C(t) - r( 2) (t + C)(v 1)/2I (T) , (6.6.13)y + vp) + 2) q
and
Sy(t) - r(q) + (t + C) (v+)/2 (T) (6.6.14)
Y+v+ 2/)66.4
where X I a , I (T) denotes the modified BESSEL function of the first
kind of order p (e.g. see LEBEDEV [27, p. 108], OLVER [34, p. 60], or
WATSON [60, p. 77]), p = (+l)/(I+v+2), q - 1 - p, and
(t + C) ('+'+2 )/ 2T(t) - X- 1 (6.6.15)
v{( +v+ 2)/2}
Hence,
1 - lm Sx(t) r(p) ( + lim ) p (T) (6.6.16)
Q t+@ c(t) r (q) t÷+ +Xv+ 2 t I_ T)
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We observe that p and v > -1 implies that 0 < p, q < 1 and also
that T ) + - as t - + -. Using the so-called asymptotic representation
for modified BESSEL functions of the first kind (e.g. see OLVER [34, p. 269]),
one may show that on the real line lim {I (0)/I (W)} 1 for all real
values of a and 8 . It follows from (6.6.16) that
Q f Iq x I \p-q (..7
r(p) + v + 2 ' (6.6.17)
and hence [from (6.6.11) through (6.6.14) above]
* ,v/ {' •(TO) - I (To)]"
F(Q ) - C(11-0/2 {I-(To). 1P(T , (6.6.18)
I q ( 5
where T denotes T(O). At the expense of some mathematical obscurity,
the expression (6.6.18) may be written in the somewhat simpler form
F(Q*) '- qp(~ I a )qp X( (6.6.19)P + v+ 2 A(y  6..Y9
where A (•) denotes the generalized AIRY function of the first kind of
(nonintegral) order a (see SWANSON and HEADLEY [42, pp. 1401-1402]),
a- (v-i)/(.+l), 8" (u-v)/(v+l), Ex [I /( 0+l)]2Pc•I , and
y- [I/(V+l)] 2q C"4 l. Theorem 6.6.1 then tells us that the X force
will be annihilated in finite time if and only if
x0 (I x1 + \'+ q-o qPAa(•X)
X0 X p qv+ 2,)- X ) (6.6.20)
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which for to - 0 simplifies to
Xo < /X_ XI q-p r(p) (6.6.21)
YO R + v + 2 r(q)
Concerning simple approximate battle-outcome-prediction conditions,
the author [45] (see also TAYLOR and PARRY [59]) has shown that under the
appropriate conditions x0 /y 0 < /a0/b0  implies that the X force will lose
a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle in finite time. Here a0 denotes
a(O) and similarly for b0 . A fight-to-the-finish is, of course, just
a special case of such a battle. More precisely, we have
THEOREM 6.6.2 (TAYLOR [453): Assume that b(t) f L(O,+-)
and that R(t) - a(t)/b(t) is nondecreasing. Then for
LANCHESTER-type combat modelled with (6.5.1),
•0 < 0(6.6.12)
implies that the X force will lose a fixed-force-ratio-
breakpoint battle in finite time.
PROOF. Introducing the force ratic u - x/y, we find that it satisfies
the Riccaci equation (see Appendix A.3)
du2T" b(t)u2 - a(t) with u(O) - 0 x0 /y 0 . (6.6.23)
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Let u +(t) R(tr) - i(t)/b(t) denote the positive root of the quadratic
equation b(t)u2 - a(t) - 0, and observe that du/dt < 0 for any positive
u < u+(t) (see Figure 2.7). The assumption that R(t) is nondecreasing
++then'yields that u +(t) is nondecreasing. It is readily shown that
du/dt(O) < 0 and u (t) nondecreasing imply that du/dt(t) < 0 for all
t > 0 (e.g. see Section 2.2 above or TAYLOR and PARRY [59, pp. 526-527]).
Consequently, when (6.6.22) holds and R(t) is nondecreasing, it follows
that du/dt(t) < 0 for all t > 0. It then remains to be shown that X's
10
breakpoint force ratio is reached in finite time. Observing that
a0 < + and b0 > 0, we find that under the stated conditions
du 2 b(t) 2 _ a b(t) dudtU=b(t) {u2 - ) -<-0 bu -()
dt - b 0 00 0 b0 - 1 dt
Thus,
u~) U du dt(i k du(0
U(t) ) dt < u0 + (0) t b(s)ds (6.6.24)
0 dt - dt
whence b(t) A L(O,+-) implies that u(t) goes to UBp in finite time.
Q.E.D
The above proof of Theorem 6.6.2 is particularly important, since it may
be extended to more general models, e.g. (6.13.1) (see Theorem 6.13.3 below).
Moreover, the role of the assumption that b(t) A L(0,+4) in guaranteeing
that the battle is driven to termination is clearly shown in the above
proof.
1 1
By considering LIOUVILLE's so-called normal form (see INCE (23,
p. 271], fcr the Y force-level equatiou, the author [45, p. 197] has
also developed the following complementary result
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THEOREM 6.6.3 (TAYLOR [45]): Assume that
T
0 < R(O) < +- and that lir f /a(t)b(t) dt +o.
T÷+ to0
T
Let r(t) = f Va(s) b(s) ds,
to
_____1/4G(T) (- , and Q(T) - [R(t)] (6.6.25)
where Q'(T) denotes dQ/dT. If G(T) < 0 for all
T > 0, then
x 0 , ao
x0> _(I + C) (6.6.26)
implies that the Y force will be annihilated in finite time.
Here e denotes (l//i•j)[d/dt Zn{a(t)/b(t)} 1 / 4 ]. Furthermore,
if dR/dt > 0 for all t > 0, then Y will lose a fixed-force-
ratio-breakpoint battle in finite time.
The deterministic inequalities (6.6.22) and (6.6.26) show us the comple-
mentary nature of Theorems 6.6.2 and 6.6.3: if the initial force ratio
u0 M x0 /y 0  is below a certain critical value, Theorem 6.6.2 predicts
that Y will win a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle; while if u0
exceeds a second critical value, Theorem 6.6.3 predicts the X will win.
Example 6.6.3. Again we consider combat modelled by (6.5.1) with the
power attrition-rate coefficients with no offset (6.6.10) and C > 0.
4 Without loss of generality, we may assume that U > v and then
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dR/dt > 0 (i.e. R(t) is nondecreasing). Theorem 6,6.2 then yields that
Y will win a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle in finite time if
< C (6.6.27)
In preparation for invoking Theorem 6.6.3, we compute
(' 21I ) (pt'v+2)/2
T(t) - 2• + 2 / (t+C) (6.6.28)
and
G(T) - (v-;)(ji + 3v +4 (6.6.29)
4(i + v + 2) T
We observe that G(r) < 0 for all T(t) > c(0) and also co> 0 if
and only if p > v. Hence, Theorem 6.6.3 yields that X will win a
fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle in finite time if
x 0 > C (1-v)/ 2 + .-.Ž? - (v+l) (6.6.30)
YO ýk b4kb
The complementary nature of Theorems 6.6.2 and 6.6.3 is clearly shown by
the victory-prediction conditions (6.6.27) and (6.6,30). However, these
deterministic inequalities also show us that these simple approximate victory-
prediction conditions fail to predict the outcome of battle when
k a(-v)/2 - (0 <(-v)/2 + (-V) (6.6.31)
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Further results and examples are given in TAYLOR [39].
Let us now elaborate further upon the general nature of the victory-
prediction conditions given in Theorems 6.6.2 and 6.6.3. Our examination
will also yield that there is a "gap" in these victory-prediction conditions:
for a certain given range of values for the initial force ratio, we cannot
forecast the outcome of battle. To see the complementary nature of these
conditions, we observe that under the appropriate conditions, Theorem 6.6.2
yields (for dR/dt > 0 always)
X Ca
Y will win if -O--0 , (6.6.32)
YO b0
while Theorem 6.6.3 yields (for G(T) < 0 always and e0 > 0)
X will win if -0 > (1 + ) 0 (6.6.33)
Moreover, for many attrition-rate coefficients of tactical interest (e.g.
the power attrition-rate coefficients with no offset), we have that
dR/dt > 0 if and only if G(r) < 0 if and only if 0 > 0, although
these if-and-only-if statements do not generally hold. In such cases,
though, we observe that for
FaO < (1 + C0) (6.6.34)
we cannot predict by this approach who will be the loser of a fixed-force-
ratio-breakpoint battle. Thus, there is a "gap" in these simple approximate
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The significant thing to note about the simple approximate
victory-prediction conditions (6.6.32) and (6.6.33) is that although they
are rather strong sufficient conditions, they are very simple: they
involve only simple functions of the initial conditions and initial values
of the attrition-rate coefficients plus assumptions about the behavior
over time of the attrition-rate coefficients. No "special" mathematical
functions are involved, although this is not true for the exact force-
annihilation-prediction conditions given in Theorem 6.6.1 except for the
special case in which a(t)/b(t) = CONSTANT. However, as shown by both
(6.6.34) and Figure 6.12, there is a "gap" in these simple approximate
victory-prediction conditions. The price of removing this "gap" is the
introduction of higher trandscendental functions (see, for example,
TAYLOR and COMSTOCK [58, p. 350]). Furthermore, "exact" results with
no such gap in victory prediction are apparently only possible for a
fight-to-the-finish in which one side or the other is to be annihilated
(see also Sections 3.5 and 3.6 above).
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6.7. Parametric Dependence of the Parity-Condition Parameter.
We have seen in Section 2.2 that for a LANCHESTER-type FIF
attrition process with constant attrition-rate coefficients, Y will win
a fight-to-the-finish in finite time if and only if
S< a.(6.7.1)
Thus, when there are no temporal variations in fire effectiveness, anni-
hilation of a force depends on only two relative factors, namely: (I) the
initial force ratio u0 a x0/yo, and (II) the relative fire effectiveness
R - a/b. Theorem 6.6.1 generalizes (6.7.1) to homogeneous-force combat
modelled by (6.5.1) with the temporal variations in fire effectiveness.
It tells us that, for example, the annihilation of the X force depends
on the following three factors
(Fl) the initial force ratio, u0 - x0/•,
(F2) the relative-fire-effectiveness parameter, Ak - ka/k b,
and (F3) the parity-condition parameter, Q " max
when there are temporal variations in fire effectiveness. The first two
factors, (Fl) and (F2), are clearly relative ones, and explicitly depend
on certain given parameters in our combat model.
How does the parity-condition parameter Q depend on the input
parameters to our simple combat model (6.5.1)? This is an important
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question for the military OR worker to answer, since its answer will
help him to better understand how force-level and weapon-system-performance
factors interact to determine the outcome of battle. In our examination
here we will show that for time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients
the outcome of battle no longer depends on just relative factors but that
the intensity of combat generally also influences -he battle's outcome.
Specifically, we will determine on which input parameters of the model
(6.5.1) the parity-condition parameter depends for the special case of
unlimited firepower for one or both sides, i.e. either a(t) f L(O,+oa)
* *
or b(t) i L(O,+o-). In this case %mn "max' and we will denote this
common value simply as Q . Theorem 6.6.1 then takes the following
form.
THEOREM 6.7.1: Assume that either a(t) A L(O,+oa) or
b(t) A L(O,+4o). Then the X force will be annihilated
in finite time if and only if
X 0 C5 c(0) - Q*S ()
R (0) --O (6.7.2)
*
where the parity-condition parameter Q is unique
and given by
lim S X(t) I 1 00 a(s)ds
t (t / tf" {C-(8)i2 :0(6.7.3)
We also have that
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Also, neither side will be annihilated in finite time if and
only if the inequality sign in (6.7.2) is replaced by an
equality sign.
We will henceforth in this section assume that either
a(t) • L(0,+4) and/or that b(t) 0 L(O,+-). For determining the
parametric dependence of the parity-condition parameter Q , it is con-
venient to introduce a new independent variable s defined by
t
s(t) - K AX f g(a) do, (6.7.5)
to
where the parameter K is to be chosen to simplify the form of J(s)
given by (6.7.7) below. We denote s(O) as so, and then so > 0
if and only if to _ 0. The substitution (6.7.5) transforms the X force-
level equation (6.5.7) into the normal form (e.g. see KAMKE [24]).
d2xd 2 - J(s)x - 0 (6.7.6)
ds2
where the so-called invariant J(s) of the normal form is given by
J(s) - h , (6.7.7)
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and t - t(s) via (6.7.5). We also define the normal-form hyperbolic-like
GLF cx(s) and sX(s), which satisfy (6.7.6) with the initial conditions
cX(0) - 1, c'(O) - 0, and S0 (0) - 0, yo) 1, (6.7.8)
where (for example) c'(s) denotes dc x/dS. It follows that
C x(s) - Cx (t(s)) , and s x(s) - KS x(t(s)) , (6.7.9)
where t - t(s) by the inversion of (6.7.5). The corresponding Y functions
(see TAYLOR [51] for further details) are analogously defined to satisfy
c y(s) - Cy(t(s)) and sy(S) - (1/K) Sy (t(s)).
It then turns out that the parity-condition parameter Q may
only depend on the combat-intensity parameter AI as the following theorem
shows.
THEOREM 6.7.2 (TAYLOR [511): The parity-condition parameter
Q does not depend on the relative-fire-effectiveness parameter
AR but may depend on the combat-intensity parameter A V It
is independent of AI if and only if the ratio of attrition-
rate coefficients is constant, i.e. a(t)/b(t) - CONSTANT.
The above theorem may be proved by considering the differential equation
satisfied by the quotient s x/Cx (see TAYLOR [51] for further details).
It is also worth noting that the force-annihilation-prediction condition
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x0  x(s Z *)sx(S)-- R X 0 X 0 (6.7.10)YO K Z cy(s 0) - sy(s 0 )
,
where the modified parity-condition parameter Z is given by
Z - Q /K . (6.7.11)
We also have that
lm _ - 1 (6.7.12S)
s-*+-c () Z*
*
By choosing K in (6.7.5) in the right way, we can sometimes factor Q into
*
two terms, one of which (i.e. K) depends on XI and one (i.e. Z ) that
does not. Theorem 6.7.3 shows us when this factorization is probable.
THEOREM 6.7.3 (TAYLOR (51]): The modified parity-condition parameter
Z of (6.7.10) is independent of the combat-intensity parameter X
if and only if the invariant J(s) of the normal form is of the
form J(s) - sa. In this case, the parameter K depends on the
combat-intensity parameter XI and is free from X I if and only
if a(t)/b(t) is constant.
TAYLOR [51] has also shown that when the invariant J(s) -s
Z* 2p-1 r (6.7.13)
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I with p 1/(2 + a). In this case
cx(s) s )(S), S p(s) p (1-2p)H (S),
(6.7.14)
S" F (S), and s y(s) p(2p-1)Hq(S)
where q - l-p, S(s) 2ps 1/( 2p), and F and H denote LANCHESTER-
CLIFFORD-SCHLAFLI functions of order v (see Section 6.9 below). TAYLOR
has also shown that when h(t) - CI{g(t)}l with C an arbitrary constant
[recall (6.5.2)], then the modified parity-condition parameter Z* can be
chosen to be independent of the combat-intensity parameter XI if andAt
only if either g(t) - (t-t 0 )" or g(t) - e a. This latter result
also implies that the same mathematical functions may be used tc analyze
"aimed-fire" combat modelled by (6.2.4) with both the power attrition-rate
coefficients with "no offset" (6.6.10) [i.e. set D - 0 in (6.2.9)] and also
the exponential attrition-rate coefficients (6.2.12).
Theorems 6.7.2 and 6.7.3 show how the parity-condition parameter Q
depends on the combat-intensity parameter X1 and the relative-fire-effective-
ness parameter AR' In contrast to the classic constant-coefficient results,
we saw that battle outcome (i.e. force annihilation through Q ) depends
on XI unless the ratio of attrition-rate coefficients is constant, i.e.,
a(t)/b(t) - constant. It is doubtful that one would ever have learned about
such dependence merely by numerically determining the parity-condition
parameter (see the next section). Thus, our theoretical investigation here
has yielded some important insights into the dynamics of combat that would
( be otherwise difficult to perceive.
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6.8. Numerically Determining the Parity-Condition Parameter
The result (6.7.3) suggests a numerical procedure for approximately
determining the parity-condition parameter Q in those cases for which
explicit analytical results are not available: we may approximate the
, A A^/ct A
parity-condition parameter Q by Q l/SX (/C (t)}, where t is
a "suitably large" value of t. In other words, we may estimate Q
simply by picking a large value for t (we denote this selected large
value by t), computing Sx(t) and Cx(t), and then forming their ratio.
Our estimate of Q is then given by Q - 1/fSx(t)/C x(t)}. The only
problem is that we do not know right now how large to take t for
"satisfactory" estimation of Q : there is an estimation error Q -Q(),
which depends monotonically on t, and a priori we do not know how large
this error is. In this section we give a bound on the magnitude of this
error, and this error estimate allows the goodness of approximation to be
easily evaluated in many cases of interest.
In actual practice we have found it more convenient to numerically
,
determine the modified parity-condition parameter Z defined by (6.7.12).
Our idea is to use knowledge about the modified parity-condition parameter
Z corresponding to one pair of attrition-rate coefficients, denoted as
a(t) and b (t), to numerically determine Z for a related pair, a(t)
and b(t). With this in mind, let us denote cX(s) corresponding to
a(t) and b(t) as cx(s;a,b), and similarly for sX and nX - SX/C¢.
In other words, we will now write




In this notation, we may write (6.7.12) asg
1rn nX(s;a,b) - 1 (6.8.2)
s-1-+0 Z [a,b]
where Z [a,b] denotes that the modified parity-condition parameter is a
functional (i.e. a function for which the independent variables themselves
are functions), depending on only the attrition-rate coefficients a(t)
and b(t).
The relation (6.8.2) suggests that we should estimate Z [a,b] with
Z defined by
Z(s;a,b) - 1/nX (s;a,b) , (6.8.3)
where s denotes a suitably chosen value for s. It may be shown that
n x(s;a,b) in a strictly increasing function of s so that the larger we
x
take s in (6.8.3), the better our approximation becomes. How large should
we take s for "satisfactory" estimation of Z ? What is the error made
by taking Z(s;a,b) as an estimate of Z [a,b]? The answer to this latter
question involves comparison with known results for Z and helps us to
determine how large to take s. Theorem 6.8.1 (an error estimate for our
approximation) tells us exactly how large to take s.
THEOREM 6.8.1 (TAYLOR and BROWN [51]): Assume that b (t) < b(t)
for all finite t < t . Let f E(s) denote the fractionil error
made in the estimation of Z [a,b] by Z(s;a,b), i.e.
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fC(s) = Z(s;ab) - Z [a,b] (6.3.4)Z (a,bI
Then
0 < fE(s) < {l/Z [a,bl] - nk(s;a,bI)} Z(q;a,b) (6.3.5)
Thus, we have presented a method for numerically determining Z [a,bJ:
we simply pick a large value for s (and denote the selected value es s),
compute s x(s) and c X(S), and then compute the estimate Z(s;a,b) accord-
ing to (6.8.3). Theorem 6.8.1 allows us to know the accuracy of our approxi-
mation, which can be improved by takl.ng s larger. AccordingIv, we can
numerically determine Z (a,b] to any specified degree- of accuracy once
Z [a,bI] is known. Moreover, exact analytical results for the modified
parity-condition parameter Z have been obtained for only the two cases of
attrition-rate coefficients considered in Section 6.5 above: namely, (I) a
constant ratio of attrition-rate coefficients, and (II) power attrition-rate
coefficients with "no offset." We will now show how to use the latter known
results to numerically determine (by comparison with the known results via
Theorem 6.8.1) the parity condition parameter in a very important related
case.
We will now apply the above theory to the analysis of battles modelled
by LANCHESTER-typt equations of modern warfare (6.5.1) with power attrition-
rate coefficients with "positive offset," i.e.
a(t) - k a(t + C)' and b(t) - k b(t + C + D)v , (6.8.6)
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with C > 0 and D > 0 (cf. (6.2.9)]. Irn order that a(t) E L(t 0 ,T) for
any finite T > t0 we must have 11 > -1, and hence a(t) j L(0,+o) so
that Theorem (6.7.1) holds. If we choose K - i/(1 + 1)]2p-1, then it
follows from (6.7.5) that the modified time variable s is given by
SW - 17 )) (t + C)" (6.8.7)
and the invariant J(s) of the normal form (6.7.6) simplifies to
J s;ab) - J(s;-y,'v) - ss (1 +Y- (6.8.8)
where p - (L+1)/(u + v + 2), a - 1/(p+l), 8 - (v-u)/(j+l), and
S- D [AI/(÷+I)]2/(J+•+2). Here we have denoted the invariant corresponding
to the attrition-rate coefficients a(t) and b(t) as J(s;y,j,,), since
we may take y, p, and v as a basis for generating the four parameters a,
8, y, and v that explicitly appear in the right-hand side of (6.8.8).
Fvrthermore, we will denote the normal-form hyperbolic-like GLF that correspond
to J(s;y,Utv) as cx(s;y,u,v) and sx(S;yUv).
We can now use the known results for the power attrition-rate
c~efficients with "no offset" (6.6.10) tn assure that Z [a,b] - Z (y,u,v)
is numerically determined to within any specified degree of accuracy. Let
T - F /H 1- denote the quotient of two LANCHESTER-CLIFFOPD-SCHLAFLI (LCS)
functions (see the next section). Then the following theorem tells us
exactly how large to take s for the estimation of Z (y > O,p,v) by
Z(s;y,v,v) to any desired degree of accuracy.
(
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THEOREM 6.8.2 (TAYLOR and BROWN [51]): For a battle modified
by LANCHESTER-type equations of modern warfare (6.5.1) with
power attrition-rate coefficients with "positive offset" (6.8.6),
if we estimate Z (y,p,v) with Z(s;y,p,v) defined by
Z(s;y,uV) - l/nx(s;y,0,v) , (6.8.9)
then bounds on the fractional error made in this approximation
are given by
o f• < Pq-P r(p) - T (S) Z(s;y,••,•) (6.8.10)
Er (q) q (..0
1/(2p)
where q - l-p, S(s) a 2ps/ , and nrx(s;y,u,v) denotes the
quotient of two normal-form hyperbolic like GLF for the attrition-
rate coefficients (6.8.6), i.e. rY x(s;y,14,\) - Sx(S;y,W,v)/cx(S;y,•,V).
Also, S denotes S(s), and fE(i) denotes the fractional error
defined by (6.8.4).
In order to numerically determine the modified parity-condition
parameter for the offset power attrition-rate coefficients (6.8.6), we must
use knowledge about how quickly the limiting value (i.e. Z [a,b1 1) of a
hyperbolic-tangent-like function of a related pair of coefficients [denoted
as a(t) and SI(t)], power attrition-rate coefficients with "no offset"
(6.6.10), is reached as its argument increases without bound. In Figure
















is quite quickly reached, and consequently (recall Theorem 6.8.2) Z(s;Y,4,v)
*^
has essentially converged to Z (y,p,v) when s - 10.0 (see TAYLOR and BROWN
[51] for further details). Results generated by this numerical procedure
for the power attrition-rate coefficients with "positive offset" (6.8.6)
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6.9. Application to General Power Attrition-Rate Coefficients
In this section we will give analytical results for combat modelled
by variable-coefficient LANCHESTER-type equations for modern warfare (6.2.4)
with the general power attrition-rate coefficients (6.2.9), which we rewrite
here as
a(t) - k (t + C)", and b(t) - kb(t + C + D)V. (6.9.1)a
Physical motivation for the use of these coefficients as well as the
relation between their parameters k, a9b, C, and D and those of the range-
dependent attrition-rate coefficients a(r) and 8(r) in BONDER's constant-
speed-attack model) may be found in Section 6.2 above. Thus, the parameters
ka, kb, C, and D may ultimately be related to the performance and operational
characteristics of the two opposing weapon-system types.
Within the context of BONDER's constant-speed attack corgidered in
Section 6.2, both C and D > 0 if and only if r. r, > ro, the maximum
effective range of X's weapon-system type is greater than that of Y which
is in turn greater than the opening range of battle rO. Also, on physical
grounds we should have p and v > 0, i.e. the weapon-system kill rates
increase with decreasing force separation. The only restrictions (besides
the general ones discussed in Section 6.5) that we place on these parameters,
however, is that both C and D > 0, since it makes more physical sense to
consider a slightly different form for the coefficients in other cases.
Formally all our mathematical results hold in these other cases, though.
Analytical results have been developed for the following two special
cases of general power attrition-rate coefficients (6.9.1):
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(CI) power attrition-rate coefficients with no offset, i.e.
S D - 0 in (6.9.1),
and
(C2) power attrition-rate coefficients with positive offset and
a nonnegative integral exponent for X's kill rate, i.e.
D > 0 and v - n (a nonnegative integer) in (6.9.1).
Although general analytical results have not been obtained for the attrition-
rate coefficients (6.9.1), the above two special cases may be used for many
such battles of tactical interest. Within the context of BONDER's constant-
speed attack, power attrition-rate coefficients with "no offset" allow one
to model combat between two weapon-system types with same minimum effective
range but different range dependencies for each system's fire effectiveness,
while power attrition-rate coefficients with "positive offset and integral X
exponent" allow one to model such combat between two weapon-system types
with different maximum effective ranges for a mildly restrictive case of
range dependencies for X's weapon-system type.
Let us first consider the case (Cl) of power attrition-rate
coefficients with no offset, i.e.
a(t) - k a(t + C)u, and b(t) - k.0(t + C)" (6.9.2)
with C > 0. In order that both a(t) and b(t) E L(t 0 ,T) for any finite
T > to, we must have both W ard v > -1, and then both a(t) and
b(t) A L(0,4-). As we saw in Section 6.5, the X and Y force levels
x(t) and y(t) may be expressed in terms of hyperbolic-like GLF, which
for the above coefficients (6.9.2) are given by (TAYLOR and BROWN [53; 54])
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Cx) F (T) Sx(t) G la /•1-2p H (T),
(6.9.3)
C (t) -F (T) S (t) - (x /la)2 p- H (T)Yp ' Iq '
where a - • + v + 2, p - (4+l)/a, q - l-p, and
T(t) - (2Xi/a)(t + C)/ (6.9.4)
Here F (•) and H (ý) denote LANCHESTER-CLIFFORD-SCHaFLI (LCS) functions
1 2
of order a and may be represented for a # 0, -1, -2,... as the infinite
series
F(•)- r(a) • " ( "I/2)2
k-0 {k! r(k+a)}
and (6.9.5)
H (•) - r(a) (&/2 )2(k+a)
( k-O 1 0 P(k+a + W)}
In other words, the X force level x(t) is given by13
x(t) - xoF p(T ) F q(T) - Hq (t) H p(T)}
- - ) qpR Fq (T 0 ) H (T)- Hp(Tr) Fq(T)} (6.9.6)OVR(q0 p  '
where T denotes T(O). We finally observe that for both p and
v > -1 it follows that both p and q ( (0,I).
The LCS functions Fa and H form a fundamental system of
solutions to
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d2a • I ) F - 0, (6.9.7)
d&2 \ ~ /d&
with Wronskian W(Fa( H I) = (W/2)1-2 . Further mathematical properties
are given in Table 6.11, and the reader is directed to TAYLOR'and BROWN [54]
for further details. It is convenient to introduce an additional LCS
function T analogous to the hyperbolic tangent and defined by
T ( H_ ()/F(•) (6.9.8)
It follows that T (ý) is a strictly increasing function of ý on [0,+o-)
with T (0) - 0 and
a
lim T (Q) - a)(699)
+ r(a) (
Tabulations of these LCS functions are given in Appendix D for cases
corresponding to a wide variety of tactical situations14 (see also TAYLOR
and BROWN [55; 56]. A representative tabulation of the hyperbolic-like
LCS functions F (x)W H1,(x) and T ax) for a - 3/5 is shown in
Tables 6.111 and 6.IV. We observe from Table 6.IV and (6.9.9) that the
limiting value of T3 / 5 (x) as x - + - is quickly reached, with three-
decimal-place agreement by x - 4.5.
The X force will be annihilated in finite time if and only if
1 5
q-px _0_( _ {F (T 0 H (TO ) r(q)/r(p)}
YO r(q) /R F () ) r(p)/r(q) . (6.9.10)
It is readily shown that F (a) -- H1. (E) r(a)/r(l-a) > 0 for all
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TABLE 6.11. Properties of the LCS Functions F (•) and H (c).
1. dF /d& - (&/2)1-2 H (O)
2. dHa /d& - (&/2)2a-I F (O)
3. F a(ý) F 1(a) - H (C) H_(•) - 1 for all ,
where a is not an integer (including zero)
4. F(0)-1
5. H (0) -0 for a > 0
6. dF /dx(O) - 0
7. ((ý/2)1-2a di /d&} -.
8. F 1 / 2 ( ) - cosh &
9. H1 / 2 (ý) - sinh ý
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a E (0,1) when • > 0 is finite. Also, neither side will be annihilated
in finite time if and only if the inequality sign in (6.9.10) is replaced
by an equlaity sign. When C 0 G, (6.9.10) reduces to
Xo ( Xl q-P
Sr(q R (6.9.11)
The time to annihilate the X force, denoted as ta is determined by' a'
x(ta) - 0, and it follows that
a
X xOF (T 0 ) + YO V0/R (XI/•)q-P H2(TO)
(xH) aO - (6.9.12)a)) x qO(T0 ) + y0Vr RR (XI/)q-p F a(T0 )
or
Si2/a
X T1 - P 0F (T0) + R (XI/Oq-PH ( -C. (6.9.13)
ýq [xOH q (T0) + Y0 V3 R I/a)PF q (T 0) .
We will now examine a couple of numerical examples to show the use
of the above analytical results for developing insights into the dynamics
of combat. These examples illustrate the use of the LCS functions Fa,
Hl a, and Ta for analyzing "aimed-fire" combat modelled by the power
attrition-rate coefficients with "no offset" (6.9.2). Consider BONDER's
constant-speed-attack model, which we have examined in Section 6.2 above.
All the force-level trajectories shown in Section 6.2 for battles in which
the two opposing weapon-system types have the same maximum effective range
(i.e. Figures 6.5 through 6.9) were developed by using (6.9.6) or the
2283
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analogous result for y(t). Let us now focus on the prediction of battle
outcome from initial conditions without explicitly computing the force-
level trajectories (cf. questions (Ql), (Q4), and (Q5) of Table 6.1). We
will consider combat situations modelled by the input data and computed
parameter values shown in Table 6.V. The reader should observe from
Tables 6.IV and 6.V the predicted agreement between r(l-a)/r(m) and the
limiting value of T (x) as x + + - (recall (6.9.9)] for a - q - 3/5.
We will now consider two cases: (I) r 0 = 2000 meters, and (II) r 0 = 1250
meters.
When r 0 = 2000 meters (see Figure 6.5 above), we have C - 0 and
-o = 0. The maximum time that the battle can last is t m 14.91 minutes,max
since at this time the attacking Y force reaches its final objective
(i.e. the defensive position of the X force). We will now consider the
qualitative behavior of the 1 - , v - 2 X-force-level trajectory
denoted as curve (C) linear-quadratic in Figure 6.5. The inequality (6.9.11)
tells us that the X force cau be annihilated if and only if x0/y 0 < 0.420.
By (6.9.12) the annihilation Lime of the X force is given by T (T(t X))
q a
3.544 x0 /y 0 . For x0 - 10, yo - 30, we have T (T-• ) 1.18122 so that
q a
from Table 6.111 (using linear interpolation) we obtain rx - 1.009. Hence,
a
(6.9.4) yields tx - 14.24 minutes and ra = 89.8 meters. Further resultsa a
are given in Table 6.VI.
When r 0 . 1250 meters (see Figure 6.6 above), we have C - 5.5923
minutes, To M 0.0975, and t - 9.32 minutes. In this case (again,max
for 4 M 1, v - 2), X can be annihilated if and only if x0 /Y0 < 0.382.
with from (6.9.12) the arnihilation time of the X force given by
T T( " (3.5656• + 0.223)/(0.156M + 1.004), where p x /yO. Some
q a 0 0 028
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TABLE 6.V. Particulars for the Numerical Examples for Combat Modelled
by the Power Attrition-Rate Coefficients with No Offset
(6.9.2).
1. Input Data
p 1, v - 2
a - 0.06 X casualties/minute/(a single Y firer)
80 - 0.6 Y casualties/minute/(a single X firer)
r r8 - 2000 meters
v - 5 miles/hour
2. Computed Parameter Values
k - 4.023 x 10-3 X casualties/(minute)p/(a single Y firer)a
kb = 2.698 x 10-3 Y casualties/(minute)v/(a single X firer)




further numerical results are given in Table 6.VIII. Again, these parametric
results should be contrasted with the single L4 - 1, V - 2 X-force-level
trajectory [denoted as curve (C) linear-quadratic] shown in Figure 6.6.
Let us next consider case (C2) of power attrition-rate coefficients
16
with positive offset and integral X exponent, 
i.e.
a(t) - k a(t + C) , and b(t) - kb(t + C + D)n, (6.9.14)
with C > 0, D > 0, and n a nonnegative integer. We also assume that
p > -1, and then both a(t) and b(t) f L(0, +-). As we developed in
Section 6.5, the X and Y force levels x(t) and y(t) may be expressed
in terms of hyperbolic-like GLF so that once we have determined the latter,
we can compute the force-level trajectories. Using the method of successive
approximations (see Section 6.5), one can compute that for the above
coefficients (6.9.14) we have the following offset power LANCHESTER functions
(-r/2 )2k nk iJ (..5
Ct) -t r(q) k! r(k + q) nk A (6.9.15)
Sx(t) r(p) )2(k) nk(T/2 7 (6.9.16)
k !O r(k + p + j) 4 k '
c(t) r (P) (T/2)2k n 6j (6.9.17)Cy~ I ~~kO k! r(k + p) I CO
and
2q Ou (T2 ) 2(k+q) n (k+l)sCt) - \-$- r(q) I rk. +q12 ) _ j (6.9.18)S()k !O r(k + =
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TABLE 6.VI. Annihilation of the X Force as a Function of the Initial
Force Ratio for the Coefficients with No Offset (6.9.2)
with r 0 - 2000 Meters.
(xo/Yo) t (minutes) r (meters)




TABLE 6.VII. Annihilation of the X force as a Function of the Initial
Force Ratio for the Coefficients with No Offset (6.9.2)
with r 0 = 1250 Meters.




t - 9.32 minutes and xf - x(r - 0) 1.35.
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where o - i + n + 2, p = (p+l)/O, q l-p, 6(t) - D/(t + C), T(t)
is again given by (6.9.4), and the offset coefficients A, B k9 C k' and
Dk are given in Table 6.VIII. In this table
n n!( ) 22• (n-Z)!
denotes the usual binomial coefficient. We observe that p > -1 and
n > 0 imply that both p and q E (0,1).
We may use Theorem 6.7.1 (which is a special case of Theorem 6.6.1)
to predict force annihilation. Unfortunately, we have not been able to
* *
analytically compute the parity-condition parameter Q - Q (D,p,n) for
the offset power attrition-rate coefficients (6.9.14), but it may be
numerically determined by the method given in Section 6.8. For such
determinations as well as for analyzing force annihilation, though, we
have found it more convenient to use the normal-form GLF [e.g. see (6.7.9)]
than to use Cx(t), SX(t), Cy(t) and S (t). Thus, we introduce the
modified time variable s defined by (6.8.7) which we rewrite as
s(t) - [Al/(11+I)] 2  (t + C)"+I (6.9.19)
with so 0 s(O) - [i/( 11+I)] 2 p C()1+l), and obtain [cf. (6.7.9)] the normal-
form hyperbolic-like GLF. Thus, we obtain the normal form offset power
LANCHESTER functions, for example
Cs(s) r-(q) (S/2 )2k nk i , (6.9.20)




TABLE 6.VII. The Offset Coefficients for the Offset Power LANCHESTER
Functions (6.9.15) through (6.9.18).
0
A0 - 1, and for k > 1
j k(k-p) In (n Jzfr0<j<nAk (k-J/a) (k-p-j/a) £Af 0 P q--
0
B0 0 1, and for k > 1
B 1 -- k(k-Ip) j ( n) BJ j Y o 0<j n"k (k-j/a)(k+p-j/a) k-i for < < nk
0
C00 -1, and for k > 1
_ _n 
kJ- i
C . £0 I ( p nk-i ) for 0 < J < nkk -(k-j /a ) L Z (k+ -l+( _T /la)
0 n -
n D J-Z
DJ . k(k-p-$-1 n ___k-1
"k (k-p-i-j/o) 2 (k+(Z-J)/a) for 0 < j < n(k+l)
NOTES: We hai•• adopted here the convention that 4, PB, and C - 0
q k k
for < 0 or J > nk. Also, D - 0 for j < 0 or j > n(k+l).
k
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" (sp (S/2)2(k+p nk i J
Sx(S) . -p (p)k! 0 k! r(k+p+l) 1 0 • B, jk (6.9.21)
where S(s) - 2 ps /(2p), A(s) = Y/sa, a - l/(p+l), and the offset parameter
y is given by y /(P[+11/)]a D. We may use these normal-form power
LANCHESTER functions to predict force annihilation by means of (6.7.11)
after the modified parity-condition parameter Z - Z (y,p,n) has been
determined. Numerical results (see TAYLOR and BROWN [57] for Z ) are
shown in Figure 6.14 for two sets of values for the exponents in-the
coefficients (6.9.14): (I) p - 1, n - 1, and (II) 1 - , n - 2. The
time to annihilate the X force, denoted as ta, is determined by
x(tX) X 0, and hence
a
{x 0cy(s 0 ) + y0(/XV•R/K)Sx(a
n(s(t")) 0 , (6.9.22)a {x 0 Sy(S 0) + y0( R!K)cX(S0)}
where n x(s) - c x(s)/Sx (s) and K [ i/(-+l)]
We will now consider a couple of numerical examples for analyzing
"aimed-fire" combat modelled by the power attrition-rate coefficients with
"positive offset and integral X exponent" (6.9.14). As above, we will
consider BONDER's constant-speed-attack model. All the force-level
trajectories shown in Section 6.2 for battles in which the two opposing
weapon-system types have different maximum effective ranges (i.e. Figure 6.10)
were developed by using the above analytical results. Focusing now on
the prediction of battle outcome, we will consider combat situations
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modelled by the input data and computed parameter values shown in Table 6.IX.
We will now consider two cases: (I) r 0 = 1500 meters, and (II) r0
- 1250 meters.
When r 0 M 1500 meters, we have C - 0 and so - 0. The maximum
time that the battle can last is t - 11.18 minutes, since at this timemax
the advancing attackers (i.e. the Y force) overrun the defensive position
of the X force. In this case Z (y,p,n) - Z (0.32,1,1) - 1.381, so that
(6.7.10) tells us that the X force can be annihilated if and only if
x0/yo < 0.264. By (6.9.22) the X-force annihilation time is given by
n (s(t )) - 2.739 x0/y0. For x0 - 10 and yo - 50, we have 'x(s ) X 0.54772
X a 00 0a
so that by techniques similar to those used above for the previous examples,
X Xwe find that s - 0.771. These computations for determining s involve
a a
generation of tables of sx, CX, and 1 X for y - 0.32 and Vu n - 1.
Hence, (6.9.19) yields that tX . 10.25 minutes and r - 125.7 meters.
a a
Further results are given in Table 6.X.
When r 0 M 1250 meters (see Figure 6.10 above), we have C - 1.864
minutes, so - 0.0255, and t - 9.32 minutes. In this case X can bemax
annihilated if and only if x0/y0 < 0.281, with the X-force annihilation
time given by nx(s - (1.001P0 + 0.0 0 9)/(O.1 2 7p0 + 0.366), where
P0 x 0o/Y 0 ' Numerical results are given in Table 6.XI. Finally, these
parametric results should be contrasted with merely computing a force-level
curve for a particular set of values for battle parameters (e.g. compare
them with, for example, the single X-force-level trajectory for
ra - 2000 meters shown in Figure 6.10).
A few final remarks about the results of this section seem to
be in order. We have given results that allow one in principle to study
the variable-coefficient model (6.2.4) with the general power attrition-rate
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TABLE 6.IX. Particulars for the Numerical Examples for Combat Modelled
by the Power Attrition-Rate Coefficients with Positive
Offset and Integral X Exponent (6.9.14).
1. Input Data
V0 -V 1
a0 - 0.006 X casualties/minute/(a single Y firer)
$0 - 0.6 Y casualties/minute/(a single X firer)
r - 1500 meters, r 8 - 2000 meters
v - 5 miles/hour
2. Parameter Values
k - 5.364 X 1)-3 X casualties/minute/(a single Y firer)a
kb - 4.023 x 10-3 Y casualties/minute/(a single X firer)
p - q - 1/2
D - 3.728 minutes, y - a.320 (casualties minutes)
1 /2
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TABLE 6.X. Annihilation of the X Force as a Function of the Initial
Force Ratio for the Coefficients with Positive Offset (6.9.14)
with r 0 - 1500 Meters.





t tma- 11.18 minutes and xf - x(r - 0) 2.48.maxf
TABLE 6.XI. Annihilation of the X Force as a Function of the Initial
Force Ratio for the Coefficients with Positive Offset
(6.9.14) with r 0 W 1250 Meters.
(Xo/Yo) tXa (minutes) r (meters)




tt mx- 9.32 minutes and x f x(r - 0) - 1.74.
max 2
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coefficients (6.9.1) almost as easily and thoroughly as one can study
LANCHESTER's classic constant-coefficient model (2.2.1). In practice,
though, the details for such variable-coefficient combat models are
generally rather complicated as we have seen above. Furthermore, except
in special cases (e.g. a constant ratio of attrition-rate coefficients)
the solution to such variable-coefficient LANCHESTER-type equations for
modern warfare, unfortunately, apparently cannot be represented in terms
of any of the "elementary" functions of analysis but requires the intro-
duction of new transcendents defined by infinite series. Moreover, such
infinite-series solutions by themselves provide little insight into the
dynamics of combat and, in fact, as we have seen above require a fairly
high degree of mathematical proficiency just to understand, let alone to
use. In the next section we will therefore give a simple approximation
to such solutions.
Finally, we note that the above results for power attrition-rate
coefficients with no offset (6.9.2) may be used to analyze "aimed-fire"
combat modelled by (6.2.4) with exponential attrition-rate coefficients
(6.2.12). This may be seen by observing that the substitution
t At
s - f a(a)do - (k a/a )e a transforms the X force-level equation
.00
(6.5.7) into the normal form (6.7.6) with invariante J(s) - KsV, where
K - (kb/ka)(Xa/ka)V and v - (XbiXa) - 1.
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6.10. The LIOUVILLE-GREEN-LANCHESTER Approximation.
As we have seen above, the analytical solution to variable-coefficient
LANCHESTER-type equations of modern warfare generally involves so-called
higher transcendental functions with which most OR workers are quite un-
familiar. In this sect~on we will give a simple approximation that involves
only "elementary" functions and requires no advanced mathematical theory to
apply. We call our approximation (6.10.1) to the solution of LANCHESTER-type
equatibns for modern warfare (6.5.1) the LIOUVILLE-GREEN-LANCHESTER (LGL)
17
approximation. Error bounds, i.e. bounds for the errors in the approximate
solutions, are given in terms of simple a priori estimates that are both
realistic and also easy to evaluate. These error bounds are based on new
theoretical results by the author (see TAYLOR (471) for the theory of the
LIOUVILLE-GREEN (LG) approximation18 and do not require knowledge of the
exact solution.
Let us make the additional assumption that the attrition-rate coefficients
a(t) and b(t) are twice differentiable for t0 < t < +- . Then our
approximation to the solution of the X force-level equation (6.5.7) is given
by
x(t) L- [ J {x, cosh(T-To) - (y 0,oR + xoe ) sinh(T-T0 )}, (6.10.1)
where ý(t) denotes the LGL approximation, R0 denotes R(O), e' denotes
E(0), e(t) f {l/[41(t)]}d Xn R/dt, T0 denotes T(O), and
r(t) - ft /aT()b(s) ds. This approximation was developed by the author
t0
(see TAYLOR [47]) by transforming the X force-level equation (6.5.7) into
LIOUVILLE's normal form (see INCE [23, p. 2711) with the first derivative




dX.- { + F(T)}X - 0 (6.10.2)
dT2
by means of the substitution T - ft '7~s) b*s ds and x(t) -
1/40X(T)[R(t)/Ro0  In (6.10.2) we have that
F(r) - P"(T)/P(T) , (6.10.3)
where P(T) - [R(t)]-1/4 and P'(T) denotes dPidT. Heuristically, if the
appropriate fractional power of the relative fire effectiveness R(t)
- a(t)/b(t) is "slowly varying," then from (6.10.3) we would expect that
IF(T)i << 1 so that the term F(T) is "negligible" in (6.10.2). The LGL
approximation (6.10.1) comes dropping this term, and Theorem 6.10.1 gives us
bounds on how "negligible" it is.
What is the error made in using (6.10.1)? This is an important question
for any OR analyst who wishes to use such an approximation. It is important
for him to know the accuracy of the approximation (6.10.1) and especially
to know when it is particularly accurate or inaccurate. The following
theorem gives a priori error bounds for the LGL approximation.
THEOREM 6.10.1 (TAYLOR [47]): Error bounds for the LIOUVILLE-
GREEN-LANCHESTER (LGL) approximation (6.10.1) to the solution
of LANCHESTER-type equations of modern warfare (6.5.1) are given by
Ix(t) - i(t)I < x0 Kje(t) < x0 K.Ue(t) , (6.10.4)
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where
Khee2{, + Io0 1) + (yo/xO) 0 o, 
(6.10.5)
J - I for 1 - (y0 /xo) AR/W < cO
and then K + c Y0 /X0 ) 0 Rr0 , (6.10.6)
J - II for -1 - (yo/xo) RO < O <1- (yo/xo) v¶
and then K -2 , (6.10.7)
J-III for co <- 1- (y 0 /x 0 ) R/0
and then K 1 - e0 - (y 0 /x 0 ) 7R90 > 0 , (6.10.8)
and
et)- FR(t)/4 {exp(2 f IF(a)lIdo) - D} sinh(T-T 0 ) (6.10.9)
The sign of the error is determined by the sign of F(T). As long as
x(t) > 0, it follows that
F(T) > 0 fpr all T > TO implies that x(t) > x(t)
with the last inequality being reversed when F(T) < 0 always.
( 297
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Example 6.10.1. For combat modelled by (6.5.1) with the power attrition-
rate coefficients with no offset (6.9.2), the LGL approximation to the X
force level is given by
x(t) - (1 + tiC) (i-v)/4 I cosh(T-T0
- [y0 /R C(p-v)/ 2 + (x 0 (,-v)/( 4 X1 )} C- snh(T-T (6.10.10)
where
T(t) - (i/6) XI(t + C) , (6.10.11)
and 6 - (1 +v+ 2)/2. For the error estimate (6.10.4) of Theorem 6.10.1,
we have
1/ IF(a)Ida - i-vl ( 3Ou + v +4) c-6- (t + C)-
2 32X 1 6
Also, it may be shown that F(T) > 0 for all T > -O > 0 if and only
if >v.
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6.11. HELUtBOLD's Modification of LANCHESTER's Equations
Based on consideration of historical combat data, HELMBOLD [18] has
proposed a modification of LANCHESTER's equation for "modern warfare" to
account for inefficiencies of scale for the larger force when force sizes
are grossly unequal (see Section 2.12 for further details). His basic
idea is to modify relative force-attrition (or fire-effectiveness)
capability by a multiplicative factor depending on only the force ratio,
and for temporal variations in fire effectiveness, his proposed modification
would read
dx - E( y with x(O)x
dt (6.11.1)
dy - -b(t) E (Y) x with y(O) - yo
"where Ex and EY denote the fire-effectiveness-modification factors
that model the inefficiencies of scale. HELMBOLD argued that these fire-
effectivenss-modification factors should satisfy the following three
requirements:
(RI) Ex(u) - EY(u) - E(u) (i.e. the same inefficiencies of
scale for each side),
(R2) E(u) is an increasing function of its argument,
(R3) EG) - 1.
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HELMBOLD then considered the special case in which E(u) is a
c
power function, i.e. E(u) - u with c > 0. In this case, (6.11.1)
becomes
dx -a(t) (-) . y with x(O) - x0dt "y
(6.11.2)1-W
dd -b(t) - (Y) x with y(O) - yo,
where we will call W the "WEISS parameter" (see Section 2.12). It
follows that W - 1 - c. We will refer to (6.11.2) as the equations for
HELMBOLD-type combat. These equations are particularly significant
because a simple generalization of them gives a much better fit to
casualty-rate curves used in several important contemporary large-scale
combat models than does LANCHESTER's classic model of modern warfare
(2.2.1) (see Section 7.11 below). As for the case of constant attrition-
rate coefficients (see Section 2.12 above), the substitution p- xW
w
and q - y transforms the nonlinear combat model (6.11.2) into a
linear one, namely
dt -W a(t) q with P(O) - xO
(6.11. 3)
-W b(t) p with q(O) y Yo
Hence, all the results for variable-coefficient LANCHESTER-type equations
of modern warfare (see Sections 6.5 through 6.10 above) also apply to the
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equations for HELMBOLD-type combat (6.11.2). Moreover, it may be shown
that for Ex(u) - E.(u) - E(u) if x and y are "separated" in E(x/y),
i.e. if E(x/y) - F(x)/G(y), then the only form for E(u) satisfying (R2)
and (R3) above such that we can obtain a linear model, i.e. the attrition
rates proportional to only the "numbers" of firers, by a transformation
of only the dependent variables is given by E(u) - uC with c > 0. Thus,
the only combat model of the form (6.11.1) [with Ex and Ey satisfying
(Rl) through (R3)] transformable into a linear model like (6.11.3) is
given by (6.11.2) when E(x/y) - F(x)/G(y).
In the case of constant coefficients, (6.11.2) becomes
Sdx x1-l-W
d=--a• (2) • y with x(O) - Y
(6.11.4)1-W
tt=-b • (Y-) 1 "W- x with y(O) - yo,
dt x
where a and b denote constant attrition-rate coefficients. The state
equation for (6.11.4) is given by (see Section 2.12 for details)
2W 2W 2w wb(xo0 .. x) a(y 0  - y) for W 0
and (6.11.5)
b tn(x 0 /x) - a i.n(yo/y) for W - 0
Thus, for the case of constant attrition-rate coefficients, the equations for
HELMBOLD-type combat yield the square law when W - 1, the linear law when
W - 1/2, and the logarithmic law when W - 0. Hence, we should think of
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(6.11.4) as a general combat model which contains many of the classic homo-
geneous-force combat models as special cases (see Section 2.12 for further
details).
We will find it very instructive for future developments (see Section
7.11 below) to examine casualty rates (expressed as a fraction of each side's
current strength) for the above model of HELMBOLD-type combat (6.11.4).
Considering X's fractional casualties per unit tLme, we obtain from the first
of equations (6.11.4)
I1 x X's fractional casualties a WI-.... - av ,(6.11.6)
x dt per unit time / uW
where u denotes the X-to-Y force ratio, i.e. u - x/y, and v denotes its
reciprocal (cf. Section 5.2).
In Figure 6.15 (cf. Figure 5.3) we have plotted X's fractional casualties
per unit time versus the force ratio v - y/x (denoted in the figure as A/D)
for the case in which Y attacks and X defends. As in Section 5.2 above,
for the force ratio we have used the quotient of the attacker's strength (here,
force level) divided by that of the defender (denoted as A/D), since most
combat analyses use this ratio A/D and consequently we will be able to more
easily relate such LANCHESTER-type models to them.
In Figure 6.15, W - 1 corresponds to the case in which X's casualty
rate is proportional to only the number of enemy firers, and (in the symmetric
case in which Y's casualty rate has the same functional form) consequently
the corresponding attrition model is given by LANCHESTER's equations for
modern warfare (2.2.1), which yield the square law. We observe (see also
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0.01 -WnO (LOGARITHMIC LAW) -
0 I l.I
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
FORCE RATIO, A/D
Figure 6.15. Relation between the defender's casualty rate (expressed
as a fraction of his current force level x(t) ] and the
attacker/defender force ratio for the model • - -a(" ).y
with X defending. [NOTE: In the legend of the above
figure, A denotes the attacker's force level, and D denotes i




Section 5.2) that in this case (i.e. W - 1) X's fractional casualties per
unit time are directly proportional to the force ratio A/D when Y
attacks and X defends. Referring back to the first of equations (6.11.4),
we see that W - W corresponds to a more efficient use of the attacker's
firepower for force ratios v - A/D - y/x > 1 than does W - W when
1 > W1 > W2 , since the attacker's fire-effectiveness-modification factor
for W - W1 (i.e. %(x/y) - (x/y)1-W1] is greater than that for W - W2
when y/x > 1. Figure 6.16 shows the same type of plot when X is the
attacker and Y the defender. In this case, the casualty-rate curve
corresponding to the square law is a hyperbola (see also Section 5.2).
Similar curves for daily casualty rates (but not expressed in terms of
differential equations) are commonly used to assess casualties in currently
operational large-scale ground-combat models (see Section 7.11). Consequently,
by studying analytical representations of these curves, we can obtain some
valuable insights into the dynamics of combat as portrayed by such models
(e.g. se!ee Section 7.14) below.
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~ - 0.01 FIREPOWER
S X ATTACKS AND Y DEFENDS
i.)
I I I!
0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
FORCE RATIO, A/D
Figure 6.16. Relation between the attacker's casualty rate (expressed as
a fraction of his current force level x(t)] and the
attacker/defender force ratio for the model dx (-)lW y
with X attacking. [NOTE: In the legend of the above figure,
A denotes the attacker's force level, and D denotes that
of the defender. ]
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6.12. The General Linear Model for Combat Between Two Homogeneous Forces
In this section we will briefly examine the general linear-differ-
ential-equation model for combat between two homogeneous forces. Special
cases of this general model will be examined in more detail in subsequent
sections of this chapter.
Thus, we consider the following LANCHESTER-type equations for
x and y > 0
( - -a(t)y - B(t)x + r(t) with x(0) - x0 ,
(6.12.1)j -b(t)x a (t)y + s(t) with y(0) -(612
dt Y
where x(t) and y(t) denote the X and Y force levels at time t,
and a(t) and b(t) denote LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients, which
represent the fire effectiveness of a single firer on each side. The
coefficients a(t), 8(t), r(t), and s(t) have different physical inter-
pretations, depending upon the context in which the model (6.12.1) is
viewed. Thus, there are several different sets of physical circumstances
to which the model (6.12.1) may be hypothesized to apply, and we will
now discuss several possibilities.
The term r(t) in the first of equations (6.12.1) can model
either (A) the replacement rate of the X force (with a negative value
representing a net continuous withdrawal of the X force), or (B) the
attrition [with r(t) < 0] of the X force from exogenous fires (not
subject to attrition) at a rate not dependent on X's force level.
Similar remarks apply to s(t). For simplicity, however, we will consider
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only the first possibility here, and we will consequently refer to r(t)
and s(t) as replacement rates. Within this context, two different
tactical situations may again be hypothesized to yield the above
equations (6.12.1) (cf. Figure 2.15 of Chapcer 2):
either (Sl) "aimed-fire" combat between two homogeneous forces with
"operational" losses and with continuous replacements,
or (S2) "aimed-fire" combat between two homogeneous primary
forces (or infantries) with superimposed effects of
supporting fires not subject to attrition and with
continuous replacements for the primary forces (see
Figure 6.17).
f
In the second case (S2), it is assumed that each side uses "aimed" fire
and that target-acquisition times do not depend on the number of enemy
targets (see Section 6.5 for a further discussion). The supporting
weapons are assumed to employ "area" fire against enemy infantry (see
WEISS [61] for a more thorough discussion of assumptions). In this case,
determination of numerical values for the attrition-rate coefficients
a(t) and 0(t), modelling the supporting fires, follows along the lines
discussed in Section 5.7. In the simplest instance we then have that,
for example, c(t) - aL U v~uo/AY, where the X force's artillery is
denoted as the U force with force level u(t), a denotes the
lethal area of a single U artillery round, vU denotes the U firing
'rate per tube, u0  denotes the U force level (which is constant because
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the U force suffers no losses), and A denotes the area of the region
occupied by the Y force.
Mathematically, we make the following assumptions about the attr!ticn-
rate coefficients and replacement rates in the model (6.12.1-.
(Al) a(t) and b(t) are defined, positive, and continuous
for t0 < t < + - with to <0
(A2) (t) and B(t) > 0 for to t < '00,
(A3) a(t), b(t), a(t), $(t), r(t), and a(t) C L(to,T) for
any finite T.
We place no further restrictions on the replacement rates r(t) and s(t),
and thus negative values are possible for them. We further assume that
a(t) and b(t) are given in the form (6.5.2), and we then introduce for
the primary weapon systems the combat-intensity parameter AI and the
relative-fire-effectiveness parameter AR defined by (6.5.4).
No results have previously appeared in the literature for the
general model (6.12.1) with variable attrition-rate coefficients. We will
now show that (6.12.1) may be transformed into a simpler canonical form
to which results for variable-coefficient LANCHESTER-type equations of
modern warfare (6.5.1) may be applied. Thus, the model (6.5.1) is
basic for studying a wide variety of combat situations (cf. also Section
6.11 above). The substitution
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t t
p(t) - x(t) exp{f 0(s)ds} , q(t) - y(t) exp{f c(s)ds} (6.12.2)
0 0
transforms (6.12.1) into
- -A(t)q + R(t) with p(O) - x0
dt
(6.12.3)




A(t) - a(t) exp{f (s(s) - a(s)]ds},
and 0(6.12.4)
B(t) - b(t) exp{- f [B(s) - c(s)Ids},
0
t




S(t) - s(t) exp{f a(s)ds}
0
The transformation (6.12.2) is motivated by looking for an "integrating
factor" for, for example, the first equation of (6.12.1), as writing
dx/dt + 8(t)x - -a(t)y + r(t) suggests to us.
As we have seen above, we may consider equations (6.12.3) to
model "aimed-fire" combat between two homogeneous forces with continuous
replacements. However, there is another very important set of circum-
stances that leads to similar equations of this form. Consider aimed-fire
310
'° m i i l l m mmi H i " i -- - .-- i - _ ___ ___- __=- ---- __- _--- ---- ---
combat between two homogeneous forces modelled by LANCHESTER's equations
of modern warfare (6.5.1). In this model the state variables x(t)
and y(t) are the numbers of combatants that are effective on each side.
Furthermore, consider now a fixed-force-level-breakpoint battle. If we
introduce new state variables X(t) and Y(t) defined by
X(t) - x(t) - xBP and Y(t) - y(t) - YBP ' (6.12.6)
where xBp and YBP denote the X and Y force-level breakpoints,
then (6.5.1) is transformed into (for X(t) and Y(t) > 0)
(dX -aWt)Y - w(t) with X(0) - x0 -dt xBP
(6.12.7)
dt b(t)X - v(t) with Y(0) - YO - YBF (
where w(t) - a(t)yBP and v(t) - b(t)x B. These equations (6.12.7)
are of the same form as (6.12.3), and thus we see that the equations
(6.12.3) may also be taken to model force attrition "above a unit's break-
point." We observe that for the transformed force-level variable X,
X - 0 corresponds to the X force reaching its breakpoint.
The force-level trajectories x(t) and y(t) for the model
(6.12.1) [equivalently, (6.12.3) or (6.12.7)], moreover, no longer possess
a very important mathematical property that is possessed by all solutions
to (6.5.1) with a(t) and b(t) > 0 for all t > 0 and x0  and
Y0 > 0: namely, all solutions to (6.12.1) are no longer nonoscillatory
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in the strict sense that x(t) and y(t) can now have more than one
zero. This mathematical property is troublesome and makes analysis of
battles modelled with (6.12.1) much more difficult than analysis of
those modelled with (6.5.1). This nonoscillatory property is further
discussed in Section 6.15 below.
The X force level as a function of time, x(t), for the general
model (6.12.1) may be represented as
t
x(t) -.exp- f $(,)ds]
0
S[xO{CQ(o) CP(t) - SQ(O) SP(t)} - y0/3XR {CP(0) SP(t) - Sp(0) CP(t)}
+ Z(s) {C (S) S (t) - S (s) C (t)}dsa(s) P (6.12.8)
where Z(t) - -A(t) S(t) + dR/dt - {R(t)/A(t)}dA/dt, and the hyperbolic-
like GLF C pt) and S p(t) are linearly-independent solutions to the
P force-level equation (6.13.3) that satisfy the initial conditions
(6.13.4). The GLF C Q(t) and S Q(t) are similarly defined. The above
result is readily developed by considering (6.12.3) and applying well-known
results for inhomogeneous ordinary differential equations (e.g. see
HILDEBRAND [19, pp. 29-30]). Further analysis of the general model
(6.12.1) is beyond the scope of our present investigation, but we will
now consider some important special cases.
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6.13. Combat with Supporting Fires
An important special case of the general linear combat model (6.12.1)
is that in which there are no replacements, i.e. r(t) and s(t) = 0, and
in this case our combat model becomes (again, for x and y > 0)
= -a(t)y - 8(t)x with x(O) - x0
dt
(6.13.1)
dy -b(t)x - z(t)y with y(O) - ydt
As discussed in the previous section, two different tactical situations
that may be hypothesized to yield the above equations (6.13.1) are
(cf. Figure 2.15 of Chapter 2):
1
either (Sl) "aimed-fire" combat between two homogeneous forces with
"operational" losses (see BACH et al. [1])
or (S2) "aimed-fire" combat between two homogeneous primary forces
(or infantries) with superimposed effects of supporting
fires not subject to attrition (see TAYLOR and PARRY [59])
(see Figure 6.18).
For convenience, we will refer to (6.13.1) simply as modelling combat with
supporting fires and hence follows the name of this section. The modelling
of the attrition-rate coeffcients in (6.13.1) is discussed in Section 6.12
aiove, with further details to be found in Chapter 5.
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3 For our analysis of the LANCHESTER-type model (6.13.1) of combat
with supporting fires, we make the following mathematical assumptions about
the attrition-rate coefficients
(Al) a(t) and b(t) are defined, positive, and continuous
for t0 < t < + - with to < 0 ,
(A2) a(t) and 8(t) > 0 for to.< t < + o,
(A3) a(t), b(t), a(t), and 8(t) E L(t 0 ,T) for any finite T.
We further assume that a(t) and b(t) are given in the form (6.5.2), and
we then introduce for the primary weapon systems the combat-intensity parameter
xI and the relative-force-effectiveness parameter XR defined by (6.5.4).
The X force level as a function of time, x(t), for the model (6.13.1)
may be written as (see TAYLOR (49])
t
x(t) - [exp{- f 0(s)ds}]
0
x [X0 (CQ(O)Cp(t) - SQ(O)Sp(t)} - yoV R{Cp(0)Sp(t) - Sp(O)Cp(t)}], (6.13.2)
where the hyperbolic-like GLF C p(t) and S p(t) are linearly-independent
solutions to the P force-level equation
2 1 da ddt- a(t) b(t)p - 0 (6.13.3)
d2 2 a(t) dt dtt
with initial conditions
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C p(t 0 ) 0 , Sp(t 0 ) 0 0
(6.13.4)
(i/a(t 0 )} dC /dt(t 0 ) - 0, {1/a(to)}dSp/dt(to) - i/•R
The GLF C Q(t) and S Q(t) are similarly defined (see TAYLOR [49] for further
details). Finally, we observe that the above result (6.13.2) is a special
case of (6.12.8).
The above force-level results are readily developed by observing
that the substitution (6.12.2) transforms (6.13.1) into
d -A(t)q with p(O) - x0t
(6.13.5) -
d -B(t)p with q(O) -y ,t
with
t




B(t) - b(t) exp{- f [B(s) - a(a)]ds}
0
From (6.13.5) we see that all the results for LANCHESTER's equations of
modern warfare (6.5.1) may be used in our study of combat with supporting
fires as modelled by (6.13.1). Then, for example, the X force level
x(t) as given by (6.13.2) follows from this observation. Let us also




d 1t d t)d (6.13.7)
dt 2  A(t) dt dt
which may be written in the equivalent form (6.13.3). In a similar vein,
TAYLOR [49] has developed the following results that describe the behavior
of the model (6.13.1):
RESULT 1: At most one of the two force levels x(t) and y(t)
can ever vanish in finite time.
RESULT 2: If either A(t) ý L(O,+ro) or B(t) V L(O,+-), then
the X force (with supporting fires) will be annihilated
in finite time if and only if
j C (0) S-(0)
O IA *C Q(0) - S Q(0)
where lim {S (t)/C (t)} - i/A . Also, neither
side will be annihilated in finite time if and only if
the above inequality sign is replaced by an equality
sign.
RESULT 3: If a(t) S 8(t), then
t
x(t) - [exp{- f 0(s)ds}J
0
x [o(CY(O)Cx(t) - sy(°)Sx(t)} - YoN {CX (O)Sx() - Sx(0)Cx(t)) ],
and the X force (with supporting fires) will be
.C annihilated in finite time if and only if (6.6.1) holds.
317
Further results and a discussion of their significance is to be found in
TAYLOR [49]. In particular, Result 3 says that when each side's supporting
fires are always equally effective [i.e. a(t) =8(t)], their effects cancel
out and the battle's outcome in a fight-to-the-finish is the same (alLhough
the vtctor suffers greater losses) as when they are not present.
Thus, we see that the combat model with supporting fires (6.13.1)
may be transformed into LANCHESTER's equations for modern warfare (6.5.1) so
that all the results for the latter (see Sections 6.5 through 6.10 above) may
be invoked. In particular, one is interested in developing battle-outcome-
prediction conditions (recall Section 6.6). Exact force-annihilation-
prediction conditions for the model (6.13.1) are readily developed by a
translation of Theorem 6.6.1 to the txensformed equation (6.13.5), and a
special case of such conditions appears as Result 2 above. We will now con-
sider simple approximate battle-outcome-prediction conditions for this model.
Example 6.13.1. For constant coefficients in the model (6.13.1), we have
CP(t) - exp[t(8-a)/2] {cosh 6t + [(a-0)/ 2 6] sinh et}, and S (t)
- (V/e) exp[t(8-0)/2] sinh et, where 8 -6 ab + [(a-8)/ 212. If follows that
1 _ - (e-a)/2
A
Hence, Result 2 yields that the X force will be annihilated in finite time
if and only if
XO / 2 ()+1 ,(6.13.8)
YO31
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where R - a/b denotes the relative fire effectiveness of the two opposing
primary weapon-system types, and S - (4-a)/a/a denotes the net effectiveness
of Y's supporting units normalized by the "intensity" of combat between the
primary units. Moreover, when each side's supporting fires are equally
effective, i.e. a " 8 or S - 0, then the X force will be annihilated in
finite time if and only if
which is the same as LANCHESTER's classic model (2.2.1) without the supporting
fires. Finally, we observe that the X force level x(t) is given by
x(t) - {x0 cosh ot [ay0 + (a ) xo] sinh et}, exp[-t(a + b)/2]
Simple approximate battle-outcome-prediction conditions for a fixed-
force-ratio-breakpoint battle may be developed by considering the RICCATI
equation satisfied by the force ratio u - x/y, namely
du . b(t)u 2 + {a(t) -8(t)}u-a(t) with u(O) - u0  XO (6.13.9)
This observation was apparently first made by TAYLOR and PARRY [59]. Before
developing simple approximate victory-prediction conditions with (6.13.9),
we will develop some "local" conditions of force superiority which will
motivate subsequent developments.
For a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle, it seems appropriate to
say that "the course of battle is moving towards a Y victory" when
du/dt < 0. Moreover, du/dt < 0 if and only if
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b W) x 2() + {ae(t) - O(t) xMt y(t) < a(t) y2(t W (6.13.10)
which may be rearranged to yield that for nonnegative force ratios
"Y is winning" xt< R-t S(t) p_)___(.3.1
if and only if 2 [2 
where
R(t) - a(tS) 8(t) (6.13.12)
b(t) ra(t) b(t)
Here R(t) represents the relative fire effectiveness (Y to X) of the
primary units, while S(t) represents the net effectiveness of Y's support-
ing units normalized by the "intensity" of combat between the primary units.
The "local" condition of force superiority (6.13.11) then says that the
/
force ratio x/y will continue to decrease (to Y's favor) when it is below
a certain (time-varying) critical "threshold" value. This threshold value
depends on only the weapon-system-performance parameters (i.e. the attrition-
rate coefficients) through the model parameter R(t) and S(t). In a sense,
we have decoupled the quantity and quality of weapon systems in the "local"
condition of force superiority (6.13.11).
In a moment we will extend the above "local" condition to be a "global"
one of force superiority, but let us first consider a very important special
case. When the supporting weapon systems are equally effective, i.e.,
a(t) 8(t), (6.13.10) reduces to the "instantaneous" square law
b(t) x 2t) < a(t) y2Ct) , (6.13.13)
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which may be considered to be a "local" condition for Y to win. In other
words, when the supportingweapon systems are equally effective, their effects
cancel out. Furthermore, if R(t) - a(t)/b(t) is a nondecreasing function
of time and a certain technical condition is satisfied then (6.13.13) holding
at t = 0 is sufficient for Y to win (recall Theorem 6.6.2). It is also
necessary when R(t) is constant. Similar statements may be made about
(6.13.11) in those cases for which a(t) 0 0(t), and we will now develop such
simple approximate battle-outcome-prediction conditions.
Thus, we will now develop a simple approximate battle-outcome-prediction
condition for combat with supporting fires not subject to attrition (see
Theorem 6.13.3 below). First, we must attend to some preliminaries. Let us
denote the right-hand side of the inequality (6.13.11) as u +(t). More
precisely, let u +(t) and u_(t) denote, respectively, the positive root
and the negative root of b(t)u2 + {a(t) - 8(t)}u - a(t) - 0. It follows that
"u"(t) - VR(t) V + 1 (6.13.14)
so that u_(t) < 0 < u +(t) and (see Figure 6.19)
< 0 for u_(t) < u < u+(t)
du (6.13.15)
dt > 0 for u+(t) < u.
We then have
THEOREM 6.13.1 (TAYLOR and PARRY [591): If du/du(0) < 0 and
u+(t) is a nondecreasing function of time, then du/dt(t) < 0





Figure 6.19. Force-ratio velocity as a function of the force ratio for combat
modelled by LANCHESTER-type equations for an (F+T)I(F+T)
attrition process [see equations (6.13.1) in the text]. Here
the length of the arrow drawn on the u-axis is in proportion
tu the magnitude of du/dt corresponding to that force ratio
u, and the direction in which the'arrow points corresponds
to the sign of du/dt, e.g. an arrow pointing to the left
corresponds to a minus sign for du/dt (cf. Figure 2.7).
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PROOF. The basic idea behind this proof is that u(t) and u +(t) "move
in opposite directions." The hypothesis that du/dt(O) < 0 yieJds that
0 < u0 < u+(O) by (6.13.15). The assumption that u+(t) is nondecreasing
then yields that u0 < u+(0) < u.(t) for all t > 0. IZ follows that
u(t) is a strictly decreasing function of time, since for t near zero
we have u(t) < u0 < u+(O) < u+(t) and consequently (6.13.15) yields that
du/dt(t) < 0 always. Q.
Theorem 6.13.2 then tells us when u+(t) is nondecreasing.
THEOREM 6.13.2 (TAYLOR and PARRY [59]): If R(t) and S(t)
are both nondecreasing functions of time, then u+(t) is a non-,
decreasing function of time.
We now make the following additional assumptions.
(A4) R(t) and S(t) are nondecreasing functions of time,
(AS) b(t) A L(O, +4o)
(A6) R(t) is not identically equal to zero.
Let R0 denote R(O) and similarly for S . Then a simple approximate
battle-outcome-prediction condition is given by the following theorem.
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THEOREM 6.13.3 (TAYLOR[501): Assume that (A4) through (A6) hold.
Then Y will win a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle in finite
time if
x Rý0 S 1 (6.13.16)
YoO {2 (2 12}
PROOF (sketch; see TAYLOR [50] for complete details). The initial-condition
inequality (6.13.16) implies that du/dt(O) < 0 so that Theorem 6.13.1
tells us that du/dt(t) < 0 for all t > 0. It remains to show that
u(t) +UBPX < u0  in finite time, where uBpX > 0 denotes X's "breakpoint"
force ratio. The latrer result may be proven by showing that u(t)t
i - K1 ft b(s)ds with K > 0, since limt+ f b(s)ds - 4•. There
are now two cases to be considered: (Cl) S(t) < 0 for all t > 0,
and (C2) there exists t 1> 0 such that R(t 1 ) > 0 and S(t ) > 0. In
the first case (Cl) it may be shown that du/dt(t) < {b(t)/b 0}du/dt(O),
t
whence u(t) < u0 + (1/b 0 ) duidt(O) f b(s)ds, and the theorem follows
0
in this case. In the second case (C2) it may be shown that
-b(t) R(tI) for 0 < u < {S(t)/21 rR-(it
-(t) <
dt - -b(t) [-l/b(t 1 )]du/dt(t 1 ) for 0 < (S(t)/2} /R(t) < u < u+(t),
t
whence u(t) < u0  K1 ft 1 b(S)ds with K- minimum [R(t 1),(-l/b(t 1))du/dt(t)].
_Q.E.D.
The assumption that limT ÷ +o 0T b(t)dt - + means that an X primary weapon
system [and, by implication from assumption (A4), a Y primary weapon system
also] has unlimited firepower, i.e. there are no logistics constraints on the
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battle. Theorem 6,13.3's proof, which we have sketched above, is particularly
significant because it allows several important extensions: (1) cumulative
firepower need not be unlimited, and (2) conditions for Y to achieve a
given force ratio within a specified time.
Let us now make a few observations about the simple approximate battle-
outcome-prediction condition (6.13.16).
Comment 1. Although there are six absolute quantities (i.e. two force
levels and four attrition-rate coefficients) in cur model of combat with
supporting fires (6.13.1), there are only three independent relative-cavabi1iZt
parameters (one relative-initial-primary-force-size parameter and two relative-
fire-effectiveness parameters) involved in victory prediction: (1) the
initial force ratio of the primary systems u0 - xo/y 0 , (2) the initial
relative fire effectiveness of the primary weapon systems R, and (3) the
initial net fire effectiveness of the supporting weapons normalized by the
intensity of combat between the primary weapon systems SO.
Comment 2. When the supporting fires are always equally effective, i.e.
a(t) E 0(t), their effects "cancel out," and (in terms of the force ratio)
the battle's outcome is the same as though they were not prejent.
Although highly idealized, the model (6.13.1) is significant because
of the insights that it provides into the dynamics of combat. As we discussed
above, we may consider (6.13.1) to model combat between two homogeneous
forces (primary weapon systems) with superimposed effects of supporting
fires not subject to attrition. F. W. LANCHESTER [26] apparently belleved
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that before 1914 the "modern" trend in warfare had been towards greater
concentration of forces (i.e. higher troop densities in combat area) and
formulated his now classic model of combat (without supporting fires)
in order to quantitatively justify the principle of concentration. It is
significant to note (e.g. see HERO (20-22], however, that the actual trend
in combat operations over the past two thousand years of military history
has been towards greater dispersion of forces (i.e. lower troop densities
in combat areas). Some figures for the last hundred years are shown
in Table 6.XII (see STEWART [41]).
Furthermore, the model (6.13.1) may be used to gain important insights
into whether or not it is "beneficial" to concentrate forces, i.e. whether
or not a side should make its initial commitment of forces as large as
possible (e.g. see Section 2.9 above). Results show zhat if the "intensity"
of the supporting-fire combat exceeds that of the primary systems [i.e.
19
m(t) 0(t) > a(t) b(t)], then the victor should not concentrate his forces
(see TAYLOR (48] for a detailed analysis of the decision of whether or not
to concentrate forces; also see Section 8.10 below). Considering the past
increases [20-22] in the fire effectiveness of supporting weapons relative
to that for primary weapon systems (e.g. small arms), we would expect that
in general a(t) B(t) > a(t) b(t) on the modern battlefield. Consequently,
the victor should not concentrate his forces according to the above. Thus,
the model (6.13.1) yields a theoretical result (about optimal military
tactics) that is in better agreement with the historical trend in military
operations than is that yielded by LANCHESTER's original model (2.2.1)
without supporting fires (i.e. the victor should always concentrate forces
[see Section 2.9 above]).
326
I ll H ili I~ I aiDin I! lili  I] i r I Id i "if~ | i- Y • !!ii
TABLE 6.XII. Increase in the Dispersion of Troops from the U. S. Civil War
to World War II (from STEWART [41]).
ITEM CIVIL WAR WORLD WAR I WORLD WAR II
Area of 100,000 men
(in square miles) 26.8 140 1727
Average frontage of
100,000 men (miles) 8.0 11 38.4
Average depth of
100,000 men (miles) 3.3 13 45
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It will be instructive for us to consider a more concrete case and
examine more closely this question about the optimal initial commitment
of forces. Hence, let us consider the constant-coefficient model of combat
with supporting fires
/dx__wihx0
dt -ay -oxwt ()-o,
(6.13.17)
d -bx -ay with y(O) - YO
dt
where a, b, a, and 8 now denote constant attrition-rate coefficients.
Returning to first principles, to determine the optimal initial commitment
of forces, we must consider a "combat-optimization" problem as we have done
in Section 2.9 above (see also Section 8.10 below). Consider now a battle
in which Y has more than enough troops to win. Will Y be "better off" by
initially committing all his forces to battle? Should he hold some of them
in reserve? We assume that this initial-commitment decision is to be made
(only) once before the battle begins. If we take the overall casualty-exchange
ratio Rc (- yc/xc, where yc denotes Y's casualties and similarly
for x c) as Y's decision criterion, then Y should initially commit more
forces to battle as long as DR c/y0 < 0. Then for either a fixed-force-
level-breakpoint battle or a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint one, it may be
shown (see TAYLOR [491) that DRc/3y0 < 0 if and only if a(dy/dx)/Du > 0.
This if-and-only-if statement holds because a(dy/dx)/Du always has
the same sign (see below) and the attrition-rate coefficients are constant.
For the model (6.13.17) we have
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d= a + bu
dx a + Su
4( and a straightforward computation yields
•u d =ab - aiB (6.1].3.18)
Sx (a + su) 2  1
Thus, we see that a(dy/dx)/3u > 0 always if and only if ab > a$. Hence
the prospective victor should initially commit as many primary-system
forces (e.g. infantry forces) as possible to battle when the intensity
of combat between the primary forces exceeds the "intensity" of the
supporting fires, i.e. when ab > aB. When a8 > ab, more forces than are
required to "Just" assure victory should not be initially committed because
they are more vulnerable to supporting fires (see TAYLOR [48] and Section
8.10 for further details).
As discussed in Section 2.9, there is a very simple and intuitively
appealing interpretation of the above optimal force-commitment decision
rule. The instantaneous casualty-exchange ratio dy/dx represents the
"cost" to Y of reducing the X force level a unit amount. The partial
derivative a(dy/dx)/au represents the variation in this cost to changes
in the force ratio u - x/y. When a(dy/dx)/au > 0 always, then Y's
instantaneous cost of doing battle is always reduced when the battle is
fought at lower force ratios u - x/y. If Y in,"tially commits more
forces to battle (i.e. Y makes yo larger, then the battle is fought
at lower force ratios, and Y is cumulatively better off according to this
decision criterion. Hence, ab > 08 yields that Y is better off by
initially committing more forces to battle. Moreover, this decision rule
is surprisingly robust and holds for other decision criteria (see TAYLOR
[48]). Finally, this heuristic reasoning is shown to be mathematically
precise in Section 8.10 below.
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6.14. HELMDOLD-Type Combat with Supporting Fires
If we assume that attrition between the two primary weapon systems (e.g.
infantries, see Figure 6.18) follows HELMBOLD's modification of LANCHESTER's
equations of "modern warfare" to account for inefficiencies of scale when
infantry-force sizes are grossly unequal (see Section 6.11), our model of combat
with supporting fires (6.13.1) becomes (see Figure 6.20)
dx x1-Wd -a(t) (A) 0 y - 8(t)x with x(0) -dt x0
(6.14.1)
dy - -b(t) (Y) "-W x - c(t)y with y(O) - yo ,
where a(t) and 0(t) again represent the effectivenesses of the supporting
fires, and W denotes the "WEISS parameter" of the battle.
More formally, we will call (6.14.1) the equations for HELM.OLD-type
combat with supporting fires not subject to attrition, although (of course)
we know that other interpretations are possible (see Sections 2.12 and 6.13
above). Here, we have assumed that both sides suffer the same inefficiencies
of scale. This nonlinear combat model (6.14.1) reduces to the above studied
linear model (6.13.1) when W - 1. In analyzing this model we will again
assume that assumptions (Al) through (A6) of Section 6.13 hold. Finally,
let us note that the above nonlinear combat model (6.14.1) is highly oper-
ationally significant, since it provides an excellent fit to large-unit
(i.e. division-level and larger) casualty-rate curves currently used in
several of the principal large-scale ground-combat models used in the
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Again (see Section 6.11), this nonlinear HI-LMBOLD-type combat model
may be transformed into a linear combat model by the appropriate transformation
W W
of the dependent variable. Thus, the substitution p - x and q - y
transforms (6.14.1) into
( -W{a(t)q + 0(t)}l with p(O) - XOw
dt P
(6.14.2)
d-d -W{b(t)p + a(t)q} with q(O) . Y(W
dt
Hence, all the results (see Section 6.13 above) for the linear model with
supporting fires not subject to attrition (6.13.1) apply the the nonlinear
HELMBOLD-type combat model (6.14.1). For example, when assumptions (A4) through
(A6) of Section 6.13 are satisfied, then the Y force will win a fixed-force-
ratio-breakpoint battle in finite time if
(x ) + ' + 1 (6.14.3)
where R(t)' and S(t) are given by (6.13.12), R0  denotes R(0), and
similarly for SO.
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6.15. The General Linear Model with Replacements (Constant Attrition-Rate
Coefficients).
In the case of constant attrition-rate coefficients, the general
linear model (6.12.1) reads
dx -ay -x + r with x(O) - x0 ,
dt x
(6.15.1)
-bx - ay + s with y(O) - Y0
dt
where a, b, as, , r, and s denote quantities that remain constant during
a particular battle, and we assume that a and b > 0, while a and
B > 0. Although there are several different sets of physical circumstances
that may be hypothesized to yield (6.15.1) (see Section 6.12 above), we
will consider (6.15.1) to model "aimed-fire" combat between two homogeneous
forces with supporting fires not subject to attrition and continuous
replacements/withdrawals. In this case we should consider r and s to
be replacement rates, with a negative value denoting a net rate of
withdr .wal of forces. Accordingly, we will place no restrictions on the
replacement rates r and s, i.e. r and s are unrestricted in sign.
The model (6.15.1) is of interest because it provides insights into
the consequences of additional troops (continuously) committed to battle.
We may consider a term like, for example, r to represent the rate at
which additional X forces are committed to battle. Another related inter-
pretation is that r represents the net rate at which the X force enters
the fields of fire of the Y force. Such interpretations essentially apply
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to small-unit combat in fire fights. We may also (see Section 6.12 above),
however, consider (6.15.1) to model combat with operational losses and
continuous replacements. In this case we may consider (6.15.1) to apply
to large-scale combat over a sustained period of time, and then r and s
represent the rates at which additional resources are committed to the
theater of operations (see MORSE and KIMBALL [31, pp. 71-731). In this
light, analysis of this combat model will provide important insights into
the nature of tradeoffs among (1) direct combat capability, (2) "build-up"
capability, and (3) operational losses. In terms of the NATO scenario,
the model (6.15.1) provides rough insights into the structure of tradeoffs
among the quality of weapon systems, the quantity of weapon systems, and
the "build-up" rates at which new systems are introduced into the theater
of operations.
Unlike the previous variable-coefficient versions considered above,
the constant-coefficient model (6.15.1) yields an analytical solution that
is simple enough to provide some important insights into the dynamics of
combat through direct analysis. When ab 0 a8, the X and Y force
levels x(t) and y(t) for the model (6.15.1) are given by
2 0
x(t) - + Ae(-6a)t ( + e ) Be-(e6+)t,
and (6.15.2)
y(t)-n (e + 6) Ae (e-)t +Be-(e+)t
where
334
A- 2e( +) (x° - ( 6)- (o- i , (6.15.3)
26(e + 6) b - ) + (Y - r)
B- ab +(e+0 / (x0  (6.15.4)
aB T- (e b+ -) a
- as ,r br Bs A - ab - aS , (6.15.5)
6 2 ab + 6'2 d and a - 2 (6.15.6)
Let us also note the following identity
e+6 r - 1 1 ~ 2l (6.15.7)
where R - a/b and S - (0-a)/Y/a (see Section 6.13 fcr a discussion of
the military interpretations of these parameters R and S).
When ab - ac, the X and Y force levels x(t) and y(t) for
the model (6.15.1) are given by
x(t) . x e- (a+B)t + (ar- ast
+(Or + as) + (1 ex o - ( (6.15.8)
(ai + 0)2 CL + B
and
y(t) -yo e (a-0) t - (a)(cr - as ) t
-(as + br) ( I (cix - ay0\
" (+ + 8)2 + 8 {i - . (6.15.9)
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In this latter case, i.e. when ab - aB, the constant-coefficient combat
model (6.15.1) possesses the state equation
b(x 0 - x) - 8(y 0 - y) + (8s - br)t, (6.15.10)
which yields that the overall casualty-exchange ratio is constant, i.e.
x_8E 'a _ (6.15.11)
Yc b'
where the X and Y casualties are given by
xc x0 + rt - x , and Yc YO + st - y . (6.15.12)
Let us observe that in all cases the instantaneous casualty-enchange ratio
dx/dy is giverý by
dx . sBb+-"E _ (6.15.13)d-y 'ý I  W- bx ay c 
which for ab - a8 becomes
dx8+ r- (8/b)s (6.15.14)
dy b s- bx- a"y
In particular, for br - Os and ab - ct we have the linear law
b(x 0 - x) - 8(yo - y) ' (6.15.15)
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Determination of the qualitative behavior, e.g. battle-outcome-
prediction conditions, for the linear combat model with replacements
(6.15.1) is much more difficult than we have heretofore encountered because
the force levels x(t) and y(t) no longer possess a very important mathe-
matical property that facilitated analysis of combat modelled with
LANCHESTER's equations for modern warfare (6.5.1): namely, all solutions
to (6.15.1) are no longer nonoscillatory in the strict sense that x(t)
and y(t) can have more than one zero. We will give an example cf such
solution behavior below. However, analysis of the qualitative behavior of the
model (6.15.1) ir relatively straightforward when ab > a8, i.e. the
intensity of combat between the primary systems exceeds the "intensity"
of the supporting fires, and we will aaw develop force-annihilation-prediction
conditions for this case. Let us first observe that 6 - a > 0 if and
only if ab > ca. Hence, in this case the exponential e(8-C)t in (6.15.2)
is a strictly increasing function that grows -iAthout bound. Furthermore,
the signs of x(t) and y(t) for large t are opposite and determined
by the sign of A. For A - 0, i.e. (x0 -O ) - (yo-n)(e+6)/b, (6.15.2)
reduces to
x(t) - x0 e-(e+a)t + ei - e-+)t},
and (6.15.16)
y(t) - y0 e-(e+a)t + nil - e-(eG ) }.
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x will be annihilated
in finite time if (x0 - 0 < + ) (y0 - n), (6.15.17)
and only if
which may also be written in the equivalent form
( -< // [IS+ (2++i (Y0 -ri) ' (6.15.18)
The Y force will be annihilated (and only then) in finite time when
the above inequality (6.15.18) is reversed. Moreover, from (6.15.2) we see
that y(t) > 0 for all t > 0 when (6.15.18) holds with C and n > 0.
The requirement that & and n > 0 in the force-annihilation-prediction
condition (6.15.18) is absolutely essential as the example depicted in
Table 6.XIII shows. In other words, (6.15.18) [equivalently, (6.15.17)]
is satisfied for the battle depicted in Table 6.XIII, but the Y force
is actually annihilated before the X force is. The reason why (6.15.18)
fails to correctly predict force annihilation is that ri < 0. This example
should alert the reader to the fact that determination of the qualitative
behavior, e.g. force-annihilation prediction, for the constant-coefficient
model with replacements/withdrawals (6.15.1) is much trickier than that
for the variable-coefficient model (6.5.1) with no placements/withdrawals.
Let us finally sketch the development of the above expressions for
the force levels x(t) and y(t). When ab 0 a$, we may write (6.15.1) as
dx ' -a(y - n) - B(x- •) and d -b(x- •) - a(y - 1) (6.15.19)dt
whence the substitution X x - • and Y - y - n transforms (6.15.19)
into
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TABLE 6.XIII. Example That Shows That One Must have Both & and n > 0
in Order for the Inequality (6.15.18) to Correctly Predict
a Y Victory in a Fight-to-the Finish.
NOTE: In this battle we have taken (in compatible units) a - b - 2,
a- 8 - 1, r 0, and a - 150. It follows that (6.15.18) is























2.1 59.36 - 8.98
2.2 55.02 - 4.73















dX dY O -bX - aY--u iaY -8X and --t b -a
dt d
for which we have given a solution in Section 6.13 above. When ab aB,
we may write (6.15.1) as
dx . a( +ad s - b(x + y),
dt rbx+y) and bt
whence follow the above results.
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6.16. 'variable-Coefficient Equations for FTIFT Attrition Process
As emphasized above, S. BONDER [5;10] has stressed the importance
for weapon-system evaluations of using time-dependent attrition-rate
coefficients in LANCHESTER-type combat models to represent temporal variations
in firepower on the battlefield (e.g. see the battle trajectories given in
Section 6.2 above). We have considered various aspects of such variable-
coefficient generalizations of LANCHESTER's equations for modern warfare
in several of the above sections. Let us now, however, consider the follow-
ing LANCHESTER-type equations for a FTIFT attrition process with time-
dependent attrition-rate coefficients
dx -a(t)xy with x(O) - x0
(6.16.1)
dy - -b(t)xy with y(O) - yo
These equations may be hypothesized to model combat under either of the
following two sets of circumstances (cf. Sections 2.4 and 2.11 above):
either (S1) both sides use "area" fire and a constant-area
defense [12; 61],
or (S2) both sides use "aimed" fire with the rate of target
acquisition being inversely proportional to the
number of enemy targets and also being the controlling
factor in the attrition process [12].
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The modelling of the attrition-rate coefficients a(t) and b(t) is
discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.7 above. Mathematically, we assume that the
attrition-rate coefficients a(t) and b(t) are positive and piecewise
differentiable. We further assume that both a(t) and b(t) ( L(O,T) for
any finite T > 0 and similarly for d/dt{b(t)/a(t)}.
The development of analytical results for the X and Y force levels
x(t) and y(t) is very much more difficult for time-dependent attrition-
rate coefficients than it was for constant coefficients (see Section 2.4).
Since no relation like LANCHESTER's linear law (2.4.3) generally holds for
the variable-coefficient combat model (6.16.1), we are led to a nonlinear
second-order differential equation in order to analytically determine, for
example, x(t). Accordingly, we may use differentiation and algebraic
elimination to obtain from (6.16.1) the X force-level equation
d2 xx 1 {dx 2  dx x 1 da dx
d2 x (x)x a d (t) dt 0 , (6.16.2)
with initial conditions
x(0) - x 0 , and dx
where a0  denotes a(O) and similarly fpr b0 . Unfortunately, this
second-order nonlinear differential equation is apparently not equivalent
to any standard equation solvable in terms of "elementary" functions,
e.g. see INCE [23] or DAVIS [16]. However, we will give some simple
approximations to the solution of this nonlinear differential equation.
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TAYLOR (46] has developed the following two simple approximations
to the solution of (6.16.2), denoted as x it) for i - 1 and 2, namely
x 0
t - t t t, (6.16.3)
[exp{--f Gi(s)ds} + x0 f b(s) (exp{-f Gi(r)dr})dsl
0* 0
where
a(t) (b x - y) for i - 1
a 0 0 000
Gi(t) - (6.16.4)
b(t)x0 - a(t)y0  for i - 2.
What is the error made in using the above approximations? How "good" are
they? To answer these important questions, TAYLOR [46] has developed a
bound for the error made in using either of the two approximations Wl(t)
and x2 (t). This bound is easy to evaluate and does not require knowledge
of the exact solution x(t). His result is as follows.
THEOREM 6.16.1 (TAYLOR [46]): A bound on the error made in
the approximation (6.16.3) xi(t) (for i 1,2) to the exact
solution x(t) of (6.16.1) is given by
x 2 (t) - Xl(t) > Ix(t) - x (t)01 for i - 1,2, (6.16.5)
where a




X r- _ _ _
H (t) - a(t) (b 0 x0 - ay) + (--l)j V0(b)
a f 0  A 00 0,t a
for j = 1,2.
In Theorem 6.16.1 V denotes the variational operator defined and
discussed in OLVER [34, pp. 27-29], i.e.
a 0s) dsa.
When b(t)/a(t) is monotonic, however, this bound simplifies and becomes
tighter. Thus, we have
THEOREM 6.16.2 (TAYLOR (46]): If d/dt{b(t)/a(t)} > 0 foc
all t E [O,T], then a bound on the error made in the approxiue.tion
(6.16.3) x i(t) (for i - 1,2) to the exact solution of (6.16.1)
is given by
x2 (t) - (t) > (-1)"+ {x(t) - • (t)} > 0 for i - 1,2.
The above are the only analytical results known to the author for the
nonlinear combat model with temporal variations in fire effectiveness (6.16.1).
Let us finally observe that all the above results apply to a more
general nonlinear combat model. When each side has supporting weapons not
subject to attrition (cf. Section 6.13 above), our model becomes
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d x
dt -a(t)xy - 8(t)x with x(O) - x0 ,
(6.16.6)
dy- -b(t)xy - c(t)y with y(O) - y0 ,dt
where a(t) and 0(t) are nonnegative and represent the effectiveness of
supporting fires. However, the substitution (6.12.2) transforms (6.16.6)
into
I2dt - -A(t)pq with P(O) - x0 V
(6.16.7)
- -B(t)pq with q(O) - yo ,dt
t t
with A(t) - a(t) e3p{- f a(s)ds} and B(t) - b(t) exp{- I $(s)ds}.
0 0
Tib, all the above results for the model (6.16.1) may be applied to the more




"*6.17. A Result for the General Model with Temporal Variations in
Fire Effectiveness
Two quantities of fundamental interest to the military OR worker
are (1) the force ratio, and (2) the casualty-exchange ratio. In this
section we will show that for the general case of combat between two homogeneous
forces, the difference between these two fundamental quantities provides a
simple (but yet very basic) "local" condition of force superiority that some-
times allows one to determine that the force ratio is a monotonic function of
time. Such a result is not only of intrinsic interest but also important
for understanding the dynamics of FEBA movement (Forward Edge of the Battle
Area, which is the contact zone between opposing forces) when combined with
a rate-of-advance equation for FEBA motion. In large-scale combat models
for a given engagement, the motion of the FEBA is usually taken to depend
monotonically on the force ratio so that monotonic behavior of the force
ratio over time can be translated into qualitative statements about cumulative
FEBA movement (see Sections 7.13 and 7.14 for further details). Thus, the
results of this section may be used to develop fundamental qualitative in-
sights into the dynamics of combat.
As we saw in Section 6.1 above, we may generally model combat between
two homogeneous forces with the following deterministic LANCHESTER-type
equations for x and y > 0
dx . -G(t,xy) with x(O) -
(6.17.1)
d- -H(t,x,y) with y(O) yo
"*Starred sections are not required for the understanding of the sequel and
should be omitted at first reading. They usually require more mathe-
matical sophistication to be understood.
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where x(t) and y(t) denote the X and Y force levels at time t, and
G and H denote force-change rates (with a negative force-change rate
signifying a net influx of replacements). When there are no replacements
and withdrawals, G and H are simply casualty rates. To insure the
existence of partial derivatives needed in subsequent analysis, we assume
that G and H are differentiable.
It is of interest to be able to determine in whose favor the course
of battle is progressing without solving the equations (6.17.1) in detail.
If we consider a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle (a special case of
which is a fight to the finish in which one side or the other is annihilated),
then the rate of change of the force ratio is an appropriate measure of
the direction in which the course of battle is moving, since we can then
identify towards which combatant's force-ratio breakpoint the battle is
being "steered." Then according to this criterion, there is a simple criterion
(with a rich military interpretation) for a force to be "winning": namely,
a force is "winning" when the force ratio exceeds the casualty-exchange
21
ratio. This "local" condition of force superiority applies to all
LANCHESTER-type models with two force-level variables and yields a "global"
condition of force superiority (i.e. the force ratio monotonically changes
to the advantage of one side) when certain trends over time hold.
Let us now develop our local condition of force superiority.
Accordingly, we introduce the force ratio u - x/y. As pointed out by
TAYLOF and PARRY [59], for a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle it seems
appropriate to say that "the course of battle is moving towards an X
victory" when du/dt > 0 (or, simply, that "X is winning"). Our "local"
( •condition of force superiority is developed by determining the sign of
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du/dt at a point in time. We will do this without solving the equations
(6.17,1) in detail. Considering the force ratio u - x/y, we find after




This result (6.17.2) is the key result from which all subsequent developments
in this section follow. We assume for simplicity that we always have dy/dt < 0,
with other cases being handled in a straightfoward manner. When dy/dt < 0,
then du/dt and (u - dx/dy) have the same sign. Thus, for dy/dt < 0
we see from (6.17.2) that a "local" condition of X-force superiority (i.e. X
is "winning" a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle) is
u (t,x,y) . (7.17.3)
The inequality (6.17.3) has a very important military interpretation.
In general, the quantity dx/dy is the instantaneous (or differential)
force-change ratio, which for cases of no replacements and withdrawals becomes
the instantaneous (or differential) casualty-exchange ratio. Consequently,
in such cases, (6.17.3) says that X is "winning" when the force ratio
exceeds the instantaneous casualty-exchange ratio. In other words, the
relative size of the force ratio and the casualty-exchange ratio determine
the direction of the course of battle. Such a rule of thumb may be very use-
ful in such an interpretative sense when the exact dynamics of combat are




It is of particular interest to be able to predict when (6.17.3)
will hold throughout a battle (i.e. to determine a "global" condition of
force superiority). Although we have not succeeded in developing such
conditions in general, we will now give results for a special case of
fairly wide applicability. Thus, for many LANCHESTER-type combat models
of interest, the instantaneous force-change ratio dx/dy depends on only
t and the force ratio x/y, i.e. dx/dy is a homogeneous function of
degree zero in the force-level variables x and y (see COURANT [15,
pp. 108-1101). When this is true, we will say that Condition (HO) holds
and will denote dx/dy as o - p(t,x/y), i.e.
Condition (HO): •y (t,x,y) p (t,u), with u x/y . (6.17.4)
dy
In this case, we may write
duadu IE 1 .(t, u) ,(6.17.5)dt y dt)
where
E(t,u) - u - P(t,u) . (6.17.6)
We will call E(t,u) the excess function, since it represents by
how much the force ratio u - x/y exceeds the force-change ratio dx/dy.
Motivated by consideration of a number of specific LANCHESTER-type models,
we assume that E(t,u) - 0 has a unique positive root, which we will
denote as u+, for each finite value of t and that E is positive
for u > u+ but negative for u < U+. In order to assure that u+1t)
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"behaves properly" over time, we assume that 3E/9u is nonpositive for
u - u+. More precisely, we assume
(Al) < 0 for 
0 < u <
u+()Etu) > 0 for u +< u,
and
(A2) _L (tu+) < 0 for all t > 0
where u+ denotes the unique positive root of E(t,u+) - 0 for any fixed
value of t.
Let us now consider combat modelled by LANCHESTER-type equations for
which Condition (HO) holds. Then X is "winning" a fixed-force-ratio-break-
point battle when (6.17.3) holds. This is a "local" condition of force
superiority. As discussed above, one can specify certain trends over time
to in some sense strengthen (6.17.3) into a "global" condition of force
superiority (cf. developments in Section 6.13 above). In particular, when
u+(t) is nonincreasing over time, then (6.17.3) holding at only t - 0
guarantees that du/dt(t) is always positive,22 i.e. the force ratio
u - x/y continuously changes to the favor of X.
THEOREM 6.17.1 (TAYLOR [44]): Assume that Condition (HO) and
Assumption (Al) hold and that u+(t) is a nonincreasing
function of time. It follows that
(6.17.7)





PROOF. From (6.17.5) we see that du/dt and E have the same sign when
dy/dt < 0. We assume that this latter condition holds. Hence (6.17.7)
and Assumpcion (Al) imply that u+(O) < u0 . The assumption that u,(t)
is nonincreasing then yields that u +(t) < u +(0) < no for all t > 0.
It follows that u +(t) is a strictly increasing function of time, since
for t near zero we have u+(t) < iu+(O) < u0 < u(t) and consequently
Assumption (Al) implies that E(t,u(t)) > 0 for all t > 0. Q.E.D.
We now establish a necessary and sufficient condition for u+(t) to
be nonincreasing.
THEOREM 6.17.2 (TAYLOR [44]): Assume that Condition (HO) holds.
Then u+(t) is a nonincreasing function of time if and only if
ap/at(t,u+) < 0 for all t > 0, i.e., Assumption (A2) holds.
PROOF. Differentiating the identity E(t,u+) - 0 - u+ - p(t,u+), we obtain
du+ a- (tu)
S3,U+)
whence follows the theorem by (A2). Q.E.D.
We will now briefly consider several concrete examples in order to
illustrate the above general theory.
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Example 6.17.1. For LANCHESTER's equations of modern warfare (6.5.1),
we have dx/dy- (1/u) a(t)/b(t) - (1/u) R(t) - p(t,u) so that Condition (HO)
is satisfied. We also then have that E(t,u) - u - (l/u) R(t) so that
Assumption (Al) is satisfied with u +(t) - R_(. Computing ap/pt - (1/u) dR/dt,
we see from Theorem 6.17.2 that u+(t) is nonincreasing if and only if
R(t) is. We leave it as an exercise for the reader to show that (6.17.8)
yields the same result as direct computation of du+ /dt. Theorem 6.17.1 then
yields that the force ratio u - x/y is a strictly increasing function of
time when u0 > viý and R(t) is nonincreasing.
Example 6.17.2. For the equations of HELMEOLD-type combat with supporting
fires (6.14.1) with W E (0,1], we have dx/dy - u -W(a(t)+8(t)u W}/{a(t)+b(t)uW I
- P(t,u) so that Condition (HO) is satisfied. We also then have that
E(t,u) fu -W/(a(t) + b(t)u W)} F(t,u) where F(t,u) - b(t)u2w +
fa(t)- 8(t)} u - a(t) so that Assumption (Al) is satisfied with
W V(t) I S¶t) + + 1 , (6.17.9)
where the normalized net effectiveness of supporting fires S(t) is given
by (6.13.11). It may be shown (cf. Theorem 6.13.2 above) by direct
computation using (6.17.9) that R(t) and S(t) nonincreasing implies that
u+(r) is nonincreasing. Applying Theorem 6.17.1, we find that the force
ratio u - x/y is a strictly increasing function of time when
(x/yo)W > /R {S0 /2 + /i + (S0/2)}2 and R(t) and S(t) are nonincreasing.
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A more thorough analysis of the force-ratio equation, however, is required
to develop a battle-outcome-prediction condition analogous to (6.13.16)
(cf. the proof of Theorem 6.13.3).
Example 6.17.3. Consider combat modelled with
dx -a(t) g(t,x,y) and dy -- b(t) g(t,x,y)
dt dt -
where a(t), b(t), and g(t,x,y) > 0. It follows that p(t,u) - R(t) so
that our results yield the "instantaneous" linear law b(t)x < at)y for
Y to be winning a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle. When g(t,x,y) - xy
[i.e. combat is modelled with (6.16.1)], further analysis of (6.17.5) yields
V that
t
u(t) < u0 exp{- (% - u0 )yf f b(s)ds} , (6.17.10)
0
where yf denotes Y's (final) force level when X is annihilated and
we have assumed that u0 < R0 and R(t) is nondecreasing. If we assume
that b(t) j L(0, + -o), then (6.17.10) only guarantees that X will lose
X
any fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle with uBp > 0 in finite time.
It does not guarantee that X will be annihilated in finite time (and,
indeed, X will not be). Furthermore, this annihilation-time bound (i.e.




_ _ _ _ I.1
Every military man intuitively knows that the force ratio and the
(instantaneous) casualty-exchange ratio influence the outcome of battle.
In this section we have shown that these two ratios may be quantitatively
related to develop battle-trend predictions, e.g. the force ratio will
always change to the advantage of one of the combatants, without having to
solve the LANCHESTER-type equations in detail. In particular, we showed
that a general "local" condition of force superiority which applies to all
deterministic LANCHESTER-type models with two force-level variables may be based
un comparing the force ratio with the instantaneous casualty-exchange ratio.
When appropriate temporal trends are satisfied, "global" conditions of force
superiority may be developed from these "local" ones.
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FOOTNOTES for Chapter 6S
1. By the classic LANCHESTER theory of combat (i.e. its classic developments)
we mean developments in the differential-equation modelling of combat
before the publication of DOLANSKY's [17] 1964 survey article. Con-
stant attrition-rate coefficients were assumed for reasons of simplicity
and lack of methodology and data for their prediction [17].
2. S. BONDER (see BONDER and FARRELL [10, pp. 30-31]) has stressed the
importance of analytical solutions to such models for developing in-
sights into the dynatics of combat by portraying the relation between
various factors in the combat attrition process and the surviving num-
bers of forces and for facilitating sensitivity and other parametric
analysis (see BONDER [91). Furthermore, finite-difference methods
for developing numerical approximate solutions to such equations are
discussed in Chapter 7 below.
3. Other significant work appears in BARFOOT (2], BONDER and FARRELL [10],
and KIMBLETON [25].
4. Here we would like to mention the work of RUSTAGI and SRIVASTAVA
[39] and RUSTAGI and LAITINEN [38] on the estimation of the
Markov-dependent-fire parameters in BONDER's [6;8] expression for the
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficeints (see also Footnote 1 for
Chapter 5).
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5. To be precise, we only conjecture that this statement is true. It
is, of course, a very difficult task (and one well beyond the
scope of this book) to prove that the solution to a differential
equation cannot be expressed in terms of "elementary" functions
(e.g. see RITT [37] or RISCH [36]). Based on our work in this
field, however, we feel that the statement is probably true for
combat modelled with many (if not most) time-dependent attrition-
rate coefficients of tactical interest.
6. See Footnote 13 of Chapter 3.
7. See Footnote 14 of Chapter 3.
8. In other words, both x(t) and y(t) > 0 for all finite t > 0.
9. It seems appropriate to delineate a set of physical circumstances
that may be hypothesized to yield a battle with attrition-rate
coefficients such that h(t) E L(0,4-). For example, consider a
fire fight in which the combatants take cover and continue to reduce
their vulnerability so that enemy fire effectiveness decays
exponentialily over time, i.e. a(t) - k ae-Yt and b(t) - ke-Yt
with y > 0. In this case, M - X /y, and M is finite when
h(t) E L(0,41).




1i. See TAYLOR [50] for an example that shows that such a battle
need not ever end when b(t) E L(O,+-o), i.e. limited cumulative
firepower is available to the X force.
12. The naming of our LCS functions is based on the facts that
a function similar to F (0) was introduced by LUDWIG SCHLXFLI
(1814-1895) in 1867 (see [401) and that another related one
appears in a posthumous fragment of the great English geometer
WILLIAM KINGDON CLIFFORD (1845-1879) (see [14, pp. 343-348]).
Although the GLF given by (6.9.3) may be expressed in terms of
modified BESSEL functions of the first kind of fractional order
(i.e. I for 0 < a < 1) [see (6.6.1) through (6.6.14) above],
we have introduced the LCS functions because too few of such
BESSEL functions I are tabulated (i.e. tabulations apparently
only exist for a - + 1/4, + 1/3, + 1/2, + 2/3, + 3/4, and these
do not correspond to cases of interest). Observing that we may
write
" (/2) 2k+a
I a w k {k! r(k + a + 1)1k-O
the reader may find it instructive to show that the results given
in Example 6.5.2 are equivalent to (6.6.11) and (6.6.12) and
also to (6.9.3) above.
13. Equation (6.9.6) follows directly from substituting (6.9.3)
into (6.5.6).
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14. The tabulations provided in Appendix D are taken from the longer
(i.e. (55]) of the two reports by TAYLOR and BROWN (55; 561 (also
available from the National Technical Information Service) which
contain five-decimal-place tables of the hyperbolic-like LCS func-
tions tions F (C), H1a (C), and T (E) for values of the argu-
ment g - 0.00(0.01) 2.00(0.0) 10.0 and various values of the order
a. The short table [56] contains tabulations for a - 1/2, 1/3, 2/3,
1/4, 3/4, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, 3/7, and 4/7 corresponding to
p, v - 0,1,2,3 for the attrition-rate coefficients (6.9.2); while
the longer table (55] contains tabulations for a - 1/2, 1/3, 2/3,
1/4, 3/4, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, 2/7, 3/7, 4/7, 5/7, 4/9, 5/9, 3/11,
5/11, 6/11, 8/11, 5/13, 8/13, 5/17, 12/17, 5/21, and 16/21 corre-
sponding to V, v - 0, 1/4, 1/2, 1, 1 1/2, 2, 3. As we have seen
above in Section 6.2 [see (6.2.1), (6.2.5), (6.2.6), and Figure 6.2],
such values for u and v allow one to analyze, for example, a wide
variety of range capabilities for weapon systems in BONDER's constant-
speed-attack model (6.2.1).
15. These force-annihilation-prediction results may be obtained by
substituting the GLF (6.9.3) and the result (6.6.17) for Q of
Section 6.6 into Theorem 6.7.1.
16. More generally, we could have considered D > 0 but did not do
so because (6.9.14) reduces to (6.9.2) when D - 0.
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17. The naming of t'ie LIOUVILLE-GREEN-LANCHESTER (LGL) approximation
was arrived at in the following manner. The LIOUVILLE-GREEN-
(LG) approximation [34] (also called the WKB approximation [33,
pp. 790-791; 34], the JWKB approximation [28; 341, or even the
WKBJ approximation [30]) to the solution of a second-order linear
differential equation is a very useful approximation that is frequently
made in applied mathematics. Since we have applied the theory of
the LG approximation to LANCHESTER-type equations of modern warfare,
we have called the result the LGL approximation.
18. The LG approximation (see OLVER [34, Chapter 6]) is a widely used
approximation to the solution of a second-order linear ordinary
differential equation. See the previous footnote for further
details.
19. Actually, additicnal hypotheses are required. For simplicity we
have omitted them here (see TAYLOR [48] or Section 8.10 below).
20. An equivalent result is given by MORSE and KIMBALL [31, p. 72].
However, their result is in a considerably less convenient form for
determining the qualitative behavior of the model (6.15.1). For
example, the behavior shown in Table 6.XIII was not detected by
MORSE and KIMBALL, and consequently incorrect battle-outcome-
prediction conditions are implied in [31, p. 72].
21. This interpretation only holds for cases of no replacements and
withdrawals or, more generally, when the rates of replacement
and withdrawal are equal.
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22. In TAYLOR (44] we erroneously stated that (under the stated assump-
tions) (6.17.7) was a condition sufficient to predict an X victory
in a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle. Subsequently, we discovered
the counterexample mentioned in Footnote 10 above (i.e. see TAYLOR
(50]) that shows that such a battle need never end when
b(t) E L(O,+-), i.e. limited cumulative firepower is available to
the X force. Consequently, for example, Theorems 6.6.2 and
6.13.3 each contain the assumption that b(t) • L(O,+-), and
Theorem 6.17.1.
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APPENDIX D: TABLES OF LCS FUNCTIONS FOR ANALYZING
HOMOGENEOUS-FORCE BATTLES
1. Introduction.
This appendix contains the most extensive set of tables of the
LANCHESTER-CLIFFORD-SCHLXFLI (LCS) functions (see Section 6.9) which
are currently available for analyzing homogeneous-force "aimed-fire"
combat modelled by power attrition-rate coefficients with "no offset"
Ua(t) - k a(t+C), and b(t) - kb(t4C) (D.1)
or by certain other attrition-rite coefficients that yield force-level
equations equivalent to (6.9.7). Some military situations modelled with
these coefficients have been discussed above in Section 6.2, e.g. "aimed-
fire" force-on-force combat between two opposing weapon-system types
with the same maximum effective range. These tabulations of LCS functions
allow one to analyze such combat modelled by the power attrition-rate
coefficients (D.1) with somewhat the same facility as one can for the
conscant-coefficient case, and thus they can aid in parametric analyses
(see Section 6.9 for further details).
Tabulations of the hyperbolic-like LCS functions F (m)
Hl(•) , and Ta (&) are given in this appendix fcr various values of
the argument & and for a - 1/2, 1/3, 2/3, 1/4, 3/4, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5,
4/5, 2/7, 3/7, 4/7, 5/7, 4/9, 5/9, 3/11, 5/11, 6/11, 8/11, 5/13, 8/13,
5/17, 12/17, 5/21, and 16/21. As we have seen in Section 6.9 above,
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the LCS functions F (:M and HL (E) may be represented for
a 0 0,-I, -2, ... as the infinite series
2 2k
F w r() {k0 r (k+a)J ' (D.2)
and
H ) U/2) (k+)
Ha_.() = r(k) F. (k!r(k+a+l) (D.3)
while T (Q) is defined by
H l_a (C)
T L (E)- (D.4)ci F(a
The LCS function F (C) corresponds to the hyperbolic cosine, H 1(aMaiI-
to the hyperbolic sine, while T (E) corresponds to the hyperbolic
tangent. A key result that is used to develop force-annihilation-
prediction conditions is that (TAYLOR and BROWN [51 ; ee also Section
6.9 above)
lim T M = a (D.5)S r(a)
2. Use of LCS Functions for Analyzing Homogeneous-Force Combat.
The LANCHESTER-CLIFFORD-SCHLFLI (LC.7) functions F a() and




the power attrition-rate coefficients with "no offset" (D.1). In other
words, the LCS functions arise in solving the differential-equation
force-on-force combat model (6.5.1) with attrition-rate coefficients
(D.1). In order that both a(t) and b(t) E L(t 0 ,T), we must have ij
and v > -I, and we will assume that this latter condition is satisfied.
For such combat, these LCS functions may be used to
(Ti) compute the force levels as functions of time,
(T2) predict force annihilation,
and (T3) compute the time of force annihilation.
Although we have given results for accomplishing these tasks in Section
6.9, for the reader's convenience we will review the salient points and
collect the main results here.
According to (6.5.6) and (6.9.3) , the X force level x(t)
may be written as
x(t) - x0 (Fp(T 0 )Fq(T) - q (To0 )Hp(T)}
-Yo R A Fq(To)Hp (T) - Hp(To)Fq(T)} (D.6)
where p - (a+1)/(i+v+2), q - 1-p
T(t) - (L (t+C)(p+v+2)/2 (D.7)
T0 denotes T(O), X1 - ai- and XR k /kb. Let us observe that




q E (0,1). From (D.5) and (D.6) (see TAYLOR (3] for details) we may
conclude the following force-annihilation-prediction result. [Alterna-
tively, we may substitute (6.9.3) and (6.9.8) into Theorem 6.6.1 to
obtain Theorem D.1.]
THEOREM D.1 (TAYLOR and BROWN [5]): Consider combat between
two homogeneous forces modelled by the FJF LANCHESTER-type
equations (6.5.1) with power attrition-rate coefficients (D.1).
Assume that both W and v > -1. Then the X force will be
annihilated in finite time if and only if
XF ()-r()) H (TO)
XO C__ 47rGo (D.8)"YO AR U q- P r(q) Hq•(T
When T- 0 (i.e. C -O), the X force will be annihilated
in finite time if and only if
x0 < ' q-p r(p) (D.Sa)
YO (-;;2) r(q)
When (D.8) is satisfied, the time to annihilate the X force, ta is
determinedly x(t) - 0. It follows that
a
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oF(T o) +y - Hp(TO
T FT(t X ) p 0 +v+2) H 0  (D.9)
q a )I aq-p
X0 iqCT0)+ YOVXR i+v+2/ Fq(TO)
or, more explicitly,
- F o(rO) + YO qR H C(T
t T T (D.IO)
a0 q XH t0 )+Y0 Vi.' 14+v+2, q _.
where T- and T denote inverse functions. Numerical examples
q
using the above analytical results have been given in Section 6.9 above,
and these examples show the use of the LCS functions for analyzing
homogeneous-force combat.
3. Tables of LCS Functions.
This appendix contains the most extensive set of tables of the
LANCHESTER-CLIFFORD-SCHLFI functions currently available. The Annex
contains tables of five-decimal-place values of the hyperbolic-like LCS
functions Fa(x), Hi-.(x), and T (x) for various values of the argu-
ment x, namely x - 0.00 (0.01) 2.00 (0.1) 10.0, and a - 1/2, 1/3,
2/3 V 1/4 I 3/4 V 1/5 V 2/5 , 3/5 V 4/5, 2/7 , 3/7 , 4/7, 5/7 , 4/9, 5/9, 3/11, 5/11,
6/11, 8/11, 5/13, 8/13, 5/17, 12/17, 5/21, and 16/21. These values of the
1
index a correspond to 4, v - 0V 1/4, 1/2 , 1 1 p-, 2, and 3 in (D.1)
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and allow one to analyze, for example, a fairly wide variety of range
capabilities for weapon systems in the constant-speed-attack model of
Section 6.2. These tables have been calculated by the recursive methods
given in TAYLOR and BROWN [4, Section 8].
A representative tabulation of the hyperbolic-like LCS functions
F Qx), Hl-Q(x), and T a(x) is given in, for example, Tables D.VIIIA
and D.VIIIB of the Annex for a - 3/5. The values of the argument x
are the same as those used for the tabulation of the hyperbolic functions
by ABRAMOWITZ and STEGUN [1]. These particular tables for a - 3/5 also
appear in Section 6.9 and have been used to compute the numerical examples
given there. The reader should note in Table D.VIIIB that from (D.5) the
limiting value of T a(x) as x ) +- (here a- 3/5) is quickly reached,
with three-decimal-place agreement by x - 4.5. Also, the reader should
recall from Section 6.9 (e.g. see Table 6.11) that F 1/2() - cosh •,
H1/2 - sinh •, and TI/ 2 (•) - tanh 9, and consequently Tables D.IA
and D.IB for a - 1/2 are simply tabulations of the hyperbolic functions.
4. Outline of Computational Procedure.
The above-mentioned tabluations of these LCS functions make the
analysis of several important classes of LANCHESTER-type battles (see
Section 6.2) a comparatively easy matter. A couple of numerical examples
have been given in Section 6.9 to show how these LCS functions may be
used to analyze homogeneous-force "aimed-fire" combat modelled by the
power attrition-rate coefficients with "no offset" (D.1). For such analy-
sis of homogeneous-force combat, the author suggests the following
3
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computational procedure (based on the results given above in Section
D.2):
(TASK 1) determine from (D.8) whether the X force can be
annihilated,
(TASK 2) if annihilation is possible, determine the time of
the X force's annihilation as follows:
(SUBTASK 2a) compute Tq (T) by (D.9)
[here T - )
(SUBTASK 2b) using interpolation, determine T x
a
from the appropriate tabulation of TqP
(SUBTASK 2c) using (D.7), compute tXa T-1 (t )'
a a-
From the above, it should be noted that these two determinations involve
only the initial force ratio u0 - x0 /y 0  (and not the individual initial
force levels themselves). For the numerical examples given in Section
6.9, when the X force is not anninilated with a given time tmax* the





In Section 6.9 above, we have shown how the LCS functions
allow one to conveniently obtain much valuable information about the
"aimed-fire" force-on-force attrition model (6.5.1) with power attri-
tion-rate coefficients (D.1) without having to explicitly compute the
entire force-level trajectories. Previously one was limited to only
being able to compute force-level trajectories (see TAYLOR [2] and
TAYLOR and BROWN (4]). With the availability of these tabulations of
LCS functions (see the Annex to this appendix), one can now tell which
side is going to be annihilated and when this event will occur without
explicitly computing the trajectories. Not only did we answer questions
about the qualitative behavior of the force-on-force combat model (e.g.
force annihilation) for specific values of, for example, initial force
levels but also for the entire possible range of values for the initial
force ratio, (i.e. parametric analysis of model behavior).
The results of this appendix may be used for other parametric
analyses, e.g. parametric dependence of battle outcome on weapon-system
capabilities. Thus, the contents of this appendix (see also Section 6.9
above) allow one to develop important insights into the dynamics of combat
between two homogeneous forces with temporal variations in fire effective-
ness. With the availability of these tabulations of the LCS functions,
one can now analyze combat modelled by the power attrition-rate coeffi-
cients (D.1) with somewhat the same facility as he can for the constant-
coefficient case of FlF LANCHESTER-type equations and thus aid in para-
metric analyses of such homogeneous-force battles. For a further discussion
of the significance of such results for military operations research, the
reader is directed to TAYLOR and BROWN [5].
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ANNEX to Appendix D:
Tabulations of the LCS Functions F (x), H W(x), and T (x) for
a 1/2, 1/3, 2/3, 1/4, 3/4, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, 2/7, 3/7, 4/7, 5/7,
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Chapter 7. MODELLING TACTICAL ENGAGEMFNTS
7.1. Introduction
The fundamental role of ground-combat troops (in the U.S. Army's
own words, e.g. see [164, p. iv]) is to "shoot, move, and communicate."
Consequently models of tactical engagements must in some manner represent
the attendant processes of attrition, movement, and C3 (i.e. command,
control, and communications). In this chapter we will focus on the
modelling of force-on-force attrition in tactical engagements, although
some consideration does have to be given to the other two processes of
3movement and C , especially as they influence the attrition process. The
two attrition-modelling approaches that are principally used in the United
States for assessing casualties in simulated combat engagements and that
we will examine in detail are as follows:
(Al) detailed LANCHESTER-type models of attrition in tactical
engagements,
(A2) aggregated-force casualty-assessment models based on the
use of index numbers to quantify military capabilities.
We will try to be fairly comprehensive in our examination of these two
approaches for assessing casualties in tactical engagements, and when
details must be omitted, references to further details in the literature




- - - m -.. . =. _ •,_ • .. .• .. . .
(A3) Coordinated use of a detailed combat model with a less
detailed casualty-assessment model.
Although it has been rather widely used for defense-planning purposes
in both England and West Germany, this third approach (i.e. the
hierarchical-modelling approach) has not been as widely used in the
United States as the first two. Consequently, we will only briefly
discuss the hierarchical-modelling approach and not examine it in nearly
as much detail as the other two.
Combat (especially that between company-sized units and larger) is
a fantastically complex random process. Nevertheless, deterministic
models of combat attrition are commonly used in studies for computational
reasons, since many people believe that they give essentially the same
results for the average course of combat as do corresponding stochastic
models and these stochastic attrition models are considerably less con-
venient to handle (see Chapter 4 for further details). Hence, in the
chapter at hand we will consider only deterministic models of force-on-
force attrition for assessing casualties in tactical engagements. Even
so, the inherent complexity of the combat process leads to great complexity
in operational models of combat attrition. However, for purposes of
understanding the modelling approaches and concepts that may be used to
build such operational models, it is convenient to abstract much simpler
2
auxiliary models and to study them . Thus, we will examine some
simplified versions of tactical-engagement models, with the understanding
that a more complicated model would be desirable for investigation of
actual planning or operational problems.
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As we indicated in Chapter 1, two divergent (but yet complementary)
trends in the use of combat models are the following3:
(Ti) their simplification in order to more easily obtain insights
into the dynamics of combat,
(T2) their enrichment in details in order to better duplicate real-
world combat activities.
In previous chapters we have concentrated primarily on obtaining insights
into the dynamics of combat from relatively simple models rather than
enriching such models in details. Thus, we have emphasized studying rela-
tively simple combat models in order to better understand their basic
nature and to hopefully perceive some significant interrelationships that
are difficult to discern in more complicated models. However, such simple
models may also be the point of departure for building complex operational
models.
In other words, one approach for understanding the reasons why a
large-scale complex operational model produces certain output results for
particular numerical input data is to abstract a simpler model (e.g. one
with fewer variables or simpler functional relations between them) from
the complex one. This simple auxiliary model is then used to investigate
the system dynamics of the more complex model by considering alternative
assumptions and data estimates. The simplified auxiliary model should
be intuitively plausible and transparent but yet it should capture the
basic essence of the complex operational model. This idea of using relatively
simple auxiliary models in conjunction with a complex operational model is,
4
of course, not new , but the author knows of no clear articulation of this
approach for understanding large-scale combat models. Thus, the simple
models that we will consider in this chapter should not be taken literally
but shotuld be considered as a point of departure in the building of more
428
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complex models enriched and elaborated upon in numerous details. In order
that our simple models not be taken literally by the inexperienced modeller,
we will explicitly discuss a few general ideas about modelling, the process
of building a model. Our remakrs should provide some insight into how
ymplex models like, for example, ATLAS, BONDER/IUA, and VECTOR-2 have
evolved 5 .
- Many people (e.g. see MORRIS r114] or BONDER [12]) have come to realize
that models and modelling are two completely different subjects. Thus,
A an individual can be quite knowledgeable about models (i.e. he may under-
stand the assumptions on which they are based and also their characteristics
and properties), but he may still be quite incapable of building his own
model to fit given requirements of, for example, military analysis. It
is not an easy task to adapt (i.e. to "bend and twist") a model to fit
specific scenario and analysis requirements. Modelling (i.e. model build-
ing) is an art, which is probably best learned by active experiences (see
BONDER [12] and MORRIS [1141 for further discussions). Thus, the simple
models presented in the rest of this chapter should not be considered as
final products but rather should be considered as points of departure in
the building of operational models.
W. T. MORRIS [1141 has hypothesized that the process of model building
may be considered to consist of the following three aspects:
(Al) the process of enriching or elaborating upon a basic logical
structure,
(AW) the use of analogy or association with previously developed
logical sturctures to determine the starting point for this
enrichment process,
and (A3) the interactive (i.e. "looping") nature of the model-building
process.
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The enrichment process itself may be considered to consist of the following
elements: (1) making constants into variables, (2) adding more variables,
(3) using more complicated (i.e. nonlinear) functional relations between
variables, (4) using weaker assumptions and restrictions and (5) not sup-
pressing randomness. These general ideas about modelling should be kept
in mind as we subsequently review models of combat attrition. Combat-
modelling theories only provide the "skeleton," and the military operations
research (OR) worker must add the "meat" to the body of the attrition model.
Let us finally make a few observations about the impact of the modern
digital computers on modelling. The computer has essentially freed the
military OR analyst from having to worry about mathematical tractability
and allows him to focus on model formulation (i.e. model building). For
example, with respect to attrition modelling, the military analyst's efforts
should be focused on analyzing the combat process and formulating the
appropriate casualty-assessment equations, since numerical results can
always be generated with the help of a digital computer using standard
numerical integration techniques. However, before the age of digital com-
puters one had to worry about building "useful" models that could be
conveniently "solved." Of course, the mathematical aspects of models are
still important, since many times in the process of model building it is
useful (even essential) to understand the mathematical properties of the
logical structures being enriched in details.
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7.2. Additional Operational Factors to be Considered in LANCHESTER-type
Models.
In adapting LANCHESTER-type models to represent the dynamics of
combat in actual tactical engagements, one should consider a number of
additional operational factors that were omitted by the relatively simple
models considered previously in this book. In particular LANCHESTER's
classic combat formulations essentially considered only the fire effective-
ness (assumed constant) and the numbers of opposing combatants. We can
enrich such simple attrition models by considering additional operational
factors such as those shown in Table 7.1 in order to reflect more of the
inherent complexity of combat (see also Sections 2.6 and 2.7 above).
The LANCHESTER-type models that we consider here and in Sections
7.4 and 7.8 are all deterministic in the sense that each of them will
always yield the same output for a given set of input data. Even though
combat between two military forces is a complex random process, such
deterministic combat models are commonly used for computational reasons
in defense-planning studies, for example, to assess the relative impor-
tance of various weapon-system and force-level parameters, since
many people believe that they give essentially the same results for
the mean course of combat as do corresponding stochastic attrition
models6.
Let us now briefly discuss the operational factors shown in Tible
7.1. Some of them have been considered in previous portions of this
book, and many will be further discussed in this chapter. To begin with,
we have already discussed (see Sectioi. 5.5 above) how for "aimed" fire
the corresponding LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients depend directly
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TABLE 7.1. Additional Operational Factors to be
Considered in LANCHESTER-Type Models.
(1) Range-dependent weapon-system capabilities
(2) Other temporal variations in fire effectiveness
(3) Unit breakpoints
(4) Unit deterioration due to attrition
(5) Target-acquisition considerations
(6) Diversity of weapon-system types
(7) Command, control, end communications
(8) Effects of terrain
(9) Suppressive effects of weapon 3ystems
(10) Effects of logistics constraints
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on factors such as firin3 raýe, rate of target acquisition, hit prob-
abilities, etc. and indirectly on factors such as range between firer
and tarSet, tactical postures of firers and targets, relative motion of
firers and targets, etc. Many people (e.g. BONDER and FA111LL [151) feel
that for many tactical situatiuns the principal factor iS Lhe rsnme betwe'en
firer and target, and we have examined Lhe consequences of such raj£nc
dependence for attrition-rate coefficients in BONDER's consrant-speed-
attack model (see Section 6.2 above). In other cases, however, one may
want to have the attrition-rate coefficients also depend on other opera-
tional factors (e.g. firing rate, target posture, etc.) that may change
over time.
We have already considered modelling battle termination through
unit breakpoints and unit deterioration due to attrition in Chapter 3
(in particular, see Section 3.10; see also Section 2.8). Additionally,
for combat between two homogeneous forces taret acquisition is explicitly
considered through tas which appears in (5.4.1) through (5.4.2), in
BONDER's expression for the LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient in
the case of MARKOV-dependent fire. In Section 5.10 we examined an
important limiting case for such a coefficient when the constraining
factor for killing targets is acquiring them (after ideas of H. BRACKNEY
[201). We found that under such conditions the rate of "aimed"-fire
attrition took the form
dx _ "xy, (7.2.1)
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where A is a constant of proportionality related to the reciprocal of
the time required to acquire a target by visually searching a region (siee
Section 5.10 for further details). Moreover, Vector Research, Inc. (see
[15 4,pp. 203-108] or (117,pp. 43-45]) has developed a more refined (i.e.
enriched in operational details) model for the target-acqufsition process
in engeaenta between heterogeneous forces and its consequent impact an
the attrition process. Since we have not discussed heterogeneous forces
yet, let us do so (and also command, control, and communications) before
returning to a brief general discussion of target-acquisition eftects
(including terrain effects and target selection).
Actual combat (especially large-scale operations) consists of many
different weapon-systeri types (e.g. infantry, tanks, artillery, mortars,
etc.) operating together as "combined-arms teams," and such diversity of
weapon-system UTes may be modelled by explicitly considering the attrition
of each different type. In other words, attention is given to differences
in weapon-system cap1biJ.ity, and each side's forces are disaggregated by
explicitly considering many differcnt veapon-system types that can be
individually attrited. We will consider in greater detail the modelling
of attrition in combat between such heterogeneous forces in Section 7.7
below. Essentially one keeps track of the lasses from all opposing weapon-
sytem types for each target type. The extension of the attrition-modelling
ideas of, for example, Chapter 2 is straightforward and is primarily a prob-
lem of bookkeeping and notation in the simplest case.
One may conside.. conmmand. Pcontrol, and communications (C 3) as influencing
the efficiency of fire directed at enemy targets. Let us briefly examine
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a simple model that vas deve)oped by T. S. SCHREIBER (1271 and provides some
insight into the conctcibution of C3 systems to combat effectiveness 7 .
SCHREIBER considered a battl.:2 between two homogeneous torces in which eachi
unit remains in its original posLt!.on and fires on enemy units untiU it
is destroyed by enemy fire or the battie ends. At the beginning of battle,
each force has complete information about enemy unit locations. SCBREIBER
argued that an intelligence system provides informatior on the effects of
fire on enemy units and also the status of friendly unita, and a command
and control system redirects fire (using information from the intelligence
system) uniformly over surviving enemy units 8 . He hypothesized thez the
effectiveness of the intelligence and command and control systems in this
type of battle could be represented by the fraction of the enemy's destroyed
units from which fire has been redirected. If this fraction is one, fire
is being directed at only "live" enemy units with no "overkill;" but if
it is zero, fire is being directed at the original enemy positions with
attendant "overkill." Consequently, SCHREIBER postulated that the following
LANCHESTER-type equations (for x and y > 0) would model such a combat
situation.
dx . -a xy with x(O) - x0 9
dt Xo- ey(xo - x
(7.2.2)




where x(t) and y(t) denote the X and Y force levels, a denotes
the usual LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient for "aimed" fire [i.e.
it ia given by (5.3.1) and (5.3.2)], ey denotes the "command efficiency"
of the Y force, and b and e denote corresponding quantitites for
the X force. The above equations (7.2.2) have the same functional form
as thoac for BRACKNEY's model with target-acquisition times inversely pro-
portional to target density (5.10.11).Also, 0 < ex, ey < 1 in (7.2.2).
It is instructive to examine the extreme caues fct the aiove attri-
tion process as postulated by SCHREIBER. Tie maximiLm combat efficiency
for the Y force occurs when e.. 1., and theti
dx (7.2.3)
which is th.ý usual attrition ratc for "atmed" fire when Larget-acquisition
times do not depend on the number of enemy targets. The maximum "overkill"
by the Y force (i.e. the least combat effici.ency) occurs when ey - 0.
and then
dx - a x , (7.2.4)
which is the same functional form for the attrition rat4 for "area" fire
against a constant-density defense. HELMBOLD [78] has also noted that
atrrition rates take the form (7.2.3) when fire is ,oncentrated on the
sur-viving targets, and (7.2.4) whet, it is directed at the original positi'ons
with no redistribution.
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SCHREIBER [121] assumed tnat the "command efficiencies" e, and e
were constant in (7.2.2) and used this simple model to show that an increase
in the efficiency of intelligence and command and control systems can be
e.uivalent zo a substantial increase in numerical strength (up to 41.4 per-
cent). His analysis used the following analytical results. Since the
instantaneous casualty-exchange ratio for SCHREIBER's model (7.2.2) is given
by
dx aY - ex(Y0 -)l-- .- y-i - (7.2.3)
dy b x 0 - ey (x 0 - X)7
and the "cimmand efficiencies" eX and ey are assumed to be constant,
one readily obtains the state equation for SCIMREIBER's model.
'0 1 - x(t)l X0~ (2 - ey) + ey 2~~
0y (7.2.26)
"a YO - y(tw! > (2 - ex) + ex(7--.,
which readily yields (cf. Section 3.5) the folloidng coildition for a draw
in a fight-to-tne-finish (3'parity" condition)
bx 02  ay0  (7.z.7)
(2 - ex) (2- e)
Although a state equation is thus radily obtaLned, for example, the X
force-level equation Is not equivalent to any standard differential-eqzuation
form, and consequcutly the X force level X(t) is apparertly not ex-
pressible in terms of "elementary" functions. Considering the left-hand
side of "he parity condition (7.2.7), we can easily show that an increase
it the value of the command afficiency from e to ex increases the
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combat power by the same amount as an increase in numerical strength by a
fraction f given by
,-7 1 , (7.2.8)
X
when follows SCHREIBER's conclusion about the Lradeoff of numerical strength
and the efficiency of C3 systems.
Let us finally note the following two significant shortcomings of
SCHREIBER's above tradeoff analysis: (Si) in the case of mobile units they
would not remain in their original positions, and (02) "command efficiency"
would decline during battle due to damage to the intelligence and comeand
and control systems. Nevertheless, SCHREUBERis simple model (7.2.2) with
constant "command efficiencies" eX and ey has provided some important
insights into the influence of C3 systems on combat power.
We now return to target-acquisition considerations with a brief
general discussion of target-acquisition modelling for combat between
heterogeneous forces. We continue our dJscussion of Vector Research's re-
fined model of the target-acquisition process and its influence onr the
attrition rate. Vector Revearch, Inc. (see [254,pp. 103-108] or [117, pp.
43-45]) considers that the rwo major factors determining the value of an
attrition-rate coefficient are (1) the acquisition and selection of tar-
gets, and (2) the conditional kill rate (i e. the rate at which acquired
targets are destroyed). Concerning target acquisitien and selection, the
proportion of time that a Tyeapon is actively engaging an enemy tacget de-
pends on the interaction of three processes:
(P1) the line-of-saiht process (whitoh determines when a given
target is visible or invisible to a potential firer),
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(P2) the target-acquisition process (which determines the time
required for a firer to acquire a particular target),
and (P3) the target selection process (which specifies a scheme by
which a weapon crew chooses to engage a particular target
from among those that have been acquired).
In other words, the effects of terrain are considered by computing inter-
visibility (i.e. existence of line of sight) for each target-firer pair
based on their map locations. Therefore the complex operational models
developed by Vector Research must keep track of all firer and target po-
sitions during the evolution of battle9 . The exact way in which the above
three processes interact depends in an essential way on which of two kinds
of acquisition and target-selection modes the weapon systems employ--serial
or parallel acquisition (see Section 5.16 for further details; see also
(39], [154], or (117]). Suppressive effects of weapon systems may be
accommodated in Vector Research's models (e.g. see [72]), k-ut the phenome-
nologlcal basis of such suppressive effects is poorly understood at this
time (see the "R~port of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group
on Suppression" [45]).
Although the process of suppression is poorly understood, most military
arelysts feel that the suppressive effects of weapon systems should be in-
cluded in any model of combat operations. In general, two ways to model
auppressive effects within the context of detailed LANCHESTER-type formu-
lations are (see TAYLOR [141,pp. A-56 - A--60] or BARR [ 81 for further de-
tails):
(a) modify LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients to reflect
degraded fire effectiveness of the firing units due to firers




(b) consider combatants of a given class to be in different states
(in the simplest model there are two states: unsuppressed and
suppressed) with different fire effectiveness and vulnerability
to enemy fire in each state; this approach requires some model
of state transitions.
The reader can see from the above that there is no problem in modelling
suppressive effects. However, there unfortunately is no supportable data
on troop behavior when under fire to use in such models. Thus, the major
problems are to scientifically determine functional relations and to
estimate the parameters in any hypothesized model of suppressive effects.
Although the U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC)
has conducted many suppression experiments and the U.S. Army has reviewed
the entire topic of fire suppression (see [45]), the representation of
suppressive effects in casualty-assessment models (in particular, LANCHESTER-
type models) remains a major problem area.
The effects of logistics constraints may be modelled in various ways.
The main approach is to represent the consumption and distribution of
various types of supplies (e.g. ammunition, fuel, etc.). When supplies
of a particular type are depleted to some given critical level, the combat
effectiveness of a unit is appropriately modified (see [117J,BONDER and
FAR.RELL [15], KERLIN and COLE [98], and CHASE [28] for further details).
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7.3. Modelling Small-Scale Engagements versus Modelling Large-Scale Ones.
There is a fundamental difference between modelling (with differential
equations) ,;mall-scale engagements and modelling large-scale ones: for
small-scale operations it may be possible to reasonably represent force
interactions and attendant attrition rates with a few differential equations,
but for large-scale operations of conventional armed forces the same approach
might well involve hundreds (and possibly even thousands) of differential
equations tied together through battlefield operations. In other words,
large-scale warfare involves a seemiugly overwhelming amount of detail
because of the very scale of operations. Small-scale operations are usually
considered as fire fights between at most a few different weapon-system
types on each side, but in large-scale warfare one must consider many dif-
ferent weapon-system types (both combat and combat-support systems) operating
as combined-arms teams in sustained operations that involve not only fire
fights but also maneuver, reconnaissance, logistics, committing of reserves,
allocetion of tactical aircraft to missions, etc. Thus, in large-scale
warfare there are not only many more military units and types of systems,
but these systems and units engage in a much wider variety of activities
than do the few types in small-scale engagements.
Moreover, the scale of combat operations actually dictates what is
a feasible approach for modelling a particular type of engagement (see
Figure 7.1). As we saw in Chapter 1, there are three main approaches used











(BATrAUON-SIZED UNITS AND SMALLER) X X
LARGE- UNIT ENGAGEMENT
(DIVIKI4-SIZED UNITS AND LARGER) X X
Figure 7,1. Feasible modelling approach related to scale of
combat operations.
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Each of these approaches involves a different level and amount of detail,
and each provides a different degree of resolution to battlefield operations.
The higher the degree of resolution, the higher (of course) is the amount
of details that the model considers. Furthermore, the total amount of
details that is feasible to handle depends on current computer technology.
As we saw in Chapter 1 (recall Table 1.III relating combat-assessment
approach to the scale of combat operations), Monte Carlo simulations have
been used to assess casualties in small-unit combat (i.e. combat between
battalion-siz .1 units and smaller), while the firepower-score approach
applies primarily to large-scale (i.e. corps-level and theater-level) com-
bat. However, LANCHESTER-type models12 have been developed in the United
States for the full spectrum of combat operations, from small-unit combat
to large-scale operations. Thus, if one wants to assess casualties for
simulated tactical engagements between battalion-sized units or larger,
there are essentially only two types of models that have been widely used
in the United States for assessing casualties in such tactical engagements:
(Tl) detailed LANCHESTER-type models,
and (T2) aggregrated-force models based on quantifying military
capabilities with index numbers (i.e. firepower-score models).
Although one could also consider a third approach of employing a hierarchy
of models, such an approach has not been widely used in the Uited States,
and we will consequently not consider in detail in this monograph (see
Section 7.20, however, for a brief conceptual discussion).
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For very simple small-scale engagements it has always been possible
to model in detail attrition in fire fights (provided that forces and opera-
tions are not too complicated). Here, we mean not just to formulate a com-
bat model but to develop an operational model from which numerical results
may be obtained. However, for large-scale warfare it has been possible only
relatively recently to model attrition in detail (i.e. to attrite each dif-
ferent type of weapon system individually). The modern large-scale digital
computer has provided the computational capability for detailed modelling of
large-scale military operations. In fact, without the modern digital
computer operational models of virtually any degree of complexity would be
impossible. In particular, the advent of the modern high-speed large-
scale digital computer has made feasible not only high-resolution Monte
Carlo combat simulations such as DYNTACS and CARMONETTE, automated "quick
games" such as ATLAS, and other theater-level firepower-score-based combat
models such as CE and TBM-68, but it has also made possible differential
combat models such as BONDER/IUA and its many derivatives 1 3 . Furthermore,
the relation between feasible modelling approach and the scale of combat
operations (as portrayed in Figure 7.1) depends in an essential way on the
state of the art of computer technology.
All the above complex operational models that are conceptually based
on LANCHESTER-type equations (e.g. BONDER/IUA, DIVOPS, or VECTOR-2), however,
model combat attrition in detail and explicitly consider the many different
weapon-system types that can be individually attrited. These weapon-system
types include different types of weapon systems in maneuver units and dif-
ferent types of fixed-wing aircraft, as well as separately represented field
artillery, air defense artillery, and helicopter weapon systems. Such
LANCHESTER-type models represent attrition in a way that reflects the in-
ternal dynamics of combat activities and relates these dynamics to specific
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weapon-system parameters and tactics considered important in small-unit
engagements. The effects of individual weanon-system types on the outcome
of a theater-level campaign are clearly observable and bear a clear relation-
ship to the input performance assumed (see [117] for further details).
A different approach for modelling attrition in large-scale (i.e.
theater-level) combat operations is to represent attrition in a macroscopic
fashion. The many different weapon systems on one side are all combined
together by using firepower scores into a single scalar quantity, the "com-
bat capability" (or firepower index' of the force, and combat causes
attrition of this index number. The attrition of combat capability is de-
termined with the help _Z casualty-rate curves that relate the relative
combat capabilities of the forces (expressed in terms of the two firepower
indices) and other tactical factors to their casualty rates (expressed in
an aggregated fashion). Losses of individual weapon-system types are then de-
termined by some means of disaggregation. Such aggregated loss-rate relations
are apparently largely judgmentally determined (although having some alleged
basis in empirical combat data), and the author knows of no conceptual ap-
proach or mathematical models for relating weapon-system-performance para-
meters and other operational variables to the numberical determination of
these aggregated-force loss rates.
In the rest of this chapter we will discuss various aspects of model-
ling tactical engagements. We will first consider a number of examples from
guerrilla-warfare applications because the engagements are of small enough
scale to yield simple (but yet detailed) LANCHESTER-type models and also
because such modelling information is readily available in the open litera-
ture. We will then progress to more complicated LANCRESTER-type models,
including models of combat between heterogeneous forces. The firepower-
( .score approach and aggregated-force models are then discussed. Finally, we
briefly discuss current operntional models of large-scale conventional warfare.
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7.4. Applications to Guerrilla Warfare.
The literature on applications of LANCHESTER-type models to the study
-of guerrilla warfare (see DEITCHMAN [44] and SCHAFFER [1251 is small but of
particular interest because it contains the only examples of tactical engage-
ments kparticularly ambushes) to appear in the open literature. These two
papers contain many interesting modelling ideas as well as several detailed
models of small-scale engagements. Moreover, the ambush models considered
by these authors have much wider applicability than just to guerrilla war-
fare, since (for example) the "force-oriented defense" (see HOLDSWORTH [88]),
which has been proposed for NATO operations, is based on a tactical doctrine
of rather wide-spread use of ambushes.
DEITCHMAN [44] in 1962 introduced the idea of modelling an ambush with
"aimed" fire for the ambushers and "area" fire for the ambushees, e.g. F/FT
attrition. He used such a simple model to argue that the attacking guerrillas,
heavily outnumbered overall, can win if both sides are divided into small
groups, and the guerrillas always attack in ambushes. Such a result is in
consonnance with recent history, which shows that defending regulars must
have overall force ratios above teu to one to meet such local guerrilla
attacks at all successfully. SCHAFFER [125] subsequently in 1965 studied
guerrilla-warfare engagements in more detail and under a variety of operational
conditions (i.e. skirmish, ambush, and siege). He developed several LANCHESTER-
type models for small-force guerrilla engagements that are typical of the
early stages of insurgency. These models included the effects of supporting
weapons and the discipline or morale of the troops involved, and they allowed
for temporal variations in weapon-system effectiveness (i.e. firepower).
His paper is an excellent source of modelling ideas. SCHAFFER used these
models to develop insights into the important attack parameters in guerrilla
warfare and also to quantitatively justify some new military hardware. We
will now examine the ideas of these two important papers in more detail.
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7.5. DEITCHMAN's Basic Ambush Model.
The goal of DEITCHMAN's investigation [44] was to develop a quentitative
explanation of why high counterguerrillo./guecrilla force ratios have beea
required for regulars (i.e. counterguerrillas or counterinsurgents) to defeat
insurgents in guerrilla warfare (see Figure 7.2). He sought to explain this
empirical fact with a simple model. DEITCHMAN's simplified conceptualization
of guerrilla warfare was as follows:14 the defending regular aL'my (counter-
insurgents) must fragment itself to defined the many possible points that are
vulnerable to guerrilla attack and to hunt down the many guerrilla bands;
guerrilla warfare itself occurs as a sequence of engagements between small
groups drawn from the oveiall forces. Thts, the overall forces do not engage
each other directly in combat, but small groups drawn from them sequentially
fight battles. As Figure 7.2 shows us, history indicates that the defending
regulars must have overall force ratios abo,'e ten to one to defc•t the gterrillas
under such circumstances.
DEITCUMAN thus considered guerrilla warfare as a sequence of engage-
ments between small groups drawn from overall forces. H. K. WEISS [1581 had
developed the following LANCHESTER-type squations to approximately represent
such combat between two homogeneous forces in which both sides use "aimed"
fire (with constant target-acquisitio.l times)
dx - p. with x(, ) -x o ,
dt m
(7.5.1)
y . -b with y(O) - yo ,
dt n
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Figure 7.2. Estimated force ratios in guerrilla wars between
,.he end of World War II and 1962 (from DEITCHMAN [44]).
Although the erd of the Vietnam War has been indicated,
the data upon which this figvre is based dates from
ro later than 1962,
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where x(t) denotes the overall X force level, m denotes the (initial)
size of X's combar groups, b denotes a constant LANCHESTMI attrition-rate
coefficient representing the fire effectiveness of a single X combatant, and
y(t), n, and a denote corresponding quantities for, the Y force. We will
sketch the derivation of these equations at the end of thle section.
The condition for a draw in a fight to the finish (i.e. "parl cy"
condition) is readily obtained from (7.5.1) as (cf. Section 3.5)
0o (a n (7.5.2)
For larger values of the initial force ratio, i.e. x0/y 0 > (a/b)(n/m), X
will win such a fight to the finish; and for smaller ones, the X force will
lose. Thus, engagement outcome depends on three relative parameters (cf. Section
2.2. and 6.6 above): (1) the initial overall force ratio (xo/yo), (2) the
relative fire effectiveness (b/a), and (3) the ralative (initial) size of
the small groups (m/n). The break-even (or parity) point expressed in terms
of the initial force ratio as a fumction of relative group size is shown in
Figure 7.3 for various values of relative fire effectiveness b/a. This figure
shows that a side that is heavily outnumbered overall can still win if in all
the individual engagements its groups are larger than te enemy's or if the
relative fire effectiveness is sufficiently in its favor.
DEITCHMAN [44] argued that for all "reasonable" values of the Zbove
relative parameters (i.e. x0/yo, b/a, and m/n), the parity condition (7.5.2)
implies that an excessively large (initial) local force ratio is required for
the guerrillas to win. For example, let X be ths counterinsurgents aad
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.1 .2 .5 1.0 2 5 iO 0
Relative ( initiol size of the small groups, m /n
Figure 7.3. Break-even (or parity) point in the initial overall force
ratio as a function of relative group s•.ze for combat
between small groups drawn from overall larger forces
(after DEITCHXM.N [44]/. Tnis figure shows up that, for
example, for (b/a) - 2.0 a value of (m/n) - 0.125 is
required for parity when (x0 /y 0 ) - 4.0. If we let X
denote dre counterinsurgents (counterguerrillas) anld Y
denote the guerrillas, then the counterinsurgents X
will win such a sequence of engagements with (b/a) - 2.0
for all combinations of (m/n) and (x0 /y 0 ) lying
above the straight line labelled (b/a) - 2.0.
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Yt be the guerrillas. Then (7.',2) (or, eqwivalently, Figuv-e 7,3) says that,
for exkmple, a local (initial) zorce ratio of (m/n) -i 0.125 is required for
parity when (.ý/yo) -t 4,0 and (b/a) s 2.0, The latter two valued are taken
to represent the guerrillas being less numerous overall and possess 4ng
relatively less effecrlv-, firepowizr than the couraterinsurgents. [DEITCHMAN
argued that relative fire effLCtivenees (b/a) should favor the counterinsurgents,
since onn ,;ould expect the guerrillas to use crude weapons or a limited number
of captured ones.] Thus, for sLch "typical" values WEISS'S [1581 model (7.5.1)
requires that the guerrillas must hteavily vndtnumber the counterinsurgents in
all the local ergagements in order to be able to win. Peuce, WEYSS's model
is in this case at variance wtth empirical evicencb that guerrillas can win
(and, indeed, many times have [recall Figure 7.21) wi..h equal or ilferior
numbers in the local cngasements. DELTMI21AY then sought to find tactics that
would allow the guerrillas to win with equal or inferior numbers in the local
engagemer as: lie consequently postulated that 'imbush tactics by the guerrillas
could achieve this end.
Thus, DEITQhIArN conceptualized that a counte Linsurgent force, say
X, would move through an area iearchtin for gu'errillas or Intenlirg tu a' tack
a guerrilla base, The guerrillas., denoted as the Y force, should counter
such a tactic by preparing an ambush for the approaching counterinsurgents.
In this ambush engagement, the force being ambus ,:1 (i.e. the ambushees X)
are in plain sight (i.e. full view) of the arb,'vuhers Y, who use "aimed"fire,
so that X's casualty rate is proportional to only tho- number of Y ambushers,
with target-acquisition times negliglble. On the othar hand, the aabushers
are hidden, and the ambusheei (who have been "caught by surpirse") fire
blindly Into the general area occu'ied by th2 ambushers (i.t. they return
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"area" fire) so that Y's casualty rate is proportional to the product of the
numbers of both X ambushees and Y ambushers. Thus, DEITCHMAN [441 hypothesized
that attrition in such a homogeneous-force ambush could be modelled by 1 5 (see
Figure 7.4)
Sdx
dt - -ay (AMBUSHEE ATTRITION) with x(O) - x0 ,
(7.5.3)
... -bxv (AM-BUSHER ATTRITION) with y(O) - yodt "
where for the simplest case considered by DEITCHMAN the atczition-rate
coefficients a and b would be given by (see Chapter 5 for further details
about more sophisticated models for them)
a = vYs P and b - v . (7.5.4)
Y SSIC.Y X A 7
with v and v denoting the firing rates of X and 1, PSSKXY denoting
che single-bhot kill probability of Y .gainst X, aVx denot.ing the vulnerable
area of a single X target, and A,, denoting the "presented" area occupied
by the Y force. Here, we assume that the anbushees return "small arms" fire
(see Section 5.13 for other types of. "araa" fire, e.g. "arýillery" fire). We also
assume that the X force fires iuto the actual region occupied by the Y force,
with modificatJon of (7.5.4) being required if this does not coincide with the
region i- which X believeg the ambushers to occupy and into which hb con-
sequen:ly directs his fire.











b2 (x 0 - x2) - a(y 0 - y) , (7.5.5)
so that (see Section 3.5) the ambushing Y force will win an engagement with
x
fixed force-level breakpoints f BP Xo a YBP B if and only if
(X)2 fY(x0 ) 2a { 1  B }
Y0- <fX p2B (7.5.6)
~BP~
Thus, parity exists between the forces in a fight to the finish for
(x0)2 2a 2V y PSSKxy
Sb VX (aVx /AY)
LkL us finally note that these results all hold for a single engagement.
DEITCHMAN [44] used the above simple ambush model [and, in particular,
the parity condition (7.5.7)] to conclude that:
(Cl) attacking guerrillas, heavily outnumbered overall, can win if
both sides are subdivided into small gr?,ips and the guerrillas
attack with local numerical superiority, but the local superiority
required on the part of the guerrillas is greatly reduced if
ambush tactics are used,
(C2) all things being equal, the ambushee cannot win in such an
ambush engagement,




DEITCHMAN added that the overall high defender/guerrilla force ratios that
have historically been required for counterguerrillas to win against guerrilla
attacks are very difficult to reduce significantly. These conclusions were
based on the following type of analysis. Consider an ambush by guerrillas
such as we have examined above. Then parity between the guerrillas and the
ambushees is given by (7.5.7), and (2a/b) in (7.5.7) can easily be on the
order of several hundred so that a few ambushers can annihilate many ambushees.
For example, PSSK may be on the order of 0.1, aVX may be about 1 square foot
for a man taking available cover in the terrain, and 2 men .can easily be hidden
in a region of uncerzainty of 1.600 square feet; th,-n for equal firing rates,
(2a/b) - 320 so that according to (7.5.7), for example, 2 ambushers can
annihilate a force of 25 ambushees.
The force levels as functions of time, i.e. x(t) and y(t), are rather
complicated for the simple model (7.5.3). To develop them, for example, we
may solve (7.5.5) for y and substitute the result into the first equation
of (7.5.3) to obtain
dx a
{x2 + [(2b/a)y2 -
x ]} 2
whence integration (e.g. see the "C.R.C. tables" [871) yields the results
shown in Table 7.11. The complexity of these results for the simple model with
constant coefficients (7.5.3) provides some insight into why numerical integra-
!-ion techniques must usually be used for LANCHESTER-type models of any degree
of complexity. DEITCHMAN gave numerical results for x(t) and y(t) for
a number of illustrative battles. He observed that the victor can reduce
his fractional loss (i.e. casualties expressed as a fraction of the unit's
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TABLE 7.11. Analytical Expressions for Force Levels x(t) and y(t)
in DEITCHMAN's Ambush Model (7.5.3).
u 2
(a) Whem ambusher Y wins a fight to the finish (i.e. 2 x0 < aYO):
for 0 < t < B/A
x(t) - -- Y0 - xo tan(-At + B)
y(t) - {y -_L x2} {sec(-At 
+ B)}2
for B/A < t
x(t) - O and y(t) - 2 x 2
where
b ~/2a 2A 2= V ;' YO Xo
B tan-l Xo
2ab 2
(b) When ambushee X wins a fight to the finish (i.e. J- x2 > aYO):
2 0
for 0 < t
X(t) - 2 - 2a coth(A't + B')
VxO T~ YO
b 2
y(t) 2x Y 2
{sinh(A't + B'))
where
A' = O Xo-•-L
B' 1 coth-I l( a
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initial force level) by initially committing more men to battle (see
Section 8.9 for more general results of this nature).
Let us finally sketch the development of WEISS's model for combat among
small groups (7.5.1). WEISS (158] observed that warfare was tending in the
mid 1950's towards employment of small combat groups operating independently.
He consequently sought to develop a simple model for aggregating a large number
of such engagements between small groups. Let us therefore consider an X
force of overall numerical strength x0 and assume that it' is divided into
"combat groups," each of which initially contains m0  combatants. There will
be NX - x0 /m such groups. Similar quantities for the Y force are
analogously defined, with n0  denoting the initial strength of their combat
groups. We will consider "aimed-fire" combat between two such small groups;
it may be modelled by
dm -an with m(O) - m.
dts
(7.5.8)
dnd -bm with n(O) - n
where m(t) and n(t) now denote the force levels of the two small groups
at time t in the engagement, and m and n denote their initial (or start-
ing) values (equal to m0 and no when two "fresh" units fight). For one
engagement, we then have
a(n 2s- 2) - b(m 2 - 2) (7.5.9)
s f 5 f
4
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where the subscript f denotes a final value (i.e. a value at the end of such
an engagement).
Consider now a sequence of engagements between pairs of two such
combat groups drawn from the overall forces (which have initial strengths x0
and y0 ) such that (1) each engagement is a fight to the finish, (2) the
survivors of one engagement subsequently take on a fresh enemy combat group
(a full initial strength) in another fight to the finish, and (3) the sequence
ultimately leads to a draw (i.e. all the initial overall forces x0  and yo
are annihilated). By repeatedly applying (7.5.9) to engagements of such a
sequence and adding, we find that all terms not involving the initial strengths
cancel out, and the condition for a draw consequently is
or
arOY0y bmox 0 , (7.5.1G)
since there were, for example, (x 0 /m0 ) engagements in which the X group
started at full strength. Notice that when all men on each side are in a
single unit, (7.5.10) reduces to LANCHESTER's square law; but when we have a
sequence of engagements between two individuals, (7.5.10) reduces to LANCHESTER's
linear law. Can we devise LANCHESTER-type equations that yield (7.5.10)
as a parity condition for a fight to thp finish? Denoting mo and no simply
as m and n, we observe that the equations (7.5.1) yield the desired parity
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7.6. SCHAFFER's Models of Guerrilla Engagements.
SCHAFFER's [125] goal was to develop LANCHESTER-type models for studying
(e.g. for evaluating casualty claims for) small-force guerrilla engagements that
are typical of Phase II insurgency.1 6 His models included the effects of
supporting weapon systems and the discipline or morale of the troops involved.
SCHAFFER also allowed the fire effectivenesses of the different weapon-system
types to vary with time and model temporal variations in firepower due to, for
example, changes in the tactical postures of combatants during a fire fight.
A number of his models explicitly considered such time-dependent attrition-rate
coefficients. As is the case for operational models with almost any degree
of complexity, analytical results were not expressible in terms of "elementary"
functions, and numerical results had to be generated by numerical integration.
SCHAFFER's article [125] is particularly important because it is
apparently the first reported use of LANCHESTER-type models to study actual
combat situations and because of the many interesting models that it contains.
He apparently used these models in studies at RAND to provide insights into
the important attack parameters in guerrilla warfare and to quantitatively
justify new hardware concepts (e.g. fast-response from supporting weapons).
SCHAFFER [125] first considered the overall military manpower flow in
Phase II insurgency (see Figure 7.5) and examined small (typically 100-man)
engagements classified as (1) skirmishes, (2) ambushes, or (3) sieges.
Thus, each side has a large manpower pool from which small fighting groups
are drawn for guerrilla-type operations. He assumed that for such operations
food, weapons, and ammunition were inexhausbile. Traditional LANCHESTER
combat theory had previously considered only battlefield casualties, but
SCHAFFER added operational losses and captures to his models.
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Figure 7.5. SCHAFFER's conceptualization of the military manpower
flow in Phase II insurgency (from SCHAFFER [1251).
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SCHAM'F1R developied. a gt*neralized LAN(ES.TER t•heory for force depletýon
tn such small engagecents. Fe considered losses due to t:he following source,4
(SI) batlefleld casualties,
and (02) surrenders and desertions.
L%.!t X denote the counterinsurgents ind Y denote the guerrillas (!nsurgenLs).
SCHAFFER considered combat between small groups of infintry withI supporting
weapons and took the rates of battlefiild ca.iaalti*s to be elven b,"
c - a(r,x)y E I i(r,x) Wi(t) with x(O) - x0 #
i
(7.6.1)
dt - -b(t,y)x - L (ty) W t) with y(O) - yo ,)c
where (dx/dt) denotes the casiualty rate for the X force, b , b(t,y)
denotes the fire effectiveness of a single X combatant (i.e. LA'.'HESTER
attrition-rate coefficient), E (t,y) denotes the effectIveness of I's jth
suoporting weapon-system type, W (t' denotes the number of X's jth support-
ing weapon-system type thac is firing at time t, and (dy/dt)c, a = a(-,x),
Ei, an( Wi denote similar quantities tor the Y force. Here the subscript
i refers to the Y force and j to the X force. Wi and W have been
taken t- be futictions nf time, since the supporting weapons are taken to be
employed f.r only portions of the battle.
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The rate o.f -,ur. xdera, an deserticss were hrpothesited by SCHAFFER
to delend on (1) the friendly namualty rate, and (2) the difference between
rhe friendly/eaemy force rttio and unity (i.e. an unfriendly force ratio
causea the fciendly fal-ces to "fade away"). Assumtog that the surrender and
desertion :atas i-ere ýxpressible ,s su.s of separate pom;.r series, SC'.!AFFER
wrote
d x rx [PXl + 2 +
( A) r dt it.
d 1 y4  L ?YI + P'2 c )J
L q~1  -Y+ 1 q - I
'wiere qk - i for y/x < 1, and -~ 0 for x/y ( 1. SCHALFFER [125, pp.
461-462] went on to digcusr what restrictions should be placed on the signis
of the 'coefficibnts p. q, and r in (7.6.2). He pointed out that for the
types of engagements between small units considered by him (i.e. both dx/dt an l
dy/cit mut always be < 0), one must always have both (dx/dt) and
+ 2d
(dy/dt)s~ <_ 0 (i.e. a net rate cf loss due to surrende~s and desertions), and
hence h assumed tha both rx and r < o. [SCA <FE1R observed that "in a
self-policing military group" it can be assumed thai r - 0.] Thus, on
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I
pyrsica.l/opo.rational grounri. w- muiit alwayvi h.xva both 4. 'k ad q,) Ž0 for
,•.l1 irtegers k > I; qre mull analogously have borth V., and <' 0 The
coefficients p n pk q ird qYk roficrt the wotivation. and diocitp.'ine
of the troops involved in tha engagemert, and rhe greater the magnitaddcr t•ie
abso.J,lute v.lue of such a coefficienz, tht poorer the motivatiou and disciplirne
of the trools involved.
1 7
For computational purposes SCHAFFER only retained the first few terms
in (7.6.2). Thua, his equations for the total race of force der.. ion, e.g,
dx/dt - (,x/dt)c -. (dx/dtis+d, w'.-re (see Figure 7..5)
dx .- _('p) a(Lx)y 1 -I 1 ( x ..
dt 1 x x 2
- (l-p 7 ) .El(tx) WitW) with x(0) -x
(7.6.3)
- -(i-pr) b(t,y)x - qyl - 1 - qY - 1)2
\ ~- (l-Py Ej (t,y) Wj (t) with 7(O) -YO
j
where both pX aud p j 0, qXk _ 0 with q 0 when y/x < I, and
qY >0 with qY - 0 when x/y < I. The larger that Ip x, Ip Y , I, XqI, or
lqy I is, the poorer is the motivation and discipline of the soliders involved
(i.e. as discussed above, these coefficients model the morale and discipline
of the troops involved). Also, for the appropriate choices of values for
q Xk and qYk the terms that contain (y/x - 1) and (x/y - 1) can simulate
the act of breaking off an engagement, which is in keeping with the guerrilla










Figure 7.6. Diagram of guerrilla-warfare engagement to which
SCHAFFER's general model applies.
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or at soma other disadvantage, . wil 1 gradutally disengage, with the remaining
troops fightinug a rear-gurard aution). S01AFFER then applied his above
•e.ali~ed .ttrit.f.n IA2. auiotýs (7.b3) ;o the following three special types
of guerrilla-warfare engageýeents: (T) •.kirmlsh, (I1) ambush, ana (l11)_sie.
As noted above, the solution to a LVICRESTER-:ype model as :umplex as (7.6.3)
is most likely not exqpressible in cer-ms of "elementary" functions, 1 8 anM con-
sequently one must use numarltcal-integration teclomiques to generate nvmerical
results for specific battles.
SCFAFFER U25, p. 4631 used the. word skirmish to denote an engagement
with a relatively limited commitment of resources. He assumed Lhat the primary
force19 cn each sice :Is composed of riflemen ard that every rifleman on each
side uses "aimed" fire (see Sections 2.2 and 6.5 for further discussions of
"aimed" fire) with an associated constant actrition-rate coefficient modellir.g
their fire effectiveness. In this case equations (7.6.3) become
dx (l.-px)ay , _ 1) - q 2 ._ i)2d• X - qxI x x
- (l-P x. ) Ei(t,x) Wi(t) with x(0) - x0
(7.6.4)
-- (1-,o )bx - qhY ' 1) -. q(~ 1~
dt Y1 \y ' Y2 (y
- (l-PY) E j(t,y) W (t) with y(O) - y
where a and b denote constant attrition-rate coefficients.
SCR&FFER examined numerical results (generated by numerical-integration
techniques) for a variety of specific battles modelled by (7.6.4). lie concluded
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that morale and discipline (in addition to weapon-system effectiveneraes ana
the initial force ratio) can have a sLgnificant effect on the outcome of battle.
He showed that the numerically weaker side can win when discipline/morale
factors outweigh firepower disparities. In his calculations SCHAFFER took
numerical values of 0, -0.5, and -1.0 for both pX and py [see (7.6.4)],
where (for example) pX M -1.0 means that one X combatant deserts his
fighting group for each casualty that the group sustains. Values of 0.04 were
assigned to both a and also b. SCHAFFER modelled these attrition-rate
coefficients (see Chapter 5 for more sophisticated models) by, for example,
a = vYPSSKxY 'YP(KIH)Xy , SSH (7.6.5)
where AT
PS - . (7.6.6)
2 y
Here v denotes Y's firing rate, AT denotes the presented area of a prone
X infantrymAn to rifle fire over average terrain, P(KIH)XY denotes the prob-
ability that an X target is killed when he is hit by a round of Y's iire,
and P SSH denotes single-3hoc hit probability. SCHAFFER actually gave sample
numerical values for these parameters to the above model (7.6.4). An illustrative
ave..age rate of fire of v - 5 pounds/minute would lead to expenditure of
10 lbs of .22-cal rifle ammunition in about 80 minutes. SCHAFFER considered
the following values to be typical: AT - 0 1 ft2 at a range of 100 feet,
P(KIH) - 0.5, and a - 1 ft (corresponding to 10 mils at 100-ft range).
The single-shot hit probability PSSHxY given by (7.6.6) is computed according
to the "small-target" approximation (see MORSE and KIMBALL [l15,p. 1121), which
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applies when the single-shot dispersions are "much larger" than the target.
Some skirtaish results for the case in which there are no supporting weapons
on either side are shown in Figure 7.7.
SCHAFFER also considered skirmishes in which a single type of supporting
weapon backed up the weaker side. For example, when the cuimterguetrillas bring
up supporting weapons, he modelled combat by (see. Figure 7.8)
dx -.- -) a(S )y - q (Yx - 1)2 with x(O) - ;70
(7.6.7)
. -(i-py) { bx + S (t,y) }- q 1)2 with (7..)
dt Yc Y wihyO)yJ
'whe-e S yc (t,y) -1 E (t,y) W (t) and the integer index j takes on a single
value. In other words, S M S (t,y) denotes the effectiveness of the single¶~cc
type of supfort4 .ng weapon. Suppressive effects of the supporting weapons
are considered by having the fire effectiveness of enemy infav.:rv decreased by
the supporting fire, i.L. a - (S c) with a(S c) being a decreasing function
of S . The effectiveness of the supporting fires is modelled by the simplified
formula given in Section 5.13, namely
20
a.
Se V 'U •Y Y' (7.6.8)
where V denotes the firing race of X's supportirg weapons, aL denotes
UL
the lethal area cf a single round of these supporting ueapons, and fly denotes
the area of the region in which the Y force is considered to be randomly
dispersed (and into which the supporting weapons are assumed to deliver "area"
fire). SCHAFFER conceptualized that such a skirmish ,vuld begin without
( any supporting veapors for the counter insurgents, supporting fires would be
cailed for at come time after engagement initiation, and after some additional
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20 4 0.08 0.08 0403 0.06 0.06 0
4 0.08 0.06 0
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Figure 7.7. Results for model of skirmish with no supporting weapons
on either side (after SCHAFFER [125]). In this case, the
battle dynamica are given by
Tt d (1 - Px)ay - q(Z ...)2









Figure 7.8. Skirmish in which the counterguerrillas bring up
supporting weapons. Here S denotes the effectiveness
C
of supporting fires and is modelled by (7.6.8). If
we ignore surrenders and desertions, then the combat
dynamics are given byIdxI
- -a(S )y,
S-bx - S (t~y).
Suppressive effects are modelled by taking a - a(S c),
i.e. the fire effectiveness of a Y combatant





delay the supporting fires would arrive. He modelled this process by
S c(t,y) - wyU(t)y H(t - td) , (7.6.9)
where wyu(t) - vUaLu /A [cf. equation (7.6.8) above], td denotes the delay
U .
time for the supporting fires to be added to the battle, and H(t-td) denotes
the "unit step function"
H(t-t d 0 for 0 < t < td (7.6.10)
1 for td-i t .
Such a step function allows us to "turn on" the supporting fires after a given
amount of delay.
SCHAFFER took DEITCHMAN's ambush model (see the previous section) as a
point of departure and added temporal variations to fire effectiveness modelled
by attrition-rate coefficients. SCHAFFER emphasized that it was important to
use time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients (cf. Section 6.2 above) and that
such time dependence was the dominant factor in an ambush. He argued that
temporal variations in fire effectiveness are the result of changes in cover
(i.e. shielding) available to the ambushees and their gradual transition from
area to aimed fire over the course of the ambush. Because of the element of
surprise in thi ambush, the ambushees' cover is initially minimal but inproves
as they "take cover." On the other hand, the ambushers' position is relatively
secure and it does not change until they choose to break off the engagement.
The ambuehees initially return area fire because they have been "caught by
surprise," and this fire transitions (i.e. changes) to aimed fire as they
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recover their tactical discipline from the initial shock of the ambush. On
the other hand, the ambushers always use aimed fire, although its quality
deteriorates over time. During the early stages of the ambush, the ambushers
have little motivation to desert or surrender, but after a time t , they
may decide to withdraw. SCHAFFER quantified the effects of these potential
acts through the quantity qT(t) defined as
qy(t) - qyI H (t-tc) H(x/y- 1) .C(7.6.11)
In other words, qy(t) > 0 for t > t > 0 or x/y > 1, and it is zero other-C--
wise.
Based on the above considerations, SCHAFFER modelled such an ambush
with the following LANCHESTER-type equacions (see Figure 7.9)
dx2
t -(l-pX) a(t)y - q(X -1) (-P E (t,x) w~ Wt
(AMBUSHEE ATTRITION) with x(O) -x
(7.6.12)
dy -_b(t,y)x - (q)W x 1)2 jtyW()dt Y - yy • jty jt
(AMBUSHER ATTRITION) with y(O) - yo
where qy(t) is given by (7.6.11), and the attrition-rate coefficient a(t)




COUNTERGUERRILLAS b (t, y) GELLAS
Figure 7.9. Schematic diagram of battlefield sit.uation corresponding
to SCHAFFER's model (7.6.12) of ambush in which counter-
insurgents have a single type of fire support (here,
artillery) with fire effectiveness denoted as Sc - S (t,y).
For this guerrilla-warfare engagement, (7.6.12) reduces tofRd-IL -(1- p a(t)y qx
S-b(t,y)x - I(t,y) - q (t) (
where the attrition-rate coefficient for the ambusher
"aimed" fire a(m) is modelled by (7.6.13) and the
ambushee return-fire effectiveness b(t,y) is modelled
by (7.6.14). Here the arbushee return fire, as modelled
by (7.6.14), t.ransitions from pure "area" fire to pure
"aimed" fire.
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dx . - _ 1
vyIr(t) P(KIH)y
a(t) - X 2 (7.6.13)
with the presented area of a single X ambushee being modelled by
AT
AT (t) = ---
X 1l-e-atS
Here, AT denotes the "steady-state" value for the vulnerable area of a single
00
X ambushee, and a and 8 reflect the speed with which an ambushee can
approach this level of maximum cover. A typical value for AT for prone
2troops against rifle fire is 0.1 ft . SCHAFFER modelled the ambushee's return
fire against the ambushers with
b(t,y) - b (l e-yt) + b y e-Yt (7.6.14)
"aimed-fire" "area-fire"
contribution contribution
where bI and b2 denote attrition-rate coefficients for "aimed" and "area"
fire respectively, and y denotes the transition rate from "area" to "aimed"
fire. The parameter y is used to model how fast the ambushees recover from
being "caught by surprise" in the ambush. SCHAFFER, however, expressed
in terms of two other parameters: a factor of increase in the effectiveness
of the ambushees' return fire, F, and a time for this increase to occur, r.
We then have
Fb 2 Y0 - b1 (1 - e-Y) + b2 Yet, (7.6.15)
whence
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Fl4 , - b 2y/b 1  (7.6.16)T'~ 1 - Fb 2Y0/b 1J
SCHAFFER observed that typical values for the battle parameters yield
b2 y/b 1 < b2 Y0 /b 1 << 1, whence we have the approximation for (7.6.16)
Y -(!)1 Zn (7.6.17)
Some "typical" results for ambushes modelled by (7.6.12) are shown in
Figure 7.10. SCHAFFER concluded from his study of ambushes modelled by (7.6.12)
that "in the absence of supporting weapons, ambushes can be successful against
forces that are numerically twice as large as the ambusher's force, provided
the ambushee has less than perfect discipline and/or is sluggish in attaining
aiming parity with his opponent." His analysis showed that a properly conducted
ambush should be an excellent tactic (see SCHAFFER [1 2 5 ,pp. 483-484] for
further details).
Finally, SCHAFFER considered sieges, which he divided into two stages:
(i) a "softening-up" phase with supporting weapons, and (II) an assault stage
during which the artillery fire must be lifted. Fe modelled an assault with the
fcllowing LANCHESTER-type equations (after work by BRACKNEY f20] on tactical
posture and the functional form for an attrition race; see also Section 7.2 above)
dx PSSKXy
-t - -(-px) tXY y (ATTACKER ATTRITION) with x(0) - x0
(7.6.18)
dd•- -Cl1-py) --
t Y kxy (DEFEN&)ER ATTRITION) with y(O) - v
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10O Case F' r Px qx _
90 SqKare law - - - -
1 20 5 0 0 05
so 0 2 20 15 0 0 0.5
70 - 3 5 5 0 0 1.04 5 5 0 0 0.5
5 5 15 0 0 0.5DC60 -6 5 15 -0.5 1.0 0.5
50 -2 Initial X force level 10
__Initial Y force level z 5
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Figure 7.10. Results for model of ambusit with no suIpporting weapons
on either side (after SCHAFFER [125]). In this case,
the battle dynamics are given byL -d -,(1 - p ) a(t)y - q)
&- -{b (l-e-Yt) + b ye -t }x - qY(t) (~-1)2,
where a(t) is modelled by (7.6.13).
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where t denotes Lhe average time between the firing of two successive rounds
by a single defender (with target-acquisition times being assumed negligible),
and the average time for an attacker to acquire a target by visual search of the
defender's position (with "presented area" AY) is assumed to be inversely
proportional to target density (with constant of proportionality k X) and is
assumed to be the dominant (i.e. constraining) factor in the target-actrition
process for the defenders. In the assault modelled by (7.6.18), X is the
attacker and Y is the defender. Thus, the time for a single assaulting
firer to destroy an emeny defensive target is approximately equal to the time
for him to acquire one, and the average time for an assault troop to acquire
such a defensive target is given by k a/yý The model (7.6.18), of course,
only applies to the assault situation up until the time The defensive perimeter
is overrun or until a counterattack is launched.
Thus, SCHAFFER [125] developed a number of detailed LANCHESTER-type
models of small-scale guerrilla-warfare engagements. These were apparently
the first detailed LANCHESTER-type models of tactical engagements to be
developed and applied to military-analysis problems in the United States.
His models contained a number of significant operational enrichments (e.g.
time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients reflecting changes in tactical
posture, fire discipline, calling in of supporting fires, etc.) over previously
considered simplistic LANCHESTER-type models (e.g. the classic constant-
coefficient models (2.2.1) and (2.4.1) of LANCHESTER [104]). SCHAFFER developed
a number of important quantitative insights into the dynamics of guerrilla-
warfare operations from exercising these models (see SCHAFFER [125] for
further details).
476
- - - - - - - *-*------
7.7. Modelling Attrition for Combat Between Heterogeneous Forces.
So far in this book we have considered various aspects of attrition
modelling for combat between two homogeneous forces, but actual combat consists
of many different weapon-system types operating together as "combined-arms
teams." For example, there may be infantry (armed with several types of
weapons), tanks, artillery, mortars, etc. on each side. Let us therefore consider
combat between such heterogeneous forces and briefly indicate how the above
basic ideas on modelling combat attrition are extended and adapted to such cases.
For illustrative purposes, we consider an engagement with m different
types of weapon systems on the X side and n for Y (see Figure 7.11).
Although more complicated types of force interactions may be postulated, we will
consider the "natural" extension of (2.2.1) to this combat situation. We
accordingly assume that
(Al) the attrition effects of various different enemy weapon-system
types against a particular friendly target type are additive
(no mutual support, i.e. no synergistic effects),
and (AW) the loss rate to each enemy weapon-system type is proportional
to the number of enemy firers of that type.
Let Y denote those Y who engage Xi, and let Yij denote the correspond-
ing number of Yij and similarly for y . Similar quantities are analogously
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Figure 7.11. Schematic of combat between heterogeneous forces.
In this figure Y denotes those Y who are
engaging Xi, and Y j denotes the corresponding
number of Y and similarly for y Also, aij
denotes the "inherent" weapon-system kill rate of
one Y against live Xi targets, i.e. the rate
at which one Y can kill Xi targets.
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For notational convenience we will always let the subscript i refer to the X
force and the subscript j refer to the Y force. Thus (recall Figure 7.11),
the index i will always take on the integer values 1 through m and the
index J will always take on the integer values 1 through n. In other words,
Xji denotes those Xi who engage Y with i - 1,2,..., m and j - 1,2,..., n.
Hence, without further specification if we say xi > 0, it will be understood
that the inequality holds for i - 1,2,...,m.
For modelling combat between heterogeneous forces, one must take into
account that a particular firer type can try to engage various different enemy
target types. Hence, we must represent how fire is distributed over enemy target
types. Accordingly, we will now introduce the allocation factor ij -YiJ/Y i
- fraction of Y who engage Xi. It follows that
yiJ- ijYj (7.7.2)
To complete our notational preliminaries, we let aij denote the "inherent"
weapon-system kill rate of Y against live Xi targets, i.e. the rate at
which one Y can kill Xi targets.
Let us now examine how (Al) and (A2) lead to the following linear model
(no synergistic effects for weapon systems in joint operations) for xi and
y >0
dxi n
dt y *ijaiJY with x (0) - xi,
dy1  
(7.7.3)
- i- ibjixi with yj(0) - yj
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where 0 < %Jio' ij 1 , and on physical grounds aij and bj > 0. Let us
now develop (7.7.3) from assumptions (A!) and (A2) above. Assumption (Al) may
be stated in mathematical terms as, for example,
dxi n (Xi loss rate (
dt I due/o Y
while assumxjrion (A2) irteans that
X, loss rate
due to YJ aiJYij , aJLiPiYJ ' (7.7.5)
whence follows (7.7.3) from combination uith (7.7.4). If we "absorb" the
allocation factors into the attrition-rate coefficients, e.g. let A ij -ulij,
then our linear combat model (7.7.3) may be written as (for xi and y > 0)
dx n
i r 0 itd-• =-L Aij with x (0) M x ,
(7.7.6)
dy1  m0
dt . - i1 with y, (0) - I
If we add operational losses [or attrition from enemy supporting weapons
not subject to attritljn (see Sections 6.12 and 6.13 for further details)], then
our combat wodel becomes (again, for xi and yj > 0)
dxi n 0
S_ - -n with x (0) - x0,
(7.7.7)
_ il Bixi -•JyJ with yj(O) - yj
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where a denotes ail attrition-rate coefficient modelling the operational losses
of Y and similarly fc " On physical grounds, we must have a and
> 0.
In complex operational LANCHESTER-type combat modc.-s like BONDER/IUA
and its may derivatives, 2 1 attrition-rate coefficients corresponding to Aij
and Bji in (7.7.6) above are (as they are in the real world) complex functions
of the weapon-system capabilities, target characteristics, distribution of the
targets, allocation procedures for assigning weapons to targets, etc. These
models then attempt to reflect these .omplexities by partitioning the attrition
process into four distinct subprocesses:
(1) the fire effectiveness of weapon-system types firing on live
targets,
(2) the allocation process of assigning weapons to targets,
(3) the inefficiency of fire when weapon-system types engage other
than live targets,
and (4) the effects of terrain on limiting firing activities of weapon-
system types and on mobility of the systems.
BONDER and FARRELL [15, pp. 16-17] have included the effects of the first three
subprocesses above on an attrition-rate coefficient, for example, as
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Ai(r) - Pi 1ia 1 (r) , (7.7.8)
where ip ij denotes the allocation factor (the fraction of Y who are
assigned to engage Xi), IY denotes the intelligence factor (the fraction
of Y who are actually engaging live Xi targets), and a j(r) denotes
the "inherent" weapon-system kill rate (the rate at which one Y kills
live Xi targets when it is engaging only Lhem). HLre, for simplicity,
we have assumed that the inherent weapon-system-kill capability (as quantified
by aij) depends on only the range between firer and target (see BONDER and
FARRELL [15] for further details). Similar to the case of homogeneous forces,
te "inherent" weapon-system kill rate aij is computed as
I (7.7.9)
where TxY ( a r.v.) denotes the time for a single Y firer to kill an
Xi target.
Thus, BONDER and FARRELL's [151 approach (see also CHERRM [30] and
[117; 154]) basically decomposes the battlefield into unit engagements, and there
are further decomposed into a series of one-on-one duels between opposing weapon-
jystem types. For each firer-target pair one must perform a detailed analysis
of a single firer engaging a passive target. Force interactions are then tied
together with attrition equations similar to (7.7.6), and these assessment
equations are made to respond tn the evolution of combat (e.g. changing firer
positions) through the operational factors influencing kill rates. Terrain
effects are incorporated into such models by computing intervisibility (i.e.
existence of line-of-sight) for each target-firer pair based on their map
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locations. Consideration is given to cover, concealment, terrain roughness,
etc. but time does not allow us to So into further details here (see Chapter z,
especially Section 5.16, for further developments, however).
Let us finally consider the determination of numerical values for the
allocation factors OJi and ti in the heterogeneous-force model (7.7.3).
We first observe that (in some sense) X controls (i.e. influences or can
affect) 0ji but such an allocation factor is not directly affected by Y.
Similarly, Y controls *iJ. There are then two basically different approaches
for determining numerical values22 for such allocation factors in a tactical
engagement:
(1) the descriptive approach (based on asking the question, "How
would fire be allocated?"),
and (2) the normative approach (based on asking the question, "How should
fire be allocated?").
Both these approaches involve building a model of the allocation process. The
descriptive approach is based on observing how people make such decisions in
real-world situations, while the normative approach is based on modelling human
behavior as a "rational process" with an optimization problem. This latter
normative approach may also be thought of as being based on asking the question,
"What is the 'best' choice for the allocation factors?" Further discussion of
this important topic of determining values for such allocation factors would
take us too far afield from our main subject of modelling tactical engagements,
but we will return to it in Chapter 8 (see also Section 5.16).
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7.8. Analytical Results for Heterogeneous-Force Models.
Let us now briefly discuss what analytical results have been obtained for
tLe heterogeneous-force model (7.7.7). We will find out that, except for some
special cases, only a few analytical results of limited usefulness have been
developed. In fact, it is essentialiy impossible to analytically solve systems
of differential equations like (7.7.7) for combat interactions with any degree
of complexity (recall Figure 6.11). Consequently, numerical-integration methods
(see Appendix E) must be generally used to generate numerical results for particu-
lar battles of any degree of complexity. Thus, such numerical-integration methods
are essentially always used to numerically determine the force levels as functions
of time, i.e. x i(t) and y (t), in complex operational models like BONDER/IUA.
In general an attrition-rate coefficient such as Aij in (7.7.7) varies
with time t and the force levels of the combatants. When the attrition-rate
coefficients Aij and Bji depend on the force levels xi and y , the system
of differential equatiors (7.7.7) is nonlinear. We will not consider this case,
however, since no useful analytical results are apparently available for such
systems of nonlinear ordinary differential equations. When the attrition-rate
coefficients do not depend on the force levels, we may take them to depend on
time,23 and we will therefore consider (again for xi and y > 0) the follow-
ing linear combat model with time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients
dxi n








whtere (as above) the subscript i runs over the integer values I through m




tq(t) W y(t) exp{f a (s)ds},
0
transforms (7.8.1) into
dpi i1 A ij (qn with p (0) - Xi
(7.8.3)
= - Bji(t)Pi with q (0) W YO
where
t




i(t) W B jiW exp{- f [si(S) - a (s)Ids}
0j
Thus, in discussing the development of analytical solutions, we may without loss
of generality consider (7.8.1) with i(t) and a (t) identically equal to
zero, 3..e. for xi and yj > 0
dxi n 0
dt J1l A ij Wy with x (0) - Xi
(7.8.5)
fdy 1  i 0
dt I Bji(t)xi with yj(0)M y-
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Although equations (7..8.5) are a linear differential-equation combat
model and consequently all. the results from the theory of linear ordinary
differential equations may be invoked, essentially no explicit analytical
results for x i(t) and y.(t) of practical significance for military OR are
known to this author. We can, of course, in theory use the method of successive
approximations (cf. Section 6.5 above) to determine xi (t) and y (t), but the
details are prohibitively complex. Let us proceed just far enough to indicate
such difficulties to the reader.
It is, moreover, convenient to express such computations in a more compact
notation. Therefore, let us write (7.8.5) in vector/matrix notation as
i - -A(t)y with x(O) - 0(8
(7.8.6)
S=-B(t)x with y(0) - y0
where i denotes dx/dt, x denotes a column vector of the m force levels of
T
the heterogeneous X force [i.e. x . (Xlx2,... x m)], B(t) denotes an n x m
matrix of attrition-rate coefficients (i.e. B(t) - [Bji(t)], where [B ji(t)
denotes the matrix with element B ji(t) in the Jth row and ith column for
j - 1,2, ... , n and i - 1,2, ... , m), and similar quantities for the
Y force are analogously defined, with Z being an n-vector and A(t) an
m x n matrix. We may write (7.8.6) in even more compact notation by introducing
T T T S= (,x ,z ) so that it becomes (for w > 0)
T T T T
S- -C(t)• with T(0) - 0 (,0' 0) , (7.8.7)
where C(t) denotes the following (m + n) x (m + n) matrix
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c(t)-
Assuming tiLe appropriate integrability of the coefficients [i.e.
C(t) E L(0,T) for any finite T], and apply the method of successive approxi--
mations (cf. Section 6.5), one may show (e.g. see REID [1 2 2 ,pp. 62-63])
that the solution to (7.8.7) is given by
- 0(c)MX , (7.8.8)
where 0(C) denotes the following infinite series of matrices
t t S1
Q0(C) - I - f C(sl)ds 1 + f C(s 1 ) {f C(s 2 )ds 2 }ds 1
0 0 0
t S sl s 2
-f C~s f C(s2) {f C(s 3 )ds 3 }ds 2 ds 1  , (7.8.9)
0 0 0
I denotes the (m + n) X (m + n) identity matrix, and the integrals are matrix
integrals. The matrix quantity Qo(C) is sometimes called the matrizant ( 122,
p. 63]. It is the (m + n) x (m + n) matrix of fundamental solutions to (7.8.7)
and satisfies the matrix differential equation (see REID [1221 for further
details)
S- - C(t)W with W(0) - I , (7.8.10)
where W(t) - to(C).
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Example 7.8.1. We may obtain the representation (6.5.16) for the solution
Cx(t) to (6.5.13) as a special case of (7.8.8). To see this, we let
T
w w (CX9S y) and then (6.5.13) may be written in the form (7.8.7) with
n = (1,0) and
(t) - b)0 a(t)/IXR]
If we substitute the above into (7.8.8) and (7.8.9), we find that C x(t) is
given by (6.5.16). Thus, the successive-approximation results of Chapter 6
for the hyperbolic-like GLF may be viewed as special cases of the matrizant (7.8.9).
The reader should nute that (7.8.8) also applies to the more general
model
d-A(t)- - G(t)x with x(O) - (7.8.)
S-B(t)x - (t)Z with z(0) -,Yo ,




The above results are also readily extended to the case in which replacements are
continuously added to the battle (7.8.6) [or, equivalently, (7.8.11)].
Accordingly, we let q(t) denote an m x n column vector of replacement rates.
Our mudel (7.8.7) then becomes
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TT T T
, -C(t)w + %(t) with w(0) - w - (,) (7.8.13)
The solution to (7.8.13) may be written as (e.g. see REID [122] again)
t
W(t) - (c(C)4 + P C) f fio(C)] 1(s)ds, (7.8.14)
0
t 0 0-1
where %O(C) is given by (7.8.9) and [no(C)]'] denotes the inverse operator
M-(C) of Q(C). Thus, the force levels as functions of time are even more
compiicated when replacements are continuously committed to LANCHESTER,-type combat
[cf. (6.12.8) and Figure 6.11]. As we noted in Chapter 6 (recall Figure 6.11),
it is impossible to "solve" the differential-equation combat model (7.8.13)
when both m and n > 1, although a formal solution such as (7.8.14) may, of
course, be written down.
The solutions (7.8.8) and (7.8.14) are formal symbolic solutioxis to
(7.8.7) and (7.8.13) for the vector of force levels w T(t) - ( T(t),Y (t)).
Unfortunately, they are of no computational use when both m and n > 1. Thtus,
although they symbolically represent the force levels, the "solutions" (7.8.8)
and (7.8.14) have been put to no practical use.
Let us now consider the model (7.8.6) in the special case of constant
attrition-rate coefficients, i.e. for x > 0 and > 0
(x--AX with :z(O) Z-
(7.8.15)
S--Bx with t(0) 1
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where A denotes an m x n matrix of constant attrition-rate coefficients modelling
the fire effectiveness of the heterogeneous Y force and B denotes an n x m
matrix of constant attrition-rate coefficients for the X force. Similar to
what we saw in Chapter 2, the two basic vehicles for answering questions con-
cerning the outcome of combat modelled by the constant-coefficient differential
equations (7.8.15) are: (1) the state equation, and (2) the X and Y force
levels as a function of time x(t) and Z(t). Unlike the case of combat between
two homogeneous forces, though, we now deal with vectors and matrices, not
scalars, and far fewer explicit analytical results have been developed.
To obtain information concerning parity (i.e. equal military strength)
between the two opposing heterogeneous forces w& consider the state equation.
By parity we mean that neither force ever "wins," and of course we must specify
battlpý-termination conditions for such a determination. We will limit our
discussion to a fight to the finish, since results have only appeared for this
special case. Since negative force levels make no physical sense (cf. our
discussion in Section 2.2), we must accordingly extend the model (7.8.15), which
holds for x and y > 0, to cases in which one or more of the component forces
of either heterogeneous force become annihilated. if we are to retain constant
coefficients, we must essentially assume that there is no redistribution of
fire by friendly forces after an enemy target type has been annihilated. In
this case, the naturaleextension of (7.8.15) is
(A--E X(x).AZ with 0() -
(7.8.16)
_ -E y()Bx with X(0) M
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where Ex(x) is an m x m diagonal matrix with diagonal element
i for xi > 0,
eX W 1 frx >0(7.8.17)ei ) to otherwise
and similarly for Ey(Z).
Equations (7.8.16) and (7.C.17) are nothing t..ore then the generalization
to heterogeneous-force combat of LANCHESTER's equations written in a form to
avoid the physical absurdity of negative force levels. In other words, Xi
only suffers attrition according to the appropriate component of (7.8.15) as
long as x > 0 (i.e. dxi/dt nl ajYj for xi > 0), and such an
attrition equation is "turned off" once xi - 0 (i.e. dx /dt - 0 for x, < 0)
[cf. (2.2.2)]. By parity Letween the forces, we simply mean that xi (t) and
S(t) > 0 for all i, J, and finite t > 0. Unfortunately, there is generally
no extension of LANCHESTER's square law of parity between two homogeneous forces
(2.1.6) to combat between such heterogeneous forces. However, SNOW [133] has
shown24 that in one and only one special case does the square law (2.i.6)
generalize to combat between heterogeneous forces: namely, the condition for
parity between heeterogeneous X and Y forces is given bythe following quadratic
expression for the force levels
Iil i ~ j l (bi 2 (7.8.18)alji~laij " J-1 J l
1f and only if for any two fixed indices I and J
aL- i - -LDLI- (7.8.19)
aijaU bj 1 b
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where i - 1,2,...,m and j - 1,2,...,n. The condition (7.8.19) was called
Condition M by SNOW (133].
For developing, for example, the X force level as a function of time
x(t), there are two different (but equivalent) methods for constant attrit-ion-
rate coefficients and heterogeneous forces:
(Ml) a matrix-theory approach that involves evaluation of a matrix
eponential function,
and (M2) algebraic elimination to obtain the Xi force-level equation
(which contains only xi).
Although (in both cases) one finds that x i(t) is simply a sum of certain
exponential functions of time weighted by coefficients that are functions of
only the attrition-rate coefficients and initial force levels, explicit
results (even for the simplest 2 x 2 case) have not been generally obtained for
(7.8.15) (recall Figure 6.11 of Chapter 6). Thus, although the general form
of the solution is well known, it is so complex that explicit analytical
results have not been obtained except in special cases. We will now briefly
illustrate each of the above solution methods. In both examinations we will
only consider the case in which xi and y > 0, and then (7.8.15) applies.
The matrix-theory approach consists of considering the vector differ-
T (T T)
ential equation (7.8.7) for w - (Z ,T ), namely
- -Cw with T(0) - T T T (7.8.20)
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In this case the matrizant (7.8.9) reduces to the matrix exponential
-Ct 00 k(k t k
e = - , (7.8.22)
and the solution to (7.8.20) may be written in terms of this matrix exponential as
w(t) - e-Ct w0 . (7.8.23)
Thus, we are left with the task of evaluating the matrix exponential e-Ct with
C given by (7.8.21).
The complexity of evaluating the matrix exponential depends essentially
on whether or not the matrix C has distinct eigenvalues. Let ICI denote
the determinant of C and
A( - IC - XI1 . (7.8.24)
The eigenvalues of C (as the reader will recall) are the roots of the (m + n)
degree polynomial equation
A(A) - 0 - IC - AII (7.8.25)
Consider now the (m + n) roots of (7.8.25) and assume that there are q distinct
values. Let Nk denote the multiplicity minus one of the kth elgenvalue. It
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follows that q + jq- Nk - m + n. By the confluent form of SYLVESTER's theorem
-Ct
(see FRAZER, DUNCAN, and COLLAR [59, pp. 78-853) the matrix exnonential e is
given by
ek Z (X k t (7.8.26)
k rk k i
whereN
ZN (k k) -(N k T k TN dAI Xk
(Nr+1)
N (X) 1 ( r- )
k r#k r
and F(M) denotes the transposed matrix of the cofactors of XI - C. In the
English mathematical literature F(X) is called the adjoint of XI - C (see
[ 59, p. 21]). The result (7.8.26) may be equivalently developed by considering
the JORDAN canonical form for the matrix C (see CODDINGTON and LEVINSON [38,
Chapter 31). In the case of distinct eigenvalues for C, the above expression
for e-Ct simplifies considerably: namely (cf. HILDEBRAND [82, pp. 64-66])
-Ct m+n - kt








I ., .-a,:- - *..' _
As the reader may have already guessed, no really useful analytical results have
so far been obtained for (7.8.26) except in special cases when other methods are
more convenient (see below). Thus, matrix-theory methods show us the form of the
solution to (7.8.20) for the X and Y force levels x(t) and X(t), but these
results are generally of little computational use (recall Figure 6.11 of Chapter 6).
Example 7.8.2. For the (F + T)I(F + T) attrition process, we have m - n - 1,
aad (7.8.20) holds with [see equation (2.12.2)]
CCr
Invoking (Y.8.23) with e given by (7.8.27), we find that, for example,
S ½(I
1
x(t) - e 2 {x cosh et - - [ay0 +1 (0-%)1 sinh St}
where 8 - Vab - {(8-10 )/2}
The algebraic-elimlnation approach relies on the differential-equation
combat model's special structure to use differentiation and algebraic elimination
to develop a Nth order (where N < m + n) linear differential equation for each
of the force levels. When there is a simple solution for the force levels to
the linear combat model (7.8.15), this approach is the simplest one for obtaining
it. Let us now illustrate the algebraic-elimination approach with a simple
example. Consider a homogeneous Y force in combat against two enemy weapon-
system types. Then, for xi ard y > 0, we have
495
____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ /4
- 1i**i iiliil ni u il~ ''iiii- a l
dx 1  ywith x (0) X
dx2  -alY with xl(O) - x
dx 20
awith 2O (7.8.28)
dA - -blx - b2 x2  with y(O) yo
The Y force level equation is readily obtained by differentiating the last
equation of (7.8.28) with respect to time and combining the result with the previous
two equations. We find that
d _ (a b + a b2)Y . 0 (7.8.29)
dt2  1 b1  a2 b2
with initial conditions y(O) - yo and dy/dt(O) - - blxO - b2 xO. It follows that
y(t) y Y0 cosh t- OO)sinh et , (7.8.30)0 0
where z - blx0 + bx 0 and e - Va b + a b Also,
0 1 1 2 2 1 1 a2b2  Alo
0(t) - + a ( o sih et (7.8.31)
We may also use algebraic elimination and elementary integration to obtain the
following state equation from (7.8.28)
2 2 z 2 2
z -2 (Yo - y2) , (7.8.32)
where z - z(t) - b1x1 + b When the X force is composed of m different




levels by (7.8.,30) and (7.6.31), only with z, z0 , and 6 now given by
z(t) - . bzx (t) z0 - z(0), and 6 iml albi . The above results
for (7.8.28) are the only simple ones known to the author for combat between
heterogeneous forces (recall Figure 6.11).
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7.9. Current Detailed LANCHESTER-Type Operational Models of Tactical Engagements.
The following are current operational 2 5 models (used in the United States)
that employ detailed LANCHESTER-type equations to assess casualties in tactical
engagements: 26
batulion-level combat: BONDER/IUA and its many derivatives such as
BONDER AIRCAV (or IHA), BLDM, AMSWAG, FAST,
division-level combat: DIVOPS
theater--level combat: VECTOR-2
As we have pointed out in Section 1.3, in these models attrition is modelled
analytically, but movement is modelled in a simulatory manner. Consequently,
these models are not exactly analytical ones, but they are more precisely called
hybrid analytical-simulation models. Since all the above detailed differential-
equation combat models have been developed by the principals of Vector Research,
Inc. (VRI) (see also Footnote 21 above), it seems appropriate to briefly discuss
the combat-modelling approach of VRI.
The basic idea 2 7 behind the modelling approach of VRI is to develop
analytical structures that can. be used to forecast the evolution of combat over
time in terms of battlefield geometry (i.e. troop positions), force levels, and
supplies. It is also hypothesized that there exists a functional relation between
the results of battle and the initial numbers of forces, types and capabilities




Results Types of Weapon Systems
of are a function of Weapon CapabiMities
Battle Doctrine of Employment
(tactics, organization)
Environment
Unfortunately, because of the large number of variables Involved, such a functional
relation is not known for the overall evolution of battle, nor is there sufficient
data to develop it empirically. It is therefore assumed that subprocesses can be
quantified and modelled for at least short periods of time and extrapolated.
Thus, the VRI approach is to examine the battle for short periods of
time afd to hypothesize that for each side during such a short period of time:
(1) locations change due to tactical movement,
(2) weapon systems are attrited by enemy activity,
(3) resources are expended,
and
(4) personnel become casualties due to enemy activity.
Heterogeneous-force LANCHESTER-type equations (cf. Section 7.7) are used to
represent the loss of weapon systems and personnel. Implicit in such use is the
assumption that if the state of the battle is known at the beginning of a small




then the rate aL which losses occur- can be predicted for this small time interval.
Because of this rate focus, differential equations (i.e. LANCHESTER-type equations)
are the appropriate modelling tool. Conceptually these models are based on the
following two components:
(I) the concept of the state space,
(2) the concept of process models.
As we mentioned in Section 1.6, the state space consists of those variables that
allow one to predict the future course of combat, e.g. numbers and locations of
different weapon systems, target lists, plans and intentions, etc.
The VRI approach (BONDER and FARRELL [151; see, also [39; 117; 154] and CHERRY
[30]) in essence conceptually decomposes the battlefield into unit engagements,
whic--h are further decomposed into a series of one-on-one duels between opposing
weapon-system types. For each firer-target pair one must perform a detailed
analysis of a single firer engaging a passive target (e.g. recall Section 5.3).
Force interactions are then tied together with LANCHESTER-type heterogeneous-
force attrition equations similar to (7.7.6), and these assessment equations are
made to respond to the evolution of combat (e.g. changing firer positions)
through the operatioual factors influencing the kill rates. The evolution of
other state variables (e.g. ammunition supplies or battlefield information)
are similarly modelled with differential equations. Terrain effects are incor-
porated into the combat model by computing intervisibility (i.e existence of
line of sight) for each target-firer pair based on their map locations.
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Consideration is given to cover, concealment, terrain roughness, etc., but
time does not allow us to go into further details here (see Section 5.16 or
[39; 117; 154] for further details). In such a complex system model, the
LANCHESTER-type equations are numerically integrated.
The modern large-scale digital computer has made such det4iled models
possible, especially those of large-scale combat. Because of the detailed
weapon-system-performance information used in their combat assessments, i.e.
to compute LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients (see Chapter 5, especially
Section 5.16), the data and data-base problems associated with such models
are, however, formidable although no less so than those for detailed Monte
Carlo combat simulations. For example, VECTOR-2 may require between 200,000
and 300,000 pieces of input data for a "typical" run (see BONDER [141 for
further details). The interested reader can find further information about
the time and resource requirements for actually using these models in [91
(e.g. the time required to acquire input data, the time required to structure
this data in the model's input format, the time required to run the model, and
the time required to analyze and evaluate the model's results). Such models
consider heterogeneous forces, battle plans (ground order of battle and air
order of battle), target acquisition, allocation of fire, fire support by
ground weapons, movement, intelligence, command and control, logistics, etc.
The full extent of combat systems and processes that have been incorporated
into the VRI models is indicated in Tables 7.111 and 7.IV (see CHERRY [30]
and [39; 117; 154] for further details). These very complicated operational
models, however, have been developed from the basic analltical structure
discussed above by the process of enrichment, which we have also considered
above (e.g. see Section 7.1).
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TABLE 7.111. Weapon Systems Included in the Differential Combat Models Developed
by Vector Research, Inc. (from CHERRY [30]).
Tanks, including secondary armament
APC's, including multiple armament systems
















Rocket or Missile Artillery
Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft with Conventional or Advanced Ordnance
Air Defense Guns and Missiles
Land Mines, including scatterable mines
Jeep and Truck Mounted Weapons
Laser Designators
Target-Acquisition Systems, whether ground or air based,
including optical and other electromagnetic systems and
seismic, audio, and other systems
Smoke or Other Obscurant Aerosal, however delivered.
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TABLE 7.IV. Processes Modelled in the Differential Combat Models Developed by
Vector Research, Inc. (from CHERRY (30]).
Acquisition, "serial" or "parallel," including false acquisitions,
acquisitions of dead targets, and mis-identification (and loss
of acquisition)
Target Selection, including criteria for the acceptance of low-priority
targets (an approximate minimax target-selection process is avail-
able in addition to descriptive models)
Aiming, Round Selectior,, and Mode-of-Fire Selection, including fire
adjustment process
Firing, direct and indirect: single rounds, volley, and burst; adjusted
and unadjusted; ballistic ordnance, command-guided ordnance, self-
guided ordnance, illumination-guided ordnance; etc.
Ordnance Lethality, immediate or delayed, against weapons-system
,' hardware or crew, including multiple damage states (which may
involve damage to only one component or sub-system of the weapons
system, such as a mobility kill or a partial firepower kill)
Maneuver
Deliberate Deterministic or Stochastic Use of Local Terrain or
Vegetation for Cover and Concealment, including (but not limited to)
suppression by artillery or direct fires
Commimication of Target-Acquisition Information Between Weapon Systems
Damage Recovery, including re-manning of a weapon system which has
suffered a crew kill
Minefield Encounter, including initial encounter attrition, attrition
during reorganization (if any), clearing- or passage-tactics
decision, maneuver alterations for clearing, passage, or attempted
bypassing, and attrition by mines during passage, clearing, etc.




7.10. Overview of Aggregated-Force Mo)dels of Attrition in Tactical
Engagements.
In stark contrast to the aet:ailed LANCHESTER-type models of
attrition in tactical engagements are the aggregated-force attrition models
that combine all the various different weapon-system types on a side in
some particular geographical combat area (or "sector") into a single
equivalent homogeneous force. This force's combat capability is quaintified
by a single scalar quantity called the unit's firepower index, As we
discussed above in Section 7.3, the firepower-index approach is only
used for modelling large-scale combat (i.e. division-level operations and
larger). T•ie quotient of the firepower indices of the two opposing forces
is calletd thz force ratio and is the principal measure of relative combat
capability used in analyses of simulated conventional ground combat. It
is a major factor considered in the assessment of casualties and the move-
ment of fcrce,* against enemy resistance.
Moreover, the Jaily lose in combat power as quantified by the
uait's firepower Index is assessed on the basis of seve:al operational
factors, principal of which is the force ratio (actually the ratio of
the attacker's firepuwe. index to that of the defender). Curreni theater-
level combat models typically use curves of daily fractional (or percentage)
casualties versus the force ratio (for both the attacker and also the
defender for each of several engagement types such as meeting engagement,
attack of prepared position, etc.) for assessing such losses. These
curves supposedly have an empirical basis (.see (16 4 ,pp. 23-28] or
ANDERSON et al. (6, p. 53]; however, COCKFKLL and BALL [37, especially
p. 1-21 have a different opinion). Unfortunately, there 1,s no erplicit
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relationship between weapon-system parameters, operational factors, and
attrition as there is for detailed LANCHESTER-type models (e.g. recall
(5.2.1), (5.2.3), and (5.4.1) above in Chapter 5, see also (117, pp. 3-4]
or [154]).
Although such aggregated-force models are much simpler thin the
detailed differential combat models and therefore more computationally
convenient, a large-scale digital computer is still required for their
implementation. Such aggregated-force models have been fairly widely
criticized (see, for example, BONDER (13],HONIG et al. [901, or STOCKFISCH
[135]),but large-scale conventional-force ground-combat models that use
such aggregation techniques have been and continue to be essentially the
only analysis tools used for large-scale conventional-force military
analyses in the United States (see [ 91) and also NATO countries [94].
The simple fact is that some. type of aggregation must be done in order to
model theater-level combat in a computationally convenient manner.
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7.11. Aggregation of Forces in Combat Analyses.
The modern battlefield contains many diverse weapon-system types
that complement each other and operate as "combined-arms teams." For
example, there can be both mounted and dismounted infantry, tanks, various
types of anti-tank weapon systems, artillery, mortars, infantry with
rifles, infantry with machine guns, etc. One must then either model such
operations in great detail or find some means for aggregating forces.
Military planners28 and military operations analysts have consequently
developed various index-number approaches for aggregating the diverse combat
capabilities of such a heterogeneous military force into a single scalar
measure of combat power. Although there are many such indices 29 of the
relative combat capabilities of military units, all 30 are essentially
variations on the same theme, and consequently we will generically refer
to any such index-number approach as a firepower-score approach.
The firepower-score approach develops one single number (referred
to as the firepower index) to represent the "combat potential" of a
military unit. A linear model is used to develop this index number, i.e.
the firepower index, from the scores of individual weapon systems as
Table 1.11 of Chapter 1 shows. As STOCKFISCH [135] has emphasized, however,
the words score and index should not be regarded as being synonymous.
We should use the term firepower score to refer to the military capability
or value of a specific weapon system and use the term firepower index--
which is obtained by summing scores-to refer to the military capability
or value of some aggregation of diverse weapons. In other words, the




where si denotes the firepower score of the ith X system and xi
denotes the number effective in the unit (see Table 1.11 again).
Although many firepower-score methods claim that the firepower
scote of a weapon system is determined as the product of a measure of
single-round lethality and the expected expenditure of ammunition
during a fixed period of time, in actuality varying amounts of subjectivity
are involved in the development of such a firepower score. For this and
other reasons (e.g. see HONIG et al. [90]), the firepower-score approach
has received a fair amount of criticism. Nevertheless, it is essentially
the only approach that has been used to model large-scale combat in
currently operational ground-combat models (e.g. see [9]). In other words,
4.
unless one duplicates large-scale combat in detail, one must use some
type of index-number approach to aggregate the many different types of
forces involved in modern large-scale military operations (see last
paragraph of Section 7.9). Thus, although it has received varying amounts
of criticism from different sources, the firepower-score approach is used
by essentially all currently operational large-scale ground-combat models.
In large-scale (i.e. division-level and above) ground-combat
models,31 firepower indices are used as a surrogate for unit strength to32
(1) determine engagement outcomes,
(2) assess casualties,
and (3) determine FEBA movement.
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The force ratio is a major factor (but not the only one) used to make
such assessments. Here, however, the term force ratio means the ratio
of the attacker's firepower index to that of the defender. Consider,
for example, the 7th Infimtry Division of the U. S. Army and assume that
the firepower scores and other data shown in Table 1.11 apply. Then the
7th Infantry Division would have a firepower index of 32,640. If an
attacking enemy army group were to have a firepower index of 146,880,
then we would have a force ratio of 4.5 (A/D), where A refers to the
attacker and D to the defender.
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7.12. General Mathematical Structure of Attrition Calculations in
Aggregated-Force Models.
The usual approach (e.g. see [64]) for assessing casualties in
firepower-score-based combat models is to have daily casualties (i.e. the
casualty rates) depend directly on the following two factors:
(Fl) the force ratio,
and (F2) the engagement type.
It will be instructive for us to hold the last factor constant and further
examine how casualty assessment depends on the firepower scores and indices.
The basic mathematical structure of the attrition calculation in
aggregated-force models may be thought of as being done in two steps and
may be explained as follows:
nXno X X 0
iil
STEP (.)
(Aggregation of Forces) (7.1241)
YO - Si
. Ax)m A(E wTith A[(0) - xO,
STEP (11) x at w (7.12.2)
(Mutual Attrition of
the Aggregated forces) " ( ) - B(Y) with y(O) - x0
y yX
where ai denotes the firepower score of the ith X weapon-3ystem type,
0_
X i denotes the initia number of the ith X system, x0  denotes the
5C9
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initial value of the firepower index for the X force, x(t) denotes
its value at time t, A(x/y) denotes a given function of the force rati),
t - 0 denotes the start of the attrition calculation, and similarly for
the corresponding Y quantities. This calculation is then repeated for
each "sector" on the battlefield (see Figure 7.15 in Section 7.15 below).
Thus, casualties in terms of a loss in the force's combat power are computed
from some expression like (7.12.2). In other words, we only know how
much the force's combat power was reduced by a day of combat action, and
losses of individual component weapon-system types must be obtained by
some means of disaggregation.
ATLAS basically computes casualties in the above manner, with the
firepower scores (i.e. X and sa) being held constant over time.
However, IDAGAM dynamically recomputes weapons' values which correspond
to the firepower sctres si and s Y above, according to the antipotential-i i
potential (or eigenvector) method (see Section 7.18 below; also HOWES
and THRALL [92] or ANDERSON [3; 5]). The latter calculation involves the
numbers of enemy targets, allocations of friendly fire, and kill prob-
abilities against enemy targets.
We have given the basic structure foi attrition calculations in
aggre&,ated-force models above. In actual application such models give
attention to a multitude of details on combat operations, e.g. positioning
of units, logistics considerations, allocation of fire (especially support-
ing fires), air defense, air operations including allocation of aircraft
to tactical missions, unit breakpoints, terrain factors, intelligence,
command and control, order of battle, etc. (e.g. see documentation on
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on CEM [25; 106] or IDAGAM [6] for further d.tails). Sur-h operational
and tactical factors influence exactly how '0.i2.1) is computed.
Finally, let us briefly discuss how the engagemenit type, the
second factor (F2) considered in casualty assessment, is determined.
In CEM [15, p. 21; 56, p. 35], for example, the type of engagement is
determined by the missions (which are, in turn, determined from an
estimate of the situation at various echelons of command) of the
opposing forces and, where appropriate, the type of defensive position
(see Table 7.V). In the "mission matrix" shown in Table 7.V, the
entries are the engagement types, while the rows and columns denote the
missions and types of defenEive positions of the two opposing forces.
Thus, we see that in CEM there are tl'ree possible missions (for each
side), two types of defensive position, and eight possible types of
engagement. Similar methods of engagement-type determination are used
in all such large-scale combat models.
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TABLE 7.V. Engagement-Type Determination According to Mission and
Type of Defensive Position of Each of the Two Opposing
Forces (from CEM [25; 106]).
Red Mission Attack Defend Delay
Red position
Blue type




Attack -- Meeting Blue attack Blue. attack Blue
engagement of prepared of hasty advance
position position
Red attack




Hasty of hasty Static Static Static
position
Delay Red advance Static Static Static
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7.13. Fitting a Differential-Equation Model to Loss-Rate Curves
Typically Used to Represent Large-Scale Ground-Combat Attrition.
In this section33 we will develop a general attrition model, whose
general form fits the shape of most loss-rate curves typically used to
model large-scale ground combat34. All currently operational large-scale
combat models in one way or another assess casualties for each side by
using such a loss-rate curve consisting of casualty rate (expressed as a
fraction or percentage of current strength lost per unit time) plotted
against the force ratio. Here, as above, the term force ratio means the
ratio of the firepower index of the attacker to that of the defender,
denoted as A/D. Also, loss here means loss of value for the side's fire-
power index, which can then be disaggregated into losses in numbers of
different weapon-system types.
In other words, the firepower-score a pnroach takes each side's
heterogeneous forces and converts them into an equivalent homogeneous
force quantified in terms of a firepower index, daily reduction in each
side's capability (expressed as a reduction in firepower index) is then
determined from the ratio of the two such firepower indices, and finally
casualties (i.e. losses in numbers of the different weapon-system types)
are assessed by some means of disaggregation. We will now discuss how a
relatively simple pair of differential equations may be used to model this
process and fit these loss-rate curves.
Our starting point is to consider the following equations of
RE[LMBOLD-type combat with "operational" losses (cf. Section 6.14 above)
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dt -a(t)* x)ey - O(t)x with x(O)- xo
(7.13.1)/ \-
d_ -.b(t),I-z) .x - £t(t)y with y(O) -t 0O
In the above equations (7.13.1) we have added a feature not contained in the
model of Section 6.14: each side has its own WEISS parameter, denoted as
WX and Wy for •he X and Y forces respectively. We also recall from
Section 6.11 that, for example, such a parpmeter Wy allows one to account
for inefficiencies of scale in producing casualties by the Y force when
the two opposing forces are grossly unequal in size. In other words, the
firepower-modification factors EX and E are no longer necessarily
1-Wy I-WX
the same for both sides, i.e. Ey (u;W y) - u # Ex (u;W X) a u [cf.
(6.11.1)]. Also, a term like 0(t)x may be considered to represent
(here X's) "operational" losses (e.g. losses due to sickness, accidents,
etc.; see Section 6.12 for further details).
For the case of constant attrition-rate coefficients, (7.13.1)
becomes
dx 1 -d
Sdx -a-yl-dy - Ox-- with x(O) - ,
(7.13.2)
-a -be) ox - ay with y(O) - ,
where for notational convenience we have denoted W simply as d and
WX as e. For our wodel (I.13.2), for example, X's fractional casualties
per unit time are now given by
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X/ fractional casualties
(x!d per unit time )
(7.13.3)
-d d
-au +8 -av +8 •
In Figure 7.12 we show the relation between X's fractional casualties
per unit time and the force ratio v a y/x for the case in which X
defends (cf. our discussion in Section 5.2 (recall Figure 5.3) and see,
in particular, Figure 6.15 of Section 6.11). Figure 7.13 shows the same
type of relation when X attacks.
Essentially all of the principal large-scale ground-combat models
35
currently in operational use in the world today assess casualties using
the firepower-score concept and (in one form or another) casualty-rate
curves of the form shown in Figure 7.14, which is taken from documentation
on ATLAS [64]. Such casualty-rate curves are typically plots of fractional
casualties per unit time (or its equivalent) versus the force ratio (A/D)
for different engagement types 36 . Thus, two such plots like those shown
in Figure 7.14 are used to assess casualties, one curve for the attacker
and one curve for the defender. It turns out now that the Helmbold-type
model (7.13.3) gives a remarkably good fit to almost all these casualty
rate curves, i.e compare Figures 7.12 and 7.13 with Figure 7.14 (i.e.
Figure 6-5 on p. 6-5 of [64]), Figure 3 on p. 12 of [501, or pp. 28-31
of [51].
in other words, if (for a given engagement type) we assume that
the fractional casualty rate depends on only the force ratio, then the so-
called [17] asymptotic-power form (7.13.3) gives a very good fit to most
such casualty-rate curves currently used, and thus the Helmbold-type
( equations (7.13.2) may be considered to model the attrition process, with
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Figur2 7.12. Relation between the defender's fractional casualty rate
and the force ratio for the model ý-• -a-A .y ex
with X defending.
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Figure 7.13. Relation between the attacker's fractional casualty rate
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Figure 7.14. Typical casualty-rate curves used in ATLAS (from [64)).
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the parameters a, b, a, 0, d, and e depending on the type of engagement.
Moreover, there are even computerized routines available for the least-
squares estimation of these parameters (e.g. see [17], especially Figure 1
on p. 6).
As we discussed in Section 6.11 above, the model (7.i3.3),
equivalently (7.13.2), can accommodate a wide variety of classic attrition-
rate forms, and furthermore, a variety of attrition-rate forms have
indeed been used in large-scale ground-combat models over the years.
For example, ground-combat attrition in the original version of TAGS was
assumed to follow the logarithmic law (see SISKA, GIAMBONI, and LIND
(132,p. 29]), cf. d - e - 0 in (7.13.2). Today, attrition is usually
modelled as being "intermediate" between the logarithmic and square laws.
For example, comparing Figure above to Figure 7.14 (i.e. Figure 6-6
of [64]), we find that the casualty rate for a defending force is best
fit by d near I (i.e. dx/dt - -ay - $x). However, comparing Aigure 7.13
above to Figure 7.14, we find that a value for d around one-half seems
more reasonable for the attrition-rate of an attacking force (i.e.
dx/dt - -ax y/2y/2 - Bx). All these attrition-rate functional forms may,
of course, be handled by the HELMBOLD-type equations of warfare with
operational losses (7.13.2) by taking the appropriate values for the
fire-effectiveness-modification exponents d and e. Thus, this general
model (7.13.2) has the flexibility of fitting a wide variety of attrition-
rate forms that have been used to model large-3cale ground combat.
Let us finally note here that the author knows of no acknowledgment
of the possibility that the casualty-rate curves such as we have been
discussing could be fit by a differential-equation model, or might even
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have arisen from a formal or informal understanding of simple differential
equations. Thus, we have developed an important simplified analytical
model of large-unit attrition. A good analytical model, of course, should
simplify, be transparent and easy to understand, be easy to manipulate,
and increase our understanding of real-world processes (i.e yield important
insights). In the next section we will develop from the model (7.13.1)
and its constant-coefficient version (7.1.3.2) some important insights into
the dynamics of combat that are not at all obvious from the above
casualty-rate curves.
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S7 14. Changes over Time in the Force Ratio for the Above Model.
First, let us recall (see Section 6.14 above) that when WX - W - W
in (7.13.1), i.e. we have the equations
1 -W
dx . -a(t) - (-) *y - B(t)x with x(O) - x0 ,
dt y
(7.14.1)
dt • (I-) x- c(t)y with y(O) - yo 9t x
w w
the substitution p - x and q - y transforms this nonlinear combat model
(7.14.1) into the following linear one
dp - -W{a(t)q + a(t)pl with p(O) - xW
dt0
S~(7.14.2)
- -W{b(t)p + a(t)q} with q(O) - YO
dt
Hence, we can invoke all the results of TAYLOR and PARRY [146] (see Section
6.13 above). In particular, if we let
R(t) - a(t) and S(t) - {,(t) - Q(t) (7.14.3)
bkt) V-a (t)b(t)
and assume that (Al) W E (0,11, (A2) R(t) and S(t) are nondecreasing
functions of time, W) limT.. fo b(t)dt - + -, and (A4) R(t) is not
identically equal to zero, then X will lose a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint
battle in finite time if
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where R0 denotes R(0) and S0  denotes S(0). Moreover, the force ratio
u - x/y is a strictly decreasing function of time in such a battle. When
WX# Wy., the model (4.1) is, unfortunately, no longer transformable into
a linear one, but we still can obtain similar results for constant attrition-
rate coefficients by slightly different arguments.
We aczordingly compute the rate of change of the force ratio u - x/y
for the model (7.13.2), namely
du -bul~+ (i- al-ddu- ' 1e + (a - )u - au ,d F(u) . (7.14.5)
Computing F"(u) U( + e)ebu e- + d(l-d)au-d- , we find that F() - F(u;de)
is a strictly convex function of u on [0,+-) for 0 < d, e < 1 but
not both d and e simultaneously equal to zero. Let us therefore assume that
this condition is satisfied, i.e. 0 < d, e < 1 but not both d and e
are simultaneously equal to zero. Observing that F(0) < 0 and
limu +, F(u) - + o, we see that there exists a unique positive value for
u such that F(u) 0, since F(u) is strictly ccnvex on [0,+-o). Let
us denote this unique positive root of F(u) - 0 as u+. Then we have
(< 0 for 0< u < u+,
F(u) (7.14.6)
> 0 for U+< U.
It follows that if u0 < u+, then du/dt(t) < 0 as long as u > 0, since
although u(t) changes (decreases) over time, it still E [O,u+). Also,
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if u > u+ then du/dt(t) > 0 as long as u - x/y remains finite.
Thus, we have proved (cf. Theorem 6.13.1).
THEOREM 7.14.1: For the nonlinear HELMBOLD-type combat model
(7.13.2), du/dt(t) < 0 for all t > 0 as long as u > 0 if
and only if du/dt(O) < 0, i.e. u0 < u+.
We observe that when d - e and d E (0,I], then
u+- Sf2 +  /(2 + +I,(7.14.7)
where R now denotes a/b and S denotes (-a)/a/b.
Theorem 7.14.1 not only is of intrinsic interest, but it also forms
the basis of important results about the dynamics of FEBA movement given in
Section 7.16 below. Theorem 7.14.1 also leads to
THEOREM 7.14.2: For the nonlinear HELMBOLD-type combat model
(7.13.2), X will lose a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle in
finite time if and only if u0 < u+.
PROOF. By Theorem 7.14.1 we know that du/dt(t) < 0 for all r > 0 as
long as u >.0 if and only if u0 < u+. It remains to show that u ÷0+-
in finite time. Since F(u) is convex, we know that its maximum value
occurs at the end points of the interval [O,u 0 ]. Denote this maximum value




u(t) - u 0 +' dt Uo - Mt
0
It follows that u(t) - 0+ in finite time, and we have proven the theorem. Q.E.D.
The following theorem is then an immediate corollary to Theorem 7.14.2
and (7.14.7).
THEOREM 7.14.3: Assume that d - e and d E (0,1] for the
nonlinear HELNBOLD-type combat model (7.13.2). Then X will
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7.15. FEBA-Movement Modelling.
Although the fundamental role of ground-combat troops (in the
U. S. Army's own words, e.g. see [1 6 4 ,p. iv]) is to "shoot, move, and
communicate," one may think of the Army's mission as being ground control.
All ground-combat models must consequently in one way or another reflect
the control of territory by the opposing forces. Many large-scale ground-
combat models (e.g. ATLAS, CEM, and TAGS) assume that a "contact zone"
(or FEBA) separates the two opposing forces and runs in a more or less
continuous line between them. These models divide the tactical battlefield
into strips called "sectors," and the fighting forces are generally con-
strained to move within these sectors, which correspond to axes of advance
or withdrawal (e.g. see [25, pp. 9-13 and p. 82]. Combat operations in
such a sector are then more or less independent of those in adjacent
sectors, with the exact details varying significantly from model to model
(e.g. between AILAS [98] and CEM [25]). For our purposes here, however,
we assume that there are no interactions between sectors, and let us then
focus on an individual sector.
in such a sector, the forces are separated by a FEBA (see Figure 7.15),
and during an engagement changes in the rate of FEBA movement are primarily
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caused by chzuiges in the force ratio . FEBA position is then calculated
as the integral of a rate-if-advance equation, i.e.
t d
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Figure 7.15. Conceptualization of aggregated-force combat in
a sector.
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s - s(t) denotes cumulative FEBA movement from its initial position,
ds/dt denotes the rate of advance (taken to be positive for X), and
u - x/y denotes the force ratio (usually the ratio of the firepower
indices x and y of the opposing forces). In other words, we have
adopted the convention that ds/dt > 0 means that X is advancing against
the enemy (Y). In current aggregated-force models (e.g. ATLAS and CEM)
it is assumed that the rate of advance also depends on additional tactical
factors such as: (1) terrain trafficability, (2) unit types in the attack-
ing force, and (3) the engagement type 3 9 (e.g. route, retirement, delay,
meeting engagement, attack of a hasty defense, prepared position, or fortified
zone). In equation (7.15.2), r denotes all these other tactical factors.
For a fixed value of r, the rate of advance consequently depends on only
the force ratio, and this dependence (at least for most of the rate-of-advance
curves seen by this author) may be characLerized as follows:
(CI) a threshold forue ratio is required for an advance to start,
(C2) above this threshold value, the rate of advance increases
as the force ratio increases, but at a decreasing rate
(i.e. above the threshold value, the rate of advance is a
convex function of the force with essentially a horizontal
asymptote).
A sector such as depicted in Figure 7.15 is one-dimensional in the sense
that only a single number s(t) is used to specify FEBA position at time t.
We may think of this s(t) as representing an average FEBA position within
the sector (i.e. variations in FEBA position within the sector are
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-- ]. - - - ,I. - ~ .- - - -- - . - . - -- - - - ----
not considered). Although we have depicted the sectors shown in Figure
7.15 as being straight and of uniform width, this need not be the case
(e.g. see (25, p. 10 or p. 82]).
Let us row consider an example of a rate-of-advance equation that
has been suggested by historical data and used in various forms in many
RAND studies. We use this example in the next section to show that we
need to know only the above two general characteristics of a rate-of-advance
curve (and not numerical particulars as long as the curve has these general
characteristics) and, for example, the fact that the force ratio is a
strictly increasing function of time (see Section 7.14 above) in order to
develop some important insights into the dynamics of FEBA movement. We
therefore consider (see Figure 7.16)
I R--
MRx u for 0 < u < uR
ds 0 for u u < u (7.15.3)
dt R- -A <
V mA ( u uA u
ma for uA<
where VR denotes the maximum speed for retreat of the X force, uR denotes
the force ratio at which retreat begins, VA denotes the maximum speed for
max
advance of the X force, and uA denotes the force ratio at which advance
begins. We should think of the pacameters VaR x R ma amax' URP ma uA a
depending on the tactical variables (i.e. terrain type, attacking unit types,
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Figure 7.16. Rate of advance versus force ratio for the model
(7.15.3) with all other tactical factors held constant.
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is suggested by a model that fits data on operations in Western Europe
during Wrold War II (see [116] and [66, pp. 17-18]). We have chosen to
consider the functional form (7.15.3) because (1) it provides a good
40
fit to many rate-of-advance curves currently in use, and (2) it yields
an analytically tractable model when combined with attrition equations
such as (7.13.2).
From (7.15.3) we see that for a given set of tactical conditions
(denoted as T above), FEBA motion depends on the force ratio, and con-
sequently we are interested in how the force ratio behaves over time
(see Section 7.14 above). In the next section we will show how the
equations (7.13.2) and (7.15.3) provide some valuable insights into the
dynamics of ground combat.
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7.16. Dynamics of FEBA Movement in Large-Scale Ground-Combat Models 41 .
As discussed above, in an engagement FERA movement i9 governed by
the force ratio, which in turn varies with time due to losses on both sides.
We will now show how the analytical formations for attrition and FEBA motion
(given above in Sections 7.13 and 7.15) lead to some valuable insights into
the dynamics of FEBA movement as portrayed in current large-scale ground-
combat models.
It will be convenient to restate our combat model here, since its
component parts are widely scattered above. As we have seen above, con-
ventional-force combat in large-scale operations may be modelled by (7.13.2)
and (7.15.3). Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain explicit
analytical resulida concerning FEBA position, combat capabilities (i.e.
the two firepower indices of the opposing forces), and the force ratio. for
the general version of this model. However, by choosing the appropriate
values for certain parameters, we are able to obtain such explicit analytical
results: thus, we assume that d - e in (7.13.2) and denote this common
value as W. Also, for convenience and simplicity, we assume that uA - uR and
VA vR -V in with extension to the general case of u ý u andmax max max A R
A V R being straightforward but messy. Our model for conventional
max max
combat between large ground-force units in a sector may then be written
as the three coupled equations




di" - x (Y-) x - my with y(O) -Y 0 , (7.16.1)
!Ls V with s(O) - ,
where 0 < W < 1.
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One important characteristic of the analytical model (7.16.1)
ii izs transparency (cf. the last paragraph of Section 7.13): we explicitly
see all hypothesized functional relations. For a special case of this
particular model (the author currently knows of no other), explicit analytical.
results are readily available, and we will develop them below. The author
conjectures (but cannot prove) that analytical results take their simplest
form for the model (7.16.1). Even in this "simplest" case, however, the
analytical expression for FEBA position [see (-7.16.8) a=d (7.16.9) below]
is so complicated That computational results are required to provide any
insight into the dynamics of FEBA movement. However, the qualitative
behavior of FEBA position over tiae is readily discernible for the more
general case of d 0 a in (7.13.2) by combluing results on changes over
tiwa in the force ratio (se._e Theorem 7.14.1) with the general character-
istics of rate-of-advance equations [see (Cl) and (C") in Section 7.1.5
above]. Thus knowledge about how the force ratio changes over time. is
a key piece of information for understanding the dynamics of large-scale
combat as currently represented in many large-scale ground-combat models,
Analysts should therefore become familiar with how various functional
forms for attrition rates yield different types of temporal variations in
the force ratio.
We will now develop the explicit analytical results for the model
(7.16.1). If we let u - x/y v z, where Z - 1/W, then the above model




dv _1 2(dt bv + (0 - )v- a with v(O)- yo)
(7.16.2)
ds with s(O) - 0-t" Vmax Z +
where I < Z < + o. The first equation of (7.16.2) is readily incegrated
to yield the force ratio as a function of time, namely
W W )( W P e)W (7.16.3)
M ((t0 - v) ) - (u0 -vM) e 2WOt,
where
I -1 , R - a/b , S - (7.16.4)
VP r{ SS/2/+ /(S/2)2 + 1 (7.16.5)
and_ _
v- ,fS/2) + < 0 (7.16.6)
V 'R~/2 (S2
Because of the coupling of equations (7.16.2) we have not been able to
develop an explicit expression for FEBA position as a function of time,
s(t). It is possible, however, to express FEBA position as a function
of the force ratio. Thus, we may eliminate time from (7.16.2) to obtain
z v d V (1, + J)dv (7.16 7)
ds --- ~s-- b e v-V)( V - ) (v" +l(v -vp)(V VM)ii'
For Z - n - 1/W, we may use a partial fraction expansion of (7.16.7)
to obtain after some rather lengthy computations
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and the other coeffncien+ s are given in Table 7.VI. When n is odd and
vM - 1, the above expression (7.16:;8) reduces to
/ + (u - v / u 0
max I//n
6= -o+ /uav U + -}
+ F(1 n [el k] + Gn[tan- {- ( \ (u) tan- Q(U0 } 1 + /
kkuo )I Iak.{QI) k k) (7.16.9)
where the modified coefficients C through Gn are given in Table 7.VII.
Thus, we see that explicit analytical results are readily obtain-
able fo- the model (7.16.1), although the FEBA-position results only hold
for WV /n. UnfortuInately, even these explicit results do not readily
reveal the dynamics of FEBA movement. We will now show how the qualitative
behavior of the force ratio over time as determined from a force-ratio
equation Like (7.14.5) may be coupled with a rate-of-advance equation
to yield nme important insights into the dyn amics of FEBA movement.
This approwch also allows us to consider more general models of both
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TABLE 7.VI. Coefficients for Relation (7.16.8) Between FEBA Position
and the Force Ratio u - x/y.
C " ,'¶ (uA + 1)f(-_)n - 3.}/{2nl(vp + 1)(vg + 1)1
n P A
E _(vp - uA)/{2e(vP + 1))
S -(ve _UA)/{26(v + 1)}
,k= "' (u + 1){S Aý + (R - 1) cos &k1/{nlP
kA k kM
Gkn 2 IR (ui + 1)(R + 1)(sin On~l{n/Pn(v enn(vM)}k A k'k' P k M
pn (q) -q 2 _ 2q(cos n) + I
Qkk
Q n M) (ul/ - Cos 0 n)/(sin 0 n
and
nk- (2k - 1)'f/n
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TABLE 7.VII. Modified Coefficients for Relation (7.16.9) Between FEBA
Position and the Force Ratio u - x/y When n is Odd
and vM - 1.
C -{nnV - uA (n - )[ - (vp + l)(uA + l)/2j]/(n(vp + 1)-ý
D (Up - )/((v + 1)(v + 1))
n U A p
E n= (uA + 1)/{n(vp + 1)}
F - '¶( + 1) (S vAf + (R-1) cos 0 n}/{2nI(1 + cos onl) Ifl(v )k A k k k





attrition and also FEBA motion for conventional combat between large unitt3 in a
sector.
We therefore consider the more general version of
dx l-d
dx ,-a (--) y - with x(O) - X0
d_ = -b (Y-) x- Cy with y(0) - Y760
dt x (7.16.10Y
I f R(u;T) < 0 for 0 < u < uR
ds 0 for uR < u < uA with s(O) 0,
dt
Sf(u;T) > 0 for uA < u
where 0 < d, e < 1, with d and e not simultaneously equal to zero. Here
the attrition-rate coefficients a, b, a, and a also depend on the tactical
parameters, denoted as i. For understanding how the trading of casualties
interacts with the rate-of-advance equation to determine the dynamics of FEBA
movement, we need consider only the force-ratio equation in conjunction with
the rate-of-advance equation, however. Thus we consider
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u +e (a-)u - au with u(O) u 0
f R(u;T) < 0 for 0 < u < uR (7.16.11)
ds 0 for u u u with s(O) = 0,
dt R ý- - A
f A(u;) > 0 for uA < u
where 0 < d, e < 1, with d and e not simultaneously equal to zero. Let
us assume that X is the attacker. Consequently it is not unreasonable to
expect that u+ > uA. For example, a/b - 9, a - a, d - e, and uA - 1.7
leads to this situation. In this case (i.e. when u+ > uA), recalling
Theorem 7.14.1, we can obtain some important insights into the dynamics of
FEBA movement by considering the second differential equation in (7.16.11) (see
Figure 7.17). In other words, the FEBA-movement information shown in Figure
7.17, has been obtained by combining the strictly-monotonic behavior of the
force ratio over time (cf. Theorem 7.14.1) with the general characteristics
(Cl) and (C2) (see Section 7.15 above) of the rate of change of FEBA
position (cf. the second differential equation in 7.16.11).
Figure 7.17 shows us that there are several critical initial-force-
ratio threshold values that bound regions of quite different subsequent
evolution for the course of combat. If the initial force ratio u0  exceeds
u+ > uA, then the X-force attack will continue to advance against increasingly
more favorable force ratios, i.e. the attack "breaks out" in the sector.
If Y does not, for example, commit reserves or allocate air strikes to
the sector, then (according to the model) his forces will continue to
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Figure 7.17. Qualitative behavior of FEBA position over time
for combat modelled with (7.16.11).
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they are eventually annihilated. If u1 < u0 < u+, we have the most interest-
ing (and enlightening) case: the X-fcrce attack will continue to push
forward but at increasingly more unfavorable casualty-exchange ratios until
the force ratio is no longer such that an advance can be sustained, i.e. the
attack "stalls out." Our model then says that the contact zone will remain
stationary for a while until the f'rce ratio is further worn down enough
for the Y force to counterattack and being to advance.
Although the model considered here is quite an idealization ar.d
simplification of operational models such as ATLAS, CEM, and TAGS. this
basic trading of space for time (in the case in which uA < u 0 < u+)
in order to wear down the force rat.o and then to subsequently counterattack
has been a basic prnmise of NATO defense planning for years. Thus our
simple model has revealed this ianportant structure of large-scale operations.
It should, of course, be noted that this structure (i.e. the combat dynamics
portrayed in Figure 7,17) is not directly discernable from any of the complex




7.17. Current Complex Aggregated-Force Operational Models of Large-Scale
Tactical Engagements.
The following are currently operational theater-level combat models
"that use the firepower-score approach to aggregate forces for assessing







These are essentially the only operational models currently available in the
United States for analyzing simulated theater-level combat. It was estimated
[9] that as of August 1977 the approximate frequency of use of ATLAS was
600 times per year, that of CEM was 25, and that of DAGAM II was between
150 and 200.
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"*7.18. A Linear Model for Imputing Values to Weapon-Sstem Types Based on
Their LANCHESTER Attrition-Rate Coefficients.
One significant and basic criticism [90, pp. II-C-3I of the fi'repower-
43
score approach is that the effectiveness (or value) of a weapon-system type
depends on the circumstances of its employment and that any methodology for
quantifying the combat capability of a weapon-system type should result in
each weapon being assigned a number representing that weapon-system type's
value in a particular combat situation relative to all other weapon-system
types being employed. Consequently, there have been several attempts to
impute value to a weapon-system type based on the particular circumstances
of that system's fighting capability relative to that of other systems on
the battlefield. This value is then treated like a firepower score for aggre-
gating forces in models of large-scale combat operations for purposes of
modelling combat processes such as attrition, FEBA movement, and tactical
44
decision making . Thus, in this section we will examine an approach for
imputing value (i.e. assigning a firepower score) to a weapon-system type
based on the circumstances of its employment and its casualty-producing
capability relative to that of all other weapon-system types in the particular
combat environment under zonsideration. The basic idea45 of this approach
is to use a linear model for transforming all the LANCiESTER attrition-rate
coefficients 4 6 of a combined-arms team fighting against a heterogeneous
enemy force into a set of values for these weapon-system types.
This approach for imputing values to weapon-system types based on
their single-system kill rates is important because it has been and continues
to be used in so-called weapon-system equivalence studies by the U. S. Army
[89,; 149], and it also forms the basis in IDAGAM4 7 [5; 6; 130] for computing
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force ratios that are used for scaling casualties, determining FEBA movement,
modelling tactical decision making, etc. (see ANDERSON et al. [6] or SHUPACK
[130] for further details). It has also served as the theoretical basis
for aggregating forces in a hierarchical combat-modelling approach developed
in the United Kingdom (see DARE and JAMES [43] and DARE [42] for further
details; see also Section 7.20 below). Unfortunately, different authors
have used different names for referring to this method (and certain of its
variants based on how weapon-system-type value is "scaled"): HOLTER [89]
has used the terms weapon effectiveness value (WEV) and unit effectiveness
value (UEV), ANDERSON [5] has called it the antipotential potential method,
while HOWES and THRALL [90; 92] have referred to it as the method of ideal
linear weights.
The rest of this section is organized in the following fashion.
First, we will present the basic linear model for imputing values to weapon-
system types based on their LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients. Next,
we will show how these weapon-system-type values allow one to consider the
evolution of aggregated-force value without having to keep track of indi-
vidual weapon-system types in detail when it is assumed that all attrition
occurs according to the equations for a heterogeneous-force FIF LANCHESTER-
type attrition process. This result leads to several important interpretations
for parameters of the linear-valuation model, including that of the square
root of the eigenvalue of maximum magnitude from an associated eigenvalue-
problem as representing the intensity of combat between the aggregated
forces. Additionally, the evolution over time of the force ratio for this
associated aggregated-force model is examined. The imputed weapon-system-type
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"!aluas foi, each force are only determined up to a constant multiple by the
basic linear-valuatlon model. Various methods for scaling the two opposing
force-value vtctors determined by the basic model are revie~ed, and an alter-
native scaling scheme Lhat avoids certain difficulties is suggested.
We begin by considering a linear model for imputing values to weapon-
system types baaed cri their heterogeneousgforce single-system kill rates
against cpposing enemy weapon-system types. Let us first consider a feu
heuristics to foster an understanding of the liaear-valuation model's funda-
mental premise: namely, that weapon-system types are vailued in direct pro-
portion to the rate at which they destroy the value of opposing enemy weapon-
system types. Assume that you are in combat against an enemy combined-arms
team composed of various weapon-system types. Would you value an enemy
machine gun more than, say, a :'ifle? Without doubt, one will value the
machine gun more than a rifle because it is more "dangerous," i.e. it will
hurt us more in combat by destroying more of our systems. S'ince different
types of systems are involved here in the list of machine-gun kills, one will
have to pick some common denominato%:, aggregate target-type kills accordingly,
and consider the overall value of targets destroy4d. Thus, one is very
naturally led to the following gen*4ral principle for assigning value to
weapon-system types.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WEAPON-SYSTEM VALUATION: The value of a
weapon system is directly proportional to the value of enemy
weapon systems that it destroys.
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SThis qualitative rmaxim will now be developed into a quadtitative model for
deturmining weapon-system-type values. In order to have a comaon basis for
comparing different weapon-system -ypes one shoul' consider the number of
kills by a particular weapon-system type in some standard unit of time, and
thus we are led to consider the ate at which the value of enemy weapon
systems is destroyed. Thus, we see thac a very natural and intuitively appeal-
ing basic premise upon which to build a model fur determining weapon-system-
48
type value is the following .
BASIC MODELLING HYPOTHESIS FOR IMPUTING VALUES TO WEAPON-SYSTEM TYPES:
The value of a weapon-sy.tem type is directly proportional to the
rate at which it destroys the value of opposing enemy weapon-ystem
types.
We will now translate the above intuitively appealing basic hypothesis into a
quantitative model.
Consider two opposing heterogeneous forces: an X force consisting
of m different types of weapon systems (denoted as X1, X2, .. , , XK)
opposed by a Y force consisting of n different types of weapon systems
(denoted as 'Y' Y2' "' ' Yn ) (recall Figure 7.11). If we assume that
the total value of a collection of different weapon-system types is a linear
function of the number of each of these different types of systems, then
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(value ol' the n aueo rate at which (value of
'L X weapon-- one CONSTANT' ne Xi sstem( one Y
system type system - destroys Y system
systemR
(71.8.1)
As we have done in Section 7.7, we will always let (if it is at all possible)
the subscript i refer to the X force and the subscripi j refer to the
Y force. Thus, if nothing else is said, the index i will always take on
the integer values 1 through m, aud the index _.j•will always take on the
integer values 1 through n. If we let A denote the rate49 at which
one Y system kills Xi systems in e particular combat situation and
similarly let b denote the rate at which one Xi systems kills Y
systems, then we ray express (7.18.1) in mathematical terms as
n
K - b , (7.18.2)
where s denotes the value of one X weapon system, K. denotes a constant
of proportionality which will be given an operational interpretation below,
and similarly a denotes the value of the jth Y weapon-system type. Un-
fortunately, our model is so far incomplete, since not only are there m unknown
X
values sa for the X weapon-system types but also n unknown values
yi
SYi for the Y weapon-system types. This indeterminant situation is readily
alleviated by observing that an analogous system of equations holds for the
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S Y weapon-systLm types. Thus, it is convenient to write the basic liaear
model (founded upon the above basic hypothesis) for imputing values to
weapon-system types based on their single-systam kill rates as follows
nx 1 Y




where (on physical/operational grounds we must have) alj and bj > 0.
Equations (7.18.3) are (ni+n) equations in the (m+n+2> unknowns
x Y
i, sj, KX, and Ky. Thus, two more equations must be given, before a
determinant system can be obtained. On the other hand, if we consider that
and K have been determined, then we have (m+n) linear equations
x Y
in (m+n) unknowns si and s . On physical/operational grounds it only
makes senoe to have s and sa > 0, with a zero value meaning that the
i i -
model has imputed absolutely no value to the weapon-system type in question.
Thus, we should inquire whether the linear equatilons (7.18.3) possess such
a nonnegative solution. It is indeed remarkable that as loug as aij
and b > 0 we are guaranteed of always being able to find such deciied
nonnegative solutico.s to (7.18.3) without any further assumptions about the
single-system kill rates aij and bji. To prove this latter assertion,
one subscitutes the second equation of (7.18-3) into the first to obtain
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and similarly
in m
sj - • { j b kiaij sk
k-l i-I
which are more easily to be recognized as a pair of so-called eigenvalue
problems (e.g. see HILDEBRAND [82], MIRSKY [1ll], or SAMELSON (123] by
writing
(AB)T X - (7.18.6)
and
(BA)TSy - X.sy (7.18.7)
where
X - 1/(KxKy), (7.18.8)
s denotes a column vector of the m X-weapon-system-type values [i.e.
T X X X
T . s 2 , ... , s )], A denotes an m x n matrix of attrition-rate
coefficients (i.e. A - [aiji), AT denotes the transpose of A obtained by
interchanging its rows and columns, and similarly for By and B (with B
being an n x m matrix). We will see that by invoking the so-called PERRON-
FROBENIUS theorem50 for nonnegative matrices that one can guarantee that
(without any further assumptions about A and B) there always exists a
vector of nonnegative values such that, for example, (7.18.6) holds.
Before we state the PERRON-FROBENIUS theorem for nonnegative matrices,
it will be convenient to state a few basic definitions from matrix theory.
Our discussion here follows VARGA [152, Chapters 1 and 2]. For n > 2, an
n x n matrix C is called reducible if there exists an n x n permutation matrix.
P such that




where Cl,1 is an r x r st'bmatrix and C2, 2  is an (n-r) x (n-r) submatrix,
with 1 < r < n. If no 3uch permutation matrix exists, then C is called
irreducible. Any reducible n x n matrix C may consequently be written
in the following nrm-al fort
R1,1 R1,2 R ,m
0 R 2,2 ..." R2,m
PCP (7.18.9)
0 0 ... R
m,m
where P is an n x n permutation matrix and each square submatrix R j,J
for I < j < m is either Irreducible or a 1 x 1 null matrix. Also, an n x n
matrix M - [mij I is called strictly upper triangular only if mij - 0
for all i > J. Finally, the spectral radius of a square matrix is defined
to be the maximum of the absolute values of the matrix's eigenvalues. We
now state here without proof the PERRON-ifROBENIUS theorem for nonnegative
mazvices (see VARCA [152] for a proof of this important theorem).
THEOREM .5.-1.1 (PERRON [121] and FROBENIUS [60]): Let C z 0 be an
n x n matrix. Then,
1. C has a nonnegative real eigenvalue equal to its spectral radius.
This eigenvalue is positive unless C is reducible and the
normal form (7.18.9) of C is ntrictly upper triangular.
2. To the spectral radius, there correspopda a uonnegativ. eigen-
vector. 1l C is irreducible, then this eigenvector is
positive and the corresponding eigenvalue ia simple.
3. The spectral radius of C increases when any entry of C is in-
creased unless C is reduciLle, and thuin ft does not decrease.
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The above Theorem 5.M1.1 tells us that since AB 2. 0, we can always find
a uonnegative vector of weapon-system-type values t> 0, which is unique
only up to a constant multiple, for the X force such that
(AB)T X _ *x, (7.18.10)
holds, where A denotes the nonnegative real eigenvalue of AB with
largest absolute value. If AB is an irreducible n x n matrix, then Ax
and A > 0. Similarly, BA > 0 guarantees that we can also find a non-
negative vector of weapon-system-type values py >_ 0, which is unique only
up to a constant multiple, for the Y force such that
T *
(BA) -T s , (7.18.11)
and if BA is an irreducible m x m matrix, both ty and A are positive.
It should be noted that under the present scheme of things tX and
,Z Yare each only unique up to a constant multiple, i.e. unique up to a
scale factor. In other words, if (for example) tX satisfies (7.18.10),
then so will ks where k is an arbitrary constant. By scaling these
value vectors in some appropriate fashion, one can make them be uniquely
determined, but we will see that this scaling is not really necessary,
although it may be convenient.
lo summarize, we have shown that we can always solve (7.18.10)
and (7.18.11) to determine sX and se > 0 (with, for example, sX > 0
if AB is an irreducible matrix), but that these weapon-system-type
scores are only unique up to a constant multiple. Thus, the weapon-system-
type-valuation scheme given by (7.18.3) is a "reasonable" model for imputed
550
valuation of weapon-system types, since it does yield values that do not
obviousiy violate any paradigms of rationality (such as a negative value
occurring).
Let us now consider what happens to the total value of each of the
two opposing forces in the special case in which all attrition occurs accord-
ing to a heterogeneous-force FIF attrition process (see Section 7.7), and
all such attrition is accounted for by the A and B matrices of attrition-
rate coefficients. We will see that in such cases the total value of each
force undergoes a homogeneous-force FIF attrition process and that the
A
quantities KX, KY, and A may be given simple operational interpretations.
Thus, instead of having to analyze heterogeneous-force combat, one can
examine a derived homogeneous-force model for total force capability (i.e.
value). Additionally, we will find that certain model quantities are
invariant under admissible51 changes in scale for A. and zy, and we will
be led to a very convenient scaling scheme for s and s which in many
senses is the "best" scaling scheme. It should be pointed out here that
within the context of aggregated-force value, the existence of quantities
that are invariant under (admissible) changes in scale for s and
is of the greatest significance because it allows us to dedwice system
behavior that is fundamental in the sense of not depending on the particular
scaling assumptions (i.e. scaling method) adopted. All other quantities
(i.e those not invariant under the group of transformations effecting
admissible changes in scale ior As and y) depend on the choice of
scale for and and consequently different results will be obtained
for them with different scaling schemes. Thus, one has motivation for




Thus, we will assume that the X and Y forces undergo hetero-
genecus-force FIF attrition (see Section 7.7 for a discussion of the oper-
ational assumptions associated with this attrition process), i.e. for xi
and yj > 0
dxi n
dt - - a ijy with xi(O)- x°,J-l
(7.18,12)
dy1 -- b x with yj(O)
dt b jii wi
Let us consider now the total value of the X force, denoted as VX, which
(if we assume that the aggregated-force value is a linear function of the




- sixi . (7.18.13)
i-i
Similarly, we takt, the total value of the Y force V to be given by
n
Vy sJy1 . (7.18.14)
The reader should recognize (7.18.13) and (7.18.14) as the usual linear
scoring scheme for determining a single index number to represent the total
combat capability or worth of a heterogeneous force (see Sections 7.11 and
7.12 for further details). It follows from (7.18.3), (7.18.13), and
(7.18.14) that as long as x and Z > 0 •
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d - ((- V wirh Vx(O) - Vx
(7.18.15)
dV. - (1) V with Vy(0) - 0
dt - X (i Y Vi
where
0 m X00=n Y0
sixi and V Y I y (7.18.16)
i-i J-i
From (7.18.15) we see that it is convenient to let
Cx 1/KX and Cy iM/Ky (7.18.17)
and write (7.18.15) as
dVx 
0
dt. -CyV with Vx(O) - Vx
(7.18.18)
dVf ( 0-v
V -. -CxYx with Vy(0) - 0
t X X Y V
It follows from (7.18.8) and (7.18.17) that the maximal eigenvalue X
determining the weapon-system-type scores sX and ty in (7.18.10)
and (7.18.11) is related to CX and C. by
- Cx C. (7.18.19)
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Thus, the square root of the PERRON-FROBENIUS eigenvalue V/XW- C
may be interpreted as the intensity of combat attriting the values of the
aggregated X and Y forces (cf. our discussion in Section 2.2 of the
intensity of combat for the FIF attrition process). Furthermore, CX
and CY may be interpreted as LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients in
the process by which aggregated-force value is diminished over time. Thus,
for example, Cx may be thought of as the rate at which one unit of aggre-
gated-X-force value (or combat capability) is destroying aggregated-Y-
force value.
At this juncture it is convenient to use (7.18.17) to rewrite the
fundamental equations for weapon-system-type worth imputed by attrition as
X nC i W J l b j i s i
(7.18.20)
CysY . a sj" ij iX
i- 1
Although we will have no immediate use for them, it is convenient for future









from which it follows that the quantity CxCY is invariant under changes
in scale for R and i.e. CxCY remains the same when sX and
are replaced by klx and kgy where kI and k are arbitrary positive
constants.
Example 7.18.1. For the 2 x 2 case, i.e. two weapon-system types on each
side (m - n - 2), one can obtain explicit (but rather complicated and generally
unenlightening by themselves) results:
'{1 C c + /C c )2  + 4c1 2 c 2 1 } for c 1 2 c 2 1 > 0,1 {l+ 22 Cli-C22 2 1 22
-=(7.18.22)
max(cll, c2 2 ) for c1 2c2 1 - 0,
or, equivalently,
1 id + d + (d -d ) 42 +4d d for d d > 0,
1 22 11i 22 1221 1221(
* (7.18.23)
maX(dll) d22) for d - 0,
where
l 1 al1bll + a 12b 21, d i a1lbll + a 21b12
c1 2 "a11 b1 2 + a1 2 b2 2, d1 2 "a12 b11 + a2 2 b12,
(7.18.24)
c21- a 2 1 b1 1 + a 2 2 b2 1 , d2 1  a 11 b2 1 + a21b224
c2 2 -a21b12 + a 22b 22 d a12b21 + a22b22•
We find that
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(i-) ) sI for c > 0,
xs 2
(7.18.25)
c,.c2 i for c 0 and Cli >c 2 2 ,
x




( dig Y)s for d -0 and d > d
d )l21 11 22
il 22
Ywith sI - 0 for d21 -0 and dl_< d22.
Let us now turn to consideration of the evolution of the total-
aggregated-force values V and V over time. Since these values satisfy
the LANCHESTER-type equations (7.18.18) for a FIF attrition process, we can
invoke all the results that we developed in Chapter 2. In particular,
the total-aggregated-X-force value as a function of time Vx(t) is given by
0cs C•
Vx(t) - V0ash r t - V sinh /X* t. (7.18.27)
From (7.18.27) the interpretation of V'7 as the intensity of aggregated-
force combat should be obvious. However, if we consider the fraction of
0the initial total-aggregated-X-force value, denoted as fx(t) - V x(t)/VO,
we will learn much more about this aggregated-force model. Hence, we consider
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I I0
Vx(t) v0  /c~
fx(t) - - cosh VT t - - \/•-- sinh /N t, '7.18.28)
x x
from which we will deduce that the normalized force ratio p(t), defined by
P()- I V( (7.18.29)
is invariant under changes in scale for the value vectors sX and sy by
the following argument. Consider the fraction of the initial total-aggregated-
X-force value
(t) W x(t)
x __0_Tft)" 0 T---- , (7.18.30)Vx -1xa0
and observe that it is invariant under changes in scale for tX and Ay,
i.e. fx(t) remains the same when tX is replaced by k-sx where k is an
arbitrary positive constant. Consequently, from the right-hand side of
(7.18.28) we may conclude that the same is true for E y 0 /
- P0. Thus, the same invariance must hold for the normalized force ratio
defined by (7.18.79), and cur above assertion has been proven.
It is instructive for future purposes to consider a second proof of
the stated invariance of the normalized force ratio P(t). As we have seen
previously in this chapter, the force ratio is used for many key purposes
in aggregated force-on-force combat modelling (e.g. casualty assessment,
FEBA-movement determination, simulation of tactical decision making, etc.).




R t) Vy(t) (.18.31)
We observe that the ordinary force ratio FR(t) is not invariant under
changes in scale for a and jy, since the substitution a' - kla and
k transforms it in the following way
FR' 2 F . (7.18.32)
From (7.18.18) and (7.18.31) it follows that the force ratio FR(t). as
usual, satisfies a RICCATI equation which in this case takes the form
dR 2 R0 (71.3F R .Cx(FR) -2 with F (O) - Vx/V 0 (7.18.33)
Let us observe that by (7.18.21) neither of Cx and 5 is invariant under
changes in scale for e and ey. Furthermore, any quantity possessing
such invariance cannot satisfy any (differential) equation with coefficients
that do not themselves possess such invariance. From this last observation
and inspection of (7.18.33) we are led to discover that p(t) defined by
p(t) - CXFR(t) (7.18.34)
possesses the desired invariance by seeking to transform (7.18.33) into a
differential equation whose cnefficients are invariarxt under changes in
scale for ex and ty. Conbidering (7.18.33), we see that an obvious thing
to do is to multiply both sides of it by CX and to use (7.18.19) to find that
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dt p - with p(O) - pO (7.18.35)
The conjecture that p(t) possesses the desired invariance is readily
confirmed by using (7.18.2).) to write (7.18.34) as
P(t) f a smxS- • bsJs )n.y(7.18.36)
It is clear from (7.18.305) that p(t) remains the same when we replace
and p by kiAX and k•.
Thus, we have proven that both CXCY and CxFR(t) are invariant
under such changes of scale. Since the same must also be true for any func-
tion of these two invariants, we have consequently shown that the normalized
force ratio 0(t) - CXFR(t)/( /C 1CZ) possesses the desired invariance (which
we have previously shown by other means). This invariance may, of course,
also be proven directly by using (7.18.13), (7.18.14), (7.18.21), and
(7.18.29). From (7.18.29) and (7.18.33) it follows that the normalized force
ratio p(t) - p(s(t)) satisfies the following very simple RICCATI equation
"k P - 1 with P(O) - , (7.18.37)
where
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Invoking results about the force ratio from Section 2.?, we may conclude
the possession of the following important properties by the normalized force
ratio p(t), which we have shown to be invariant under changes in scale
for eXandA:
(P1) p(t) is a strictly decreasing function of time if and
only if p 0 < 1;
(P2) p(t) is constant over time if and only if po M 1;
(P3) Y will win any aggregated-force fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint
battle if and only if p 0 < 1;
(P4) p(t) is given by
M P + 1) exp(-2/A:*t) + (p 0 - (71)38
(Pt) + 1) exp(-2fA*t) - (p0- 1) (.13)
and (P5) the time t f that it will take for the normalized force
ratio to reach any specified final value p~ f 1 ise given by
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tf ( , (7.18.39)
where only one of the following two situations is possible:
either (Sl) Pf < P0 < 1,
or (S2) pf > P0 > 1.
It remains for us to discuss the normalization (or scaling) of the
weapon-system-type-value vectors s and s determined by the linear model
(7.18.3). Accordingly, we will first review how various authors have scaled
these value vectors, and then (based on being able to circumvent certain
observed apparent antimonies of imputed weapon-system-type valuation) we
will suggest an alternative scaling scheme that avoids some difficulties
observed for the other scaling schemes.
Two additional conditions (one for each vector) are needed to uniquely
specify the weapon-system-type-value vectors zX and ey that have been
each determined up to a scale factor by the linear imputed-value model
(7.18.3). Different normalization (scaling) schemes that have been proposed
and tried by various authors are shown in Table 7.VIII, with the Cx and
Cy proportionality constants of (7.18.20) (equivalently, the aggregated-force
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients of (7.18.18)] that arise from these
various scaling schemes being shown in Table 7.IX. It should be noted that
when the HOLTER-ANDERSON approach to scaling is used, the usual force ratio
F Vx/VY is equal to the normaiized force ratio P (,r//c )Vx/VY, since
one has chosen to scale the value vectors in such a way that CX - 'Y.
Consequently,
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TABLE 7.VIII. Normalization (Scaling) of Imputed Values for
Weapon-Sys tern Types.
SPUDICH* (1968)
n rn- a 0 s x a, m 0 . o Y
I { I a xy }i I S I { b xi0} s' j
i 1 j 1 Ji- i-i
DARE and JAMES (1971)
M IJJxn DJ Y -
i-i 1 a-i 1
HOWES and THRALT.L (1972)
M n HT X n r HT Y
I { I a, a I bji sj 9 *
i-i i-i J  i-i
HOLTER (1973) and ANDERSON (1979)
HAX 1n HAY
8X 1 b hi s i
tHere SPUDICH (1968) - the document published by SPUDICH in 1968 (see
list of references at the end of this chapter).
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TABLE 7.IX. Proportionality Constants (Aggregated-Force LANCHESTER
Attrition-Rate Coefficients) that Arise from the Various
Normalization (Scaling) Schemes for Imputed Values of
Weapon-System Types.
SPUDIC t (1968)
0 SY S 0SX
y-1 i i
DARE and JAMES (1971)
nDJ m n
1 f i b I cD s a sii~ ii7 L
HOWES and THRALL (1972)
,HT n HTY HT m HTX
jini ijl
HOLTER (1973) and ANDERSON (1979)
CHA HAx Y
tAs in the preceding table, SPUDICH (1968) - the document published by
SPUDICH in 1968 (see list of references at the end of this chapter).
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HA HA S DJ HT
FR = P P - -p , (7.18.40)
where the superscript denotes which scaling method is being used to uniquely
determine the value vectors p. and q in conjunction with the basic
model (7.18.20), and
S - the scaling method of SPUDICH [134],
DJ - the scaling method of DARE and JAMES [43],
HT - the sceling method of HOWES and THRALL [91] (see also [921),
and HA - the scaling method of HOLTER (89] and ANDERSON (5].
We will also use this superscript notation for referring to various other
quantities of interest computed according to these different scaling methods,
HA X the.g. 8 i will denote the value of the i- X-weapon-system type computed
by (7.18.20) with the HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling method.
It is also instructive to investigate how results for these various
scaling schemes are related to one another. Using (7.18.20), one can easily
show that if




and (as we have already shown above)
F1- ) FR. (7.18.43)
Recalling that CX CY X* is invariant under such changes in scale, we
may also deduce from (7.18.42) that
C-\ (k 2 (7.18.44)
and CY- C . (7.18.45)
Using the above equations (7.18.43) through (7.18.45), one can easily
develop relations between these various quantities of interest for the
different scaling methods shown in Table 7.VIII. Such relations (except those
pertaining to SPUDICH's scaling method) are given in Table 7.X.
The HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling method is to be preferred over the
others mentioned above (eee also Table 7.VIII) because it allows the X
and Y weapon-system types to be compared with each other, not just among
themselves (see ANDERSON (5] for further details). It is the approach taken
to scaling weapon-system-type-value vectors determined by the linear model
(7.18.20) that is used by IDAGAM [5; 6; 130]. Consequently, we have
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TABLE 7.X. Relations Between Various Quantities of Interest for Different
Normalization (Scaling) Schemes for Imputed Values of Weapon-
System Types.
DJ 1 HT 1 HA
ix HA x
i1i




XHT HF~ W CX HT - iLŽL}F A
R C T R mH
C
DJ HT HA HFA
m H





NOTE: The superscripts denote whose scaling method is being used for uniquely
determining the value vectors 1h and ty, with: S - the scaling method
of SPUDICH [134]; DJ - the scaling method of DARE and JAMES [43]; DJ - the
scaling method of HOWES and THRALL [91] (see also (92]); and HA - the
scaling method of HOLTER [89] and ANDERSON [5].
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worked out explicit results for the 2 x 2 case in the following example.
In more complex cases with more weapon-system types on each side, the eigen-
value problems (7.18.10) and (7.18.11) may be solved by iterative methods52
(e.g. see HILDEBRAND [82, pp. 68-74] or ANDERSON [5]) or some type of
iterative procedure may be used to solve the original linear system (7.18.20)
(see HOLTER [89] for further details).
Example 7.18.2. For the 2 x 2 case with the HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling applied,
the general results of Example 7.18.1 take the particular form
x5s -lI
s1




2 )2 for c2 - 0 and c 1 >c 2 2Cli-C 22  l c2
d21 for d > 0
{b 11 d21+b 21 (X*-d1 1)P. 21
Y (dll-d22) -1
S1 b22) +b21d12} for d - 0 and d > d
{b 11(d d2 +b 21d2 7 .1 11 22'
0 for d - 0 and d1l d215
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Y I {b d21 + b2(A*-d } for d2 1 > 0,
11 21 21 11
S 2 d 2 / d __
12 11 for d - 0 and d >d
(bl(dlld2) + b2d 21 11 22'
0 for d2 1 - 0 and dll d 22.
Unfortunately, this method of imputing value with the HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling
scheme53 sometimes produces results that at first sight seem counterintuitive
(see the next section, however). For example, increasing the kill rate of
a weapon-system type for one side may actually increase the force ratio
in favor of the other side. This apparently paradoxical behavior is shown
by the following example.
Example 7.18.3. For the special 2 x 2 case in which a21 - a22 ' b12 - b22 0,
i.e. two Y weapon-system types against a single X weapon-system type
(see Figure 7.18), the imputed weapon-system-type values determined with
the HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling reduce from the general expressions given in
Example 7.18.2 to
xxsI11i, s2" - ,
1 2
(4.18.46)
y a11  Y a1 2sI - , s2 - all





Figure 7.18. Diagram of heterogeneous-force interactions
considered in Example 7.18.3.
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Computing the force ratio F - SX X/(s Yl + sY), we find that
R 1 111 2Y2
alb all ( + 2a12b)2y
R 1211 a12 alb
3a1 1  2al 1lb 1 1 + a 1 2 b2 1  (ally1 + a12Y2)2
Thus, we see that there are circumstances, i.e. y 2
1/y
> (a11/a1 2) {1 + 2a 1 2 b2 1 /(a 1 1 b1 1 )), under which increasing the kill rate
of a Y weapon-system type actually increases the force ratio in X's
favor, i.e. aF R/•a1 > 0.
Although such apparently paradoxical behavior cannot entirely
be eliminated from the imputed valuation of weapon-system types by the
linear model, it is eliminated in a few special cases (such as that of
Example 7.18.3) by the following proposed scaling system. First let us
recall, though, that the HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling method picks one of the
X weapon-system types (taken to be the first X weapon-system type here)
as a reference point, and that the other X-weapon-system-type values,
which are determined by (7.18.20) only up to a constant multiple, are then
scored (i.e. scaled) relative to this standard. The reference weapon-
system type must be a "major system" in order for this scaling method to
work 54. The Y-weapon-system-type values, which are also (of course) only
determined by (7.18.20) up to a zonstant multiple, are then scaled by using
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the first of equations (7.18.20)with 1 - 1 and the assumption that
CXHA , CyHA (see Tables 7.VIII and 7.IX). Considering the above, we
propose here the following scaling scheme: choose both an X and also
a Y reference-weapon-system type; assign a value of 1.00 to the X
weapon-system type and score the Y weapon-system type according to its
relative effectiveness against this reference X weapon-system type in
a lx lduel (i.e. the ratio of single-opposing-reference-system kill rates).
Thus, we would have
T X T Y al1sI 1 and sI Y- • (7.18.47)
The basic idea here is that for each force a weapon-system type is selected
for scaling purposes as a reference point, the X-reference-weapon-system
type is assigned a value of 1.00, and the Y-reference-weapon-system type
is scored relative to this arbitrary X-reference-weapon-system-type value.
Example 7.18.4. For the 2 x 2 case with the above scaling method (7.18.47),
the general results of Example 7.18.1 take the particular form
X
8, 1,
( -c 21  for c21 > 0
c2 1
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and
for d2 1 > 0,d 21 2
Sd 12  a11d d2 b1 for d -0 and d > d
11l- 22 b11 21 11 22'
For the special case in which a 2 1 - a - b12 - b - 0 (again, see
Figure 7.18), the above imputed weapon-system-type values reduce to
x x
S" , s22 0
(7.18.48)
Y y
sI a1 1 /b ,1 1  s 2 a 1 2 /b 1 2 ,
and we then find that aFR/3alj - -b 1 xlY /(allY1 + a 1 2 Y2 )2 < 0
Which scaling method is "best"? This important question should
undoubtedly be answered by investigating which scoring scheme [i.e. combi-
nation of basic model (7.18.20) and scaling method] provides the "best"
model for imputing weapon-system-type values, i.e. produces the best results
according to some criteria. However, this type of investigation has
apparently never been completely carried out, and it doe3 appear that
alternate scaling methods are quite naturally suggested. For exaxmple,
besides the above one (7.18.47), another very reasonable scaling method
would be to assign a value of 1.00 to the X-reference-weapon-system type
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and then score the Y-reference-weapon-system type on the basis of its
relative effectiveness against this weapon-system type but weighted by the
intensity of combat in this I× 1 duel relative to the intensity of combat
in the overall battle, i.e.
2
TTY Y a 111 1 a a7 .lbl 1  * -I •-- (7.18.49)
However, it should be noted that the HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling method is more
natural in the sense of using the first of equations (7.18.20) with
x
1 and s1 - 1 to scale A . In the last analysis, though, the choice





"*7.19. Critique of Such Methodology for Imputing Values to Weapon-§ystem Types.
It is only fair to alert the reader to taie fact that there is far
from universal agreement about the usefulness and validity of the methodology
described in the previous section for imputing values to weapon-system
types. Although it is beyond the scope of our current investigation to
examine in detail criticism of and issues associated with this methodology
for valuating forces in aggregated-force analyses, we will try to outline
the salient features of such di3course and identify sources of further
information for the reader who desires additional details. It should be
born in mind, though, that (irrespective of such criticism) comparing,
equating, or quantifying in some way the relative performance of diverse
weapon systems is one of the key tasks in the evaluation of weapon systems
for defense planning (e.g. see [149, Chapter 30] for further details), and
frequently such analysis must be done within such stringent resource and
time constraints that the use of any type of detailed combat model is pre-
cluded (see below for further discussion).
The above method for imputing values to weapon-system types based
on their LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients has evolved out of previous
attempts to use the index-number approach to quantify military "apabilities:
it was apparently developed in response to the criticism of the old fire-
power-score approach that it did not value (or score) weapon-system types
based on the circumstances (i.e. combat environment, friendly force structure,
and enemy force structure) of employment for a weapon system [90, p. II-C-3]
(see also [39, p. 15], LESTER and ROBINSON (105],and [150, p. •6]). Thus,
in order to properly assess the usefulness of this new weapon-system-valuation
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methodology one should review critical appraisals of the old firepower-score
methodology: the interested reader can find critical reviews of the firepower-
score approach in HONIG et al. (90, Appendix C to Chapter II], BODE (10], and
STOCKFISCH [135] (see also [150, pp. 54-56]). It appears to this author
that the model considered in the last section for imputing values to weapon-
system types does respond favorably to the criticism that the old firepower-
score approach, which essentially judgmentally determined the values of
weapon-system types, was not a transparent model of weapon-system valuation
[150, p. 56],and also did not reflect changes in the circumstances of combat
(e.g. enemy force mix or distribution of fire over enemy target types) in
the valuation of weapon-system types. See, however, FARRELL [56] and
ANDERSON (5] for critiques of the imputed-value method.
No discussion about the pros and cons of index-number approaches used
in general-purpose-force analyses and/or models can be considered to be complete
without placing it in the perspective of noting that it may be viewed as part
of a broader debate over whether corps-level and theater-level combat oper-
ations should be represented by aggregated or detailed models for purposes
of defense analyses (e.g. see STOCKFISCH [135, pp. 9-10] or [150, pp. 54-563).
It has been argued that detailed models are to be preferred55 because they
make judgment (and the use of judgment in an immature field such as combat
modelling apparently cannot be avoided56) explicit and hopefully transparent.
Due to the almost complete lack of relevant combat data to empirically test
whether detailed or aggregated combat models yield better predictions (at
least when tested within the context of past historical combat), the debate
has become essentially metaphysical, with many people seemingly arguing
K 5
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that more detail is necessarily better. A more germane question is: How
much detail is relevant? And an even more practical question is: How much
detail can one afford? A recent U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report
[150, pp. 28-29] points out that there is a strong inconsistency between
people wanting more detail in combat models and yet resenting having to pay
for it by spending more man-years of effort to have analysts understand such
a detailed combat model and learn hcw to use it. In other words, more support
is required in terms of people (i.e. analysts) to maintain and use a more
detailed model, particularly if another agency or company developed the model.
The transfer of a complex model from one installation to another is fre-
quently an insuperable problem (e.g. see SZYMCZAK [139] for further details).
Many people today feel that combat models have become too complicated5 7 ,
and there has consequently been talk of a "complexity crisis" (see Section 7.23
below). One suggested way out of this dilemma of requiring both model detail
and also ease of running and understanding has been to use a hierarchical
modelling approach in which the output from detailed combat models of small-
unit operations is used to generate various combat-results tables for a
large-scale aggregated combat model. Thus, the output from one model is the
input to another model. Well-developed hierarchies of combat models exist
in the United Kingdom and West Germany, and also to a lesser extent in the
United States (see Section 7.20 for further details). Within this context
the above weapon-system-valuation model provides an essential interface
between a small-unit detailed model and a large-scale aggregated one by
converting heterogeneous-force single-system kill rates (determined by the
detailed model) into firepower scores 5 8 (i.e. weapon-system-type values)
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that are sensitive to the physical and operational circumstances of battle
(e.g. see DARE [42, pp.294-295]). Thus, these imputed weapon-system-type
values in some sense combine the best of the detailed- and aggregated-combat-
modelling worlds by explicitly considering the physical and operational
factors of a combined-arms-team engagement but yet aggregating all the forces
on each side in some geographical region. Within this context, these new
imputed weapon-system-type values apparently are a distinct improvement over
the old firepower scores which were essentially judgmentally determined.
With the above as general background, let us now briefly turn to
the problem of evaluating the merits of the above methodology for imputing
values to weapon-system types. Four criteria that one can use for this






and (C4) computational efficiency.
The first criterion (Cl) asks that such a methodology is logically consistent
and produces no contrudictions or paradoxes, while the second (C2) requires
.£that if such weapon-system-type scores (i.e. values) are used in a model of
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some combat process (e.g. attrition, FEBA movement, tactical decision making),
the results produced are consistent with evidence from the real world. In
the latter instance (as well as the next two), the use to which the weapon-
system-type scores are being put must be considered. The Tlsr two criteria
(C3) and (C4) are particularly important for any quantitative methodology
that is to be used for defense planning/defense decision making (e.g. see
[150, -pp. 25-31]). They are apparently particularly well satisfied by the
above methodology for imputing values to weapon-system types in relation to
other modelling approaches (especially the computational efficiency of index-
number-based models of such combat processes as aggregated-force attrition,
FEBA movement, and tactical decision making), and consequently they will not
be further discussed here. Thus, it remains to discuss the internal con-
sistency and external validity of tne imputed-value method.
R. L. FARRELL [561 has investigated the internal consistency of the
above weapon-system-type-valuation scheme and concluded59 that this valuation
method does not satisfy the elementary properties that one would desire for
a weapon- and force-evaluation methodology. He used the following four








FARRELL argued that the methodology failed to be tactically meaningful by
exhibiting the following "paradoxes":
(P1) increasing the kill rate against an enemy system sometimes
actually increases the value of that system,
and (P2) a shift in fire distribution to cause more attrition to a
higher-value enemy target can sometimes reduce the value of
the firing force.
We will now show by considering a simple example that a little further
analysis reveals that neither instance is really a paradox.
I
Example 7.19.1. Consider the special 2 x 2 case in which a12 0 a22 " b21
a 22 - 0, i.e. two X weapon-system types against a single Y weapon-system
type (see Figure 7.19). The imputed weapon-system-type values determined
with the HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling are given by
X X b12sI I 2 blI1
(7.19.1)
aY 1 a b +absY 0
1 b - a1 1 b + a 2 1 b 1 2  2b11
It is readily shown that
as Y




Figure 7.19. Diagram of heterogeneous-force interactions
considered in Example 7.19.1.
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What does not seem to have been previously noted, though, is that
I i <~ . (7.19.4)
ýb12 (s X
2
Thus, the value of a Y target type is increased when it is inflicted with
a higher loss rate by any other X weapon-system type except the reference
one XI, since the value of the firing X system goes up and consequently
the Y system kills a higher value target type and hence increases in value.
However, the target type always increases in value less rapidly than the
firer type (see (7.19.4) above], and this result is quite plausible and
intuitively appealing. Computing the force ratio FR - V x/V -
(b11xI + b 1 2x2 )/(y 1 Va11b11 + a2 1b 1 2 ), we find that
3F R a11b 12 b11  ab+X 7195
11 2( 1 b11+a2b12) y 11 2112 11
Thus, we see that there are circumstances, i.e. x2 /x 1 > (b 1 1 /b 12 ){l+2a 2 1b1 2 /(a 11 b1 )}
under which increasing the kill rate of an X weapon-system type actually
reduces the force ratio against X, i.e. 3 FR/abll < 0. To understand why
this has happened, let us observe that
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as Xxb-- < 0 (7.19.6)
b11
i.e. increasing the kill rate of X1 against Y1 decreases the value of
X2 relative to that of X (see Figure 7.19). Hence, increasing the kill
rate of X can actually decrease th.e force ratio against X when there are
not enough X1  systems present to overcome the decrease in value of the
X2 systems.
The above example provides much insight into the imputed-valuation
scheme (7.18.20) with HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling and raises the question (at
least in this author's mind) of whether the "paradoxes" (P1) and (P2) above
are really paradoxes at all. Some further discussion of ELample 7.19.1
within this context therefore seems to be in order. Further investigation
has revealed that more generally60 (at least for the 2 x 2 case)
for < 0 (7.19.7)
3b ab X
bji >i 0  i bt( sX
i.e. increasing the single-system kill rate bji of Xi (with the exception
of i - 1, the reference-weapon-system type for the HOLTER-ANDERSON scaling
scheme) against Y increases not only the value of the firer-type weapon
x y
system sa but also the value of the Y target-weapon-system type s .
This is not unreasonable, since the Y system now kills a more valuable Xi
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target type. However, the firer type increases in value more than the
target type, _'.e. 3(s '/si)/ab1 l < 0, as is eminently reasonable,. Further-
more, 39 /3b~ < 0 for k 0 1 or 1, i.e. increasing the single-system kill
rate of Xi against any target type decreLses the value sX of any other
X firer type Xk (except for, of course, k - i or 1) because it has become
less effective relative to Xi [cf. (7.19.6) above in Example 7.19.1].
Furthermore, this last result explains the second apparent paradox (P2),
since
p js n as-
R- 1 kr2 k F' I X (7.19.8)
abji {nl, k2-8bj R=1-Itl bj
In particular, recalling (7.19.5) and the subsequent discussion in Example
7.19.1, we see that increasing the fire effectiveness of one wcapon-system
type decreases the relatyive effectiveness of other weapon-system types
(except for, of course, the X-reference-weapon-system type) against the
enemy weapon-system type, with the attendant consequence thaL total force
value may actually decline61 if the relative numbers of these diminished-
value weapon-system types are sufficient to outweigh the total value of
the weapon-system type whose fire effectiveness has been increased. It
should be noted that this situation occurs when a weapon-system type with
relatively small numbers on the battlefield is increased in effectiveness
(i.e. single-system kill rate), while relatively more numerous weapon-system
types remain at their previous effectiveness and therefore decrease in
relative value.
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It consequently does seem to be perfectly reasonable to this author
that increasing the single-system kill rate of a particular weapon-system
type could actually decrease the total value of a force due to weapon-
system types that are more numerous becoming less valuable. In this context,
it should be born in mind that increasing the capability of a single
particular weapon-system type in a combined-arms team historically has not
always increased total-force effectiveness. (Here we have taken some
literary license in the phrasing of this argument, but in any case the
model here indicates that more detailed analysis of interactions is required
for assessing total-force effectiveness.) Thus, the model (7.18.20) for
imputing values to weapon-system types based on their single-system kill
rates not only does not appareatly produce any serious paradoxes but also
yields some interesting and important insights into weapon-system valuation.
In retrospect, it does not seem intuitively obvious that one could increase
the value of a single particular weapon-system type (as the old judgmentally-
based firepower-score methodology allowed) in isolation from its interactions
with other weapon-system types.
Thus, the above paradoxes (P1) and (P2) produced by this model for
imputing weapon-system-type values appear to this author to be more illusionary
than real, just as have so many other paradoxes of rationality that have,
for example, been noted for game-theoretic models of political behavior
6 2
(e.g. see BRAMS (21]). The brief remarks made in this section about the
internal consistency of this methodology are not meant to be definitive but
to stimulate further detailed analysis and discourse. Thus, it does appear
to be premature to dismiss the weapon-system-valuation model presented in
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the preceding section as not being a satisfactory quantitative tool for
defense planning because it fails to satisfy elementary properties that one
would desire for such weapon-system-valuation methodology (although indeed
one cannot guarantee that it may not eventually-turn out to be so). Further
investigation, thought, communication, and discussion of such results are
definitely required.
It remains for us to very briefly discuss the external validity of
the above weapon-system-valuation methodology. It seems appropriate to
consider both the valuation methodology itself and also the use in models of
combat processes (e.g. attrition, FEBA movement, tactical decision making)
of index numbers developed from these weapon-system-type values. Concerning
the valuation methodology itself, it easily passes the test of prima-facie
validity, but to date no experiments about whether tactical commanders,
defense planners, battlefield soldiers, etc. actually value weapon-system
types this way have been conducted to establish its empirical validity (cf.
SHUBIK's [129] remarks on experimental gaming). Concerning the use of index
numbers derived from these weapon-system-type values in combat-process
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models, such models again easily pass the test of prima-facie validity6 .
As with any type of combat model, however, empirical validity is an open
question because of the scarcity of combat data (recall our discussion in
Section 1.2 above and see Section 7.22 below). One point that is rather
ironic in view of the current fashionability of detailed models today and
bears special note is the fact the available real combat data does not
support investigating the empirical validity of detailed combat models but
only that of relatively simple, aggregated large-unit models (see
Section 7.22 and HUBER, LOW, and TAYLOR [951 for further details).
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Finally, a very important point that has not been mentioned and apparp-tly
has been overlooked is that aggregated-force casualty-rate and FEBA-movement
curves (see Sections 7.13 and 7.15) that were developed for one set of
firepower scores must be recalibrated for these new imputed values based on
single-system kill rates. For example, if one uses the ATLAS casualty-rate
curves as IDAGAM [6, p. 53] does but with weapon-system-type scores developed
by the antipotential-potential method, then the casualty-rate curves must
be revalidated for the new weapon-system-type scores, since different fire-
power scores originally produced the derived data points upon which the
curves aje based (see (84]). In other words, firepower scores (called
theoretical lethality indices in [84]) were used to convert raw historical
data (numbers of men and material) into derived historical data (force ratios
and combat-environment descriptors) from which the caaualty-rate curves
were developed (see Figure 7.20 and also [84]). It certainly is not obvious
a priori that a different set of firepower scores (such as produced by the
antipotential-potential method) would lead to the same curves, and this
point regarding the validity of empirically-based functional relations
developed for one set of firepower scores when different scores are later
used to compute force ratios should be further investigated.
Thus, we have exposed the reader to a number of objections that
have been raised against this new weapon-system-valuation methodology.
The interested reader can find further discussions of this matter in the
references cited in this section. However, the author does not believe
that these objections are any more serious than can be raised against
essentially any other combat-modelling methodology. Furthermore,
there are times when aggregated-force models based on index numbers must be
used, and this new methodology appears to overcome many of the shortcomings of
the old iurely-judgmentally-based firepower-score method.
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Figure 7.20. Process of developing casualty curves from raw






As we have seen above, one can either model the force-on-force combat
attrition process in detail or use some type of aggregation approach to model
it in not so much detail. Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses.
Modelling in ditail produces very complex models that are more credible64 to
many people, apparently mainly because they do contain more detail. However,
for many (of these very same) people such detailed models of large-scale combat
operations are far too complicated to be understood, require too much input
data, and (in general) are just not responsive enough. On the other hand,
aggregated combat models are fast running, do not require as large data bases,
and are much more responsive. However, they do lack a certain amount of credibility,
and many of their inputs are not derivable from physically measurable quantities
[14]. But yet for many defense-planning purposes there is a need for large-
scale (e.g. theater-level) fast-running models (e.g. see DARE (42, pp. 286-287]).
How can one represent large-scale combat in an aggregated fashion and
still maintain credibility? The hierarchical-modelling approach attempts to
solve this formidable problem by combining the strengths of high-resolution
detailed combat models of small-unit operations with those of low-resolution
aggregated models of large-scale combat operations. The basic idea is to run
the detailed model (or models) to generate data for estimating parameters (i.e.
input data) for an aggregated model. In this way, the output data of a high-
resolution combat model is used as the input data for a low-resolution combat
model. This is also the basic idea behind the fitted-parameter analytical model
which was discussed in Sections 5.1 and especially 5.15 above (see Figures 5.1
and 5.12 again).
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Although (to the best understanding of this author) the idea of such a
hierarchy of models has been around for some time, recent interest in the United
States and an attendant analytical framework apparently dates from the Ph.D.
thesis of G. CLARK [34] in 1969 (see also [35]). Subsequently, CLARK's ideas
have been used by a couple of organizations in the United States. For example,
Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) (later GRC) has employed this approach (see
STOCKTON [137]) to use output from CARMONETTE to develop combat-results tables
for assessing engagement outcomes in the Division Battle Model (DBM) [47] (see
also [64]).
Apparently, however, such a hierarchical approach has been much more
widely used in NATO countries for a variety of reasons. There are well-developed
hierarchies of models in both the United Kingdom (UK) and also the Federal
f Republic of Germany (FRG) [41] (see also DARE [42], FISCHER and HUBER [57], and
4
NIEMEYER [119]). In fact, the best conceptual discussion of the hierarchical-
combat-modelling approach known to this author is the recent one by D. P. DARE
[42] of the UK (see [64, Appendix A], however).
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7.21. Significant Modelling Issues.
We have briefly touched upon the conceptual bases (i.e. methodologies)
for assessing casualties in tactical engagements in war games and other
combat simulations in the above sections. However, there remain a number
of significant problems involved with the implementation of such methodologies
and building operational models of combat (cf. our discussion of the art
of modelling in Section 7.1 above). Here we will briefly indicate what
some of the issues are. The following is therefore a list of what appear
to the author to be some of the significant modelling issues:
(1) scale of operations to be represented,
(2) significant factors (i.e variables) to be represented,
(3) degree of resolution versus amount of detail,
(4) representation of time and space,
(5) assessment of battle outcomes.
Time prohibits any detailed discussion of all these important issues
so let us focus on one area that holds particular promise but (unfortunately)
has apparently not been appreciated by military OR workers as much as it
should have been: namely, the identification and classification of the
significant variables in combat. The American military historian and
combat analyst COL TREVOR N. DUPUY [86] (U. S. Army, ret.) has developed
the following classification of combat variables:
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(1) environmental variables-those which affect the effectiveness
of weapons,
(2) operational variables-those which influence the employment
of weapons and forces,
A. tangible
B. intangible.
DUPUY (48; 49] has developed methodology for systematically applying the
effects of such variables (see Table 7.XI) to his own fire-power-score
method of combat analysis, which he calls the Quantified Judgment Method
of Analysis (QJMA). He has the advantage of apparently being essentially
the only person in the United States to have generated new primary combat
data from historical records, and combat modellers and analysts should
get many new ideas from his work.
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TABLE 7.XI. The Significant Combat Variables of T. N. DUPUPI [86].
A. Weapons effects
Environmental B. Terrain factors
Variables C. Weather factors
( D. Posture factors
E. Mobility effects
Operational F. Tactical decision-making effects
Variables G. Vulnerability factors




7.22. Historical Validation of Attrition Models.
What confidence do we have that our models can actually pre-
dict what might happen in future possible combat? What is the basis
of our knowledge about military combat that is represented by these
models? Following STUART CHASE [29], it is possible for us to identify
at least seven methods for obtaining such knowledge:
(Ml) appeal to the supernatural,
(M2) appeal to worldly military authority -- the higher
ranking the better,
(M3) listen to the claims of the most compelling con-





and (M7) the Scientific Method,
These approaches are, of course, not mutually exclusive and often
overlap. Unfortunately, the Scientific Method has not always been
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the source of knowledge in defense-planning work , and the simple
fact is that if we are honest, there are some severe limitations on
the current state-of-the-art as far as how literally we should believe
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model outputs. The main problem is that the nature and quality
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of the available combat data is so extremely poor that we have no
reliable "bench mark" against which to "calibrate" our combat models.
Compared with the physical sciences, there is an almost complete lack
of historical combat data (see Section 1.2 above). Although future
combat may be quite unlike that of the past due to the introduction of
new technologies and weaponry, it does seem desirable to (in some sense)
calibrate our models with past military operations.
Does such a model (necessarily an abstraction) agree (or, at
least, not disagree) with the realities of the physical world (either
now or in a possible future)? Thus, the combat scientist is faced
with the very practical problem of verifying a combat model, perhaps
with respect to future possible circumstances and not even the reali-
ties of today. In general, the problem of verifying models of man/
machine systems is quite difficult (e.g. see NAYLOR and FINGER [118]
or VAN HORN [151]), and combat models in particular present a number of
special subtleties (see also HUBER, LOW, and TAYLOR [95, Appendix C]),
although the process of model verification67 frequently appears to
the uninitiated to be straight-forward. We will now discuss a few of
these subtle points, but more careful reflective discussion is need-
ed on this difficult subject.
Special subtleties present in the scientific verification
of combat models are as follows:
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(1) principle of uniformitarianism does not hold,
(2) systems are only partially observable,
(3) conceptual basis of knowledge is more like that in the
social sciences than that in the physical sciences.
The physical sciences are essentially based on the principle of
uniformitarianism, which holds that physical and biological process-
es, conditions, and operations do not change over time (i.e. uni-
formity over time). For example, in geology the doctrine of uniform-
itarianism holds that the present is the key to the past [1121. This
principle, of course, does not hold for planning models of new fu-
ture environments (e.g. see HOWLAND [93]). Thus, the combat model-
ler faces a special problem (which has gone largely unnoticed) in
verifying his models: the empirical data base for the testing of
such a model is from the real world (past), whereas the prediction
from the model is for the real world (future). What is meant by
the verification of such a planning model is in need of critical
examination. Additionally, in contrast to the modelling of purely
physical systems, combat models involve (1) hardware (e.g. weapons)
and physical processes, (2) people, and (3) organizational structures.
Although human behavior in combat may not chanýe appreciably over
time, weapons (i.e. hardware) and organizational structures have and
will continue to change appreciably. Thus, the principle of uniform-
itarianism does not hold for combat analybis, and we cannot use the
past by itself to predict the futw-e for combat operations.
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Furthermore, since wars are fought for reasons other than
just for collecting combat data, even our knowledge as to what
has occurred in past combat is imperfect and incomplete. One might
even say in technical jargon that military systems in combat are
only "partially observable." Finally, since combat models resemble
social-science models more than physical-science ones, the standards
of knowledge about combat should be more like those of the social
sciences than those of the physical sciences. Unfortunately, this
has caused difficulties, since the backgrounds of most military OR
workers are most closely related to the latter field (i.e. the
physical sciences). It appears that epistemological concepts from
the social sciences should be quite useful and possibilities in this
direction should be further explored in the future.
Before we consider the specifics of the verification of com-
bat models, it seems appropriate for us to briefly consider the
sources, nature, and availability of combat data. Firstly, one
should distinguish between two types of combat data:
(TI) real combat data,
(T2) simulated combat data (i.e. data generated in a simulated
combat environment by field experiments, field exercises,
war games, machine simulations, etc.)
The two basic primary sources of real combat data are (see McQUIE et al.




(S2) official military histories.
Unfortunately, quantitative data that is needed from these primary
sources for verification of mathematical models of combat is not
readily available: the extraction of such quantitative data from
archives requires great investment in manpower of a highly specialized
nature (one essentially needs a military historian), while the official
histories (at least those for the U. S. Army) are purely narrative and
do not contain tables, graphs, or appendices with data [109]. (Moreover,
a glance at Russian works like SIDORENKO [131] indicates that such
quantitative historical studies have been undertaken with vigor in the
Soviet Union.) COL T. N. DUPUY (U. S. Army, ret.) and his associates
at the Historical Evaluation and Research urganization (HERO) are
some of the few people to have conducted research on the archival data
(e.g. see [84] or [85]; see also DUPUY [49]) and must be considered the
only bona fide experts on it. Moreover, HERO has provided (from
winter 1975 until spring 1978) a "Combat Data Subscription Srrvice,"
whose volumes contain quantitative data (laboriously) extracted from
archives 68. Finally, secondary sources of real combat data are dis-
cussed in many of the papers mentioned later in this section.
After a thorough study of the sources, nature, and availability
of real combat data, McQUIE et al. [110] concluded that for the purposes
of statistical analysis, the data available on World War 11 and Korea
are "inadequate, incomplete, and probably biased." Incompleteness is
a particular problem with data measured for one engagement
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frequently not available for others [110]. Moreover, the avail-
able real combat data is essentially of an aggregated (as opposed to
detailed) nature, i.e. "bean counts" for the larger combat units (see
McQUIE et al. (110] or McQUIE [109] for further details). In other
words, the available historical records do not provide detailed com-
bat data such as the positions of individual weapons, targets en-
gaged, engagement conditions for individual target-firer combinations
(including the number of rounds expended at each target), etc. Thus,
the available real combat data does not support verification of de-
tailed combat models, but it only supports such investiations of
relatively simple aggregated large-unit models (see Section 7.3 (also
TAYLOR [145]) for a discussion of detailed versus aggregated combat-
attrition models).
However, using simulated combat data, one can in principle
verify either detailed small-unit (or even many-on-many) models or
the submodels used in such models. There have apparently been some
efforts along these lines (e.g. by the U.S. Army's Combat Develop-
ments Experimentation Command (CDEC)) but information dissemination
about them is poor to nonexistent. The author can supply no specific
references outside of mentioning the relatively recent TETAM (Tactical
Effectiveness of Antitank Missiles) study by the U.S. Army [31-33]
(see also BRYSON [26] and THORP [147]).
There have been some (but surprisingly few) attempts to veri-
fy combat models. To place this work in proper perspective, it is
convenient to conceptually factor the overall combat process into







(3) C3 1 (command, control, communications, and intelligence),
(4) support.
Verifiuation efforts have concentrated on the first of these four pro-
cesses, and for present purposes so will we. We may also consider
that there are different organizational levels at which combat can be









The available (real) combat data 6 9 is only on Level 1 of the
above classification scheme, i.e. force-on-force operations, and
then apparently predominantly for large-scale operations. Generally
speaking, one can develop both detailed and also aggregated models
K5t
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of combat processes at each of these five levels
70 (cf. Section 7.3
above). Model verification efforts, moreover, have primarily con-
sidered the attrition process71 for such large-scale force-on-force
combat. Furthermore, there are essentially only two general approach-
es for verifying72 (or testing) such large large-scale attrition
models:
(Al) "replay" some particular historical battle(s) to see
whecher or not the model satisfactorily "reproduces"
the historical outcome(s),
and (A2) find regularities or "patterns" in historical battle
data, and then determine whether or not the m9del ex-
hibits a similar "pattern."
The first approach has generally involved large-scale detailed models
and large-scale aggregated data (e.g. see FAIN et al. [54], and one
can raise serious objections about its scientific validity (see below).
The second approach has generally involved large-scale aggregated
models and large-scale aggregated data and has by and large only con-
sidered the classic constant-cceifficient LANCHESTER-type equations
for modern warfare. i'ith rather mixed results being reported (see
below for further details). To this author, the general consensus
seems to be that such a simple functional form is not violently
contradicted by the available combat data but that the consequent
model predictions are statistically too inaccurate for practical use
[77] (Uf. McQuie et al. [110, p. 93]). A careful review and inte-
gration of such past work is lacking and seems to be in order before
plowing any new ground.
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Now that we have established the contextual setting for the
B historical validation of combat models, let us consider a few par-
ticulars. A number of studies (see Table 7.XII) have considered
verification of very simple LANCHESTER-type models, i.e. LANCHESTER's
classic formulations (2.2.1) and (2.4.1) and simple variations there-
of. In Table 7.XIIwegive the authors' names and publication date
of every empirical-verification examination appearing in the open
literature and known to the author. The exact reference to each
piece of work may be obtained by consulting the list of references
at the end of this chapter. All this work has considered secondary
sources and combat data, i.e. data available from other sources
such as history books. Usually considering only initial and final
strengths in numbers, it has generated results tbat at best may be
called inconclusive. This result is not too surprising, since
"aggregated" forces were considered without any type of "scoring"
(i.e. weighting) of the various different weapon-system types com-
prising the opposing heterogeneous forces.
Positive results (i.e. reports of theoretical consequences
not at variance with the available combat data) have been reported
by ENGEL [52], WEISS [158; 160], HELMBOLD [74-76; 79-80], SCHMIEMAN
[126], BUSSE [27], and SAMZ [124]. For example, WEISS [158] reports
that there is some justification for using LANCHESTER-type equations
of modern warfare (2.2.1) "as a point of departure" in modelling
combat. On the other hand, after a rather lengthy and comprehensive
analysis, WILLARD [162,p. 4] concluded that his analysis did not
justify the use of LANCHESTER's classic equations (2.2.1) and
(2.4.1) for modelling large-scale combat. This conclusion is not
at all surprising, since heterogeneous forces were aggregated on the
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TABLE 7.XII. AuthorsWhoHave Investigated the Empirical Verification
of LANCHESTER-Type Models of Warfare.
J. H. ENGEL (1954)
H. K. WEISS (1957, 1966)
R. L. HELMBOLDt (1961a, 1961b, 1964a, 1964b, 1969, 1971a, 1971b)
D. WILLARD (1962)
W. A. SCHMIEMAN (1967)
W. W. FAIN, J. B. FAIN, L. FELDMAN and S. SIMON (1970)
J. J. BUSSE (1971)
R. W. SAMZ (1972)
J. B. FAIN (1977)
tHere HELMBOLD (1961b) - the second paper published by HELMBOLD in 1961
(see list of references at the end of this chapter). ,'
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basis of numbers alone without any "scoring" of the various different
weapon-system types. Moreover, when such "scoring" is used, much
more positive results hav-e been reported (see FAIN [53, pp. 38-391).
As we have previously discussed above, HELMEOLD [80, pp. 1-3]
has emphasized that there are only the two general approaches (Al)
and (A2) for verifying combat models: (A-1) the approach of "replay-
ing" some particular battle(s), and (A2) the approach of looking for
regularities, or "patterns," in the historical battle data. The
usual difficulty with the first appraoch (Al) is that insufficient
data is available on any one historical battle to carry out the pro-
posed comparison (see HELMBOLD (80]; also McQUIE [109]). Even when
sufficient data is available, rather restrictive assumptions must
be made about the conduct of battle, and critical appraisal of these
assumptions leads one to raise serious objections about generaliza-
tions based on such an examination (see HELMBOLD f80, pp. 1-2] for
further details). The work by ENGEL [52], FAIN et al. [54], BUSSE
(27], and SAMZ [124](see also BOULTON et al. [19]) falls into this
first category (Al), while that by WEISS [158; 160], HELMBOLD [74-77;
79-811, and SCHMIEMAN [126]falls into the second category (A2).
This second approach (A2) is nothing more than the Scientific Method
of verifying a model indirectly through checking testable conse-
quesces against observations, the so-called hypothetico-deductive
method (see MORRIS [ll3,pp. 101-103]).
ENGEL's work [52]' gets more attention from the uninitiated
than it probably should. Its weakness is that he estimated para-
meters and also tested the model with the same set of data and forced
a fit through the initial and final force levels for the battle of
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Iwo Jima. In fact, all such attempts at model verification by
method (Ml), i.e. historical "replay," suffer from such deficiencies
(lee REMOLD (80, pp. 1-2] for a further discussion). On the other
band, HELMBOLD's work [74-77; 79-81] has been much more comprehen-
sive. He has sought to indirectly test LANCHESTER-type combat models
against the available historical data by empirically examining the
testable consequences of such models (see Footnote 40 of Chapter 2
for further details). He has applied this approach not only to
ground battles [74-76] but also to air battles [80] and has reported
positive results concerning the validity of LANCHESTER-type combat
models. More recently, he [81] has examined the validity of "break-
point-type" hypotheses (see Chapter 3) and found that "the breakpoint
hypothesis yields theoretical implications that are at variance with
the available battle termination data in several essential respects."
On the other hand, T. N. DUPUY [.83-861 has examined combat
data from primary sources and has in some sense shown the validity
of the firepower-score approach (see also [69]). His work apparently
is the original empirical basis for both the ATLAS and also TBM (see
1164])casualty-rate curves. Subsequently, J. FAIN [531 has analyzed
HERO (Hisotrical Evaluation and Research Organization) World War II
data on 60 engagements in four major Italian campaigns and has repor-
ted positive results concerning the scientific validity of LANCHESTER-
type models of warfare (particularly when a "scoring" system is used
to aggregate the heterogeneous forces). She [53, p. 34] has empha-
sized that the HERO data (of which she examined only a small part)
is the most nearly complete and accurate 'ollection of combat data.
Most recently, DUPUY [491 has published a book Numbers, Predictions
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and War, which may be considered to be the culmination of about fif.-
teen years of historical research by DUTPUY and his associates at HERO
and makes their work available to the general public. Much more work
should be done in this area. It is encouraging that today HERO of-
fers a "Combat Data Subscription Service"73 and a journal entitled




7.23. The Complexity Crisis.
It appears that the trend for the future is f or the development and
use of more detailed and complex combat models. This trend has, however, caused
an unanticipated result: it has created a complexity crisis,. In fact, this
complexity crisis was even the theme of the U. S. Army's Fifteenth Annual
Operations Research Symposium held in 1976 (see HARDISON (71]). The complexity
crisis has manifested itself in several significant and far-reaching ways such
as the inability of various DoD agencies to use their complicated computer-
based models to their maximum potential, or by the inability of military OR
analysts to communicate model methodology (and hence the quality of study-generated
74information) to decision makers . This communication problem is especially
acute because of the high degree of labor differentiation and specialization in
DoD analysis activities (e.g. L_ýPPER (97] identifies the following different
participants: users, designers, developers, producers, and managers of models
and data bases, and decision/policy makers;,see also BREWER and SHUBIK [24].
The operational combat models that we have mentioned in Sections 7.9
and 7.17 above are very complex, particularly detailed models. Such complicated
combat models must be implemented on a digitial computer, and without the
modern high-speed large-scale digitial computer they would be impossible.
Consequently, detailed combat models (not only the Lanchester-type ones we
have discussed above but also high-resolution Monte Carlo simulations) are
quite costly to build, costly to run, and generate quite demanding data-base
requirements (see [9] for further details). In other words, such complicated
operational combat models are rather demanding in resources (especially
highly technically qualified peopole to maintain, exercise, and modify them).
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In fact, just evaluation 75 of such complex models is a significant and by
no means completely solved problem (e.g. see GASS [62]). Additionally,
the complexity of a model limits one's ability to conduct useful sensitivity
and other parametric analyses. Thus, there is a definite price to pay for
complexity, and those who demand more detail are frequently not willing to pay
the price for it (e.g. see the discussion by BONDER [14]).
How should one go about resolving this complexity crisis? This is a
very difficult and subtle question that is far beyond the scope or our modest
efforts here. If the reader has become aware that more detail is not always
better, that too much detail can cause a problem, and that serious thought
should be devoted to this problem, then this section has achieved its goal.
Now that the modelling community has proven that it can build very detailed
and complicated combat models, how should it manage their use? This is not
purely a technical question, but one with organizational, professional,
managerial, and sociological aspects %cf. STOCKFISCH [135; 136], BREWER [221,
and BREWER and SHUBIK [24].
The hierarchical-modelling approach (see Section 7.20).may be thought of as
one possible way to overcome the complexity crisis: a detailed model is used
to support a more aggregated model. Along the saae lines, a colleague of the
76author has suggested that the complex model should be used to educate the
mnalyst, while a simple model should be used to comminicate with the decision
maker. In other words, complex combat models should be used as research tools
to determine basic relations that can be presented to decision makers with
simple, transparent, easily-understood models. The detailed contbat model could
be used as a device for developing confidence in thv ability of the simple model
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to reflect the same trends as the complex one and consequently for giving
credibility to the simple model. In this context the complex model serves as
77the "back-up" for the simple model . The reader will, of course, recognize
this approach as being essentially the coordinated use of the large-scale
complex operational model with a simple auxiliary model (see Section 7.1
above; also IGNALL, KOLESAR, and WALKER [96] for a lucid discussion not in a
defense context). It should be clear to the reader that more work on such
modelling strategies for large-scale systems is desperately needed.
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 7
1. As the author's colleague Professor C. J. ANCKER of the University of
Southern California has pointed out, it is not generally true that a so-
called mean-value model (obtained by replacing a random variable in a
stochastic model with its mean value) yields a good approximation to
the mean value of the corresponding stochastic process. However, the
results of Section 4.16 indicate that if the initial force levels are
"not small" and the forces are "not near parity," a deterministic
LANCHESTER-type combat model may be considered to approximately yield
the mean course of combat in the sense that it yields very nearly the
same expected values for the force levels as does the corresponding
continuous-parameter MARKOV chain (see Section 4.2) for the same values
of model inputs. Thus, in this very special case of exponentially-dis-
tributed times between casualties, such a deterministic LANCHESTER-type
model may indeed be considered to yield the mean course of combat (see
Section 4.16 for further details). In other cases (e.g. some other
distribution for the times between casualties), however, this is not
always true. Thus, without the appropriate qualifications being observed,
it is simply no0 true that such a deterministic model invariably yields
the same results for the mean course of combat qL do corresponding
stochastic attrition models (e.g. a Monte Carlo simulation). Hopefully,
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2. The :everse process of starting with a simple model and then elaborating
upon it and enriching it in details is, of course, the approach usually
used by model developers to build their models. See W. T. MORRIS [1141
for a lucid discussion of this enrichment process. It is discussed later
in this section.
3. Our discussion here follows that in TAYLOR [143], where these ideas were
apparently first articulated.
4. GEOFFRION [651 has suggested a similar conceptual approach of using a
simple auxiliary model to generate tentative hypotheses to be tested in
a full-scale operational model and thus to provide guidance for further
(computerized) higher-resolution invcsttgacions. We also have felt (see
TAYLOR [140]) that the use of relatively simple auxiliary models in con-
junction with complex operational models has much to offer for the analysis
of military operations (see also NOLAN and SOVEREIGN [120] and WEISS
[159]).
5. Documentation about these models has been discussed in Chapter 1 (see
Footnote 23 of Chapter 1). For the reader's easy reference, however, let
us point out that information about ATLAS may be found in KERLIN and
COLE [98] or [64]. Also, information about BONDER/IUA and its various
derivative models may be found in [9; 15-16; 72; 153], while that about
VECTOR-2 may be found in [39] (for VECTOR-l, see [1541 or [117]).
6. See Footnote 1 above. Further information about the comparison of deter-
ministic and stochastic LANCHZSTER-type models (in particular, about the
comparison of a determiniatic force-level trajectory with the mean course
of combat for a corresponding HARKOV-chain model) is to be found in SeLL'Ou 4.16.
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7. VECTOR-2 promises [155] detailed representation of the C3 process, combat
intelligence, and further refinements in target acquisition (see [39] for the
final product). These processes were apparently not modelled in detail in
VECTOR-l (see [117; 154]) but require user-supplied tactical decision rules
for their representation. Also, see TIEDE and LEAKE [148] for some related
ideas concerning the modelling of tactical information systems.
8. The command and control system tries to avoid wasting fire by engaging
killed targets or false ones. The uniform distribution of fire over
surviving enemy targets reflects this mission.
9. Thus, the target-acquisition, allocation, and attrition processes are repre-
sented by analytical submodels, while movement (which causes changes in
the positions of weapons) is represented in a simulatory manner. Bonder
[13]has consequently referred to a model like BONDER/IUA or one of its
many derivatives as a hybrid analytical-simulation model.
10. This is the approach apparently taken in AMSWAG (a derivative of BONDER/IUA)
[721. A more sophisticated approach would be to also modify the appropriate
LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficients to reflect decreased vulnerability
of suppressed combatants.
11. The firepower-score approach has been briefly discussed in Chapter 1, and
we will discuss it further in this chapter. Indices of the relative combat
capabilities of military units (based on a "scoring system" for the weapons
employed in the units) have b-en used by military gamerg and force planners
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in the United States for at least thirty five years. We are here
generically referring to both such indices and the associated scores as
firepower scores. (See Section 1.3, STOCKFISCH [135, pp. 7-9], and
Section 7.11below for a discussion of the difference in meaning between
the words score and index as generally used in defense analysep). Members
of this family of scores and indices are firepower score/index of combat
effectiveness (FS/ICE), firepower potential/unft firepower potential
(FP!UFP), firepower potential score/index of firepower potential (FPS/IFP),
weapon effectiveness index/weighted unit value (WEI/WUV), weapon effective-
ness value/unit effectiveness value (WEV/UEV), antipotential potential, etc.
(see STOCKFISCH [135] for further references and a guide to the literature
about firepower scores; also see HONIG et al. [90, Appendix C to Chapter II]
and HOLTER [891). When two names (separated by a "slash") are given above,
the first name (e.g. FS) denotes the scoring system for weapon-system types,
while the second (e.g. ICE) identifies the index number for a unit's capa-
bility. The firepower-score approach has also been used in NATO countries
(e.g. see WOLF [163], HUBER et al. [94], or DARE [42]).
12. We are calling both differential-equation and also difference-equation
models LANCHESTER-type models. In practice, all operational models of
combat systems of any degree of complexity use finite-difference methods
for computation and thus are really difference-equation models. flowever,
for purposes of model building, it is much more convenient to think
in terms of differential equations.
13. Again (also see Footnote 5 above), mcstof these models have been discussed
in Chapter 1 (see Fuotnotes 17 and 23 of Chapter 1). However, information
about TBM-68 (as well as a discussion of the concept of a theater-level
"quick gamie") may be found in [1641.
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14. DEITCHMAN's [44] analysis neglected many important factors of guerrilla-
counterguerrilla operations (particularly the effect of the attitude and
support of the local population, for which the two sides must contend by
political, economic, and psychological as well as military means). However,
such factors may be represented in the model's parameters (e.g. fighting
effectiveness or size of the group). Also, they might be expressed in
probabilistic terms, but DEITCHMAN did not considex this aspect (see
KISI and HIROSE [103]for an examination of the probability of winning
for the MARKOV-chain analogue of DEITCHMAN's ambust model).
15. Thus, DEITCHMAN's [44] model is purely deterministic. Stochastic aspects
have been investigated by KISE and HIROSE [103],who considered the MARKOV-
chain version of DEITCHMAN's ambush model and determined expressions (both
exact and a POISSON approximation) for the probability of winning a
fixed-force-level-breakpoint battle.
16. The concept of phases of insurgency is apparently due to MAO TSE-TUNG
(see SCHAFFER (1 2 5 ,p. 458]). There are three such phases, with Phase III
being traditional national warfare. The first two phases of insurgency
are characterized by small-force ground-yielding operations by the
insurgents but overall military superiority of the counterinsurgents.
During Phase II the insurgents' operations escalate in military character
but remain basically small-force guerrilla activities designed to cause
the dLfense to fragment (i.e. the engagements are localized and
relatively isolated). During Phase III the insurgents take the strategic
offensive and operate with larger, more conventional forces in more
traditional military ways (aee also [70] or [108]).
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17. Thus, one obtains valuable guidance for selecting numerical values for
the coefficients in (7.6.2): pick larger values for the coefficients
p and q corresponding to troops that are poorer in motivation and
discipline.
18. To determine whether or not the solution to a particular differential
equation is expressible in terms of "elementary" functions is a very
difficult advanced-mathematical task (see Footnote 5 of Chapter 6 for a
further discussion). Here all we mean is that (based on our mathematical
experience and intuition) we feel that the statement is very likely to
be true.
19. Here we mean "primary" (as opposed to "supporting") weapons system. The
reader may think of a force composed entirely of primary weapon systems
as being infantry (see WEISS [15 9 ,p. 180] for further details).
20. SCHAFFER [125,p. 470] stated that (7.6.8) holds approximately if
VUa < 0.2AY and that a "more exact formula accounting for overlapping
effects would be"
Sc - {1 - (1 - a /AY)U}y/Tv
where T denotes the "time it takes to fire vU rounds." SCHAFFER
also gave a more precise definition of a .
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21. Essentially all complex operational LANCHESTER-type combat models that
represent engagements in detail (i.e. do not aggregate forces with fire-
power scores) and are in current operational use in the United States
have been developed by the principals of Vector Research, Inc. The
discussion here follows that of BONDER and FARRELL [15, pp. 11-17].
22. The value of such an allocation factor may, of course, change during an
engagement, and thus we should denote it as being a function of time,
e.g , ýl "j -ý j (t)"
23. We are justified in doing so because each of the variables upon which
such an attrition-rate coefficient directly depends (see Section 5.11)
5 may be considered to be a function of time. Hence, it is possible to
explicitly determine the value of such an attrition-rate coefficient
as a function of time (cf. Section 6.2).
24. Actually, the results were apparently obtained by others and summarized
by SNOW [133,p. iii].
25. Documentation about these models have been discussed above in Footnote 5
(see also Footnote 23 of Chapter 1, BOSTWICK et al. [18), CORDESMAN [40],
and FARRELL [55]).
26. Here we mean a model that represents some of the complexities of actual




27. Our discussion here follows that of BONDER and FARRELL (15, pp. 11-121.
28. Military planners have apparently used the firepower-score approach
(see below in the main text) for at least thirty years (see MULHOLLAND
and SPECHT [1161 to plan operations and to plan and control tactical
exercises. Although the origins of using firepower scores for these
purposes are somewhat obscure they are still in use today (see the
U. S. Army's field manual FM 105-5 (73]). Furthermore, it appears as
though such use of firepower scores in planning was the origin of their
use by OR workers for modelling large-scale ground combat.
29. Examples of such scores/indices are given in Footnote 11 above. BODE [10]
has given an excellent discussion of the use of such index numbers in
general-purpose force analysis, while ALDRICH and BODE [1] have given a
lucid discussion of the conceptual problems of aggregation in theater-level
combat models.
30. The one exception is the antipotential potential or WEV/UEV (see
Footnote 11 above, HOWES and THRALL [92], and ANDERSON [3-4];
see also Section 7.18), which may be exercised in the running of
IDAGAM (see ANDERSON et al. [6]). ATLAS and other models that
employ the firepower-score approach have, however, been in the recent
past much more widely used in the United States than IDAGAM (see (9]).
31. Our discussion here follows that already given in Section 1.3, but we have
repeated part of it. here in order to give the reader a complete and unified




32. Many times the first assessment (i.e. determination of engagement outcome)
is omitted. For example, ATLAS and IDAGAM only do the last two assessments.
However, some models (e.g. Theater Battle Model (TEM-68) [164]) determine
the outcome of an engagement (e.g. whether or not an attack is successful)
before assessing casualties. In this case, the casualty-assessment curves
depend on the engagement's outcome (see Figures 4 through 7 of [1641).
33. For a slightly different discussion of the developments of this section,
see TAYLOR [142].
34. Examples of such casualty-rate curves may be found in the documentation
for the following large-scale ground-combat models (see also Footnote 5
above): ATLAS [18; 98]; CEM [25; 1061, TBM-68 [164] and TAGS [50-51].
See HONIG et al. [90] for a general discussion about such large-scale
models (but for the period before 1971). Although IDAGAM does not use
firepower scores (see Footnote labove), it uses the same casualty-rate
curves as ATLAS (see [6, p. 53]). In fact, it is stated on p. 53 of [6]
that until better historical data is available, the standard functional
relationships (used in ATLAS) between force ratios and percent casualties
must still be used. Finally, models used for NATO planning also employ
the firepower-score approach and similar casualty-rate curves (e.g. see
[94, pp. 287-298]).
32. See Footnote 32 and also Footnote 5.
33. For example, as shown in Figure 7.14, ATLAS [64] distinguishes between
seven different types of engagements.
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37. Subsequent research by the author (see TAYLOR [144]) has shown this assump-
tion to be necessary. It was not orignally given by TAYLOR and PARRY [1461
(see also Sections 6.6 and 6.13 above).
38. Here, again, force ratio means the ratio of firepower indices (AID).
39. In CEM [25, p. 21; 106,p. 35], for example, the type of engagement is
determined by the missions of opposing forces and, where appropriate, the
type of defensive position. In this fashion the tactical decisions (i.e.
mission assignments) of commanders influence FEBA movement through the
determination of engagement type (see the last paragraph of Section 7.12
for further details).,
40. Rates of advance for simulated large-scale ground-combat operations are
usually given as tables or curves (e.g. see [25; 46; 64; 90; 106; 164]
WAINSTEIN [156-157] and not as mathematical relations. See EMERSON [ 511,
however, for some other functional relatious. An excellent survey of rate-of-
advance modelling (with some European perspectives) is to be found in GOAD [68).
41. See also TAYLOR [142].
42. With the exception of that for TACWAR [100] (formerly called TACNUC [102])
(also see KERLIN et al. [101]), references to documentation about these
models has already been given in Footnotes 5, 13, and 34 above (see also
Footnote 23 of Chapter 1).
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43. It should be emphasized to the reader here that we are generically using
the term firepower-score approach to refer to any one of a family of index-,
number approaches for determining the value (or score) of an individual
weapon-system type and then the combat capability (or value) of the
military unit employing them (see Footnote 11 above). A simple linear model
is used to aggregate the firepower capabilities of all the different
weapons in the unit (recall the example given in Table 1.11).
44. In IDAGAM [6] (see. also SHUPACK (130]) tactical decisions such as allocation
and movement of reserve divisions, to attack (or not) and where, and with-
drawal of divisions from a sector are handled by the theater-control model.
Force ratios (based on some type of scoring for weapon-system types) are one
of several factors considered in algorithms modelling these tactical
decisions. Moreover, there are a number of different options (in all 13)
available to the user of IDAGAM (see SHUPACK [130, pp. 86-97]), all but
one of which use force ratios to scale the magnitude of combat losses.
It is therefore possible to use LANCHESTER-type equations by themselves
thwithout any such scaling (i.e. use the 13 attrition option) to model
combat losses and use force ratios only for modelling tactical decisions.
The CEM model [25; 106] does something similar in not using force ratios
for the assessment of casualties but using them only in the modelling
of tactical decisions. Thus, the possibility exists of using a detailed
(e.g. LANCHESTER-type) model of attrition in conjunction with a tactical-
decision model that uses force ratios. It is interesting to note that
the need for some aggregation method for quantifying the military
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capability of fighting units for use in a tactical-decision algorithm in
a closed (i.e. no human intervention) model of large-scale combat operations
is never mentioned by critics of the firepower-score approach.
45. This idea was apparently independently proposed by SPUDICH [134], DARE
and JAMES [43], and HOWES and THRALL [91] (see also [92]). Early work
was done by ANDERSON [2] (see also [5]) and HOLTER [89]. Some further
references to work done by U. S. Army analysts is to be found in [149].
See also ANDERSON [3; 4] for ome further background material and
references.
46. Here we are using the term LANCHESTER attrition-rate coefficient in its
broadest sense to denote the kill rate of a single weapon-system type against
a particular enemy weapon-system type. Consequently, no assumption at all
is being made here that any LANCHESTER-type model be used or even represents
the attrition for such an engagement. For example, in several U. S. Army
studies (89; 149, Chapter 30] the Division Battle Model (DBM) was used to
generate the "casualty data" from which single-system kill rates were
computed. In other cases, detailed Monte Carlo combat simulations have been
used to generate "killer-victim scoreboard" (i.e. a matrix whose elements
show how many of each weapon-system type were destroyed in a battle by
each weapon-system type on the opposing side) in so-called weapon-equivalence
studies (see [149, Chapter 30] for further details). Further information
on approaches for determining single-system kill rates is to be found in
Chapter 5.
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47. IDAGAM is a theater-level combat model that is widely used in the United
States and elsewhere (see Section 7.17). It is one of the major models of
theater-level combat and is principally used at the joint-service level
of studies and analyses.
48. Some alternative hypotheses for imputing values to weapon-system types are
discussed in HOWES and THRALL (91; 92]. These authors, however, recommend
the one we have given here.
49. For notational convenience, we have denoted here as aij an attrition-
rate coefficient that includes the effects of the fire-allocation process
and that we have denoted above as A ij. Thus, the reader should bear in
mind that such an attrition-rate coefficievt as aij changes when the
distribution of fire by a Y firer type changes.
50. For further information and background about the PERRON-FROBENIUS theorem,
which goes back to results of PERRON [121] and FROBENIUS [60], see
GANTMACHER [61, Chapter 13], VARGA [152, Chapter 2], and SENETA [128].
51. Here we have used the term "admissible", since we must limit ourselves
to those transformations of scale that preserve the fundamental requirement
that ZX and ty must always be nonnegative. Henceforth we will omit
the word "admissible" when referring to such transformations of scale,
but the reader should keep the above restriction in mind.
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52. All modern computer centers have "canned" algorithmic routines available
for numerically solving such eigenvalue problems and determining the
eigenvector associated with a particular eigenvalue.
53. Such apparent antimonies as discussed here are, unfortunately, inherent
to this linear model for imputing values to weapon-system types. However,
the choice of scaling method evidently does influence which particular
cases will be plagued by such apparently anomalous behavior. Furthermore
(and more importantly), we show in Section 7.19 that such antimonies are
more apparent than real.
54. In the 2 x 2 case (see Example 7.18.2), one must have (a11b11 + a1 2b 2 1 )
> (a2b2 + a2b1) tn order that s• be defined when a2111 + a2221 - 0.
55. In real-world studies, the time and resources available invariably dictate
whether or not a detailed model can be used. A detailed model like
VECTOR-2 requires approximately five to ten times the number of data
inputs as does an aggregated model like IDAGAM (see [150, p. 53]).
Even a relatively simple theater-level model as ATLAS requires a fair
amount of resources just to be prepared for a new set of production runs:
it requires 2-4 months to acquire a fresh data base and 1 man-month
to structure this data in the model's input format (9, p. 38]. A
detailed model like VECTOR-2 requires infinitely more time for the prepara-
tion of inputs. Thus, there is a need for theater-level models that are




so-called "quick games" (see [164]). It has always struck this authcr
as being rather unfair to criticize ATLAS because it is a relatively
simple model that does not demand a lot of time and resources to be run.
Such critics appear to have forgotten that ATLAS was developed as a
"quick-game" model (see [164]) (it evolved out of a model called
computerized QUICK GAME [991 (see also LOW [107, Appendix D])) and that
it was not developed for detailed investigatios of theater-level combat
[98, p. 5].
56. STOCKFISCI [135, p. 6] has used the term immaturity to denote the state
of affairs in which the phenomenological bases of the field are not well
established. In such a field (as combat or conflict analysis), epistemological
questions abound (often in the guise of questions about methodology) because
the correspondence between the real world and the model world has not been
irrefutably established. This situation should be contrasted to that for
classical physics in which (within their realm of applicability) physical
laws are so well established that one does not suggest the use of alternative
paradigms (i.e. questions aboý.Z methodology do not arise). STRAUCH [138,
pp. 13-15] has pointed out that in an immature field like defense analysis
the application of quantitative methodology to a problem (denoted by him
as a squishy problem) differs fundamentally from that for a rigorously
quantifiable problem in a mature field because the analyst must exercise
judgment (see, in particular, [138, p. xiii]) to abstract a formal problem
and attendant mathematical model from an ill-defined problem regarding
phenomena not well understood (see also [138, pp. 3-20]).
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57. Besides being difficult and costly just to maintain and run, complex
models are particularly difficult to evaluate (see GASS [62] (also
[63]) for a further discussion), especially when documentation is
lacking (see (150, pp. 25-31] for a particularly lucid discussion of
documentation and other related management problems). As we have
already noted many times, documentation is a particular problem for
combat models (see SZYMCZAK [139] for not only a lucid discussion of
problems within the defense-analysis community but also some interesting
suggestians for improving current documentation practiceL,).
58. See Footnote 43 above.
59. However, there is far from universal agreement concerning many of the
details of FARRELL's investigation (e.g. see ANDERSON [5, pp. vii-viii]).
60. The statements made here are based on further investigations that time
and space do not permit us to document in complete detail..
61. ANDERSON [5, p. viii] has pointed out that (if desired) there are
straightforward ways of preventing such behavior, for example, with
the antipotential-potential method in IDAGAM (see SHUPACK [130] for
further details).
62. The author would like to thank his colleague G. OWEN for exposing him
to the literature of paradoxes of rationality. Professor OWEN has
emphasized that the occuirence of such paradoxes did not result in
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researchers abandoning trying to apply game- theory to problems of
rational behavior but instead provided rationale for further (more
sophisticated) analysis. He has added that what appears Lo be a
beginner as a paradox invariably appears to the seai;oned game theorist
ab perfectly intuitively obvious behavior.
63. Frequently, such models are challenged because they are too simple, but
any experienced modeller can take the basic paradigm and build a more
complicated model through the process of model enrichmeut (see
Section 7.1 above and MORRIS [114] for further details).
64. It is interesting to note that determination of whether such a model
is "convincing" or "credible" is apparently based on logical grounds
and not based on testing against any empirical data. In Section 7.22
we will discuss the problem of historical validation of combat models.
To the best of this author's knowledge, no detailed combat model has
ever been validated against historical data, essentially because of thu
quality of available historical combat data (see Section 7.22, McQUIE
et al. 11101, McQUIE [109], and/or HUBER, LOW, TAYLOR [95] for further
details).
65. A recent U. S. Getueral Accounting Office (GAO) [1501 study has emphasized
that empirical study is necessary to strengthen the scientific foundation
and objectivity of defense decision making (see also BREWER and HALL
[23], STRAUCH [138], STOCKFISCH [135; 136], and BREWER and SHUBIK [241).
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66. See HELMBOLD [77], McQUIE et al. [110), and McQUIE [109] foz discussions
of the limited avax.lability of historical combat data, HELMBOLD discusses
the nature of data available from secondary sources (e.g. history books),
while McQUIE [1091 (see also (110]) discusses the nature of data available
from primary sources (e.g. unit reports and official miltiary histories).
Additionally, McQUiF discuuses the shortcomings of tne historical combat
data that does exist. He provides an outstanding dJscussion of the nature,
availability, and quality of historical data.
67, We are here using the words "verification" and "validation" interchange-
ably. Many auLhors distinguish between the verification and the validation
of a model, but there is apparently no consistent use of these terms in
the literature (see, for example, MORRIS [113], FISHMAN and KIVIAT [58],
BONDER [11, pp. 68-70], VAN HORN [1511, and NAYLOR and FINGER [118]).
For our present purposes, however, such a distinction does not seem warranted,
especially since there is not consistent use of these terms in the
literature.
68. Unfortunately, this unique service had to be terminated after only two
volumes of (quarterly) publication, apparently due to lack of support.
69. Simulated combat data of one form or another exists on essentially all
levels, particularly the lower levels (i.e. few-on-few and below).
70. BONDER [13] has considered models of different combat processes at three
different levels: (1) individual firer against a passive target,
(2) small-unit combat (battalion and below), and (3) large-scale combat.
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He has discussed the verification of models at these three system
levels. Based on our knowledge of the available combat data, such
verification can only pertain to simulated (and not real) combat
data (here some type of field experimentation), but this fact is not
explicitly pointed out to the reader. No references are given by
BONDER (13].
71. Some notable exceptions have been the HERO ORALFORE study [85] and work
by COCKRELL [36], GOAD [67] (see also (68]), and GRAVES [69], which have
investigated historical FEBA movement (see also [46; 49]). Again, large-
unit operatious were considered.
72. Our discussion here follows HELMBOLD (80, pp. 1-3]. There are, of course,
other positions that one can take concerning the verification of models
(see, especially, NAYLOR and FINGER [118]). In the main text we have
presented the two that are most germane to combat models.
73. See Footnote 68 above.
74. The author would like to thank LTC Richard S. Miller, U. S. Army, of
the Naval Postgraduate School for many of the ideas discussed here,
as well as elsewhere in this section. The author is, of course, solely
responsible for the views expressed Yere.
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75. GASS [62] (see also [63]) has considered the evaluation of computerized
complex models to consist of the interrelated tasks of model
verification and validation. Here, verification is taken to mean the
attempt to ensure that a model behaves as the analysts (i.e. model
formulators and computer programmers) intended, while validation is
the testing of the agreement between the behavior of the model and
the real-world system being modelled (see FISHMAN and iVIAT [58];
see also, however, Footnote 67 above). As we have indicated above in
Section 1.22, the validatiou of even simple combat models against
historical data is a particularly difficult tsak.
76. LTC Richard S. Miller, U. S. Army, of the N~aval Postgraduate School
(see also Footnote 74 above).
77. For examples of the actual use of this approach, see NTRUMEYER [1191,
WIEGAND [1611, and ASBED (7). Each of the first two West German
authors [119; 161] has briefly discuesed one so-called TREND model,
which is a structurally rather simple aggregated deterministic
simulation model. that reproduces results of the more detailed inter-
active computerized theater-level war game RELACS (see also DARE [41]).
ASUED (7] has similarly reported about the development of a relatively
simple aggregated model and the comparison of its results with those
obtained from IDAGAM (a much more detailed theater-level model).
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APPENDIX E: FINITE-DIFFERENCE APPROXIMATIONS TO
LANCHESTER-TYPE EQUATIONS
1. Introduction
As we have seen above in Chapters 6 and 7 (e.g. recall Figure
6.11), it is impossible for all practical purposes to solve analytically
the differential equations for any but the most simple LANCHESTER-type
combat models. In order for such models to have any practical value,
there must be some convenient way to extract from them information
that is needed for defense-planning purposes. Moreover, the solving
of the differential equations for the dynamics of the force-on-force
combat provides force-level information which many times forms the
basis for extracting any further desired information from the model.
Sinca analytical methods are usually of no avail in solving these differ-
ential equations (at least for models with any degree of operational
realism), numerical methods for obtaining approximate results must be
resorted to.
Thus, in this appendix we will consider so-called finite-
difference methods for developing approximate solutions to LANCHESTER-
type differential combat equations. We will see how LANCHESTER-type
differential equations may be approximated by so-called difference
equations, which can then be conveniently numerically solved by an
automated computational procedure implemented on, for example, a modern
digital. computer. Moreover, the modern high-speed, large-scale computer
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hap made such recursive solution procedures computationally feasible,
and without it current operational models like the BONDER/IUA and its
many derivatives or the VECTOR series of models would be i~possible.
In this appendix, we will focus on the development of simple finite-
difference approximations, with the mathematical proof of answers to
attendant numerical-aaalysis questions such as convergence and stability
of these approximations being beyond the scope of our examination here.
Thus, the reader is referred to the numerical-analysis literature for
a complete mathematical justification of the methods presented here
(see the last section of this appendix),
2. A Simple Finite-Difference Approximarion.
Let us consider the following general LANCHESTER-type homo-
geneous force equation for t > 0
dt
-!dZ -H(t,x,y) with y(O) - y0 ,dt
where x(t) and y(t) denote the X and Y force levels, t denotes
time, and G and H denote force-change rates (which are net loss
rates when G and H > 0). In this section we will show how to generate
an approximate solution to (E.1) by first developing a simple finite-
difference approximation to these LANCHESTER-type equations. Thus, we
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will approximate the system of ordinary differential equations (O.D.E.s)
(E.1) by a system of difference equations (i.e. equations that connect
the force levels between only discrete points in time), which may then
be recursively solved with the help of, for example, a modern automatic
digital computer (or even a contemporary programmable hand-held calculator).
For any system of O.D.E.s such as (E.1), time is in essence
allowed to vary continuously, i.e. in principle an analytical solution
provides us with the X and Y force levels x(t) and y(t) at
any desired time t > 0. For example, the successive-approximation solu-
tion (6.5.6), (6.5.16), and (6.5.18) to the FIF LANCHESTER-type
equations (6.1.1), i.e. equations (E.1) with G(t,x,y) - a(t)x and
H(t,x,y) - b(t)y, in principle provides us with x(t) and y(t) at
any time t during the counse of such a h~mogeneous-force battle. We
v'ill now consider an approach for numerically generating an approximation
t3 the force levels at only discrete points in time.
Thus, we will consider a numerical-solution method that will
enable us to generate approximate values for the force levels, but only
at discrete points in time (as opposed to a point in time that can vary
continuouslX over the course of the battle). Accordingly, we discretize








At - T (E.3)N
It then follows that (see Figure E.1)
t - nAt for n - 0,1,2,..., N . (E.4)n
The time tn is commonly referred to as the rr-- time step (i.e. the
th
position of the n--- step in time), and the increment At is referred to
as the time-step size (here uniform). It is now convenient to introduce
the notation
X(tnn " n Y(tn) - yn
(E.5)
G(t n,x,y) - Gn(x,y), H(t ,x,y) - H (x,y).
The simplest way to generate a discrete-time approximation to
the continuous-time equations (E .1) is to recall the definition of a
derivative such as dx (t), i.e.
dt
dx (t) - lim x(t + At) - x(t) (E.6)dt AAt ý 0 A
and upproximate the rate of change of the X force level as
A
dx (t) x(t + At) - x(t) (E.7)
dt At"
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Here 'C t) denotes an approximation to the value of the derivative
at time t, i.e. the value of the rate of changa of the X force level
at time t. If we use such an appcoximation for the reta of change of,
for example, the X force level at the battle point (tnX nYn), we obtain
the following equation for an approximate value for the X force level
at the (n+!)-- time step in terms of previously determined approximate
force-level values at the th time step
x - x
n - n -G (x ,y ) (E.8)
A~t n n n
where xn and yn denote approximate values for the X and Y force
levels at time tn, e.g. x represents an approximate value for
x n X(tn). However, it is more convenient to write this latter finite-
difference equation as
n x - G n(x ny . (E.9)
Thus, by applying such approximations to our continuous-time combat model
(E.1), we obtain a discrete-time combat model (E.10) for which values of
the approximate force levels n and Yn may be generated recursively
at a finite number of mesh points t for the fixed interval [0,T] byn
the following formulas for n - 0,1,2,...,N-1
xn+l xn - Gn(xnYnt with xO - X,
Yn+l yn -Hn(x'Yn)At with " Y0
I.
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In the parlance of numerical analysis, the equations (E.10) are the
difference equations of the EULER-CAUCHY method. As we will see below,
there are not only several methods for developing such finite-difference
approximations, but there are also many other such approximations possible.
For convenience, we have assumed a uniform time-step size At, and it is
an easy matter to extend these developments to cases of a variable time-
step size At - tn - tn-I.
The most significant aspect about the finite-difference equations
(E.10) is not that they are any easier to analytically solve than the
original differential equations (E.1) (in matter of fact, they are not!)
but that they may be recursively solved for any particular numerical values,
a procedure that can be easily automated for use on, for example, a high-
speed digital computer. As we will see below in Example E.1, automation
is (in fact) quite necessary because although such recursive computation
may be very straightforward to do, it is very tedious to carry out when
it must be repeated a very large number of times. Thus, the approximation
(E.10) may be considered to be the basis for a stbp-by-step solution
procedure, which marches the battle results ahead in time: with the
approximate force levels xn and yn known at the old time step n,
equations (E.10) allow one to readily compute approximate values for the
force levels xn+1 and yn+l at the new time step n+l and thus to
"march ahead in time" (see Figure E.1).
We should now observe that since our original LANCHESTER-type
equations (E.1) only hold for x and y >. 0, we must do some precautionary
bookkeeping to prevent negative approximate force levels. This is readily
done by interpreting (as we should) equations (E.10) as meaning for
n - 0,1,2,..., N-1
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A A
( Xn+ max(O, x - G (x ,y)At) with x0 - x0
CE .11)
A A
Yn+l max(0, Yn - Hn(xn ,Y)At with y0 - y0.
For simplicity's sake, we will henceforth write an approximation in the
form (E.1O) with the understanding that an approximating system in the
form (E.11) is meant.
From (E.6) it should be clear that the "goodness" of the approxi-
mate force levels x and jn depends on the time-step size At inn
the approximating finite-difference equations (E.10), which converge to
the original LANCHESTER-type equations (E.1) as At -) 0. Indeed, it is
not surprising that it may be shown (similar to how it is done in texts
on the numerical solution to O.D.E.s) that, for example,
lim max Ixn - x 0 . (E.12)
At- 00<n<N
Unfortunately, it is a matter of artwork (as opposed to science) to pick
a time-step size At that yields "satisfactory" numerical results for
the approximate force levels. Two heuristic methods for determining
a satisfactory value for At are accordingly suggested here:
(Ml) compare exact analytical force-level results, i.e. numerical
values for xn - x(t n) and yn = Y(tn ), for a simplified
version of (E.1) (for which such analytical results are con-
veniently obtained) with the corresponding finite-difference-
generated values for the approximate force levels Xn and n
in order to find such a satisfactory value for at,
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(M2) compare numerical values for xn and yn corresponding to
the same value of t but generated by several different mesh
widths (or time-step sizes) at (e.g. At - h, h/2, h/4, etc.)
until such values, no longer "change appreciably for variations
in At" in order to find such a satisfactory value for At.
Finally. let us note that so-called higher-order (i.e. more complicated
and more accurate) approximations are possible (see below for a few brief
comments), but we feel that they are not really jusitifed for a combat model
such as (E.l) because the model itself is only a very rough approximation
to reality. This situation should be contrasted to that in the physical
sciences where the differential laws governing physical-system behavior are
much more accurately known and in many uses (e.g. a mid-course correction
for a space ship on a trip to the moon) must be very closely apprcvimated.
3. Extension to Heterogenous Forces.
The above simple method of finite-difference approximation is
both in principle and also in practice readily extended to heterogeneous-
force combat. In fact, except for a relatively minor amount of notational
complexity, it is essentially no more difficult to generate such numeri-
cal results for heterogeneous-force combat than for homogeneous-force
combat.
Let us accordingly consider combat between an X force composed
of r different weapon-system types (denoted as l, X2, ... , Xr)
and a Y force composed of s weapon-system types (denoted as
Y' Y2' "'" Y ' ) (cf. Section 7.7 above). General LANCHESTER-type
equations may be formulated for such combat by extension of the homo- A.
geneous-force model (E.1) and may be taken for t > 0 as
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idx
dt -G i(txl ... "Xr'Y,'""y) with x (0) -,
(E.13)
adt j -H (tX,...,x ryl,...,ys) with y (0) - yj,
where x it) denotes the number of Xi at time t and analogously
for y (t). Here we have adopted the convention (cf. Section 7.7) that
the index i will always take on the integer values 1 through r, and
the index j will always take on the integer values 1 through s.
Discretizing time as above (recall Figure E.1) and introducing
the notation
xi(t) =xi y(t ) JSn n 9 n Yn
G i(t n, Xl,...,YXrYI, .... Ys G ni (Xl, ... ,Ixrvyl, ... ,tys) I (E.14)
SH j(t n X,...,XrYl,...y) Hj(Xl .,xy 1.,Y, ... ,ys)
we may again introduce the above simple first-order finite-difference
approximations to the force-level derivatives and analogously obtain the
following simple approximation to the LANCHESTER-type heterogeneous-
force combat equations
X+l xn - G (X^ 9 .. x Py )
n+l n n n n
with initial conditions
ii j j
i and y ,
iiwhere x denotes the approximation to the X, fcrce level x - x (tn)
at t - tn and similarly for ;i_
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It should be clear to the reader that the approximating finite-
difference equations (E.15) may again be numerically solved with a
simple recursive algorithm. In fact, on a modern large-scale high-
speed digital computer, they are essentially no more computationally
difficult to solve than the homogeneous-force equations considered in
the previous section.
4. General Approaches for Developing Finite-Difference Approximations
As Te indicated in our examination of the simplest finite-
difference approximation (E.1O) to the homogeneous-force LANCHESTER-type
equations (E.1), there are several approaches for developing such
app,,oximatiovs to generate numerical solutions to such differential-
equatiun combat models. In this section we will very briefly consider
three basic approaches for developing such finite-difference approxi-
mations and will also meation a few specific mcthods that the reader
may encounter elsewhere. In p&rticular, all digital-computer computa-
tion centers today provide users with numerical differential-equation-
solver routines (i.e. computer -outines for the numerical solution of
O.D.E.•) as part of their general scientific-computation package.. Since
a reader who attempts ý'.o nimerically implement ý LANCHESTER-type combat
model on the computer is c'..tain to encounter such methods and routines
1i he conxAits his computation center for assistance, a few general
words about theot seem in order. However, as zoe have discussed above,
we suggest that the Yeader use tha EULER-CAUCHY method in such compu-
tational work, since it is extremely convenient to implement and possesses
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accuracy (crude as it may be) that is consistent with the scientific
validity of the original LANCHESTER-type combat model. Of course, if
one (for one reason or another) chooses to use one of the many numerical
differential-equation-solver routines that are available from one's com-
putation center (which usually supplies such differential-equation solvers
to users in the physical sciences), one will undoubtedly wind up using
some standard higher-order method, e.g. the so-called classical RUNGE-
KUTTA method (see below).
The three general approaches that can be used to develop finite-
difference approximations to O.D.E.s may be referred to as methods
based on:
(Ml) numerical differentiation,
(M2) numerical integration (combined with interpolation of
the integrand),
(M3) TAYLOR-series expansion (either directly or indirectly).
We devaloped the above EULER-CAUCHY approximation (E.10) from the stand-
point of numerical differentiation, although one could have equally
well used either of the other two approaches (M2) and (M3) (e.g. see
HENRICI [4, pp. 9-10]). Principal methods based on the numerical-integra-
tion approach are the ADAMS-BASHFORTH method, the ADAMS-MOULTON method,
and the generalized MILNE-SlMPSON method (e.g. see HENRICI [4, especially
Chapter 5] for further details; see also MILNE [11] and HILDEBRAND [6]);
while the principal methods based on TAYLOR-s*ries expansion are those
IT of RUNGE-tUGTrA type (e.g. see HENRICI [4, pp. 66-70]), especially the
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classical RUNGA-KUTTA method which (next to the EULER-CAUCHY method) is
probably the best known of all the so-called one-step methods.
How good is any particular finite-difference approximation?
What is the basis for our re( nmmendation that the reader should use
the EULER-CAUCHY method? Would another approximation be better? The
answers to such questions at least partially rest on certain concepts
and results from the mathematical field of numerical analysis. It is
beyond the scope of our present examination to provide a complete
theoretical answer to these important questions, which are easy to
answer but quite difficult to justify these answers (i.e. supply mathe-
matical proofs). Thus, for present purposes we will go into numerical-
analysis aspects just far enough to articulate issues and answers. Our
goals then are (1) to expose the reader to numerical-approximation
methods for O.D.E.s, (2) to suggest a general course of action (i.e.
use the EULER-CAUCHY method) for satisfying computational requirements,
and (3) to indicate to the reader that there are sound reasons for
our suggestion.
How good is any particular finlte-difference approximation?
Three ways to answer such questions about the validity (or goodness)
of a numerical-approximation technique are as follows:
(Wl) compare exact and approximate results,
(W2) perform theoretical numerical-analysis investigations,
(W3) do experimental cosputing.
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Similar to the intimate relation between game theory and war gaming
(i.e. behavioral model building) (see Section 8.2 below), the theory of
numerical analysis provides a fundamentally important methodological
approach (i.e. concepts and results) to the study of computational
algorithms. Thus the approach (W2) provides a basic framework (i.e.
concepts and vocabulary) for pursuing the other two approaches (WI) and
(W3), both of which have certain inherent shortcomings. For example,
the comparison of exact and approximate results can only serve as a
benchmark (i.e. a test in a specific known case), since the exact results
are lacking when the approximate results are really needed. We thus
turn to the theoretical investigation of the "goodness" of a given
finite-difference approximation. A very reasonable criterion to consider
in such an investigation is the magnitude of the error involved in
using the approximation.
There are, in fact, several types of error involved in the
numerical solution of O.D.E.s:




Moreover, the reader should be warned thac not all authors define
these terms in the same fashion or as we will here. The definitions
given here by us for the above var;.ous types of errors are more or
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less patterned after those of ISAACSON and KELLER [9, Chapter 81. Let
us now for illustrative purposes consider a finite-difference approxi-
mation to the homogeneous-force equations (E.l.) and examine these
various errors more closely. One important reason for doing this is
that not all finite-difference methods yield satisfactory results:
there do exist approximations with unsatisfactory error properties,
and a potential user should be aware of this fact. In our examination
here of these errors we will consider definitions and results for only
the X force level, with similar results holding for the Y force level.
The local truncation error measures the error by which the
exact force levels from (E.1) fail to satisfy the approximating differ-
ence equations, and consequently it depends on the finite-difference
method used. Thus, when the EULER-CAUCHY method is used, the local
x
truncation error for the X-force-level difference equation T n
is defined (following ISAACSON and KELLER (9, Chapter 8]) as
X Xn+l n+G(x yj (E.16)
n " At n n' n
where we recall that xn - x(t ) and similarly for yn" If the Tn
vanish as At - 0, we say that the difference equations are consistent
with the differential equation (here for the X force level). Also
of interest io how quickly such a limiting value is reached, and this
speed of convergence may be expressed in mathematical terms as
n 0(hp) , (E.17)
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where h - Lt. Here the notation f(h) - O(hp) means that
limh- 0 f(h)/hp - c, where c is a constant independent of h, aald is
read "f(h) is of the order hp." For example, the EULER-CAUCHY method
has truncation error T - O(At) and is consequently called a first-ordern
method. The classical RUNGE-KUTTA method has truncation error of order
4
(At) and is consequently called a higher-order method (here fourth-
order),
The roundoff error for the X-force-level difference equation
X
r is defined as
n
r =X - x (E.18)n n n
where 'n denotes the exact solution of the approximating equations and
n
I Xu denotes the numerical value that is actually calculated by the
computing equipment in place of the x Roundoff errors exist because
n
the number X cannot be calculated with infinite precision due to the
limited accuracy of any computing equipment. The approximate-solution
error for the X force level eX is defined as
n
e - x - x(tn) , (E.19)en n
which measures the error made by taking the exact X-force-level solution
of the approximating difference equations n in place of the exactn
solution to the X-force-level equation x(tn ). For any finite-difference
approximation to be any good, we require it to be convergent in the
sense that we can make the aoproximate-solution error arhitrarily small
by taking At small enough, i.e. in analytical terms
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lim max le X -0 (E.20)
At÷O O<n<N
which is equivalent to (E.12) above, and similarly for e - y - Y(tn)"nn n
For example, the EULER-CAUCHY method is convergent, with an approximate-
solution error of order At. The classical RUNGE-KUTTA method is also
convergent [with error of order (At) 4, while the so-called MILNE method
is not (there are differential equations for which spurious numerical
approximations may be obtained). Finally, the total error in the approxi-
mate value for the X force level EX is defined as (see ISAACSON and
KELLER [9, pp. 374-377] for a detailed analysis of the total error of the
EULER-CAUCHY method)
X X KE n X x(t) e + r . (E.21)n 1 n n n
A word of caution, however, is in order on the indiscriminate use
of higher-order finite-difference-approximation methods. Consider, for
example, the single differential equation
dx- -x with x(O) - x0 , (E.22)
and approximate the derivative by the central-difference formula
A
dx n- n+l n-l
to obtain the finite-difference approximation
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2At n
or
xn+, n -22c t + with X0- x (2.23)
which is well-known (e.g. see HILDEBRAND [7, pp. 132-133]) to have
truncation error of order (At) 2. Nevertheless, although the truncation
error for (E.23) is of higher order than for the EULER-CAUCHY approximation
Xn+1 i (I - 2At) n, this finite-difference approximation is not convergent
and hence is not satisfactory (see HENRICI [4, pp. 240-241] or HILDEBRAND
[7, pp. 132-135]). The O.D.E. (E.22) has the unique exact solution
e, wite-difference approximation (E.23) (being a
second-order difference equation) possesses a general solution made up
of two linearly-independent components, one of which behaves sort of like
-t t
e for small values of At but the other of which behaves like e .
Consequently, the finite-difference equation (E.23) possesses an extra
"spurious" (also "extraneous" or "parasitic") solution that has growth
properties contrary to those of the exact solution to the differential
equation (E.22) and hence will spoil the numerically computed values X
n
(see HENRICI [4, pp. 240-241] for further details).
Without going into mathematical details here (e.g. see
HILDEBRAND [7, pp. 132-145] or HENRICI [4, pp. 209-288] for such details),
the approximation of a differential equation of a given order by a differ-
ence equation of higher order has the shortcoming of introducing "spurious"
solutions as illustrated by the above example. More precisely, the higher-
order difference equation has a larger number of fundamental solutions
6
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(i.e. the building blocks out of which one constructs all solutions) than
does the original differential equation, and not all of these may behave
like the exact solution of the original differential equation. Conse-
quently, for example, the approximation (E.23) is not a satisfactory one.
In general terms, higher-order approximations introduce spurious solutions,
and such spurious solutions may cause convergence problems. In plain
words, this means that one can pick a finite-difference method such that
the exact LANCHESTER-type-model results for, for example, x(t n) and
y(t ) cannot be reached (sometimes even remotely) by the numericaln
ones X and Y by taking at small enough. Such troubles may be11 n
avoided by investigating the (relative) numerical stability of the finite-
difference-approximation solution. Unfortunately, not all higher-order
approximations (which do possess better trunction error) are numerically
stable. The reader is directed to texts on numerical analysis (e.g
[4-11]) where finite-difference-approximation methods with such undesirable
properties are identified. Thus, whenever one uses a higher-order method,
one must make sure that it possesses the desired numerical stability
properties. Moreover, the EULER-CAUCHY method recommended above is both
convergent and numerically stable.
Let us finally note here that the important mathematical properties
of convergence and stability of finite-difference approximations to O.D.E.s
are intimately related. It is a rather far-reaching result in numerical
analysis that for consistent finite-difference approximations, stability
of the difference equations is equivalent to convergence of the difference
equations' solution to that of the original differential equation (see
HENRICI [4, pp. 217-287], ISAACSON and KELLER [9, pp. 410-417], or
HILDEBRAND (7, pp. 140-145] for further details).
660
5. Some Examples.
In this section we will give several examples of finite-difference
approximations by the EULER-CAUCHY method to specific homogeneous-force
models. The main reason for giving these examples (particularly the first
one) is to indicate how such finite-difference approximations may be
recursively solved to generate numerical results.
E.I___le E.1: Constant-Coefficient LANCHESTER-Type Equations for FIF
Attrition Process. If we consider a fight to the finish, our differential
battle model is
d -ay for x and y > 0
dx }with x(O)-Xo
dt " 0 otherwise
(E.24)
-bx for x and y > 0
S= 1 with y(O) - yO
dt 0 otherwise w
The finite-difference approximation by the EULER-CAUCHY method then reads
'Xn+l I in - aj nt with o I Xo 9
. . (E.25)
Yn+l = Yn - bxnAt with YO 0 YO V
which in view of lhe fight-to-the-finish equations (E.24) should be taken
to more precisly mean
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( n+l 0 max (0, x - ay n At) with xO - x0
Yn~l max(O, Yn -bx At) with yo - yo
The reader will recognize (9.25) as FISKE's equations for modern warfare,
which we have examined in Section 2.10 above. Moreover, it should again
be emphasized that when we write (E.25) as being a finite-difference
approximation to (E.24), we really mean that the equations (E.26) are to
be understood. This previously-agreed-to convention will be followed in
the balance of this appendix. We will dow consider a specific numerical
example to illustrate the recursive solution procedure for the approximating
difference equations. Numerical results for the input data shown in
Table E.J are given in Table E.II. From considering these numerical
results, the reader should have no trouble in understanding how the
approximate battle results Xn and jn are propagated ahead in time from
the old time step to the new time step in a step-by-step fashion (cf.
Figure E.1).
Example E.2: Variable-Coefficient LANCHESTER-Type Equations for FIF
Attrition Process. In this case the battle model reads
dx -a(t)y with x(O) - x0 ,
dt
(E.27)




TABLE E.I. Input Data for Numerical Example on EULER-CAUCHY
Finite-Difference-Approximation Method Applied




a - 0.06 X casualties/minute per Y firer
b = 0.6 Y casualties/minute per X firer
At - 0.01 minute
1
NOTE: For the differential-equation combat model, X will win a fight
to the finish, since
0.333 XO > /-- - 0.316YO ao
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TABLE E.HI. Numerical Example for EULER-CAUCHY Method for Input Data
Shown in Table E.1.
t time stepn nbi At a~nAt
(minutes) ni n Ynn i n
0.00 0 10.0000 30.000 0.060 0.0180
0.01 1 9.9820 29.940 0.060 0.0180
0.02 2 9.9640 29.880 0.060 0.0179
0.03 3 9.9461 29.820 0.060 0.0179
0.04 4 9.9282 29.760 0.060 0.0179
0.05 5 9.9103 29.700 0.059 0.0178
0.06 6 9.8925 29.641 0.059 0.0178
0.07 7 9.8747 29.582 0.059 0.0177
0.08 8 9.8570 29.523 0.059 0.0177
0.09 9 9.8393 29.464 0.059 0.0177
0.10 10 9.8216 29.405 0.059 0.0176
etc.
5.00 500 4.4317 9.8276 0.0266 0.0059
5.01 501 4.4258 9.8010 0.0265 0.0059
5.02 502 4.4199 9.7745 0.0265 0.0059
7.50 750 3.4081 4.0526 0.0205 0.0024
7.51 751 3.4057 4.0321 0.0204 0.0024
7.52 752 3.4033 4.0117 0.0204 0.0024
9.55 955 3.15691 0.0645 0.0190 0.00004
9.56 956 3.15687 0.0455 0.0189 0.00002
9.57 957 3.15685 0.0266 0.0189 0.00002
9.58 958 3.15683 0.0077 0.0189 0.00000
9.59 959 3.15683 0.0000
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Examples of such time-dependent coefficients (together with their origins
from physical circumstances) have been given in Section 6.2 above. If
we denote a(t ) as a and b(t ) as b , then the EULER-CAUCHY finite-n n 11 n
difference approximation to (E.27) reads{xn+l = x n- any nAt with x C WX0 , (.)
b k Ltwith
Yr)+l 'Yn b n n• t 9t 0 , YO
In this case the reader can readily see that once the time-dependent
attrition-rate coefficients a(t) and b(t) have been specified, the
step-by-step numerical integration of the variable-coefficient equations
(E.27) by means of (E.28) is actually no more difficult than that of the
constant-coefficient equations (E.24) by means of (E.25).
Example E.3: Dynamics of a Fire Fight. Consider a "fire fight" between
homogeneous X and Y forces. Assume that LANCHESTER-type equations
for FIF attrition describe the attrition process. If we further assume
that (Al) whether or not a side has "fire superiority" may be measured
in terms of whether or not that side is putting out the greater total
volume of fire, and (A2) having (not having) fire superiority yields the
consequence that individual firers are overwhelming the enemy with their
fire (are being overwhelmed by the enemy's fire) and are consequently
increasing (decreasing) their rate of fire up to a maximum value (down
to a minimum value); than this combat may be modelled by the following
equations (see HUGGINS [8] for further details; see also von FABECK [14]
for an examination of the phenomenological bases of fire superiority)
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'mr- m V % ... Vh
dx . -a(t)y -b(t)x, (E.29)
dt -adt
a(t) - 1/ta + 1/[Vy(t) PSSKy]
b(t) - 1/{tayx + l/[Vx(t) PSIKyX]},
Cx sgn(v X -xVyy) for mX < vx < MX
dv x
S0 otherwise,
dv Y C x sgn(VyYY - Vx) 
for my < Vy < V Y
dt- 0 otherwise,
with initial conditions
x yx(O) - X0 , y(O) - YO V (0) - V0  ' (0) M-
where taXy, tayx, P SSK S x%'P S1KYX C X N my. Mx, and MY denote
constants. Here we have assumed the simple model for the LANCHESTER
attrition-rate coefficient given in Section 5.2 (see als, Section 5.10).
Also, the symbol sgn 8, read "signum e," denntes the sistnuw function
denoted by
+1 for 8 0,
sgn - 0 for a -O , (E.30)
-1 for 9 < 0
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The above model (E.29) incorporates the feature that individuals on the side
that is producing the larger total volume of fire (measured in terms of
the total number of rounds fired per unit time) can increase (up to a
limit) their firing rate by virtue of having fire superiority. Similarly,
an individual's firing rate is "chocked off" when his side loses fire
superiority. Introducing notation in the obvious way, we may then write
the EULER-CAUCHY approximation to (E.29) as
Xn+l -Xn - anynAt, Yn+l Yn - bnxnAt, (E.31)
^^
nn nn Y+ 1 (,nPS KX
l/{t + S/ }'
b n ayx n SSK









AX X AY If




Although our model of the dynamics of a fire fight (E.29) is fairly
complex and it is for sure impossible to conveniently represent its
solution in terms of any elementary functions, it is an easy matter
to program a digital computer to recursively compute the numerical
solution of the approximating finite-difference equations (E.31) and
hence to numerically integrate our differential combat model (E.29) in
a step-by-step fashion. Such a numerical procedure was indeed quite
tedious and essentially not practical before the advent of the bigh-speed
digital computer.
6. Advantages and Disadvantages of Both Analytical Sclutions and
Also Their Numerical Approximations.
In this monograph we have considered both the formulation and
also the solution (i.e. extraction of information for analysis purposes)
of LANCHESTER-type homogeneous-force combat models. Both analytical
and also numerical-approximation solution approaches have now been
examined. Some similar investigations (i.e. formulation and solution)
have been g.arried out to a lesser extent for heterogeneous-force models.
Based on these investigations, it seems appropriate to compare the
advantages and disadvantages of both analytical solutions and also their
numerical approximation. As an example of the latter, the reader should
keep in mind the first example of the last section, a numerical example




Advantages and disadvantages of analytical solutions to
LANCHESTER-type models are given in Table E.III, which is self-explanatory
and does not need any further elaboration except for the following
discussion of a few not-so-obvious points. A real advantage of simple
analytical models that yield convenient analytical solutions is their
behavioral transparency, i.e. one can easily see how model outputs are
related to inputs and other model parameters. For example, we know that
for LANCHESTER's equations of modern warfare (i.e. constant-coefficient
equations for an FIF attrition process) that the X force level
x(t) is given by
x(t) - x0 cosh(/aFb t) - yo g/b sinh(/ t) . (E.32)
Thus, the analytical solution reveals the two important model
parameters: (1) the intensity of combat, I - a/r; and (2) the relative
fire effectiveness of individual combatants, R - a/b. It also reveals
that of these parameters only relative fire effectiveness R helps
determine battle outcome, with the intensity of combat I only adjust-
ing the battle's time scale. Another very important aspect of simple
LANCHESTER-type models is their ability to provide a framework for under-
standing and interpreting results from much more complicated operational
models. This characteristic is the basic idea behind the fourth advantage
given in Table E.III, and in a similar vein we have discussed above in
Section 7.1 the coordinated use of a simple auxiliary model with a
complex operational model. A further discussion of this important
concept within the context of modelling tactical decision making as
t
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TABLE E.III. Advantages and Disadvantages of an Analytical Solution
to a LANCHESTER-Type Model.
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
(1) exact results (1) may be quite complicated
(2) behavioral transparency (2) available only for very
(i.e. can easily see relation- simple cases
ship between model's (a) few state variables
parameters and solution (b) simple forms for
behavior) attrition rates and
(3) parametric analyses easily coefficients
performed (3) may require mathematical
(4) can generate hypotheses to sophistication to under-
be tested in higher-resolution stand, appreciate, and
studies, use.
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a rational process and optimizing tactical resource allocation is to
be found in Section 8.5 below. Some additional thoughts on the coordi-
nated use of a simplified auxiliary model writh a higher-resolution com-
plex operational model (besides a graphical articulation of the basic
concept) are portrayed in Figure E.2.
Moreover, it seems appropriate to point out here that one dis-
advantage of an analytical solution is that advanced mathematical theory
may be required just to understand and use it. An example of this unfortu-
nate situation is the solution to variable-coefficient LANCHESTER-type
equations for modern warfare with power attrition-rate coefficients
(see Section 6.9). Here for cases of no offset the force levels may be
represented in terms of LANCHESTER-CLIFFORD-SCHLFLI functions (or,
equivalently, modified BESSEL functions of the first kind of fractional
order). Thus, some knowledge of special mathematical functions is more
or less required for analytically analyzing essentially all but simple
constant-coefficient LANCHESTER-type models, in particular for variable-
coefficient LANCHESTER-type equations of modern warfare (see Chapter 6).
In a similar fashion, advantages and disadvantages of approxi-
mate numerical solutions are given in Table E.IV. The only additional
comment that seems necessary here is that one disadvantage of them (the
last given in Table E.IV) is that some caution must be observed in their
use. For example, one cannot indiscriminately choose the time-stop
size at to be used in numerically generating results with the finite-
difference approximation. Also, as we have discussed above, not all
finite-difference approximations to LANCHESTER-type differential equations














(e.g. Approximate Numerical Solution
or Simulation like OYNTACS)
Figure E.2. Coordinated use of simplified auxiliary model
and complex operational (i.e. higher-resolution)
model.
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f TABLE E.IV. Advantages and Disadvantages of an Approximate Numerical
Solution by Finite-Difference Methods to a LANCHESTER-type Model.
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
(1) can always be obtained (1) need computer to generate:
(i.e. guaranteed answer) resources required
(2) easily generated by (a) time
recursive algorithm (b) money
(i.e. finite-difference- (2) difficult to perceive
equation solution readily significant relationships
computed recursively) between model parameters
(3) no advanced mathematical and solution behavior
theory required to under- (3) might be costly to perform
stand and use. parametric analyses
(4) only obtain approximate
solution (beware .)
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knowledge about numerical analysis (such as we have outlined above) is
useful for avoiding certain pitfalls of computation.
After comparing the advantages and disadvantages of analytical
and approximate numerical solutions shown in Tables E.III and E.IV,
the reader should sense that simple analytical solutions and numerical
approximations to more complicated models are in some sense complementary.
Returning to our theme about considering the information to be extracted
from a combat model, we observe that in many cases some information may
be obtained from an analytical solution to a simple model, while other
complementary information about system performance and effectiveness is
probably best obtained from a more complicated model by numerical means
(i.e. finite-difference approximation). Again, Figure E.2 portrays some
related thoughts along these lines. We feel that much more work is needed
on analysis strategies for the coordinated use of simplified auxiliary
models with complex operational combat models. In force-on-force combat
analysis, no one model can stand alone!
7. Suggestions for Further Reading.
In this section we give some selected references for the reader
who desires further information about the numerical solution of O.D.E.s.
Excellent introductions for the nonspecialist are afforded by HENRICI
[5, Chapter 14], McCRACKEN and DORN [10, Chapter 10], HILDEBRAND [7,
Chapter 2], and RALSTON and WILF [13, Chapters 8 and 9], with the last
reference probably containing the best introduction for the OR worker
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(even though the computer material is quite dated). Other good intro-
ductory texts are those by MILNE [11] and HILDEBRAND [6], in spite of
the fact that they appeared in the relative early days of digital computers.
The reader who desires further information about difference equations
themselves will find very readable introductions in HENRICI [5, Chapter 3]
and HILDEBRAND [7, Chapter 1]. An excellent short summary of the principal
finite-difference methods for O.D.E.s appears in DAVIS and POLONSKY
[3, pp. 896-897]. More theoretical treatments of the numerical solution
of O.D.E.s are to be found in HENRICI [4] and ISAACSON and KELLER [9],
with a fairly extensive list of references to the numerical-analysis
literature concerning O.D.E.s appearing in HENRICI [4] (see also MILNE
[111 for an extensive list of earlier references).
8. Final Remarks.
With the information about finite-difference approximations
contained in this appendix the reader has the computational means at hand
for building operational LANCHESTER-type models of essentially any
desired degree of complexity. Such approximation methods allow one with
the help of a digital computer to generate numerical results (albeit for
particular values of input data) from essentially any kind of LANCHESTER-
type model. With such computational support, the military-OR worker
can focus on model formulation and, more generally, the iterative process
of model building (cf. MORRIS [12]).
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For such computational work we have (for a variety of reasons)
recommended the use of the EULER-CAUCHY method. In particular, because
of the very approximate nature of LANCHESTER-type models in the first
place, higher-order finite-difference-approximation schemes hardly seem
justified as they have been in, for example, the physical sciences where
the differential laws of nature are quite precisely known. Besides the
convergence and stability of finite-difference methods discussed above,
another important computational consideration is the number of computa-
tions required. The EULER-CAUCHY does very well on this criterion because
of its simplicity. Moreover, because of the speed of modern digital
computers and the simplicity of the EULER-CAUCHY method, the smaller
time-step size required by consideration of truncation error in relation
to that possible for higher-order schemes is of little consequence.
Furthermore, operational LANCHESTER-type combat models in use today such
as the BONDER/IUA or any one of the VECTOR series of models use the
EULER-CAUCHY method (e.g. see BONDER and HONIG [1, p. 337] or [2, p. 51]).
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EXERCISES FOR APPENDIX E
1. Consider LANCHESTER's constant-coefficient equations of modern war-
fare for a fight to the finish (E.24) and the EULER-CAUCHY finite-
difference approximation (E.25) that we developed for them.
Part a. Using the finite-difference approximation and the following
input data x0 - 20, yo - 70, a - 0.1 X casualties/minute per Y firer,
b - 0.5 Y casualties/minute per X firer, and At - 0.1 minute; compute
by hand the approximate force levels xn and Yn for several time
steps in order to get a feel for the recursive solution procedure.
Part b. Based on your computational experience gained in Part a,
automate the computational procedure by developing an algorithm and
writing a computer program to calculate the approximate force levels
xn and n"
Part c. Using the data of Part a, exercise the computer program
developed in Part b. Plot the exact force level values x(t) and
y(t) against time t, and on these same plots show the values for
the approximate force levels cn and Yn'
Part d. Using experimental computation (i.e. by trial and error),
find a value for the time-step size At that yields satisfactory
approximate results. (Hint: as suggested in this appendix, take
several trial values for At (e.g. At - 0.001 minute, 0.01 minute,
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0.1 minute, 1.0 minute, 10.0 minutes), compute the approximate
force-level trajectories for each of these different values, and
compare results).
Part e. Modify the finite-difference approximation and your computer
program to handle the case of a fixed-force-level-breakpoint battle
(see Section 2.8). Exercise your computer program with the data of
Part a and f - 0.5 and fP 0.15, where (as usual)
BP BPPar a and yfBPX Y
p- fBpx 0 and YBP m fBPY0*
2. Recall the LANCHESTER-type model that we developed in Section 3.10
and that considers unit deterioration due to attrition with fixed-force-
level breakpoints
-a(l-fI) 1 - YBP) y for x> xBp and y>dx~~~ IYT-B PBP'
Tt 0 otherwise,
(E.33)
(b(l-f ) 1-/ -x for x> xB, and




where fX and fY denote the fractions of the X and Y forces thatI fI
are permanently ineffective, and 1i and V are constant parameters
modelling the unit-deterioration process.
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Part a. Develop the EULER-CAUCHY finite-difference approximatioL
to (E.33).
Part b. Using the finite-difference approximation developed in
Part a, write a computer program to calculate the approximate force
levels k and kn'
Part c. Using the data x0 - 30, yo - 80, a - 0.05 X casualties/minute
xper Y firer, b - 0.2 Y casualties/minute per X firer, f1 " 0.1,
Y - 0.3, - 2.5, v - 2.5, fBP M 0.5, and f . 0.15; find afI BP- 5adfBP
satisfactory time-step size At for this finite-difference approxi-
mation by experimental computing. (Hint: as suggested in this
appendix, first find a satisfactory time-step size for the finite-
difference approximation of Problem 1. Denote this value as hS.
Then compute approximate results for the model (E.33) for several
values of At, using hS as a point of departure (e.g. At - 0.1hs,
0.5hS, hS, 2.5hs, 5hs), and compare results.)
Part d. Using the data of Part c and the time-step value At
developed there, compute the approximate force levels, and plot
A
against time t and also y against time. Develop similar
plots for cases in which u - 1 and v 1, p - 1 and v - 2,
S- 1 and v - 2, and v - 10 and v - 10. Compare these
numerical results with those for LANCHESTER's equations of modern
warfare with the same fixed-force-level breakpoints.
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Part e. What other graphical plots would be of interest to a
military-OR analyst?
3. Using the computation aids (i.e. the computer programs) developed
above for the combat models (E.24) and (E.33), evaluate the following
rule of thumb frequently used by military planners: do not attack
unless you possess a three-to-one advantage in combat power.
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Chapter 8. OPTIMIZING TACTICAL DECISIONS
8.1. Introduction.
In this chapter we will briefly examine developing insights into
the structure of optimal tactical decisions by combining combat modelling
and optimization theories. Our approach is to apply so-called generalized
control theory (i.e. optimization theory for dynamic systems 2) to relatively
simple LANCHESTER-type combat models in which the combat strategies of
tactical decision makers are represented by "decision variables. 31, The
"best" values for these decision variables are then determined by invoking
optimality conditions from generalized control theory.
This chapter, however, is substantially different from the other
chapters of this monograph in the sense that its purpose is to provide an
introduction to and overview of the quantitative analysis of military
strategy and tactics and not to provide complete details on how this is
done. The author has felt it to be important to show how LANCHESTER-type
models can be used prescriptively for military decision making (at least
conceptually), even though circumstances have prevented complete details
being given here. Thus, our purpose here is to provide the reader with
some indication as to how the LANCHESTER theory of combat can be combined
with optimization theory to quantitatively study military strategy and
tactics. The author has felt that it would be better to provide a rather
sketchy introduction to and overview of this important topic rather than
omit it entirely. Thus, complete details will not be given, with the reader
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being referred to the literature for them. In partciular, essentially
no details from optimization theory (i.e. generalized control theory), no
details of procedures for developing solutions, and even no complete solu-
tions will be presented here. However, we will try to establish a framework
for the use of such normative models. Consequently, problem formulations
and the insights to be gained from such investigations will be stressed.
The structure of optimal time-sequential combat strategies has
been studied by the author4 by considering a sequence of specific problems,
and we will examine a few selected representatives from this collection
of specific problems. However, these combat models are too simple to
be taken literally but should be interpreted as only indicating general
principles to serve as hypotheses in subsequent studies with more detailed
operations models (e.g. a high-resolution Monte Carlo combat simulation
such as DYNTACS, or a complex operational analytical model such as BONDER/IUA
5or VECTOR-2) . Since these mathematical models are such idealizations of
the (rational) decision-making process in combat, probably the only
significant result obtained from then is the structure of the optimal
combat strategies. Consequently, the author's research has initially con-
centrated on relating the structure of optimal combat strategies to the
conceptualization of the tactical decision problem. Such work may be
helpful for understanding optimization results from (and, hence, for making
better use of) more complex operational models.
In this chapter we will therefore briefly examine several specific
optimization problems for determining optimal time-sequential combat
strategies (primarily fire-distribution strategies, i.e. strategies for
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distributing fire over enemy target types). We will also consider the
optimal initial commitment of forces in battle, and this examination of
ours will provide fresh insights into the "principle of concentration,"
which F. W. LANCHESTER [53] first attempted to quantitatively justify in
1914 (see also Section 2.9 above). On the battlefield, the opposing
commanders have conflicting interests, and this basic conflict of interests
leads to a so-called game-theoretic or two-sided optimization problem for
6determining the 'best" combat strategy for each side , i.e. each side is
faced with a tactical choice problem that is in turn affected by the
enemy's tactical strategy. Because such two-sided time-sequential opti-
mization problems (i.e. differential games) are generally so difficult
to solve and usually have such fantastically complicated solutions, we
will accordingly consider some one-sided optimization problems7 (i.e.
one side's strategy is fixed and thus only the other side has a free
choice of its combat strategy) in order to illustrate modelling points
and study the structure of optimal combat policies8 (or tactics).
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8.2. Quantitative Analysis of Military Strategy and Tactics
From the standpoint of modern operations research (OR), problems
of military strategy and tactics 9 may be viewed as being basically resource-
allocation problems over time. For example, a military commander of ground
forces is frequently faced with the problem of when and where to commit
his reserve forces into battle. As another example, the allocation of a
specific weapon-system type to an acquired target is an important tactical
decision in the fire-support process. Accordingly, the determination of
optimal (or even "good") fire-distribution strategies for supporting weapon
systems10 has been a major problem of military OR. In particular, the
determination of the optimal allocation of general-purpose aircraft to
missions in a multiperiod war with a specified number of periods has been
much studied in the past and continues today to be of significant interest
to defense planners.
Many people believe that such tactical decisions (quantified in
models as behavioral and/or decision variables) are the most significant
factors driving the course of combat to its end. Thus, one is faced with
11the problem of modelling tactical decisions . After such tactical-
decision models have been developed, it becomes of interest to find a pre-
ferred course of action from among the feasible alternatives.
Optimal strategies for such tactical-allocation problems may be
investigated by means of
12
(I) war gaming
(II) mathematical modelling combined with optimization theory.
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These two approaches both share some common dimensions of the tactical
decision-making process, but they may also be characterized by their
differences. The distinguishing feature of war games is that they use
real people playing the roles of the battlefield commanders and their
staffs to simulate tactical decision processes, while combat simulations
and analytical models use symbols, algorithms, or some other type of
logic to represent such decision processes. All such approaches and/or
modelling methodologies, however, play the same functional role in combat
simulations1 3 : they produce requisite tactical decisions (i.e. the outputs
of decision processes) at appropriate times during the course of simulated
combat. Moreover, war games are descriptive, while optimization problems
are prescriptive (or normative).
When we analytically model the tactical choice problem with each
of the opposing commanders seeking to use his "best" combat strategy, we
are led to a game-theory model for optimizing tactical decisions in which
there are at least two players or decision makers (cf. HO [34; 35]).
When there are two decision makers, such a normative model is also fre-
quently called a two-sided optimization problem (e.g. see HO, BRYSON,
and BARON [36]). Moreover, there is an intimate connection between game
theory and war gaming (e.g. see THOMAS and DEEMER [101]). In particular,
SHUBIK (72] has stressed that a knowledge of the theory of games provides
a useful benchmark and a fundamentally important methodological approach
to the study of situations involving potential conflict of interests.
Table 8.1 presents a brief synopsis of the major assumptions in game-
theoretic optimization problems and war gaming (i.e. behavioral model
686
3
TABLE 8.1. Brief Synopsis of the Major Assumptions in Game-Theoretic
Optimization Problems and War Gaming (i.e. Behavioral
Model Building).
Game Theory Behavioral Theories
Rules of the game Military doctrine and custom
External symmetry Personal detail
1No social conditioning Socialization assumed
No role playing Role playing
Fixed well-defined payoffs Difficult to define and may
change
Perfect intelligence Limited intelligence
No learning Learning
No coding problems Coding problems
Primarily static Primarily dynamic
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building). Many of the same comparisons, of course, also apply to the
comparison between one-sided optimization (i.e. the combat strategy
assumed to be known for one side) and war gaming (see SHUBIK (72, pp. 157-1801
for further details).
The author's approach for investigating optimal combat strategies
(e.g. see TAYLOR [85-88; 91-97]) has been to develop an analytical model
of the tactical engagement, to quantify the tactical choices and/or
allocations of the commanders through decision variables, to incorporate
these decision variables into the combat model, and finally to determine
the "best" values for these decision variables. We have, of course, used
LANCHESTER-type models to represent the combat dynamics in these opti-
mization problems.
Thus, the topics covered in this book on LANCHESTER combat theory
fall essentially into two categories: namely, material on
(Cl) simple LANCHESTER-type models,
and
(C2) determining optimal tactical decisions with such
simple models.
Models in the first category may be classified as being descriptive,
while those in the second may be classified as being normative. In the
latter case, the LANCHESTER-type equations are used to assess the con-
sequences of the decisions made by the co-mmanders and modelled by decision
variables. The focus of the author's work has been on understanding the
dynamics of combat and optimization of tactical decisions through studying
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B simplified analytical models, especially those that provide an understand-
ing of the basic nature of more complex operational models. A good
analytical model, of course, should simplify, be transparent and easy to
understand, be easy to manipulate, and increase our understanding of
real-world processes (i.e. yield important insights). For reasons that
should be obvious to the reader by now, the combat-optimization problems
studied by the author are far too simple to be taken literally but should
be interpreted as yielding Insights that can provide valuable guidance
for subsequent higher-resolution computerized investigations. As we have
already stressed above in Section 8.1, probably the only significant
result obtained from such combat-optimization problems is the structure
of the optimal combat strategies, since these mathematical models are such
great idealizations of the (rational) decision-making process in combat.
6
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8.3. Information to be Obtained from the Quantitative Analysis of
Military Strategy and Tactics.
Thus, as discussed above, the author's research on determining
optimal tactical decisions has been based on applying optimization theory
to such simple LANCHESTER-type combat models as we have predominantly
considered previously in this monograph, with tactical decisions quantified
through decision variables. Our work has emphasized understanding the
dependence of the structure of optimal time-sequential combat strategies
on the basic elements of the combat-optimization problem (see Section 8.4
below). As we have previously stressed for our analytical investigation
of simple LANCHESTER-type (descriptive) models (cf. the questions of
Section 6.3), we have used judiciously selected questions to guide our
research efforts on optimizing tactical decisions. Specifically, we have
been guided by trying to answer such questions as shown in Table 8.11.
Other such questions may be found posed in TAYLOR [92, p. 2; 94, p. 1;
96, pp. 2-3].
Furthermore, our own research efforts have mainly concerned optimal
time-sequential tactics for the distribution of fire over enemy target
types, with some idealized looks at optimal fire-support strategies. Our
research approach has been to consider a sequence of specific problems,
to investigate for each problem such questions as shown in Table 8.11,
and to compare the structures of optimal fire-distribution strategies
among these different problems. Analytical rather than numerical methods
have been stressed. A scenario has been developed for each such specific
problem expressed in qualitative terms, and the military operations analyzed.
Appropriate LANCHESTER-type models of the combat process have then been
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TABLE 8.11. Information to Extract from
Combat-Optimization Problem.
(Qi) Do target priorities change over time?
(Q2) How should fire be distributed over enemy targets and how should
targets be optimally selected?
(Q3) How do force levels affect the optimal time-sequential
fire-distribution policy?
(Q4) How do the number of target types and the nature of combat-
attrition processes affect the optimal fire-distribution
policy?
(Q5) How does the nature of the planning horizon (i.e. battle-
termination conditions) affect the optimal fire-distribution
policy?
(Q6) What are the affects of logistics constraints on such policies?
(Q7) How do command-and-control capabilities affect the optimal
policy?
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developed, with decision variables used to represent the feasible
actions of the opposing combatants. An optimization problem (reflecting
the tactical allocation problem faced by the combatants) has ncxt been
formulated and solved by applying the appropriate optimization theory.
Finally, after a sequence of such optimization problems has been solved,
their solutions have been studied and compared to gain insights into the
structure of optimal fire-distribution strategies. This approach of
considering a sequence of specific problems has been repeatedly used to
investigate the influence of the following factors on optimal time-sequential
fire-distribution strategies:
(Fl) combatant objectives (quantification of military objectives),
(F2) dynamics of the combat-attrition process,
(F3) weapon-system-performance characteristics,
(F4) termination conditions of the conflict,
(FS) force strengths and composition,
(F6) effects of resource constraints,
(F7) range capabilities of weapon systems.
692
8.4. Basic Elements of the Combat-Optimization Problem.
Consider two opposing forces in combat. Each force has a
commander who makes decisions that influence the course of combat.
What can each do?
What does each know?
What criteria does each base
his decisions on?
What does each war.t to do?
How is what each decides related
to what happens?
In more analytical terms, if we assume that each commander is a so-caled
rational decision maker and we attempt to model how each makes decisions,
then the essential aspects of each commander's decision process may be
stated as follows:
(EAl) the feasible courses of action available to each
decision maker,
(EA2) the information available to each decision maker,
(EA3) the outcome "yardstick" (decision criterion) used by
each decision maker,




However, we can formalize much further our method of inquiry
and (as discussed above) investigate optimal strategies for tactical
decisions by using mathematical modelling combined with optimization theory.
Let us now formally call such an optimization problem that is used for
investig&ting optimal tactical-allocation strategies a combat-optimization
problem. For the purposes of military OR it is convenient to consider
that there are five fundamental elements14 of any time-sequential combat-
optimization problem:
(El) the decision criteria (for both commanders),
(E2) the model of conflict termination,
(E3) the model of combat dynamics,
(E4) the feasible actions for each decision maker,
(E5) the information available to each decision maker.
It is intuitively obvious that each and every of the above five factors
can have a significant influence on what the "best" course of action will
be in combat. Furthermore, partially because of the paucity of real combat
data, there are alternative models which are essentially equally plausible
for each of these factors.
Modern air-ground combat operations may be characterized both
by their diversity and also by the vast scope of the sheer numbers of
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weapon systems involved. Consequently, current modelling and computer-
system technologies cannot directly reproduce such large-scale operations,
and large-scale systems must be considered in much system-evaluation work
for various reasons such as resource allocation, the combined-arms nature
of operations, etc. Since the resultant combat models representing a
tactical-decision problem for such systems (and even smaller) must be
highly idealized, probably the only significant aspect is how the structure
of optimal combat strategies depends on the above five essential elements
of the combat-optimization problem. Thus, an important problem for
military OR is to determine how the structure of optimal combat strategies
depends on these elements of the combat-optimization problem.
In essentially all optimization-theory application to tactical
decision making known to this author, it is assumed that decision makers
have essentially "perfect knowledge" about enemy capabilities. Hence,
we will not consider the information structure further, although it
certainly will play a major role in actual real-world military decisions.
Also, in much analysis a relatively simple structure for the feasible
actions of each decision maker is assumed. For example, it is frequently
assumed that an aircraft can be assigned to just one of a number of differ-
ent tactical missions, although in reality an aircraft might perform
several missions on a particular sortie. Hence, we will also not explicitly
consider the feasible actions for each decision maker (E4) further.
Moreover, concerning the first three items in the above list of elements
of the combat-optimization problem, our knowledge about such topics
increases as we go down the list. In other words, more is known about
1 695
modelling the dynamics of combat than about modelling conflict termination,
and still less is known about the decision criteria actually used by
decision makers. The author's research has emphasized relating these
three elements of the decision problem to the structure of optimal
combat strategies by considering a sequence of specific problems. Thus,
the consequences and implications of alternative assumptions about these
elements may (hopefully) be better appreciated.
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8.5. Simple AuxiliaL7 Models and Complex-Operational Models.
In this chapter we will present some elements of a theory of
optimal tactical allocation by examining a sequence of idealized combat-
optimization problems that we have considered in our research. For
reasons of mathematical tractability, we have primarily considered one-
Bided time-sequential optimization problems (i.e. so-called optimal-
control problems), but we have also considered some time-sequential combat
games. We justify our examination of deterministic optimal-control
problems on the following grounds:
(Fl) LANCHESTER-type differential games are extremely difficult
to solve,
and
(F2) there is a well-known intimate connection between the mathe-
matical theories of optimal control and differential games.
Our idea behind studying such one-sided problems is to discover properties
of optimal time-sequential combat policies that will provide guidance
for studying two-sided time-sequential tactical decision problems. However,
one must be aware of the fact that differential games do possess many
subtle mathematical features that do not cccur in one-sided optimization
problems (see ISAACS [47] for further details).
Our approach for studying the optimization of time-sequential
tactical decisions has been to consider a sequence of judiciously-chosen
simrle problems, to analytically solve each optimization problem to
determine the optimal time-sequential combat policy, and to compare the
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structures of these optimal policies. Although these problems are too
simple to be taken literally, such an analytical investigation of the
optimization of combat dynamics may be useful for
(a) guiding higher-resolution studies,
and
(b) identifying cause-effect relations between optimal military
tactics and modelling assumptions.
Some of the philosophy behind this type of investigation is shown in
Figure 8.1. Thus, we do not claim that the simple combat-optimization
problems that we have studied should "stand alone" but rather that they
should be viewed as points of departure for more detailed investigations
using either simulation (see NOLAN and SOVEREIGN [63]), .large-scale
optimization (see GEOFFRION [26]), or even war gaming. The basic idea is
to coordinate the use of a complex operational model with that of a simple
auxiliary model, although in this monograph we will consider only the
latter. We have already discussed iLl Chapter 7 such complementary use of
models within the context of descriptive models, and we will now briefly
reexamine this important concept for normative models.
GEOFFRION (26] has pointed out that a serious inherent limitation of
large-scale optimization models is that they do not explain WHY the
optimal policy or strategy is what it is, although they certainly can
deliver an optimal solution for a given set of input data. For optimizing
tactical decisions, we are more interested in (at least initially) the
structure of optimal combat strategies and their dependence on modelling
698




COMPLEX OPERATIONAL SIMPLE AUXILIARY
MODEL MODEL
I Complex structure based on eorrichmts (I Simple analyticl structure representing
of basic struct•re to achieve *realism" any most relevant features.
and "redibity". STRUCTURE
(2) Large number of variables and (2) Few variables and constraints.
constraints.
(3) Compulotiond limitations. (3) Analytically tractable.
(4) Coriutaltiaonl state of the art. (4) Theoretical state of the art and specialS~structure of problem.
(5) Only a few cam analyzed, INSIGHTS (5) Prarametric analysea possible.
(6) Socio-economic and paliticol objectives (6) Strictly military objcctives.
as wll as military ones.
(7) Credible results. (7) Theoretically sound results.
Figure 8.1. Complementary relation between the analytical study of
optimizing combat dynamics with a simple auxiliary model
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assumptions and variations in system parameters because of the many un-
certainties inherent in combat analyses. Furthermore, few (if any)
tactical-decision problems lead to a single perfect numerical model whose
solution is directly translatable into practical action. GEOFFRION [26]
has stressed that there is rather an entire family of imperfect numerical
models reflecting alternative assumptions, objectives, and data estimates.
An understanding of solution behavior for the entire family of models is
required to fully support the development of an appropriate plan of
action.
GEOFFRION [26, pp. 81-82] has further stressed that insights into
the determinants of an optimal solution are important because they help
to overcome the serious validation/credibility obstacles that are usually
present in practical applications (particularly military ones). How
can one be convinced a model is a useful representation of the real system?
Furthermore, how can the ultimate user of information generated by the
model - in DoD applications usually a senior military officer, civilian
manager, or politician rather than a technical person - be persuaded to
use the model as a decision aid? GEOFFRION [26, p. 82] feels (and so do
wOe) that the answer to both these important questions is that purely
numerical results must be supplemented by intuitively reasonable explanations
as to why these numerical results have occurred as they have. Otherwise
(GEOFFRION has continued) the validity of the model can only be taken on
faith, and the decision maker will be inclined to revert to intuition or
to some other basis for the decision about which he feels more secure.
He has then suggested the use of simple auxiliary models to supplement
the use of complex operational models, much as we have depicted in Figure 8.1.
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We therefore suggest the following methodological approach for
investigating the optimization of tactical decisions (after GEOFFRION [26]):
1. Reduce the level of detail and complexity of the full-scale
combat-optimization problem (i.e. the complex operational
model) until it can be solved analytically In closed form.
Call this a simplified auxiliary model.
2. Derive from the simple auxiliary model a set of tentative
hypotheses concerning the general behavior of the solution the
full-scale model--the combat-strategy and/or weapon-system trade-
offs determining the optimal solution for a given set of data,
the nature of the induced change in the optimal solution as
certain input data are changed parametrically, and so on.
3. Generate specific predictions from the tentative hypotheses
and test these numerically using the full-scale model.
4. To the extent that the numerical tests confirm (actually, do
not contradict) the tentative hypotheses about optimal combat
strategies, take these hypotheses as a conceptual framework
for understanding and interpreting the numerical results provided
by the full-scale model.
This approach underlies all our research on optimizing tactical decisions
(e.g. see TAYLOR [79, pp. 79-80]). Although GEOFFRION [26] limits his
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discussion to optimization models in a nonmilitary context, it is clear
that this conceptual approach has much to offer for tactical-decision
analysis when used in conjunction with either war gaming, Monte Carlo
combat simulations, or complex operational models such as BONDER/IUA or
VECTOR-2 that use fixed combat strategies. For example, one could
develop a finite number of tentative combat strategies from such a
simplified model and then evaluate in more depth each of these strategies
by using it in some type of complex operational combat model.
Thus, the relatively simple combat-optimization problems that
we will consider in the rest of this chapter should not be taken literally





8.6. Overview of Problems Considered in the Literature.
In this section we will attempt to provide the reader with an
overview of the various different types of combat-optimization problems
that have appeared in the literature. We will focus here on identifying
the principal problem types and on giving references to what work has
been done on each type. We will give both a brief overview with a few
selective references, and then we will give a more detailed breakdown
based on a more comprehensive examination of literature in this field.
In subsequent sections we will give detailed mathematical formulations
of typical problems from some of these problem-type classes.
First let us give our brief overview. For this purpose, the
author perceives that work on optimizing tactical decisions may be
classified roughly into the following four categories:
(Cl) optimal initial commitment of forces: BACH et al. [6],
TAYLOR and PARRY [90], TAYLOR [88];
(C2) optimal distribution of fire (general): ISBELL and MARLOW
[50], TAYLOR [76; 78; 79; 82; 84];
(C3) optimal fire-support strategies: WEISS [102; 103], KAWARA
[51], TAYLOR [80; 85; 86], TAYLOR and BROWN [89];
(C4) optimal air-war strategies: ISAACS [46], BERKOVITZ and
DRESHER [11; 14], BRACKEN et al. [15].
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We will give examples of combat-optimization problems from each of these
four categories in subsequent sections of this chapter. Except for the
first category (Cl), all the above work concerns optimizing time-sequential
decisions, with both one-sided and also two-sided allocation problems
(see HO [34]) being considered. Older work on "static" tactical-alloca-
tion problems (i.e. "one-shot" decisions) may be found in DRESHER's book
[21]. Further detailed references to the literature may be found in the
above papers, particularly BRACKEN et al. [15], TAYLOR and BROWN [89],
and TAYLOR [85; 86] (see also TAYLOR [93] and below).
Work in the first category (Cl) concerns the same type of problem
originally considered by LANCHESTER [53] in 1914 (see Sections 2.1 and
2.9 above) and will be examined in more detail in Section 8.9 below.
Work in the second category (C2) concerns the optimal time-sequential
distribution of fire over enemy target types in two-sided combat in
15simple one-sided-decision situations and will be examined in more detail
in Sections 8.10 and 8.11 below. In some sense it forms a basis for
considering more complicated problems such as those in categories (C3)
and (C4). Work in these latter two categories is somewhat similar in
mathematical form, with the former category (Q3) concerning, for example,
artillery allocation and the latter category (C4) concerning the allocation
of multipurpose aircraft to different types of tactical missions over
time (see Section 8.12 for problem formulations from both these categories).
Work in the third category (C3) has been on both one-sided and also two-
sided optimization problems, while that in the fourth category (C4) has




A much more detailed overview of work done on optimizing tactical
decisions with LANCHESTER-type combat models is given in Table 8.111,
which can serve the reader as a more detailed guide for further reading.
Additional topics have been added here, and the references to the literature
are nearly complete. The reader can now see, for example, the large
amount of research on optimal air-war strategies over a long period of
time. The author has liberally added his own technical reports published
by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), since such reports are readily
16
available from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS),
U. S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Srpingfield,
Virginia 22151.
The author's own research (see TAYLOR [76-88] and TAYLOR and BROWN
[891; also TAYLOR [91-971 and TAYLOR and POWERS [981) has mainly concerned
optimal time-sequential tactics for the distribution of fire over enemy
target types, with some idealized looks at optimal fire-support strategies.
Many additional supplemental details such as fairly comprehensive
literature reviews, discussions of insights gained, etc. are to be found
in the author's NPS reports [91-97]. Our approach has been to consider
specific problems and to investigate the influence on optimal fire-
distribution strategies of factors such as (Fl) through (F7) of
Section 8.3.
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8.7. Decision Analysis for Tactical Military Decisions.
It is the author's hypothesis that a soiaewhat different brand
of decision analysis (e.g. see HOWARD [37-38] or NORTH [64]) is required
for tactical military decision making. The five basic elements of
such tactical decisions have been identified in Section 8.4 above. The
author's own research has concentrated on investigating the influences
of the first three elements (namely, (1) the decision criteria, (2) the
model of combat termination, and (3) the combat dynamics) on the structure
of optimal combat strategies. Moreover, the author feels that the field
of tactical decision-analysis is in its infancy (cf. HOWARD's [37, pp. 56-58]
deterministic phase of the decision-analysis procedure) and expects in the
future to see a maturing of the embryonic conceptual framework presented
here.
In TAYLOR [76; 78-79; 82; 84; 931 a linear utility (see Section
7.18 for methodology for the development of such linear utilities; also
HOWES and THRALL [39]) was assumed for the military worth of surviving
weapon-system types, and the criterion functional (i.e. payoff) was taken
to be the net military worth of survivors. We investigated the sensitivity
of the optimal fire-distribution policy (one-sided) to parametric varia-
tions in the assigned linear utilities for survivors. It has been shown
that the n-versus-one fire-distribution problems studied in TAYLOR [78-39;
82; 84] all have quite simple solutions when enemy survivors are valued
in direct proportion to their kill capability against the homogeneous
friendly force.
PUGH and MAYBERRY [69] have suggested that an appropriate payoff
for the quantitative evaluation of combat strategies is the loss ratio,
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with an "almost equivalent" criterion being the loss difference. TAYLOR
and BROWN (89] have shown that these criteria are not really equivalent
and that the quantification of military objectives may completely change
the structure of the optimal combat strategy. Similar results have been
obtained by TAYLOR [88], who showed that KAWARA [51] had chosen essen-
tially the only type of payoff that ylelds optimal fire-supDort strategies
being force-level independent. A general approach was given by TAYLOR [88]
for determining the functional form of terminal payoffs that yield state-
variable-independent optimal combat strategies.
In TAYLOR [79] we showed that the model of conflict termination
may significantly change the optimal. fire-distribution policy. For such
investigations it has been important to have available complete analytical
solutions which are then compared to determine the influence of such a
factor.
In TAYLOR [78-79] we have investigated the influences of the
nature of the target-type attrition process on the structure of the optimal
fire-distribution policies 8. When target-type attrition (as a rate) is
proportional to only the number of firers, we (TAYLOR [79; 82]) have shown
that the optimal fire-distribution policy is always to concentrate all fire
on a single target type, which may change over the course of battle. We
have also studied the nature of such changes in target priorities. How-
ever, an optimal fire-distribution policy does not always consist of
always concentrating all fire on a single enemy target type. In TAYLOR
[78] we have shown that when enemy targets undergo attrition at a rate
proportional to the product of the numbers of firers and targets, then




"overkill." This important result may be best understood in terms of
diminishing returns from allocating a unit of weapon system to fire at
enemy targets (see TAYLOR (79, pp. 84-85] and below in Section 8.11 for
further details). Such a property of optimal fire-distribution strategies
(i.e. the splitting of fire between several target types) has been






8.8. Some Combat-Optimization Problems to be Briefly Examined Further.
In the remainder of this chapter we will briefly consider some
specific combat-optimization problems concerning (I) otpimal initial
commitment of forces, and (II) optimal time-sequential fire-distribution
strategies (see Table 8.IV), As we have already indicated in Section 8.1
above, problem formulation will be stressed, with occasional comments
being given about insights obtained into the structure of optimal time-
sequential combat strategies. The reader is referred to the literature
19
for complete details, including the pertinent optimization theory
A further, more detailed breakout of combat-optimization problems con-
sidered in the rest of this chapter is given in Table 8.V, with the
section in which each problem is considered being indicated.
710
TABLE 8.1V. General Types of Combat-Optimization Problems
to be Examined in Chapter 8.
(I) Optimal Initial Commitment of Forces
(II) Optimal Time-Sequential Fire-Distribution Strategies
(1) Optimal Fire-Support Strategies
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TABLE 8.V. Detailed Listing of Combat-Optimization Problems to be
Briefly Examined in Chapter 8.
(1) Optimal Initial Commitment of Forces (Section 8.9)
(II) Optimal Time-Sequential Fire-Distribution Policies
(1) the simplest fire-distribution problem (Section 8.10)
(2) other battle'-termination conJitions (Section 8.11)
(3) time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients (Section 8.11)
(4) replacements (Section 8.11)
(5) several enemy, target types (Section 8.11)
(6) command and control aspects (Section 8.11)
(7) FT attrition process of enemy target types (Section 8.11)
(8) stochastic LANCHESTER-type attrition processes (Section 8.11)
(9) time-sequential fire-support allocation (Section 8.11)
(III) LANCHESTER-Type Differential Games (Section 8.12)
(1) generalized tactical air-war game (Section 8.12)
(2) modified fire-support differential game (Section 8.12)
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8.9. Optimal Initial Coimmitment of Forces.
As we saw in the first section of Chapter 2, LANCHESTER (53]
was led to his pioneering mathematical mode] of combat by his attempt to
quantitatively justify the principle of concentration. We subsequently
revisited the topic of concentration of forces in Section 2.9, and we
analyzed 'here a commander's decision as to whether or not he should
initially commit as many of his forces as possible to battle. We
formulated a one-sided20 combat-optimization problem (2.9.2) and solved
it for two special classes of battles (i.e. "square-law" and "linear-law"
fixed-force-level-breakpoint battles) for a specific decision criterion
(minimizing one's own casualties). We explained how the optimal decision
could be very easily understood in terms of the behavior of the instan-
taneous casualty-exchange ratio, which determined the overall casualty-
exchange ratio and related measures of relative casualty-production
effectiveness. In the section at hand we will examine this problem more
deeply in a more general setting and will justify our contention that
many times the optimal initial commitment of forces can be very simply
determined by examining how the instantaneous casualty-exchange ratio
varies with the victor's force level and time (see TAYLOR [88] for
further details).
Let us accordingly consider combat between two homogeneous
forces described by the following deterministic LANCHESTER-type equations
for x, y > 0
d -G(t,xy) with x(O) u x0 9
(8.9.1)
dt -H(t,x,y) with y(O) - yo 9
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where G and H denote force-change rates (with a negative rate
signifying a net influx of replacements). For simplicity we will assume
that there are no replacements and withdrawals 21, and in this case G
and H > 0 are simply casualty rates. To insure the existence of
partial derivatives needed in subsequent analysis, we assume that
G(tx,y) and H(t,x,y) are each twice continuously differentiable.
Let us now consider the decision by the victor22 (taken to be X) in
this battle as to how many of his available forces he should initially
commit to combat. We will consider the initial-commitment decision by
X as a one-sided combat-optimization problem: we assume that the Y-force
commander has adopted a known course of action and consider X's initial-
commitment decision in this light. This decision is to be made only
once, before the battle begins. The decision variable for X in this
combat-optimization problem is x0 , the initial number of forces committed
to battle.
The "best" value of x0 for X to choose may be determined by
the following combat-optimization problem (sjee Section 2.9 for further




subject to: mi x 0  x0
the combat dynamics (8.9.1),





Here C denotes the decision criterion ("cost" of doing combat),
min drawdrw2
x -Xd + e, E > 0, and xdraw denotes the value2 3 of x0  that
leads to a "draw." Three possibilities for the decision criterion C
are as follows:
(Cl) friendly losses, Lx , x0 - Xf
(C2) loss ratio, Rc a (x 0 - x- Y f) ,
and
(C3) loss difference, Dc - (X0 - xf) - (Y 0  Yf)
where x f and yf denote the final force levels at the end of battle.
The battle-termination conditions are taken to correspond to either a
fixed-force-level-breakpoint or a fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle
(see Section 6.6). We will denote the optimal value of x0  as determined
,
by the above optimization problem (8.9.2) as x0 . Moreover, the above
optimization problem (8.9.2) requires calculation of the partial derivative
DC/ax0  and may not always be trivial to solve, since (for example),
mnm max-ino
aC/ax0  may have n.Altiple zeros in [x0  , x0 x] and determination of
x* could then be tedious. In other cases, however, it may be trivial
0
to solve; (e.g. when C/ax0 < 0 for all x. E (x0mn x•], then
* max
X - x0  and X should initially commit as much as possible).
Reparameterizing the course of battle in terms of y by
t - t(y) - t(y;x02 Y0 ) and x - x(y) - x(y;xo,y 0 ) , (8.9.3)
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TAYLOR [88] has shown24 how to express aC/ax 0  in terms of the
instantaneous casualty-exchange ratio dx/dy - G(t,x,y)/H(t,x,y) by
(ax 0~ Y- 3iX. + (ac(fx ax0
I/acx )f + (2C_) (8.9.4)'
Saxf dy / aYf x0, Y ax ,(.94
where (dx/dy)f denotes the final value of the instantaneous casualty-.
exchange ratio for t - tf, x = xf, and y - yf. TAYLOR [88, pp. 100-101]
has also shown how the reparameterization (8.9.3) leads to
axf / axf
ax - Cx-a0  a 0 , Y0*Yf
YO dxSexp f a dy
Yf ax ad
YO (at a ( d ) exp - f a (x)dy dy1] (8.9.5)
Yf 0YfI
which relates the instantaneous casualty-exchange ratio dx/dy
G(t,x,y)/H(t,x,y) to changes in the final X force level with
variations in X's initial strength. This result (8.9.5) is a key
one that TAYLOR has used to develop most of the results of his paper
[88]. Through (8.9.4) and (8.9.5) one can many times determine the
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sign of aC/Dx 0  from only the signs of 9(dx/dy)/ax and a(dx/dy)/at
without explicit calculation of aC/ax . Along these lines, TAYLOR
has proved the following results for a fixed-force-level-breakpoint battle.
THEOREM 8.9.1 (TAYLOR [88]): If a(dx/dy)/ax < 0 and
a(dx/dy)/at > 0 for all t E [Otf], then aC/ax0 < 0 for
C - LX, Rc, Dc.
THEOREM 8.9.2 (TAYLOR [88]): Assume that dx/dy - q(t,u)
where u - x/y and that the LANCHESTER-type equations (8.9.1)
are quasi-autonomous, i.e. a/at(dx/dy) : 0. If dx/dy = q(u)
is a strictly convex (concave) function of u on (0,4-),
then the decision criterion C is a strictly convex (concave)
function of x0  for C - LX, Rc, Dc.
The latter theorem tells us that there are decreasing marginal returns
from initially committing additional forces to battle when q(u) is
min max
convex and aC/ax 0 < 0 for all x0 E [x0  , x0  .
TAYLOR [88] has also developed corresponding results for fixed-
force-ratio-breakpoint battles and has investigated optimality results
for both classes of battles when the sign of a(dx/dy)/ax is always
the same. He has shown that the optimal initial-commitment decision
is sensitive to the decision criterion for fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint
battles but not for fixed-force-level-breakpoint battles. In other words,
different optimal initial-commitment actions are possible in these
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two types of battles. In particular, the loss ratio and the loss differ-
ence may yield different optimal initial-commitment decisions for a
fixed-force-ratio-breakpoint battle, although they yield the same optimal
decision for a fixed-force-level-breakpoint battle (see TAYLOR [88] for
further details and additional results). Similar results on the sensitivity
of optimal time-sequential fire-distribution policies to battle-termination
conditions have been pointed out by the author (see TAYLOR [79; 931 or
Section 8.11 below), Consequently, ie feel that more scientific work
is required on modelling conflict termination2 5 (see Chapter 3 for further
information and references).
Thus, the reader has seen that a fairly sophisticated mathematical
analysis has been required to justify the simple, intuitively appealing
"optimal decision rule" given under mere restrictive conditions in
Section 2.9 (see TAYLOR [88] for further details): namely, if the instan-
taneous casualty-exchange ratio (friendly to enemy) always decreases as
the force ratio (enemy to friendly) decreases, then additional forces should
be committed to battle by the victor (friendly forces). Conversely, a
simple principle underlies all this mathematical analysis: the casualty-
exchange ratio "in the small" may under the appropriate conditions be
projected to "in the large."
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8.10. The Simplest Fire-Distribution Problem.
"The simplest fire-distribution problem is for a homogeneous Y force
(e.g. riflemen only) to determine its "best" time-sequential allocation
of fire against a heterogeneous X force consisting of two weapon-system
types (e.g. riflemen and grenadiers), denoted as XI and X2 (see
Figure 8.2). Y's distribution of fire may be quantified through the
fraction of fire dirccted at X1. denoted as *. The problem for the Y
commander then is to determine the "best" value over time for ý,
denoted as 0*(t). For simplicity's sake 2, we will assume that the Y-force
commander has perfect information about the battle's current state and
also about all parameters in the attrition processes. Sefore we can determine
an optimal fire-distribution policy 0*(t) for Y, however, we must com-
plete the formulation of this combat-optimization problem, which as yet
lacks the first three basic elements (El) through (E3) given in Section 8.4.
In other words, we must still specify the following basic elements (cf.
Section 8.4) of the combat-optimization problem before it can be mathe-
matically solved: namely, (El) the decision criterion, (E2) the stopping
rule for the battle (i.e. the model of conflict termination), and (E3) the
model of combat dynamics.
Again for simplicity's sake, we will assume that the objective of
the Y force's commander is to maximize the net value of survivors at
the battle's end when such survivors are valued according to linear
utilities. Following our developments for homogeneous-force models (see
Chapters 2 and 6), we will assume that the battle continues until one or
the other has been totally annihilated, which is readily recognized as
I 719
Figure 8.2. The simplest fire-distribution problem.
Here * deDotes the fraction of Y's fire
directed at X1V The optimizattcn problem
for the Y commander is to determine the
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the simplest conflict-termination model. Later, we will discuas more
general breakpoints (see Chapter 3) below. Furthermore, we will assume
that all attrition occurs at rates proportional to the numbers of enemy
firers and that there are no synergistic effects between the X forces
(i.e. the attrition rates of X and X against Y are additive).1 agis2 readtv)
For simplicity, we will also assume constant attrition-rate coefficients.
Such attrition processes may be thought of as arising when firers engage
enemy targets with "aimed fire" and (for example) target-acquisition
times are negligible (see Sections 2.2 and 6.1 [also 7.8] for a further
discussion of these modelling assumptions). Finally, we will assume
that all the Y force's fire may be instantaneously shifted from one
X-force target type to the other (i.e. perfect comsand-and-control
capability for the Y force), and we will discuss the relaxing of this
last aasumption in the next section.
In mathematical terms, the above fire-distribution problem for
the Y force may be stated as follows.
maximize{ry(T) - px1(T) - qx2(t)} with T unspecified, (8.10.1)
(t)1
with stopping rule: one side or the other annihilated at t T,
dx1
subject to: d- 1 -talY
dx 2
(combat dynamics) d- -Y
dy -b - bx x
dt 1 1 2
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with initial conditions:
0
xi(0) x 0 for i - 1,2, and y(O) - yo
and
0 < * < 1 (Control-Variable-Inequality Constraints),
x and x > 0 (State-Variable-Inequality Constraints),
where
x1 (t), x2 (t), and y(t) denote the numbers of X1, X2, and
Y combatants at time t,
al, a2 , bl, and b2 denote constant LANCHESTER attrition-rate
coefficients (cf. Section 7.8),
T denotes the time at which one side or the other is annihilated
(i.e. the length of the battle),
r, p, and q denote the values assigned to single surviving
XI, X2, and Y combatants at the end of the battle,
and * denotes the fraction of the Y force which fires at the
X1 force.
Here we say that T (the time at which one side or the other is
annihilated and the battle ends) is unspecified (as opposed to specified
in which case the battle ends at tf - T unless one side or the other
is annihilated before this time) because it depends on Y's fire-distribution
policy ý(C).
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Such a one-sided combat-optimization problem in which the combat
dynamics are modelled by a system of ordinary differential equations is
27called an optimal control problem . In particular, the above problem
(8.10.1) is in many ways the simplest optimal-control problem that arises
in the LANCHESTER theory of combat. It has been referred to in the
literature (see TAYLOR [76]) as the ISBELL and MARLOW fire-programming
problem. Consequently, the development of a complete solution to this
problem along with appropriate solution methodology has been essential
for guiding extensions to more complex situations. The author has
accordingly viewed this problem as a "benchmark case" to which the treat-
ment (both theoretical and computational) of more complicated problems
should be related2. Moreover, several important insights into the
structure of optimal fire-distribution policies in more general cases
have been obtained from studying this simple problem (e.g. see TAYLOR
(79; 89; 93]).
The optimal time-sequential fire-distribution policy **(t)
for 0 < t < T may be determined by invoking the appropriate optimality
29
conditions from the mathematical theory of optimal control . However,
these optimality conditions are only the point of departure for
determining an optimal policy. For a problem such as (8.10.1), a
solution procedure consisting of the following steps is required (see
TAYLOR (76, p. 542] for further details):
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(Si) apply the basic necessary conditions of optimality (a
key element of which is the so-called maximum principle)
to determine an extremal 3 0 control law,
(S2) synthesize extremals and the corresponding extremal
control by working backwards from each terminal state
(i.e. determine the time history of the extremal control.),
(M3) using the time history of the extremal control, determine
the domain of controllability31 fir each terminal state
by a forward integration of the state differential equations,
(S4) establish that an optimal policy exists (e.g. see TAYLOR
and BROWN [89, pp. 200-201]) and then determine which
(if any) domains of controllability overlap; the extremal
control is then optimal for those regions of the initial
state space covered by only one domairnof controllability,
(S5) if certain domains of controllability overlap, then for
a point in the initial, state space contained in their
intersection there is more than one extremal leading to
the terminal surface; compute the return associated with
each extremal in order to select the optimal control
from a finite number of alternatives.
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The above solution procedure has been used by us to solve the above
simplest fire-distribution problem (see TAYLOR [76; 84]) and other
LANCHESTER-type optimal-control problems.
Although this problem (8.10.1) looks quite simple, the development
of a complete solution to it (see TAYLOR (76; 84]) has led to a couple of
coneributions to the control-theory literature on optimality conditions
(see TAYLOR (77; 811). The reason for this is that such combat-optimization
problems contain certain mathematical features that are somewhat different
than those usually encountered in other dynamic optimization problems
arising in the physical sciences, engineering, and other parts of OR. To
best appreciate these mathematical difficulties, it is convenient to
consider the following generalization of the simplest fire-distribution
problem.
maximize J , (8.10,2)
*(t)
with stopping --le: one side or the other annihilated,
dx 1
subject to: dt -0aIy + rI
dx 2
(combat dynamics) •- - -(l-0)a 2y + r 2
-y -b x b-dt 11 2x2
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with initial conditions:
0
x (0) - x for i 1 1,2, and y(O) -yo
and
0 < 1 (Control-Variable-Inequality Constraints),
x and x > 0 (State-Variable-Inequality Constraints),
1 2-
where J denotes the criterion functional, ri > 0 for i - 1,2 denotes
a constant replacement rate for Xi, and all other symbols are as defined
before. A particular difficulty in uolving a LANCHESTER-type optimal-
control problem such as (8.10.2) has concerned optimality conditions
associated with the state-variable-inequality constraints (SVICs). For
example, when r1  and r 2 > 0, the boundary of the state space is non-
absorbing (see TAYLOR [81] for a discussion of the concept of an absorbing
state-space boundary), and we have the following boundary condition for
the dual variable corresponding to xi
Pi(T) axi (T) + vi (8.10.3)
where pi(t) denotes the dual variable corresponding to xi(t) for
i - 1,2 and v, > 0. However we need not have vi > 0 when there are
no replacements (i.e. rI - r 2 - 0) and the boundary of the state space
is absorbing (see TAYLOR [84, pp. 632-633]).
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Before we consider the optimal policy for the simplest fire-
distribution problem (8.10.1), a few general comments seem in order.
To solve a LANCHESTER-type optimal-control problem such as (8.10.1) or
(8.10.2), one needs to know what regions of initial force levels lead
to the various end states of battle (i.e. one needs to know the domain
of controllability for each terminal state), and this requirement has
partially motivated our work on victory-prediction conditions for
LANCHESTER-type combat models (e.g. see Sections 3.5, 3.6, 6.6, and
6.13 above). Moreover, both considerations "in the small" and also con-
siderations "in the large" are required to solve such problems (see
TAYLOR [84, pp. 617-618] for further details). Thus, direct computation
of the payoff and comparison of such values has been involved in the
development of optimal combat strategies in many of the dynamic combat-
optimization problems studied by the author (e.g., see TAYLOR [80] or
TAYLOR and BROWN [89]).
Using the above solution procedure consisting of steps (Sl)
through (S5), one can analytically solve the above simplest fire-distri-
bution problem (8.10.1) in so-called "closed form." After much laborious
work (see TAYLOR [76; 84]), one can determine the optimal fire-distri-
bution policy. Unfortunately, it is too complicated to be given in its
entirety (although we will examine it in a few special cases), but it
has been completely given for all parameter values in TAYLOR [76] (with
some further refinements given in TAYLOR [84]) as an open-loop control
0
(see Section 8.12 below), i.e. ** - **(t; to, xi, yO). What is




fire-distribution policy, denoted as 0*, may be summarized as follows:
(Cl) 32 0* is always 0 or 1 (except for at most one point in time),
(C2) parameters on which the optimal policy depends are
(P1) whether Y wins or loses,
(P2) R a 1lb1/(a2b2),
(P3) d - alp/(a 2 q) .
Moreover, there are some important military interpretations of the above
parameters: (I) aibi is a measure of the strategic value to Y from
firing at Xi (rate of destruction of X i's kill capability against Y),
and (II) alp is a measure of short-run return to Y from firing at
X1 at the end of battle (rate of destruction of X1 value at the end
of battle).
A significant aspect of the33 optimal fire-distribution policy,
expressed as a closed-loop control (see Section 8.12 below), is that
it depends on the force levels alone and not on time, i.e. 0* - 0*(xlxY).
This result is remarkable because the maximum principle does not directly
involve the state variables (i.e the force levels) when the Hamiltonian
is maximized for x1  and x2 > 0. Furthermore, the optimal policy for
Y may be diiferent for different combat outcomes (i.e. whether Y wins
or loses). Assuming that R - a1b1 /(a 2 b2 ) > 1, then if Y is going to
win, ** - 1 for x1 > 0. If Y is going to lose, then the optimal
fire-distribution policy depends on another parameter, d - alp/(a 2 q),
and may be very complicated to express as a closed-loop control.
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When Y is going to lose, the general features of Y's optimal fire-
distribution policy may be described as follows. Let p - k(l + y)b 1
and q - kb 2, where k is a positive constant and y is a parameter
that reflects whether Y has valued an individual X1  survivor at the
end of battle more (y > 0) or less (y < 0) than in direct proportion
to the X1  survivor's kill capability against Y relative to that of
an individual X2 survivor. Here kill capability is measured in terms
of the kill rate against Y of a single X. firer, and y - 0 yields
that p/q w b1 /b 2 . From the above definition of y, it follows that
p - q(b 1 /b 2 )(l + y) and consequently y - -1 + 6/R. Moreover, the
following results are significant to ncte: (RI) y - 0 means that
surviving enemy weapon-system types are valued in direct proportion
to their kill capabilities; (R2) for y > -(1 - l/R), the optimal policy
is very simple: 4* - 1 for x > 0; (R3) for 3 4 -(1 - l/R) > y
> - /1 - l/R, it is complicated to determine the optimal policy; and
(R4) for - /I'--1/R > y 1 -1, it is very complicated to determine the
35optimal policy. In the latter two cases , it may be that ** is
initially 1 and then changes to 0 later with x > 0. When this change
occurs is the complicated part (see TAYLOR [84] for further details).
Let us now discuss what important military principles may be
deduced from the solution to the ISBELL and MARLOW fire-progranming
problem. Firstly, from the fact that ** is essentially always 0 or 1,
we have a quantitative justification of one of the most significant
and oft-quoted of NAPOLEON BONAPARTE's sayings (see LIDDELL HART [54,
p. 117])--"The principles of war are the same as those of a siege; fire
must be concentrated at one point." Secondly, from the fact that when
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Y is going to win (or when he is going to lose with 6 > 1) the optimal
policy is to always concentrate all fire on the available enemy target
type with largest aibi, we have a quantitative justification of the
military principle of attacking "those dangerous enemy targets against
which one's fire is most effective." Thirdly, we have a motivation for
valuing enemy target types in direct proportion to their kill capability
(fire effectiveness) from the fact that the optimal policy is both intui-
tively appealing and also very simple in this case. The HOWES and THRALL
[39] concept of "ideal" linear weights is an extension of this idea to cases
of heterogeneous forces on both sides. Thus, we have a motivation for HOWES
and THRALL's important military-valuation methodology (see Section 7.18).
Fourthly, in battle a commander must use his judgment to ascertain to
what ends the course of battle can be steered so that he may devise his
strategy accordingly. Computationally this means that to solve such a
problem one must know to which extremal end states36 the battle can be
steered (i.e. what force levels are required to drive the LANCHESTER-type
battle to a target set such that appropriate necessary conditions of
optimality are satisfied at the end). In other words, it turns out
that considerations "in the large" dominate obtaining the optimal policy
in such problems.
Let us next turn to some important computational aspects of the
simplest fire-distribution problem (8.10.1). We will illustrate one of
the computational difficulties (multiple extremals) in determining an
optimal policy alluded to above (recall steps (SI) through (S5) of the
computational procedure given above]. In Table 8.VI are shown the
results of applying to (8.10.1) the maximum principle in Step ($1) of
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TABLE 8.VI. Extremals for ISBELL-MARLOW PROBLEM FOR R -R(R-1) < 6 < 1.
Nonrestrictive Assumption: R > 1, i.e. al b > a2 b2
Case (c2): R - IR(R-l) < 6 < 1 where 6 * alp/(a2 q).
Terminal State Extremal Control Domain of Controllability
x1(t 0 for 0< t-<t a b y0 < a + (R-l)(b x 2
C1 jx2(T) >0 0*(t) 2
y(T) -0 for t <t< T a biy0  -2 (b x 2
( fr 02 2
C- x2(T) -=0 *(t) blY > 2 + (R-1)(b 2 x )0
C2  2~ a1b 0 22
y(T) >0 for t1< t_<T
1lt) 0' for 0< t < t2 a bY _ y- ~ (b x 0)2
[ 1tt 2 s2 02
y(T) -0 0 for t 2 < t<T alb _ + A(c 2x2 )
y(T) 1 1 0b 2< 2 02
>0 2 < Rs
2 {1 21/z21IT 1  all0 _
C5  x 2 (T) >0 **(t) 0 for 0 < t < T
I2 s2 bl012}
y(T) 0 Libi20  _< R{s - (b x 0
xl(T) >0 [ for 0 < t<T-T1  aby> 2
CS x T) >0 -*(t aby > a2 + A 0b2xO)2
2 < s A(b2 xO) 2
y(T) -0 0 for T-T 1 < t < T a1 blY0 < 2 + 2x
Definition of Times:
(a) t is first t such that x1CrI) ( 0.
I 0 0?2 2(b) t 2  is first t such that 2b 1x1 (t 2 )x 2 + b2(x2) a2y (t)
(c) T is determined by cosh 'a24•2 T (R-S)/(R-I).
1 2 2 1
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this solution procedure. Here the parameters A, B, s, and z are
defined as
A -- B=A(z-1)2 z 2(R-) - R"A"-1) 2  2 2
(z-l) z z (8.10.4)
0 0 =R-s blxO +b 2 x 2  , and Z R- .
Thus, we see that A and B have the same sign, and investigation of the
dependence of this sign on 6 leads to the following four cases:
(cl) 1 < 6,
(c2) R-vi(R-1) < 6 < 1,
(c3) 6 R - vf'R(R-1) ,
(c4) 0 < 6 < R - vii3(R-I)
where 6 - a1 P/(a 2 q). Case (c2) with A < B < 0 is the one shown in
Table 8.VI, which has been developed by working backwards from each
extremal end state of battle. If the initial force levels are such that
0 0
P0 - (x1% x2 , YO) belongs to the domain of controllability (see [76]) for
the terminal state CI, denoted as D(C1 ), then Y can steer the course
of battle to this end state with the open-loop extremal control shown
in the table. Moreover, it turns cut that several of the domain of
controllability shown in Table 8.VI overlap so that for a given set of
732
____-__-_ _-_-___. - _. -___-__-_ --- _- _- _ - - _--j. -.- ; ._ - . . _ - _
initial force levels there may be more than one candidate optimal course
of battle. In order to determine which extremal is actually optimal in
such cases, one can compute the return associated with each extremal from
a given initial point P0  and then determine which of these feasible
alternatives (a finite number) yields the greatest return (see TAYLOR
[84, pp. 633-634] for further details and justification). This procedure
[i.e. steps (S4) and (S5) of the general solution procedure given above]
has been followed to obtain the optimal (open-loop) fire-distribution
policy shown in Table 8.VII from the information of Table 8.VI. An outline
of the determination of the optimal policy for regions of the initial
state space with multiple extremals will now be sketched (see TAYLOR
[76; 8-] for complete details).
We will now indicate how step (S5) is carried out for the simplest
fire-distribution problem (8.10.1) for Case (c2), i.e. R - /R(R.-l) < 6 < 1,
which is the one shown in Tables 8.VI and 8.VII. Let D(Ci) denote the
domain of controllability for extremals leading to terminal state Ci,
and let Pi denote the payoff (i.e. return) associated with such an
extremaly leading to Ci. Then it has been shown (TAYLOR [84]) for
R - /RTiT7 < 6 < 1 that for terminal state, for example, CI the domain
of controllability is as shown in Table 8.VI and that the return associated
with such an extremal is given by
P b 2 RAR -2 a(Rlb-lY0 (8.10.5)
Using such results, one can show [84, Theorems Al, A2, and A3] by direct
computation of the return functional (considerations "in the large")
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TABLE 8.VII. Solution to ISBELL-MARLOW Problem for R - (R-l) < 6 < 1.
Nonrestrictive Assumption: R > 1, i.e. a bI > a2 b2
Case (c2): R - VR(R-1) < 6 < 1 where 6 = alp/(a 2 q)
Terminal State
2~ 0 2xl(t) -0 1 for 0 , t < t alblY0 + (R-2)(b x11 1 1 y0  2 (Rl( 2x
C1 x2(T) > 0 *(t) 02
y(T) - 0 for tI < t < T a blY 0 + B(b2x2
x I (t 1 )-0 (1 for O t < t1
I 2 2> 02
C2 x2 (T) - 0 **(t) 1 albly0 > + (R-l)(b 2 x 0 2
y(T) > 0 0 for t1 < t < T
x (t 2 ) > 0 1 for 0 < t < t 2  albly0 _> R{s
2 _ (blx0) 2}
C 4 x 2(T) 0 0 *(t) -,
y(T) 0 0 for t2 < t < T albly0 < 2+ A(b+ x2
2' >0 2 2 2
xl(T) > 0 albly 0 < Rs 2 - li/z2 )
C5  x2 (T) > 0 **(t) - 0 for 0 < t < T
y(T) - 0 ably 2 2 02
1 0~ ~ 1 ( 1x
xI(T) > 0 1 for 0 _ t <T-TI albly0 > R .2  1
C5 x (T) > 0 ,*(t) a by2 + 02
5 2 12 1 0(x 2 )2
y(T) - 0 0 for T-X,<t<T 1 bly0 < + B(b x02




that for R - iR(R-l) < 6 < 1
(a) P4(P0 > P 0(PO) for all p0 E {D(C ) n D(C4)
(b) P5 (P ) > PI(P ) for all PO E {D(C 1 ) n D(C5 ),
(c) Ps(p 0 ) > PI(P0) for all P0 E {D(C ) n D(C )}.
It may also be shown that D(C4 ) n D(C5 ) = 0, D(C4) n D(C5 ) = 0, and
D(C n D(C•) - 0, where 0 denotes the empty set. The above resultsD(5)5
(a) through (c) provide the basis for obtaining the optimal fire-distri-
bution policy shown in Table 8.VII from the extremals shown in Table 8.VI.
I Next, it seems appropriate to briefly discuss the extension of
the above simplest problem (8.10.1) to cases of more realistic break-
points, in particular, force-level breakpoints (see Section 2.8 and
Chapter 3). There are several different ways in which breakpoint consider-
ations can be incorporated into our combat model. The simplest way is
to consider X and X2 to be two different fighting units. If one
considers X and X2 as two different military units (each with its own
breakpoint), then we could invoke the natural extension of the simple
breakpoint model (2.8.12) of Section 2.8 and write for Y's attrition
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I-b X - bx for x>1 and x 21 11 221 B 2 >xBP
dv11 2
S-bX1 for x > x and x2 < x< , (8.10.6)dx111 B21 B
-b2x2 for x 1xl and x2 > 2p,
where 4 denotes the force-level breakpoint for X To mathematically
solve such a problem [i.e. (8.10.1) with Y's attrition rate replaced by
(8.10.6)] and determine the optimal fire-distribution policy, one considers
the battle to have different phases in each of which the appropriate right-
hand side of (8.10.6) holds. The determination of an optimal policy is now,
however, much more complicated than before (cf. TAYLOR [96, Appendix C])
and complete details have not been worked out. If one feels that a more
sophisticated breakpoint model is called for [e.g. the natural extension
of (3.10.10)], then the problem is analytically even less tractable.
However, for either modification, it is conjectured that the basic structure
of the optimal fire-distribution policy is not altered. Thus, the incor-
poration of more realistic breakpoints into the simplest fire-distribution
problem leads to a problem that is no longer analytically tractable but
that does not yield an optimal fire-distribution policy which is appreciably
different in structure than that for the simplest problem. However, the
computational solution of ths more complicated problem is facilitated
by the insights gained here for the simplest problem (8.10.1).
Finally, let us note that the very striking characteristic (Cl)
of an optimal fire-distribution policy of always concentrating all fire
on one enemy target type depends in an essential way on enemy target-type
attrition occurring at a rate proportional to the number of Y firers.
If the attrition of enemy target types is modelled by
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dxI dx 2d- t -0a xy, and d- -(l-)a 2x2 y , (8.10.7)
then 0* does not always have to be 0 or 1: it can sometimes be optimal
to divide one's fire between enemy target types (i.e. 0 < 0* < 1) for a




8.11. Optimal Control of LA.CHESTER-Type Attrition Processes.
Based on the intimate relationship between the mathematical
theories of optimal control and differential games (e.g. see HO (33-34]),
the author's research approach for investigating the optimization of
tactical decisions has been to consider one-sided 3 8 versions of time-
sequential tactical-allocation problems before tackling the more realistic
(and complex) two-sided tactical-allocation problems themselves. Our
intent has been to firmly establish both the theoretical 3 9 and computational
bases for solving such optimal-control problems before attempting to solve
the much more complex differential-game versions of these tactical-
allocation problems. This does not mean that the author does not recognize
that solutions to differential games have many unique aspects not possessed
by solutions to optimal-control problems (e.g. see ISAACS [47-48]), but
that in order to recognize such unique aspects and attendant special
difficulties, one must know and understand the optimization results for
these one-sided versions of tactical-allocation problems. As discussed
in TAYLOR [79, pp. 102-103], we have used such one-sided combat-optimization
results fir guiding extensions to LANCHESTER-type differential games
(see next section).
A number of variations on the simplest time-sequential fire-distribu-
tion problem (8.10.1) have consequently been examined by the author in
order to develop an understanding of how various factors (cf. Section 8.4)
influence the structure of optimal tactical decision making. These vari-
ations are listed in Table 8.VIII, with references being given as to where
such investigations have been reported in the literature (see also
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TABLE 8.VIII. Variations of the Simplest Fire-Distribution Problem
(8.10.1) that Have Been Examined to Provide Insights
Into the Optimal Control of LANCHESTER-Type Attrition
Processes.
(VI) Prescribed-duration versus figbt-to-the-finish battle-termination
conditions [79]
(V2) Time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients and replacements [79; 82]
(V3) n-versus-one combat [92, Appendix E; 79; 82]
(V4) Command and control aspects (97]
(V5) Heterogeneous-force FTIF attrition process [78-79]
(V6) Stochastic LANCHESTER-type attrition processes [98; 30]
(V7) Time-sequential fire-support allocation [89; 96]
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TAYLOR [92, pp. 59-64]). It should be pointed out that the author's work
[76, 84] on the simplest fire-distribution problem (8.10.1) has been
essential for guiding these extensions and establishing a framework for
interpreting and analyzing results on the structure of optimal time-
sequential fire-distribution policies. We will now briefly highlight this
work, usually providing a formulation of the optimal-control problem under
consideration.
In variation (Vl) (see TAYLOR [79]) of the simplest fire-distri-
bution problem (8.10.1), one replaces the stopping rule: "one side or
the other annihilated" by
with stopping rule: tf - T or one side or the other annihilated
at tf < T , (8.11.1)
where tf denotes the final battle time (i.e. the time at which the
engagement ends) and T denotes a specified time beyond which the battle
cannot last (see also TAYLOR [92, Appendix G]). We will refer to a battle
with the stopping rule (8.11.1) as a prescribed-duration battle [as
opposed to a terminal-control battle such as (8.10.1) that only ends by
the battle being steered to a given end-of-battle state]. In TAYLOR [79]
we found it convenient to summarize the variations (on the simplest fire-
distribution problem) considered there as shown in Table 8.IX, with
the above variation (Vl) denoted there as Problem 1 and the simplest
problem (8.10.1) as Problem 3. For the fire-distribution problem (8.10.1)
with stopping rule (8.11.1), i.e. a prescribed-duration battle, the
740
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TABLE 8.IX. Summary of Problems Considered in TAYLOR (79] to Study




W 4J 4 Ai 1
ww4.1 4.0
1 2 F C PD
2 2 F C TC
3 n F C PD
4 2 F V PD
5 2 FT C PD
EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS
Target-Type Attrition Process: F - attrition rate proportional to
uumber of firers only, FT - attrition rate proportional
to product of numbers of firers and targets
Attrition-Rate Coefficients: C - constant, V - variable
Battle-Termination Conditions: PD - prescribed-,duriatirn battle
(special casc of x1 , x2 , y ) 0), TC terminal-control
battle (fight to the finish)
, t 741
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optimal fire-distribution policy ** again turns out to be 0 or 1 for
at most one point in time, but now 0* depends on time t in addition
to the force levels, i.e. 0*(Problem 1) - 0*(t, xl, x 2, y), and this
dependence (see TAYLOR [92, Appendix G] for complete details) is much
40more complicated than for the terminal-control battle0. Again, let us
make the nonrestrictive assumption that R - aIb1 /(a 2 b2) > 1. We then
have shown (79] that for the special case in which 6 - a1 P/(a 2q) < 1
and x1 (tf), x2 (tf), and y(tf) > 0, the optimal fire-distribution policy
depends on the problem's battle-termination conditions (i.e. it may be
different for Problems 1 and 2). On the other hand, when 6 > 1, the
optimal fire-distribution policy is the same for both problems: namely,
* 1 as long as x > 0.
In analytical terms, we have for 64 alp/(a 2 q) < 1 and xl(tf)
and x2 (tf) > 0
S1 for 0 < t < t f-I,
1*t fo ~~f-(8.11.2)
0 for tf - T1 * t < tf
where 0*(t) denotes the optimal distribution of fire over time and
the backwards switching time T is given by
Ti(a) I 1 + z + a2 (8.11.3)
2 2
with z - (R - 6)/(R - 1). Thus, in this case with 6 < 1 an optimal
fire-distribution policy involves a switch from all fire concentrated
on X1 by Y to all on X2 when the initial force levels are such that
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neither enemy target type can be annihilated and the battle is scheduled
to last long enough, i.e. T > TI. Then the nature of the planning
horizon affects the optimal fire-distribution policy in the sense that
for the appropriate initial conditions in both problems [i.e. initial
force levels such that 4 1 at the battle's end x1 (tf) and x2 (tf ) > 0,
with also y(tf) > 0 in the prescribed-duration battle with tf - TI,
R - a1 b1 /(a 2b 2 ) > 1, 6 - aIp/(a 2q) < 1, and r > 0 (see TAYLOR (79,
pp. 86-87] for further details)
T1 (Problem 1) < T2 (Problem 2) . (8.11.4)
Furthermore, the optimal fire-distribution pclicy in the prescribed-
duration battle depends on an additional parameter
q Va 2
since the backwards switching time TI may depend on a, i.e. for
x1 (tf), x2 (tf), and y(tf) > 0
T (Problem 1) - a12  (8.11.5)
with Tl(a) given by (8.11.3). Let us also note that for xl(T) and
x2 (T) > 0 and y(T) - 0
743
T l(Problem 2) - T .(0) (8.11.6)
The fact that ai/aa < 0 for 6 < 1 and the above results (8.11.5) and
(8.11.6) lead to the conclusion (8.11.4). Finally, it should be noted
that this case (i.e. R - aIb1 /(a 2b2 ) > 1 and 6 - a1 P/(a 2 q) < 1] only
arises when Y values a unit of the X2 force out of proportion to its
kill rate against the Y force (i.e. too high) relative to that of one
of the X1  force, i.e. p/q < b /b 2 . In other words, the more dangerous
weapon-system type is valued less highly, e.g. a rifle is valued more
than a machine gun.
A typical problem along the lines of variation (V2) is given by
(see TAYLOR [79, pp. 97-99; 821)
maximize{ry(ff) - PXl(tf) - qx 2 (tf)}, (8.11.7)
* (t)
with stopping rule: tf . T or one side of the other annihilated
at tf < T,
dx1
subject to: d-t - -Oa 1 (t)y + rl(t)
(combat dynamics) dx 2
d--- -(1-0) a2 (t)y + r 2 (t)
S -b (t)Xl - b2 (t)x 2 + s(t)dt
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with
0 < 0 < 1 (Control-Variable-Inequality Constraints),
and
x and x 2 > 0 (State-Variable-Inequality Constraints).
Here (and henceforth) we have omitted statement of the initial conditions
for simplicity. Also, nonnegativity of a term like r 1 (t), r 2 (t), or
s(t) signifies a net continuous influx of replacements for the weapon-
system type corresponding to the force-level equation in which such a
term appears. This problem has been fairly extensively studied (79,
Problem 4; 82] under the assumption that
bi(t) - kb h(t) for i = 1, 2, (8.11.8)
which may be considered to have the physical interpretation that both
X-force weapon-system types have basically the same type of range capability,
but one weapon-system type dominates the other in exactly the same manner
at all ranges (cf. the model with range-dependent attrition-rate
coefficients in Section 6.2). When there are no replacements or with-
drawals (i.e. r 1 (t) W r 2 (t) W s(t) = 0) and the Y commander values
enemy survivors of each weapon-system type in direct proportion to their
kill rate against the Y force at the end of battle,43 i.e.
p - kbl(tf) and q - kb2 (tf) , (8.11.9)
then the optimal fire-distribution policy takes a very simple form
745
/
. . - - 4"••' • :i •• --
when x1 (tf) and x2 (tf) > 0, namely
( 1 for a1 (t) b1 (t) > a2(t) b 2 (t)
¢*(t) =(8.11.10)
0 for a1 (t) b1 (t) W < a2(t) b2 (t) (
Here, the term aI(t) b2 (t) may be interpreted as the rate of destruction
of the Xl-weapon-system-type kill rate against the Y force (see TAYLOR
[79] for further details). Thus, the Y force simply concentrates all
its fire on the enemy weapon-system type against which it can destroy
the weapon-system type's fire effectiveness (i.e. kill rate against Y)
more quickly. When there are continuous replacements, however, deter-
mination of an optimal policy is much more complicated, and certain
multiplier conditions (e.g. seeTAYLOR (77; 81]) corresponding to the
state-variable-inequality constraints (SVIC's) play an even more prominent
role: in particular, the multiplier corresponding to the terminal SVIC,
for example, x1(Lf) > 0 is restricted in sign only if r 1 (tf) > 0
(cf. (8.10.3) and see TAYLOR (81] for further details). Also, many of our
results in TAYLOR [82] (also [79, Problem 4]) have been based on our
knowledge about the conditions under which variable-coefficient FIF
attrition equations possess a simple analytical solution in terms of
elementary functions (see Section 6.5 for further details).
Another variation (V3) of the simplest fire-distribution problem




maximize~vi(tf d y w ix i t f} with T specified, (8.11.11)¢(t) i-i
dxi
subject to: - -¢iaiy for i = 1,2,..., n,
- - n) b x,dt
with
n
ni i, 0, ý 0, xiy > 0, and tf < Ti-i
A rather illuminating result (see TAYLOR (92, Appendix E; 82]) is that again
when the Y-force commander values surviving enemy weapon-system types in
direct proportion to their kill capabilities against the Y force, i.e.
Sw, - kbi for i - 1, 2, ... , n , (8.11.12)
then the optimal fire-distribution policy for Y is very simple:
always concentrate all fire on the available enemy target type for which
aibi is largest. When survivors are not valued in direct proportion
to their dangerousness against the Y force [i.e. when (8.11.12) does
not hold], then determination of an optimal policy may be quite involved
(see TAYLOR [79] for further details; also TAYLOR (92, Appendix GI).
A variable-coefficient version of (8.11.11) has been investigated in
TAYLOR [82], and results for the optimal distribution of fire shown to
resemble the constant-coefficient ones under the appropriate circumstances.
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A fourth variation (V4) on the simplest fire-distribution
problem (8.10.1) is to consider how command and control limitations on
the redistribution of fire influence the structure of optimal time-
sequential fire-distribution policies. In all the fire-distribution
problems so far considered, it has been assumed that Y's distribution
of fire against the heterogeneous X forces can instantaneously change
from one value to another, e.g. in the simplest fire-distribution problem
(8.10.1) the rate of change of the fraction 0 of Y's fire directed
at X is unrestricted and consequently can instantaneously change,
for example, from 0 to 1. In other words, we have been assuming that
the Y force can instantaneously change their distribution of fire
against enemy target-types at will. Command and control limitations,
however, may cause restrictions on how fast fire can be redistributed,
i.e. restrictions on the rate of change of 0*. Such command and
control aspects have been investigated with the following optimal-control
problem (see TAYLOR [97] for futher details)
maximize{ry(tf) - Px 1 (tf) - qx 2 (tf)} with T specified, (8.11.13)
dx1
subject to: d- _-alY
dx 2
dt2
-y -b x -b x
dt 1 1 2 2
dt
with
0< 1, X19x 2 , y>0, -R u<u RUP and tf T.
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Here RU and RL > 0 denote upper and lower bounds on the rate of change
of the distribution of fire. It has been shown [97] that such command
and control limitations on the redistribution of fire do not essentially
change the structure of the optimal fire-distribution policy, although
the shifting of fires is initiated earlier when command and control limita-
tions exist than when an entire force can instantaneously shift all its
fire from one target type to another. In other words, due to decreased
reaction ability a force must begin to change its distribution of fire
before target priorities actually change in anticipation of this coming
change.
A fifth variation (VS) (see TAYLOR [78; 791) concerns changing
the functional form of the Y force's attrition rate against each
enemy target type to the case in which such an attrition rate is propor-
tional to the product of the numbers of firers and targets. For simplicity
we have denoted this variation as "heterogeneous-force FTIF attrition."
The optimal-control problem corresponding to the prescribed-duration-
battle version of the simplest fire-distribution problem then reads
maximize{ry(tf) - Pxl(tf) - qx 2 (tf)} with T specified, (8.11.14)
*(t)
dx 1
subject to: d- '- -a 1 xly
dx 2
dt-- -(l-•)a 2 x2 y
d - _-blX - bx xdt 1 1 -
with
0 << 1, X1  x2 , y 2 0 , and tf < T.
(
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There is a fundamental difference between the structure of an optimal
fire-distribution policy for the simplest problem (8.10.1) and that
for the above problem (8.11.14): when enemy target types undergo an
"FT attrition process" (cf. Table 8.VIII), the optimal distribution of
fire does not consist of always (except for a finite number of points
in time) concentrating all fire on a single enemy target type. In
other words (cf. the optimal polizy described in Section 8.10 for the
simplest problem), **(t) may be other than 0 or I for a finite interval
of time (cf. the solutions for Problems 1 and 5 in TAYLOR 179!). The
maximum principle is no longer adequate, and the so-called theory of
singular extremals (see TAYLOR [78] for further information) is
required to solve the above optimal-control problem (8.11.14), with
ý* such that 0 < f* - a2 /(a 1 + a2 ) < 1 being the "singular control."
In this case the optimal fire-distribution policy depends directly on
the force levels (and possibly time). In TAYLOR [78] it was shown for
constant att:Ition-rate coefficients that no change ever occurs in
the ranking of target priorities when survivors of each X-force weapon-
system type are valued in direct proportion to their kill rate against
Y (i.e. p - kb1 and q - kb 2 ), and this important result is independent
of whether both X-force target types undergo an "F attrition process"
or an "FT attrition process."
We will now briefly examine tne above problem's optimal fire-
distribution policy expressed as a closed-loop cý,ntiol (see Section 8.12
below) and graphically exhibiLed in state-space-decision-rule diagrams. The
optimal time-sequential fire-distribimion policy for (8.11.14) in the case
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in which p/q - b1 /b 2  (i.e. enemy survivors valued in direct proportion to
their kill-rate capabilities) is graphically depicted in Figure 8.3. When
a1 b1 > a 2 b 2 x2 , the optimal policy is for Y to concentrate all fire
on X1. The line with equation a1bx1 - a2b2x2 (denoted as L in
Figure 8.3) is called a singular "surface" and divides the state space
into two different decision regions. When a force-level trajectory
reaches L, the optimal policy says that fire should be divided be.;ween
the two target types in such a way that the trajectory stays on L
(i.e. the singular control
* a2 (8.11.15)S=aI+ a2
is used to remain on the singular "surface"). Thus, when p - kb1  and
q - kb 2 , the optimal fire-distribution policy may be expressed very simply
1 for a1b 1xI > a2 b2x 2,
6*(x!,x 2) - aa2 /(a 1 + a2) for aIblx1 = a2 b2x2 , (8.11.16)
10 for a1 bIx1 < a2b 2x 2.
When enemy survivors of each weapon-system type are not valued in direct pro-
portion to their kill -atc against Y (e.g. p/q > b1 /b 2 ), the situation is
more complicated, with the battle being divided into two phases as far as de-
scribing the optimal fire-distribution policy is concerned. For the case in
which p/q > b1/b 2 , the optimal policy is graphically depicted in Figure 8.4.
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Figure 8.3. Optimal fire-distribution policy and corresponding
battle trajectories in the state space for heterogeneous-
force FTIF attrition process when surviving weapon-system
types art valued in direct proportion to their kill rates.
The optimal battle trajectories identified in this figure
are discussed in detail in TAYLOR [78, pp. 686-688].
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Figure 8.4. Optimal fire-distribution policy and corresponding
battle trajectories in the state space for heterogeneous-
force FTIF attrition process when surviving weapon-system
types are not valued in direct proportion to their kill
rates G(ere case in which p/q > bl/b 2 ). The optimal
battle trajectories identified in this figure are dis-
cussed in detail in TAYLOR [78, pp. 688-6901.
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For describing the cptimal fire-distribution policy, we divide the battle
into two time phases: Phase I for 0 < t < t and Phase II for
tI< t < T. During Phase I the optimal fire-distribution policy is again
given by (8.11.16), but during Phase II the optimal policy is given by
(cf. Figure 8.4)
( 1 for a1px 1 > a2qx 2,l@*(t,xl,x 2 ) - (8.11.17)
0 for alPX1 < a2 qx 2 .
Further details are to be found in TAYLOR [78].
At this juncture it seems appropriate for us to briefly make a few
remarks about how the functional form for the attrition rates of enemy
target types influcences the structure of an optimal fire-distribution
policy. In particular, we will compare the structure of an optimal time-
sequential fire-distribution policy when each enemy target type undergoes
an "F-type attrition process" (i.e. the attrition rate for each enemy
target type is proportional to only the number of friendly firers) to
that when each enemy target type undergoes an "FT-type attrition process"
(i.e. the attrition rate proportional to the product of the numbers of
firers and targets). As we have seen above in both the simplest fire-
distribution problem (8.10.1) and also the corresponding prescribed-
duration battle (Problems 1 and 2 of [79]), an optimal fire-distribution
policy when each enemy target type undergoes an F-type attrition process
consists of always concentrating all fire on a single enemy target type,
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while an optistal fite-distribution policy when each enemy target
type undergoes an VT-type attrition process as in (8.11.14) may
(depending on the densities of enemy t:arget types) sometimes involve
44dividixng one's fire between the two enemy target types4. In this latter
case, an optimal policy basically has the property that one concentrates
all fire on one target type until the relative number of enemy target
types reaches an equilibrium point, and fire is then divided between the
two target types. In essence, one must guard against "overkill" when
each enemy target type undergoes an FT-type attrition process (cf.
the optimal policies shown in Figures 8.3 and 8.4).
Moreover, there is a very simple principle that underlies all the
above results about the dependenc:e of the structure of an optimal fire-
distribution policy on the functional form for the attrition rates of
enemy target types: an optimal allocation policy involves concentration
of all effort on a single alternative when there are constant marginal
returns (measured in terms of kill rate) over time from each alternattve
4 5
and the total effort available is limited. Furthermore, constant marginal
return over time Is a basic property of an F-type target-type attrition
process. This important result is readily seen by considering the
attrition of, for example, X1  (with 1 - ) in (8.10.1), namely
dx,
( dt~ ' ( rate prof untenemy of ulte p roduced) (ll)y per unit of Y weapon system )
Thus, there is the same constant marginal return at any point in the
battle from the Y force allocating fire against a particular enemy
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target type when each undergoes an F-type attrition process. This
situation should be contrasted with the corrasponding one for an
FT-type enemy-target-type attrition process, i.e.
(-d-") irate of enemy casualties produced
y 1 alx per unit of Y weapon system (8.11.19)
In this latter case, however, the marginal return from allocating fire
diminishes over time as the X1 force level decays, and consequently
a division of total effort (i.e. allocation of fire) in an optimal policy
may be called for when the number of this particular target type is
sufficiently reduced. B. 0. KOOPMAN's (52] 1953 article on the optimal
distribution of effort contains an excellent discussion of such principles
that underlie an optimal allocation policy determined by such an
optimization problem (see also TAYLOR (79, pp. 84-85]).
Another important variation (V6) considers casualties to occur
randomly over time (see Chapter 4). TAYLOR and POWERS [98] have investigated
a stochastic version of variation (VI) above (i.e. Problem 1 of [79]) in
which casualties are assumed to follow stochastic LANCHESTER-type attrition
processes (see Chapter 4). They considered the following problem.
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maximize E[rN(tf) - PM1 (tf) - qM2 ((t)] with tf specified, (8.11.20)
subject to: casualties occur randomly as a continuous-time M1ARKOV
chain with stationary transition probabilities corre-
sponding to the deterministic heterogeneous-force
FIF attrition process (8.1.0.1),
with
M1 ' M2, N > 0 and 0 < 0 < 1.
Here 0 is taken to be a closed-loop control (see Section 8.12 below),
the integer-valued random variables Ml(t), M,(t), and N(t) denote the
X9 XV2 , and Y force levels, and E['] denotes mathematical expectation.
TAYLOR and POWERS [98] have concluded that the deterministic and stochastic
S versions of this time-sequential fire-distribution problem yield essen-
tially the same optimal policy, although the optimal policy followed by
Y in a realization of the stochastic combat process may differ appreciably
from that for the deterministic formulation if this realization does
not "follow the corresponding deterministic trajectory very closely."
Furthermore, HANNA [30] haag shown for a fight to the finish that con-
ditions do exist for which the deterministic and stochastic formulations
do not yield similar results at all for the optimal fire-distribution policy
for very small numbers of combatants.
Further variations [identified as (V7) in Table 8.VIII] on such
LANCHESTER-type deterministic optimal-control problems have been
investigated by TAYLOR [96] ar! TAYLOR and BROWN (89] within the context
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of time-sequential fire-support allocation. TAYLOR [96] has considered
10 variations on the same theme (i.e. a sequence of 10 closely related
fire-support problems), with some of these variants being investigated
much more thoroughly than others. This investigation exercises many of
the insights into the structure of optimal fire-distribution policies
discussed above. TAYLOR and BROWN [89] have shown that the structure
of such optimal policies depends not only on the functional form assumed
for target-type attrition rates (e.g. F or FT as shown in Table 8.IX)
but also on the quantification of military objectives. They have proven
the rather remarkable result for a given set of combat dynamics that
the splitting of the allocation of supporting fires between two enemy
forces in any optimal policy depends on whether the terminal payoff




8.12. LANCHESTER-Type Differential Games.
Military conflict provides the classical contextual framework
for game theory: two or more decision makers with conflicting objectives.
Moreover, combat models in general and LANCHESTER-type models in
particular provide a natural framework for formulating and analyzing
time-sequential games that reflect the antagonistic aspects of military
decision making. We will accordingly consider a couple of LANCHESTER-type
(as opposed to pursuit-evasion) differential games, which have provided
some important insights into normative aspects of the dynamics of combat.
A differential game is simply a time-sequential game (i.e. game in exten-
sive form [55]) in which the system dynamics are given by a system of
ordinary differential equations. Others have found it to be convenient
to think of a differential ýame as a two-sided optimal-control problem
(e.g. see _ HO(33]). By a LANCHESTER-type differential game we mean a
differential game in which the system dynamics are given by LANCHESTER-
type equations of warfare. It should be pointed out that essentially
all the early differential-game literature has concerned pursuit-
evasion problems (however, see ISAACS [46, pp. 96-104 and Chapter 111
for notable exceptions).
More precisely, we will consider LAN.CHESTER-type differential
games that are two-person zero-sum deterministic differential games in
which each player uses a closed-loop (or feedback) pure strategy with
perfect state information (see HO (34; 35) for a discussion of other
possibilities). In other words, each of the two decision makers has
his own (scalar) criterion functional which he seeks to maximize but
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which is in direct antagonistic conflict with his opponent's in the
sense that the two criterion functionals have a constant sum (which may
be taken to be zero) so that one person's loss is the other person's gain.
Each player (i.e. decision maker) is taken to have perfect information
about the system state and combat dynamics, but each does not know the
strategy of his opponent. Since a differential game is a game in exten-
sive form, a pure (as opposed to mixed) strategy (within the context of
perfect state information) is a decision rule for determining one's action
based on the current system state, i.e. a mapping of the state space into
the space of feasible actions at time t. Such a pure strategy for a
game in extensive form is also called a closed-loop (as opposed to
open-loop) strategy. Mathematically we may express the concept of a
closed-loop (or feedback) control as
uC - k(t,x) (8.12.1)
where uC denotes the closed-loop control (or strategy), t denotes time,
x denotes the state variables, and k denotes the given functional
relation (i.e. the decision rule). Equation (8.12.1) shows us that a
closed-loop strategy is a function of the current system state. On the
other hand, an open-loop control specifies one's action as a function of
time t and initial conditions t0 , xo. Thus, an open-loop control may
be mathematically expressed during the length of the planning horizon
for 0 < t < T as
u0 u(t; top x , (8.12.2)
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where u0 denotes the open-loop control (or strategy). For one-sided
deterministic optimal control problems, it is well known that open-loop
control and closed-loop control yield identical results both for the
system trajectory and also for the payoff, but this situation is not
true for differential games (e.g. see HO [35]). Consequently, one must
distinguish between open-loop and closed-loop strategies as we have done
here.
We will now give two examples of LANCHESTER-type differential
games. Although we will not present any solution details here, the selec-
tion of these examples has been influenced both by their analytical
tractability and also by the rignificance of insights that they provide
into optimizing time-sequential tactical decisions.
I
Example 8.12.1: Generalized Tactical Air-War Game. This problem is a
generalization of R. ISAACS's [46, pp. 96-104] tactical air-war game,
which apparently owes its origin to A. S. MENGEL (see [27]). It considers
a war between X and Y, each of which is composed of ground and air
forces. The progress of the ground war is mensured in terms of the
position of the contact zone between the opposing ground forces or FEBA
(Forward Edge of the Battle Area) (see Section 7.15 for further details).
Both X and Y have a single type of aircraft that can fly two types
of missions: (Ml) ground-support missions against the enemy's ground
forces to influence the outcome of the land war in terms of FEBA position,
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and (M2) counter-air missions which result in the shooting down of enemy
planes (but not direct help for the ground forces). The problem for each
of the two opposing cormanders is to find the "best" time-sequential
allocation of his aircraft to mission type according to the decision
criterion of the sum of the net residual value of surviving aircraft at
the end of the campaign (and measured with linear utilities) and the net
amount of value obtained from ground-support missions flown (and measured
in terms of the return from planes dropping ordnance on the FEBA). These
objectives of the opposing commanders are taken to be directly conflict-
ing (i.e. the two payoffs have a constant sum), and thus it suffices to
consider a single scalar payoff which one player seeks to maximize and
the other to minimize. Also, the air campaign is taken to last for a
prescribed length of time, denoted as T, and it is assumed that new
aircraft are introduced on both sides at constant rates. This situation
is shown diagramatically in Figure 8.5.
Mathematically the above two-sided combat-optimization problem
may be stated as follows.
maximize minimize{vx x(t t) - v y(tf
U V
tf
+ 0[RX(t)ux RY(t)vyldt}, (8.12.3)
0





TACTICAL x(ft) y(( t TACTICAL /"-
X FEBA Y~
A IRCRAFT / ) AIRCRAFT
RESIDUAL VALUE PER RESIDUAL VALUE PER
SURVIVING PLANE vxo( t) SURVIVING PLANE= Vy
I
Figure 8.5. Diagram of generalization of tactical
air-war game (8.12.3).
763
* rw~ - ~- -~J.-
dx
subject to: dT- r - (1 - v) a(t)y ,dt
(air-battle dynamics) dt s - (1 - u) b(t)x ,
dt
with initial conditions:
x(O) - x0  and y(O) -yO
and
0 < u, v < 1 (Strategic-Variable-Inequality Constraints),
x and y > 0 (State-Variable-Inequality Constraints),
where
x(t) and y(t) denote the numbers of X and Y aircraft
at time t,
a(t) and b(t) denote time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients
representing the effectiveness of aircraft in
shooting down enemy aircraft,
r and s > 0 denote constant replacement rates for each
side's aircraft,
vX and vy denote the values for each surviving X and Y
aircraft at the end of the campaign,
R(t) and RY(t) > 0 denote the time-dependent returns per unit
time obtained from flying an X &nd Y
ground-support missions,
u(t) and v(t) are strategic variables that denote the fractions
of X and I aircraft allocated to flying
ground-support missions at time t,




Here the strategic (or control) variables u(t) and v(t) are taken
46
to represent the outcomes (or realizations) of closed-loop strategies
e.g. u(t) - U(t,x,y). A further discussion of this model and its rather
long history is to be found in TAYLOR [94, Appendix B], and optimal air-
war allocation strategies for the above LANCHESTER-type differential
game are developed there, with complete details being worked out for the
special case of constant coefficients (see also TAYLOR [83]).
Example 8.12.2: Modified Fire-Support Differential Game. This problem
is a variation of Y. KAWARA's [51] fire-support differential game and con-
siders the attack of heterogeneous X forces against the static defense
of heterogeneous Y forces. Each side is composed of infantry and
artillery. The X infantry (denoted as X1 ) launches an attack against
the position of the Y infantry (denoted as Y1 ). We will consider
only the battle's "approach-to-contact" phase that lasts from the start
of the advance of the X1 forces against the Y1 defensive position
until contact is made between them. It is assumed that this latter time
is fixed and known to both sides. Using "cover and concealment," the
X1 forces begin their advance against the Y1  forces from a distance
and move towards the Y position. Small-arms fire by the X1 forces
is held at a minimum to facilitate their movement, and hence the effective-
ness of XI's fire "on the move" will be assumed to be negligible against
YI" Since the X forces are so far away from the defenders, Y1
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is assumed to use "area fire" against the attacking X1 forces. During
this "approach to contact," the fire-support units (i.e. each side's
artillery) remain stationary and deliver either counterbattery fire
against enemy artillery or "area fire" against the enemy's infantry.
By virtue of its defensive posture, the Y force obtains better informa-
tion about the location of the X fire-support units, and hence Y2
can deliver "aimed counterbattery fire" against X2 , but X2 can only
return "area counterbattery fire" against Y2 " It is the objective of
each side to attain the most favorable infantry force ratio possible at
the end of the "approach to contact" at which time "hand-to-hand" combat
occurs between the two infantries and consequently artillery fire can
no longer be directed at the enemy's infantry for safety reasons. The
decision problem facing each side is to determine the "best" time-sequential
distribution of artillery fire in order to maximize the infantry force
ratio at the time of "hand-to-hand" contact between the two infantries.
Again, the objectives of the two opposing commanders are taken to be
directly conflicting, and thus it suffices to consider a single scalar
payoff which one player seeks to maximize and the other to minimize. This
situation is shown diagramatically in Figure 8.6.
Mathematically the above two-sided combat-optimization problem
may be stated as follows.
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u v lY 1 (tf) (8.12.4)
with stopping rule: tf - T - 0
subject to: d- I - va1 2 xlY2







Xi(0) - X and y(0) - y for i- 1,2,
and
0 < u, v < 1 (Strategic-Variable-Inequality Constraints),
xl, x2 ' yI' and y2 > 0 (State-Variable-Inequality Constraints),
where
x (t) and yl(t) denote the numbers of X and Y infantry
at time t,
x2(t) and y2 (t) denote the numbers of X and Y artillery
at time t,




u(t) and v(t) are strategic variables that denote the
fraction of X and Y artillery fire allocated
against opposing infantry forces,
and tf denotes the final "approach-to-contact" time.
Again, the strategic (or control) variables u(t) and v(t) are reali-
zations of closed-loop strategies, e.g. u(t) - U(t, xl, x2, y,' y 2 ).
A further discussion of this model and its history is to be found in
TAYLOR [86], and optimal fire-support strategies for the above LANCHESTER-
type differential game are developed there.
I
Other LANCHESTER-type differential games (besides those found in
ISAACS' book [46]) have been studied by WEISS [103], CHATTOPADHYAY
[19; 20], INTRILIGATOR [42], MOGLEWER and PAYNE [60], KAWARA [51], STERNBERG
[751, and TAYLOR [80; 85]. These differential games are generally only
partially solved, with a lot of work usually producing only rather meager
results. It should also be finally noted that a number of closely related
discrete-time-sequential games have been investigated by both analytical
ýuid also computational means (e.g. see FULKERSON and JOHNSON [251,
BELLMAN and DREYFUS [81, BERKOVITZ and DRESHER [11-131, PUGH [68],




Based on our studies of the optimization of combat dynamics [76-981
using generalized control theory, we have learned the following:
(A) The structure of optimal time-sequential combat strategies
depends on all the following five factors:
(1) the decision criteria,
(2) th" battle-termination model,
(3) the combat-operations model,
(4) the feasible actions for each decision maker,
and (5) the information available to each decision maker.
The dependence is complex, and future research should concentrate
on simplified models of tactical interest to explore further how optimal
strategies depend on these factors.
(B) Force levels always effect optimal combat strategies.
The dependence may be indirect, however, through who
"wins" and "loses."
(C) The quantification of combatant objectives affects optimal
combat strategies. The most important planning decision
is whether to seek a "local" military advantage or an
"overall" one.
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(D) The time-sequential nature of target effects has a significant
influence on optimal fire-support strategies. Furthermore,
optimization of fire-support strategies should be based on
ground-support objectives.
(E) It may be quite dangerous to generalize optimal time-
sequential combat strategies from specific problems.
More research shotlid be done on better understanding the
qualifications that should be placed on such specific
results.
The above insights are illustrative of those salient features
about optimizing tactical decisions that we have uncovered in our work.
A further discussion about insights gained into the optimization of combat
dynamics may be found in TAYLOR [92, pp. 61-64; 94, pp. 8-9; 96, pp. 12-15],
where a discussion about the implications of such results for defense
planners is also contained. Although all these insights have been
developed within the context of specific problems, most of the properties
of the structure of an optimal time-sequential combat strategy appear
to be of general applicability. As we have stressed ir. the introduction
to this chapter, such insights into the structure of optimal combat
strategies are probably the only significant result obtained from this
work, since the underlying mathematical models are such idealizations of
the (rational) decision-making process in force-on-force combat operations.
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8.14. Role of Optimization in Decision Analysis for Tactical Military
Decisions
Here we will make a few final comments about considering such combat-
optimization problems in the quantitative study of tactical (as opposed to
strategic) decision making. These remarks are meant to stimulate further
thought and discussion, rather than providing any final definitive
answers.
The author feels that the most important current issue is to
determine the role of normative models in tactical decision analysis.
What exactly is the role of optimization in tactical military decision
making? Optimization problems arising from the modell.'ng of tactical
decision making with any degree of realism in the modelling of combat are
too large scale for even contemporary computing capabilities. If we
cannot optimize the detailed simulated system, what should we do? The
interchange of ideas between military gaming (e.g. see SHUBIK [721;
an excellent reference is still THOMAS and DEEMER [101]) and combat
optimization (as outlined above) needs to be stimulated. In particular,
mathematical programmers involved in such work should become more aware
of the analysis and modelling of combat operations, since they give
special structure to such optimization problems. The modelling of such
complex systems necessarily must precede system optimization, and the
author views the latter as but an extension of the former.
As we have stressed in the past (see TAYLOR [79]), more work
sh uld concentrate on developing exact optimal solutions to "approximate"
models of combat operations in orier to develop a better Lnderstanding of
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how to really improve tactical decision making (both iii the model world
and also in the real world). After all, the purpose of combat optimization
is insight, not numbers.
4 7
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 8
1. This chapter is an expansion upon TAYLOR [87, pp. 778-779 and pp. 7o3-801].
It is also partially based on portions of the author's unpublished paper
"Survey on the Optimal Control of Lanchester-Type Attrition Processes,"
presented at the Symposium on the State-of-Lhe-Art of Mathematics in
Combat Models, June 1973 (available in report from as TAYLOR [931).
2. More precisely, generalized control theory is the mathematical theory of
optimizing the performance of a dynamic system (see Section 1.6 above for a
discussion of the concept of a dynamic system). The term "3eneralized
control theory" was apparently first coined by Y. C. HO 1341 in 1969
(see also HO [35]). It includes both deterministic and stochastic oprimal
control, dynamic programming, and differential games (see HO [34] for furtier
details).
3. Actually, these "decision variables" are really decision functions, since
they are functions defined on some time interval (e.g. 0 - p(r) for
0 < t < T). The term decision variable is probably used in analogy with
the term state variable, which also evolves dynamically over time.
4. See TAYLOR [76-88], TAYLOR and BROWN [89], TAYLOR [91-97], and TAYLOR
and POWERS [98] for documentation of the author's research on the structure
of optimal time-sequential combat strategies.
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5. These operational combat models have been discussed (including the nature
and availability of documentation about them) ii, Section 1.3 above (see
also Section 7.1).
6. For the mathematical modelling of rational choice under conflict of interests,
see LUCE and RAIFFA (551 or SHUBIK [721. For an excellent investigation of
methodology for determining how people actually make decisions in a non-
c..nflicting environment (i.e. no conflict of interests), see WILCOX [104].
7. Such a one-sided time-sequential optiidzation problem is called an optimal-
control problem. Relatively recent mathematical interest (and also that
of other scientists and technolgists) in optimal-control theory stems
from the work of PONTRYAGIN and his associates on the mathematical theory
of optimality couditions for such problems (e.g. see PONTRYAGIN et al.
(67]; see also HESTENES [32]).
8. We are using here the word strategy to denote a game-theoretic strategy,
i.e. a completely specified plan of action which covers all contingencies
(e.g. see SHUBIK [72, p. 42]). We then use the word policy to denote a
"strategy" in a one-sided optimization (or optimal control) problem, i.e.
a control. In military circles, the word strategy has a different meaning,
the plans for conducting a war in the widest sense including diplomatic,
political, and economic considerations as well as those of a purely
military nature (31] (see also LUTTWAK [56, p. 183]). One then uses the
word tactics to refer to the method employed by a commander to implement
( his strategic plan [31] (see also (56, p. 199]).
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9. Here we are using the words strategy and tactics as usually used by military
planners and not in the game-theoretic sense (see Footnote 8 above).
10. See WEISS (103] for a brief discussion of the distinction between a "primary"
weapon system (e.g. tnfantry) and a "supporting" weapon system (e.g.
artillery, tactical aircraft, etc.).
11. For an excellent general discussion of the modelling of tactical decisions
for use in combat models, see ANDERSON (1].
12. It is beyond the scope of this monograph to give a detailed treatment of
war gaming, but we will attempt here to outline some further reading for
those who are interested. Excellent introductions are afforded by PAXSON
[66] (a brief introduction) and McHUGH [57] (a longer introduction
which includes a historical summary) (see also SHUBIK [72]). For a very
readable and informative popular account of war gaming, see WILSON's
book [105], which apparently draws heavily on McHUGH's work [57]. A very
thorough historical summary (unfortunately, only through the late 1950's) is
YOUNG (107]. For other excellent accounts of operational gaming and its
role in military OR, see THOMAS and DEEMER [101] and THOMAS [99; 100].
Although somewhat dated, the references [99-101] are still an excellent
introduction to gaming, probably still the best technical one in the
military field. Other more recent accounts are by SHEPHARD [ 7 1j, ARCHER
and BYRNE [4], SHUBIK [72], and especially (74]. P. BRACKEN [16] has
discussed through some very interesting historical case studies some
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very subtle difficulties in the use of war-gaming results. SHUBIK's
book [72] not only provides an excellent general introduction to gaming
but also gives an important comparison between game theory and behavioral
theories (see [72, pp. 156-166]), which has had a significant impact on
our own thinking (e.g. see TABLE 8.1 in Section 8.2). BREWER and SHUBIK
[171 have concentrated on the professional and organizational environments
for war gaming in the United States and have made a number of critical
recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of war gaming in solving
defense problems. However, little attention is given to combat-modelling
aspects. For some European accounts of war gaming, the reader should
consult SHEPHARD (71], WOLF [106], NIEMEYER [62], and especially HUBER,
NIEMEYER, and HOFMANN [41]. The latter book [41] probably provides the
best view of modern German thought on this important topic. Other related
references on the general topic of operational gaming are to be found
in the Notes and References for Chapter 1. Finally, let us note that
SHUBIK and BREWER [73, p. 8] (discussing gaming more generally) have
stressed that "the amount of publicity given free-form, political-diplomatic-
military games has been enormously disproportionate to the financial and
intellectual investments in them. Popular accounts aside (such as [105]),
research on the intellectual foundations and used of this type of work
has been negligible." Unfortunately, these statements are even more
true about war gaming.
777
13. We are using here the term "simulation' in its broadest sense (cf.
the simulation types shown in Figure 1.1).
14. An abbreviated version of this list first appeared in TAYLOR (93, p. 3]
(and later TAYLOR [94, p. 8; 96, p. 12]), where such a factorization of
a time-sequential combat-optimization problem was first discussed (see
also TAYLOR [85; p. 507]). In our work we have stressed the importance
of this conceptual factorization for tactical decision analysis, but
others have not yet apparently appreciated our point of view.
15. Here we mean that fire is exchanged between the two opposing forces
("bullets fly in both directions") but that only one side is faced with
a fire-distribution-optimization problem.
16, One simply orders a report from NTIS according to its so-called
"AD-number," e.g. TAYLOR (96] would be referred to as AD A033 761.
17. Other such lists of factors influencing opitmal fire-distribution
strategies may be found in TAYLOR [92, p. 2; 93, p. 2; 96, p. 31.
18. See Footnote 8 above.
19. See HO [34; 35] for a discussion of generalized control theory (in
particular, various generic types of dynamic optimization problems).
Further information about optimal-control theory may be found in
PONTRYAGIN et al. (67], HESTENES [32], ATHANS and FALB [5], and BRYSON and
HO [18], which are standard references (see also BELL and JACOBSON (7]).
Further information about differential games, may be found in
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ISAACS (46], BERKOVITZ [9; 10], and FRIEDMAN [24] (see also BRYSON
and HO (18, Chapter 9] and PARTHASARATHY and RAGHAVAN [65]). A very
readable general introduction to all these topics is afforded by
INTRILIGATOR [43].
20. Here (as elsewhere in this chapter) one-sided (as opposed to two-sided)
optimization problem means that there is only one (as opposed to two
with conflicting objectives) decision maker. We may think of such a
situation as arising because the combat strategy for one of the two
opposing commanders has been previously determined. Hence only one
player's combat strategy remains to be optimized.
21. Extension to cases with replacements and/or withdrAwals is discussed in
TAYLOR [88, p. 1121.
22. Since our combat model is deterministic, in principle we car always
determine who will win before the battle is actually fought.
23. As we saw for an FIF attrition process in Section 6.6, it is not
generally true that such a single unique initial-force-level value
exists (cf. also Section 2.9). Consequently, we are implicitly assuming
here that the combat dynamics are such that it does.
24. The result (8.9.4) was not explicitly given by TAYLOR (88], but it is
implicit in his developments.
7
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25. Here we mean that more effort should be spent on developing scientifically
valid (see HUBER, LOW, and TAYLOR [40]) models of conflict termination
because of the sensitivity of analysis results to such models.
26. As discussed in Section 8.4 above, such perfect information is usually
assumed for combat-optimization problems. Thus, we are well within the
current state of the art to assume such perfect information.
27. See HO [34; 35]; also INTRILICATOR [43, p. xiii]. For an introduction
to the literature of optimal-control theory, see Footnote 19 above.
28. For example, one could test the capability of a computational approach
like LAGRANGE dynamic programming (see PUGH (68]) on a discrete-time
version of this problem.
29. Such optimality conditions may be found in, for example, the references
on optimal-control theory mentioned in Footnote 19.
30. By an extremal we mean a trajectory on which the necessary conditions
of optimality are satisfied. An extremal control law is then used to
denote the policy followed in order to instantaneously satisfy these
necessary conditions and is usually determined by considering the maximum
principle. An extremal policy, of course, may not turn out to be an
optimal policy.
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31. By the domain of controllability for a given terminal state we mean that
subset of the initial state space from which extremals lead to the
terminal state (see TAYLOR [76, pp. 542-543] for further details).
32. This first characteristic is a consequence of Y causing attrition to
Xi at a rate proportional to only the number of firers. It is not true
in general (see TAYLOR [78; 791 and Section 8.11 below).
33. Except when 6 - R - /R(R - 1), the optimal fire-distribution policy is
unique.
34. It should be noted that for R > 1 we have 0 < 1 - 1/R < 1.
35. From the relation y - -1 + 6/R, we readily see that -(l - l/R) < y
if and only if 1 < 6, - /1 - I/R 7y < -(l - i/R) if and'only if
R - IR(R - 1) < 6 < 1, and -1 < y < - /1 - I/R if and only if
0 < 6 < R - R(R - 1)
36. The author has developed theoretical results along this line, i.e. boundary
conditions for the dual variables (see TAYLOR [81]).
37. See also the discussion in TAYLOR [93, pp. 22-23].
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38. Here (as elsewhere in this chapter) one-sided (as opposed to two-sided)
optimization problem means that there is only one (as opposed to two with
conflicting objectives) decision maker. A game may then be considered
to be a two-sided optimization problem. Such a one-sided time-sequential
optimization problem is also frequently called an optimal-control problem
(see also Footnotes 7 and 20 above).
39. Some new facets of optimal-control theory have been uncovered by these
investigations, and consequently a couple of contributions (TAYLOR [77;
81]) have been made to the control-theory literature (see also
TAYLOR [831).
40. We have already seen above in Section 8.10 that for the fight to the finish
(8.10.1) the optimal fire-distribution policy depends on only the force
levels and not on tire, i.e. ý*(Problem 2) - ý*(Xl,X29Y).
0 0
41. In other words, x1, x2 , and y0  are such that x(T) and x2 (T) > 0
but y(T) - 0 in the terminal-control battle (8.10.1), but that they
are such that x1 (tf), x2 (tf), and y(tf) > 0 with tf - T in the
prescribed duration battle. Such conditions for the initial force levels
are given in TAYLOR [92, Appendix G] for the prescribed-duration battle
and in TAYLOR [76; 84] for the fight to the finish (8.10.1) (see also
Table 8.VII above).
42. Here (as elsewhere) one also makes the physically realistic assumption
that p, q, and r > 0.
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43. By virtue of (8.11.8), at any giveii point during the battle will
suffice.
44. In our discussion here we are assuming two enemy ta-get types. Extension
of these remarks to an arbitrary number of enemy target types proceeds
in the obvious manner.
45. Here we mean that the marginal return from firing at a particular enemy
target type does not change over time due to the decrease in the number
of that target type.
46. Such a distinction plays an essential role in the development of the
basic necessary conditions of optimality for such a differential game
(e.g. see TAYLOR (84; 95, Appendix A]).
47. As we have discussed in Section 8.5, GEOFFRION (261 has suggested a similar
conceptual approach of ustng a simple auxiliary model to generate tentative
hypotheses to be tested in a full-scale operational model and thus to
provide guidance for further computerized higher-resolution investigations.
We also have felt (see TAYLOR [79]) that the use of relatively simple
auxiliary models in conjunction with complex operational models has much
to offer for the analysis of military operations (see also NOLAN and
SOVEREIGN [63]). In fact, this has been the hypothesis upon which all our
research has been based.
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APPENDIX F: COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRA"HY ON THE
LANCHESTER THEORY OF COMBAT
1. Introduction.
This appendix contains a comprehensive bibliography on the LANCHES-
TER theory of combat, i.e. organized knowledge concerning some aspect of
a LANCHESTER-type paradigm. Its objective is to provide the interested
reader with relevant and available information concerning LANCHESTER-type
combat models for further independent research. It should be of use to
OR researchers and other readers of this monograph who wish further more-
detailed information.
It seems appropriate to define our terms a little more precisely
here in order to better communicate to the reader exactly what type of
information he can expect to find in these references. First of all, the
reader should be aware that any theory about military combat is more
speculative than scientific because of the essential absence of histori-
ca] combat data (see Section 7.22 for further details), and the LANCHES-
TER theoty of combat (taken here to mean organized knowledge concerning
some aspect of a LANCHESTER-type paradigm) is no exception. By the term
LANCHESTER-type paradigm we mean a lucid simple example of the approach
of using differ2ntial equations to model the force-on-force combat-
attrition process. The term tLheora itself involves a number of subtle-
ties: it turns out that. a technically precise definition of the term
theory is somewh!- complicated and no such definition is apparently univer-
sally accepted (e.g. see ACKOFF [1, pp. 22-23], CAMPBELL (51, or
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BUNGE [4]). Thus, we will not precisely define the term theory, and
all this bibliography promises is further information about some aspect
concerning the models and topics studied in this monograph.
2. Nature and Scopc of This Bibliography.
This bibliography is a comprehensive list of unclassified refer-
ences on the LANCHESTER theory of combat. It is primarily composed of
journal articles to which the author has selectively added some company
and agency reports, The author has personally reviewed and has a copy
cf each entry, particularly of industrial reports. Internal publica-
tions that duplicate open literature publications have been specifically
not included. To the best of the author's knowledge, the list of open-
literature publications is complete. Finally, this bibliography is
more than a synthesis and integration of the references cited in the
individual chapters of this monograph, since additional references that
for one reason or another would have been inconvenient to cite in some
chapter have been included here. Thus, this bibliography should be
taken as the most up-to-date list of LANCHESTER literature contained in
this monograph.
The criteria for inclusion of references that are not journal
articles have been relevance and availability. The author has given
preference to citing those documents that an interested reader would
have a good chance in obtaining. In particular, three good sources of
"internal" publications are the National Technical Information Service
(NTIS), University Microfilms International, and The RAND Corporation,
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for which complete mailing addresses are as follows:
1. National Technical Information Service
U.S. Department of Commerce
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, Virginia 22151
2. University Microfilms International
P.O. Box 1764
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
3. The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California 90406
Documents available through NTIS are identified by their so-called
"AD number."
References have been narrowly limited to only those that consider
some aspect concerning LANCHESTER-type combat models themselves. The
closely related topic (at least from the standpoint of combat modelling)
of stochastic duels has been omitted, except for a few papers that show
relationships to Lanchester-type combat models. The reader who is
interested in stochastic duels is directed to the comprehensive, exhaus-
tive, and fully annotated bibliography on one-cn-one stochastic duels by
C. ANCKER [3] or his earlier comprehensive review of developments in the
theory of stochastic duels in general [2]. Likewise, references pertain-
ing to Monte Carlo simulation of combat and war gaming have been omitted.
Finally, literature concerning differential-equation models of conflict (as
opposed to combat. itself) such as RICHARDSON-type models of arms races
(e.g. see ZINNES [17]) has also not been considered here. (The interested
reader will find an introduction to this closely allied literature in
MOLL and LUEBBERT [10].)
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3. Its Origins.
It may be of interest for the reader to know how the present bibli-
ography has evolved, especially since its predecessors have apparently
influenced the work of others in ways that may not be readily apparent.
The author's 1970 report (12] on applications of differential games to
tactical-allocation problems already contained the nucleus of a litera-
ture review on the LANCHESTER theory of combat. Further references were
subsequently collected, and a M.S. thesis that gave a comprehensive lit-
erature review was directed (see HALL [8]). This work took DOLANSKY's
[7] 1964 review article as its point of departure. Subsequently, the
author prepared in December 1972 a selected bibliography [13] (60 refer-
ences), which was distributed to students in combat-modelling courses at
the Naval Postgraduate School, and any other interested parties upon
request. Here the author followed the policy (which he still does) of
citing only those references that he had personally reviewed.
It was then the author's good fortune to be invited by the Military
Applications Section (MAS) of the Operations Research Society of America
(ORSA) to deliver a "tutorial" ertitled "LANCHESTER-Type Models of War-
fare" at the 46th National ORSA Meeting on Thursday, October 17, 1974 in
San Juan, Puerto Rico. A revised selected bibliography [14] (82 refer-
ences) was consequently prepared in September 1974 and distributed at the
"tutorial" and afterwards. This tutorial was repeated at the 35th Mili-
tary Operations Research Symposium in July 1975, and the bibliography had
by this time grown to 89 references. By the time of the appearance of
the author's MAS monograph Force-on-Force Attrition Modelling (161 in
January 1980, this selected bibliography of primarily journal articles
47
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had evolved into a comprehensive bibliography of 151 references. Subse-
quent work on the monograph at hand has led to the comprehensive bibliog-
raphy presented in this appendix.
4. Other Bibliographies.
There are a number of other bibliographies that may be worthwhile
for the interested reader to consult. DOLANSKY's [7] 1964 survey paper
contains a fairly comprehensive bibliography (51 references) of material
published through 1962. In this respect, the Ph.D. theses of CLARK [6]
and SPRINGALL [111 are worthwhile to consult, especially concerning sto-
chastic LANCHESTER-type combat models. A comprehensive bibliography
(180 references) of material published up to 1980 has recently been pub-
lished by HAYSMAN and MARTAGY [9]. It should be borne in mind, however,
that different criteria have apparently been used for including refer-
ences in these various bibliographies. It may be of interest for the
combat modeller to examine similar material on arms races and other com-
petitive aspects of international relations, especially RICHARDSON-type
(i.e. differential-equation) models of arms races. In this respect, the
book by ZINNES [17] is very readable and contains a fairly comprehensive
bibliography concerning such allied work, and the recent survey article
by MOLL and LUEBBERT [101 (containing 127 references) is highly
recommended.
5. A Solicitation.
The author would be grateful to receive information concerning any
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additions, omissions, or corrections to this bibliography. Such material
would be incorporated into any future versions of this work.
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